Gazing in the Congo (DRC): the dark heart of Africa (2006-2017)

[Stan]

M-A, Salut !

Why do we continue to have peace agreements and ceremonies in the DRC when we know that a signature means absolutely nothing ?

Speaking to reporters after the meeting, the Secretary-General said the UN has done its utmost to broker an agreement that can finally break the horrendous cycles of violence. “The onus is now on the signatories to show strong, consistent and sustained leadership.”

Do we really believe that an African leader's signature and word translates into a brokered (and binding) agreement ? Even then, the current leader rarely speaks for the remainder of the clan. Probably why Mobutu resided over 1,000 miles away from Kinshasa - knowing his reign on authority was limited to payday festivities

I'm happy to see that the Intervention Brigade is not reliant on the Congolese Army. I only wonder what their mandate is, as previous versions did not prevent rape, pillage and plunder regardless of UN personnel numbers, helicopters, etc.

[M-A Lagrange]

I'm happy to see that the Intervention Brigade is not reliant on the Congolese Army. I only wonder what their mandate is, as previous versions did not prevent rape, pillage and plunder regardless of UN personnel numbers, helicopters, etc.

Hello Stan,

Well, the interrest of that new peace agreement frame work is that it is supposed to have benchmarks. Meaning if they do not enforce the peace and stability, countries of the Great Lakes (including DRC) will have to face sanctions.
Now the issue is to know what sanctions they could face...

To answer dirctly to your question about the intervention brigade mandate: they do not have a mandate for the momment and several key players in MONUSCO are quite against it. Why? Because such brigade means they would have to make war... And they were in DRC to do tourism!

I think this new agreement is a good thing as most of the countries of Central and Southern Africa are quite tired of the Great Lakes mess and are arknowledging that it is not just a DRC problem but rather a sub-regional problem. DRC is the country which has to do reforms and progress immediatly but its troubeling neigbours must too on a mid term (3 to 4 years from now).

And let say: if this is the solution for having at least "stability" and a extremly low unrest in Eastern DRc without external interferences... I go for it.
But this means real benchmarks and a new anti armed groups strategy based on CT rather than COIN in a country where government does not want functional administration and institutions. This coupled with a decentralised grass root approch to prevent conflict at communities level.

[M-A Lagrange]

For those who follow DRc since the begining, it makes 10 years, at least, we are following Bosco Ntaganda war criminal records.
And today he is seeking asilum in US embassy in Kigali to be turned to ICC.

U.S. confirms Bosco Ntaganda turned himself in at U.S. Embassy in Kigali
The U.S. State Department confirmed on Monday that Rwandan-born former Congolese General Bosco Ntaganda, wanted by the International Criminal Court for suspected war crimes in Congo, has given himself up at the U.S. Embassy in Kigali.

http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/...92H0T620130318
(There is no eah super big happy smily)

The question now is: when will the US do what they advocate for: turn Bosco Ntaganda to ICC so he can be hold accontable for his crimes:
- enlistment of children under 15
- conscription of children under 15
- active use of children under 15 as combattants during hostilities,
- murder
- persecution over civilians
- pillaging

And that's only the crimes he is wanted for!

[Stan]

M-A,
Indeed good news for the entire region !

According to a State Department press briefing yesterday, the USG intends to honor Bosco's request

QUESTION: Okay. More importantly, there are reports that a Rwandan-born, former Congolese general, Bosco Ntaganda, has turned himself in to the U.S. Embassy in Kigali. Is there any truth to that?

MS. NULAND: I can confirm that this morning Bosco Ntaganda, an ICC indictee and leader of one of the M23 factions walked into U.S. Embassy Kigali. He specifically asked to be transferred to the ICC in The Hague. We’re currently consulting with a number of governments, including the Rwandan government, in order to facilitate his request.

QUESTION: Is it your anticipation then, following his request, that he will, indeed, be transferred to the ICC?

MS. NULAND: Again, that’s what he’s asked for. We want to facilitate that request. As you know, we strongly support the work that the ICC is doing to investigate the atrocities committed in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and we are going to continue to work with the ICC in this matter.

QUESTION: There’d be no obstacle from your side then to transferring him to the ICC?

MS. NULAND: As I said, we’re working to facilitate the request that he has made.

[carl]

M-A and Stan:

Why did he turn himself in? I imagine that somebody was going to kill him if he didn't so jail was preferable. But who was after him?

[Stan]

Carl,
I can only speculate but based on what is already in print about him, “not very well liked nor educated, and feared by most locals”, I would agree with you and better to hang out in The Hague and peacefully eat 3 squares a day on the UN.

He was only ever a leader of a splintered group and you know as well as we do, that the DRC is no place to be hungry and hunted. Similar to General Mahélé in the 90’s, Bosco would end up being eaten by his own.

Most would argue that the Zaire we know is long gone. I beg to differ and see very little change.

Regards, Stan

[M-A Lagrange]

Carl,

The "mystery" of Bosco Ntaganda redition will come to light with time. What seems already proven is that someone was waiting for him in Rwanda when he crossed the border.
The Congolese have been accusing Rwanda to host Bosco as soon as Saturday.

Rwanda denies hosting rebel sought by ICC

Rwandan Foreign Minister Louise Mushikiwabo dismissed allegations by DR Congo government spokesman Lambert Mende who had said that Mr Ntaganda had crossed into Rwanda.

http://www.africareview.com/News/Rwa...c/-/index.html

Now it is repeated at will in the news papers, under anonyma, that Bosco feared for his life in Rwanda.

Report offers clues to warlord’s sudden surrender at U.S. Embassy

“I’m sure he was much more scared of us than the [US] embassy because he has caused some friction,” a senior Rwandan military official told the FT, adding that he believed Gen Ntaganda feared for his life. “The information we had consistently coming from his people was that he was heading deeper and deeper into the forest but that was a deception to our intelligence.”

http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/...t-u-s-embassy/

I let you make up your mind, knowing Rwanda psyops/desinformation capacities.

The real question is what Rwanda will do with the other 500 to 700 M23 rebel fighters who entered Rwanda when Bosco was defeated by the Makenga wing.
For memories, they are war criminals under UN sanctions too.

[jmm99]

...plus a change, plus c'est la meme chose...

Not Lady Gaga ...

... These Benguelas presently broke, and turned their backs, and a very great number of them were slain, and were taken captives, man, woman and child. The prince, Hombiangymbe, was slain, which was ruler of this country, and more than one hundred of his chief lords, and their heads presented and thrown at the feet of the great Gaga. The men, women and children that were brought in captive alive, and the dead corpses that were brought to be eaten, were strange to behold.
...
There were in the camp of the Gagas twelve captains. The first, called Imbe Calandola, their general, a man of great courage. He warreth all by enchantment, and taketh the Devil's counsel in all his exploits. He is always making of sacrifices- to the Devil, and doth know many times what shall happen unto him. He believeth that he shall never die but in the wars. There is no image among them, but he useth certain ceremonies. He hath straight laws to his soldiers : for, those that are faint-hearted, and turn their backs to the enemy, are presently condemned and killed for cowards, and their bodies eaten.
...
When they settle themselves in any country, they cut down as many palms as will serve them wine for a month and then as many more, so that in a little time they spoil the country. They stay no longer in a place than it will afford them maintenance. And then in harvest-time they arise, and settle themselves in the fruitfullest place they can find; and do reap their enemy's corn, and take their cattle. For they will not sow, nor plant, nor bring up any cattle, more than they take by wars.
...
The women are very fruitful, but they enjoy none of their children: for as soon as the woman is delivered of her child, it is presently buried quick [alive], so that there is not one child brought up in all this generation. But when they take any town they keep the boys and girls of thirteen or fourteen years of age as their own children. But the men and women they kill and eat. These little boys they train up in the wars, and hang a collar about their necks for a disgrace, which is never taken off till he proveth himself a man, and bring his enemy's head to the General : and then it is taken off and he is a freeman, and is called Gonso or soldier. This maketh them all desperate, and forward to be free, and counted men : and so they do increase. ...

So, how much has changed in four centuries ?

Ref: original source, Battell, "The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battel of Leigh in Essex," in Samuel Purchas, Purchas, Hir Pilgrimes (London, 1625), vol. 6; Hakluyt Society ed. E. G. Ravenstein, The Strange Adventures of Andrew Battel, of Leigh, in Angola and the Adjoining Regions (London, 1901), pp. 19-35; cited by John Thornton, The African Experience of the "20. and Odd Negroes" Arriving in Virginia in 1619 (The William and Mary Quarterly, 3rd Ser., Vol. 55, No. 3. (Jul., 1998), pp. 421-434).

Charles Taylor Sr received 50 years from the SL court (presently on appeal); and Charles (Chuckie) Taylor Jr received 97 years from a US court (affirmed on appeal). So, Bosco could be out of circulation for a long time - in accord with principles of retribution, reprobation and specific deterrence.

I question whether his eventual conviction (years away if it occurs at all) will have much impact (general deterrence) on the future conduct of other, modern-day "Gagas".

Since I started with Jean-Baptiste Alphonse Karr, I might as well end with his comment when he was asked his opinion about abolition of capital punishment ... je veux bien que messieurs les assassins commencent ...

Does anyone feel that these "gentlemen", the murderers, will have a Damascus moment and begin not to murder ?

Good job, fellas, in providing me with education about subject matter that I've only read of.

Regards

Mike

[Stan]

Hey Mike,

Where to start ?

Sent you a PM as some of my views are not exactly suitable herein.

What has changed since my time and recent sporadic trips to the region; little to nothing.
Infrastructure and basic human needs are not being met and education is stagnant. While communication and internet has grown exponentially, the locals are no more capable than they were in the late 90s.

Way back when herein we sarcastically used the phrase “You can take the man out of WAWA, but you can’t take the WAWA out of the man”. Regardless of what the West did and paid for (for political reasons) little would change and we paid little attention to local customs and courtesies. No amount of cash was going to change the local habitat (that money certainly wouldn’t go there and still doesn’t today).

I once sent an NCO away to the States for 18 months of both language and Infantry training. While he passed with flying colors, it didn’t take long before he returned to his old ways once back home. While most saw this as failure, I concluded that was exactly what would eventually happen.

If we are going to rule the place like the Belgian Congo, then be prepared for another 60 years of carrots and sticks with a painful and expensive venture. Otherwise, we would be better served by staying out.

Regards, Stan

[M-A Lagrange]

Hello Mike, Stan,

I am affraid, I do not have the same reading of the situation as you have.

What has changed since my time and recent sporadic trips to the region; little to nothing.

That is true for the infrastructures but the institutional environment has changed a lot.
I am affraid that it is this "mobutu time style" reading of DRC actually political turmoil that has proven to be a break to any changes. (This is not pointed at you Stan, by the way).
Building a new capable political class and credible democratic environment was Mr Meece work as SRSG and he refused it. The people are there, there are others than Tshisekedi!
Democracy means regular regime change. International community should not be opposed because of old fashion understanding of the context.

I once sent an NCO away to the States for 18 months of both language and Infantry training. While he passed with flying colors, it didn’t take long before he returned to his old ways once back home. While most saw this as failure, I concluded that was exactly what would eventually happen.

Cannot disagree with you but isn't it the same with any other countries (cf look at what is happening in Astan and Iraq...).
What is needed is either a cohersive and coordinate action from the SSR donors toward Kinshasa government or, as you said: everybody goes out and leave Kabila to deal with the regime change this will generate.

[Stan]

Hey M-A,

I am affraid that it is this "mobutu time style" reading of DRC actually political turmoil that has proven to be a break to any changes. (This is not pointed at you Stan, by the way).
Building a new capable political class and credible democratic environment was Mr Meece work as SRSG and he refused it. The people are there, there are others than Tshisekedi!
Democracy means regular regime change. International community should not be opposed because of old fashion understanding of the context.

Agreed. But, not just Mobutu style thought, rather, what to do with a huge and unpaid military ? Yes, we can change the regime and 200 different ministers as did Mobutu every year, but the largest stumbling block was the enormous military he created and has yet to gain control of or even pay for. We also don't understand how to control such a situation as it was created during a period of great wealth and power and those factors no longer exist. We can't support it, and, we can't eliminate it. The military, uneducated and armed, still dominate the government.

Cannot disagree with you but isn't it the same with any other countries (cf look at what is happening in Astan and Iraq...).
What is needed is either a cohersive and coordinate action from the SSR donors toward Kinshasa government or, as you said: everybody goes out and leave Kabila to deal with the regime change this will generate.

I would prefer that we simply take control and restart Belgian rule. Not very PC today but better than watching people die. Donor nations have placed so much political clout on their potential donations, yet, few have ever spent a week in that country. Not much of a decision making process.

If we turn off donations tomorrow, we have some absurd conclusion that we will punish the military and regime... as if both will miss a meal or some form of hardship. Really ?

If something similar to Arab Spring ever gets to the DRC

[davidbfpo]

A BBC report:

The UN Security Council has approved the creation of a special combat force to carry out "targeted offensive operations" against armed groups in eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

It is the first time the UN has given an offensive mandate to its troops.

The 2,500-strong brigade will be asked to "neutralise and disarm" rebels ......Troops from Tanzania, Mozambique and South Africa are due to form the bulk of the new brigade which is expected to be deployed by July.

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-21972193

An interesting mix of contributors. IIRC Tanzania's last combat mission was to invade Uganda long ago (1978-79), Mozambique had a long running COIN campaign with RENAMO till 1992 and South Africa has some peacekeeping knowledge (see parallel thread:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15946

[Stan]

Seems not all are happy with the new mandate

Despite the unanimous approval, several speakers expressed reservations about the text, with Guatemala’s representative questioning Council actions that could involve the United Nations in “peace-enforcement” activities. Such a move might compromise the neutrality and impartiality so essential to peacekeeping work, he cautioned. Indeed, the Organization should always be seen as an “honest broker”, he said, adding that, while he understood the logic behind the proposed deployment, he would have preferred the brigade to be a self-standing unit with specific duties distinguishable from those of MONUSCO’s other brigades.

Echoing the warning that MONUSCO now risked indirect conversion into a peace-enforcement mission, Argentina’s representative said that although the text stated clearly that the brigade would not set a precedent, the idea of “enforcing peace rather than keeping it” required deep reflection, certainly more than a week of negotiations. Negotiations on the text had not been as broad as Argentina would have hoped, she said, adding that the resolution should have included a broader complement of troop contributors so that they could be better apprised of all the new brigade’s activities.

[M-A Lagrange]

Hello Stan,

Well, between a force that keep force by watching civilians getting killed and a force that enforce/impose peace by combating the armed groups they were watching killing the civilians... I believe the choice is difficult.

[TV-PressPass]

Its interesting to me that this is the first UN force that's been given an offensive mandate like that.

I would think that this force would not be dressed in white and blue?

[davidbfpo]

TV Press-Pass remarked:

Its interesting to me that this is the first UN force that's been given an offensive mandate like that.

I'm no expert, but the UN has given some missions 'an offensive mandate' before, although maybe not for a while. IIRC the original Congo UN Mission (ONUC?) took very clear offensive action over Katanga's attempt to secede.

Watching from afar I have doubts there is both the political will and military capability to undertake such a mission. It is quite possible that some current contributors to the peacekeeping mission will wish to leave if the bullets fly.

[M-A Lagrange]

TV Press-Pass remarked:

I'm no expert, but the UN has given some missions 'an offensive mandate' before, although maybe not for a while. IIRC the original Congo UN Mission (ONUC?) took very clear offensive action over Katanga's attempt to secede.

Watching from afar I have doubts there is both the political will and military capability to undertake such a mission. It is quite possible that some current contributors to the peacekeeping mission will wish to leave if the bullets fly.

Completely concure with you David.

First: ONUC had a very offensive mandate and the UN were litteraly in control of Congo army during the Katanga wars in the 60th. But, I must say that it was against mainly the "affreux", the mercenaries engaged by Moise Tshombe, and the Mayi-Mayi Simba who were created as a reaction against Mobutu coup and Lubumba assassination by Belgium with the support of CIA.

That said, it is the first very offensive mandate since 2000 and the reorientation of the peacekeeping doctrine to "protection of civilians". Previously UN armed forces were fighting against legal or illegal governments (cf Corea war as the very first UN military intervention).

Secondly: you are right about the TCC. India and Pakistan are already in the starting blocks to leave DRC as soon as a bullet will fly too close from them. But may be is it an opportunity to remind all those countries which are funding their defense through blue helmets that peacekeeping missions are not tourism mission but actual war mission.

[jmm99]

If (like mine) one's African experience is nil, and knowledge is limited to reading, the following refs may be helpful; generally and to include "offensive" actions against "affreux" - from what is now ancient history (1964) to the present.

Piero Gleijeses, "Flee! The White Giants Are Coming!": The United States, the Mercenaries, and the Congo, 1964-65 (2001); first published in Diplomatic History 18, no. 2 (Spring 1994): 207-237; and later as Chap 3, Empire and Revolution; The United States and the Third World since 1945 (2001, edited by Peter L. Hahn and Mary Ann Heiss; free online book for non-commercial purposes).

David A. Latzko, The Market for Mercenaries (1997), presented at the Eastern Economic Association Meetings, Crystal City, VA, April 4, 1997:

Abstract

The forces of supply and demand in the mercenary market as well as principal-agent problems and their solution are reviewed. The demand for ancient and medieval mercenaries, soldiers in eras when quality mattered more than quantity, primarily stemmed from their superiority to citizen soldiers. By 1700, quantity was the dominant factor and conscripts were now just as effective as mercenaries. Demand nearly vanished as it is less costly to raise a large, state-owned army of conscripts than to hire large numbers of mercenaries. State-owned armies also serve to reduce principle[sic !]-agent conflicts.

ISSAfrica Monograph 147: Elimination of Mercenarism in Africa. A Need for a New Continental Approach, edited by Sabelo Gumedze (2008):

snip p.202:

Constructing a basis for normative intervention

A realistic appraisal of the state of mercenary law today must take into account the imperatives of sovereignty, the burgeoning need for security services at multiple levels of society; the diverse interests of players in any theatre of conflict; the expanding regimes of law in related fields such as human rights and humanitarian law; and the unavoidable consequences of globalisation. It has become apparent that we can no longer talk of reforming mercenary law without addressing the surrounding issues that relate not only to the widening scope of the private security debate but also the emergent players who for all intents and purposes may offer some services that were hitherto exclusive to the quintessential mercenary. One might even argue that whereas the legal discourse on ‘mercenarism’ may be inclined towards the absolute prohibition of private military industry (Musah and Fayemi 2000), the reality on the ground is that governments are still willing to engage the services of these firms when they consider it expedient to do so.

The province of ‘anti-mercenary’ law seems to have been eroded by the evolving practice in view of the realisation that the participation of PSCs/PMFs in the field of security, whether in the context of armed conflict or peace, extend beyond the perpetration of violence against civilians and government to the restoration of constitutional order, fight for self-determination and protection of humanitarian work. One should also take into consideration that as international law does not prohibit states from using private contractors to provide military and security services, a synthesis of what one might call the ‘mercenary problematique’, from the legal point of view, rests on the normative accommodation of security needs and the desire to punish rogue activities of security organisations or persons. Be that as it may, the broad range of functions the private security/military organisations perform argues for an evolution of regimes of law that isolate the undesirables with caution and regulate activities that are legitimate so as to enhance human security.

ISSAfrica Monograph 176: Merchants of African Conflict, More Than Just a Pound of Flesh, edited by Sabelo Gumedze (2011):

Abstract:

Despite their tarnished image, private military and security companies (PMSCs) continue to feature in almost every African conflict. Their presence in conflict zones presents a plethora of challenges, as they generally remain unregulated and uncontrolled. Initiatives aimed at addressing the involvement of PMSCs in conflict theatres have thus far also proved to be ineffective. The engagement in vigorous multidisciplinary approaches aimed at championing and improving these initiatives remains critical in addressing the insecurities posed by these merchants of conflict, particularly in Africa. This monograph is intended to make a modest contribution to this complex yet interesting discourse, through various authors presenting diverse and fascinating perspectives.

Scott Fitzsimmons, Culture Clash: The Influence of Behavioural Norms on Military Performance in Assymetrical Conflicts (Innovations 2008-2009):

Abstract:

This paper establishes the ways in which the military cultures of mercenary groups and their opponents influence their military performance in asymmetric conflicts. It develops and tests a constructivist military culture theory of military performance against the empirical record of two modern mercenary groups [JMM: Congo and Angola], one of which achieved victory over its opponent and one of which was defeated. The core logic of the theory is that a grossly outnumbered force must be highly flexible and adaptable if it is to perform the range of military tasks required to defeat materially superior opponents. Norms encouraging the pursuit of a wider range of tactical behaviour should increase military effectiveness, which, in turn, should increase a group’s prospects for military success. If the theory is correct, a military force’s performance should be conditioned by the degree to which the members of the force have been indoctrinated into norms that encourage them to be militarily effective.

Specifically, the theory reasons that military forces that strongly emphasize norms encouraging creative thinking, decentralized authority, personal initiative, technical proficiency, and group loyalty, should exhibit greater militarily effectiveness than forces that deemphasize these norms. Moreover, it reasons that military forces exhibiting greater military effectiveness should experience greater battlefield military performance than less effective groups, all else equal. Taking this into account, the theory predicts that the materially weaker party in an asymmetric conflict, which the mercenaries were in both cases, should only be able to defeat its materially stronger opponent if the weaker party emphasizes behavioural norms that encourage it to perform a wide range of tactical behaviour – that is, be very militarily effective – and the stronger party does not emphasize these norms because this should allow the weaker party to exploit the weaknesses and counter the strengths of the stronger party and, through this, defeat it. On the other hand, the theory predicts that, in asymmetric conflicts where neither party emphasizes behavioural norms encouraging them to perform a wide range of tactical behaviour, neither party should be capable of exploiting the weaknesses and countering the strengths of the other and, as a result, the balance of material capabilities should allow the materially stronger party to prevail.

Scott Fitzsimmons, Adapt or Die: The Cultural Foundations of Military Performance in the Sierra Leonean Civil War (2009):

Conclusion

The results of this analysis suggest that ideational factors played an important role in shaping the military effectiveness and battlefield military performance of the combatants in this case. Indeed, all of the testable predictions made by the normative theory of military performance were borne out during the Sierra Leonean Civil War. Overall, the normative theory of military performance appears to provide a convincing explanation of military performance in this asymmetric conflict.

The implications of these results are profoundly important because they suggest that governments, international organizations, and anyone else considering using mercenaries to implement their foreign and defence policies should attempt to understand the military culture of the private security organizations vying for their business. In other words, the potential clients of private security organizations cannot afford to determine the suitability of an organization based solely on the size of its inventory of weapons and vehicles or on the length of its personnel roster. Rather, prudent clients must demand access to the inner-workings of these organizations, particularly the junior and senior personnel who would be charged with implementing the terms of any contract, to assess how these individuals think and how they are encouraged to behave. Only then can a client determine whether a private security organization emphasizes the five norms of military effectiveness discussed in this paper and, in turn, determine whether this organization will likely accomplish its required tasks, even in the face of materially superior opponents.

Regards

Mike

[Stan]

Taking a look at the UN website, it's no wonder most think of this as the first ever offensive UN force. Heck, it says so right here

The Security Council today approved the creation of its first-ever “offensive” combat force, intended to carry out targeted operations to “neutralize and disarm” the notorious 23 March Movement (M23), as well as other Congolese rebels and foreign armed groups in strife-riven eastern Democratic Republic of Congo.

.... and created, on an exceptional basis, a specialized “intervention brigade” within the operation’s existing 19,815‑strong force.

As most of us already know, this is Bravo Sierra

Be careful what you wish for in this part of the world. The Congo has tested and swallowed the best of the UN to include nearly 20,000 peacekeepers. So now they are permitted to load their weapons and employ them ? Those attack helicopters with rockets were then (defensive) as well as useless ?

[M-A Lagrange]

Thanks Mike for the quite complete cover of the actual mercenary phenomenon in Africa. I believe some silent council members may have an opinion on this, especially on the merc market in Africa.

In 64, the mercenary business was much easier and simple than nowadays. No need of military training, COIN/CT/IW/SOP expertise…
At that time, what was the deadliest was friendly fire and drunk local army soldiers.

Here some readings recommendations on the “affreux”:
Congo Mercenary, by Mike Hoare
http://www.amazon.com/Congo-Mercenar.../dp/1581606397
Congo Warriors, by Mike Hoare
http://www.amazon.com/Congo-Warriors...ref=pd_sim_b_1
The Road To Kalamata: A Congo Mercenary's Personal Memoir, by Mike Hoare
http://www.amazon.com/The-Road-To-Ka...ref=pd_sim_b_2
MAD DOG KILLERS: The Story of a Congo Mercenary, by Ivan Smith
http://www.amazon.com/MAD-DOG-KILLER...ref=pd_sim_b_5
Who Killed Hammarskjld?: The Un, the Cold War and White Supremacy in Africa, by A. Susan William
http://www.amazon.com/Who-Killed-Ham...enard%2C+congo

I do recommend the last one.