How soldiers deal with the job of killing

[carl]

You see here we go in the direction of Grossman in the thinking that killing is somehow 'bad' and will inevitably lead to feelings of guilt and grief.

Not so. Combat killing in war is not murder, it is not a homicide, it is a justifiable killing. (I'm not talking atrocities here)

I agree.

Talking about the older NCOs I noted that where they had been in the service before the war (meaning they joined up in peacetime for peacetime) tended to fall out early (meaning leave the service or find less onerous posts from where to see out the war). The younger ones who joined up during the war (or for the war) seemed to last a lot better. Similar back then for the US maybe?

Professor White is the man to ask. I only know what I read. Now if you want to know how to give soccer moms speeding tickets without them getting mad at you, I'm the guy to ask.

Help me understand it. He did a year (?) tour of which how long was he a platoon commander? Raw soldiers and officers often do well but there is no substitute for experience.

Again, refer to Prof. White. But from what I've read, that was a common pattern, at least with the Army. Six months with troops and then six months in some kind of staff position. Madness.

I don't follow the link with Calley.

I understood you to say that Marlantes had some weaknesses from your point of view. When I mentioned Calley, it was along the same lines as when Ken said demand exceeded supply. The choice we had wasn't between Marlantes and an officer who wouldn't have had the weaknesses you perceived. It was between him and a horror of an officer like Calley.

Mike: I read Aveni's critique of Grossman that was buried in the comments. Very good and I got to bed later than usual that night.

Thank you for providing the link to that MMRMA report. I will read it. That kind of thing still fascinates me.

[JMA]

I understood you to say that Marlantes had some weaknesses from your point of view. When I mentioned Calley, it was along the same lines as when Ken said demand exceeded supply. The choice we had wasn't between Marlantes and an officer who wouldn't have had the weaknesses you perceived. It was between him and a horror of an officer like Calley.

Marlantes' problems (thankfully for his troops) seemed to manifest themselves after his service in Vietnam. The fact that (by his own admission) he became barely functional for a period indicates that problem (rather than a weakness). So then by all accounts Marlantes' service in Vietnam was good.

So it all comes back to selection then. My point is that one needs to set minimum levels for intellectual capability (SAT, ACT) and physical ability and spend most of the time the leadership and performance under stress tests ... with the odd psych test thrown in.

The first prize is that nobody falls apart either during or after combat service.

Second prize is that the officer can hold himself and his men together during that combat service and face what the future brings thereafter.

An absolute no-no is for an officer himself to fall apart during a combat tour or prove to be unable to provide the necessary leadership to help his men keep it together when under the stress of combat. Officer selection should attempt to screen for this.

Where this selection and screening fails and the officer fails to perform in combat (and on operations in general) he should be relieved immediately.

[Fuchs]

An absolute no-no is for an officer himself to fall apart during a combat tour or prove to be unable to provide the necessary leadership to help his men keep it together when under the stress of combat. Officer selection should attempt to screen for this.

JMA, by your measure the Wehrmacht was a terrible military force.

Its officers were falling apart quite often, turned into walking dead, many became alcoholics (especially in rear or flying units).

They did send their officers into vacation, into especially healthy and relaxing Kurorte", sent them away from combat on staff or training assignments and so on or simply insisted that they recovered fully after injuries, requiring weeks of recovery from combat.

[JMA]

JMA, by your measure the Wehrmacht was a terrible military force.

Its officers were falling apart quite often, turned into walking dead, many became alcoholics (especially in rear or flying units).

They did send their officers into vacation, into especially healthy and relaxing Kurorte", sent them away from combat on staff or training assignments and so on or simply insisted that they recovered fully after injuries, requiring weeks of recovery from combat.

Methinks you misunderstand me.

An officer falling apart in combat is the worst case scenario. Panic spreads faster than lightning (I'm told). Therefore all efforts must be made to prevent that happening. When it happens, and it will, act quickly to remove and replace he person.

Two problems. In peacetime there is less importance attached to careful officer selection (based on the martial requirements of soldiering) so those with gregarious sociability (but often little backbone) seem to slip through the selection net. As the war progresses the standard of candidates for officer selection starts to drop and the demand for 'numbers' allows weaker candidates to slip through.

While this is happening with the officers the NCOs are having their own problems (read recent post by Ken White on the matter). So at the end of the day you hope and pray your enemy are having greater problems than you are in this regard... because in the end it is the least incompetent military that wins the fighting war (of course the politicians are bound to screw that up as well).

Rotations are a good thing if they can be maintained (which as the war drags on they probably can't). The system which I agreed with was based on three years as a platoon/troop commander and thereafter 18 months/two years per posting.

The 'route' followed by an officer would be determined by his performance and not some egalitarian ticket punching requirement. That's as I see it.

[Fuchs]

The system which I agreed with was based on three years as a platoon/troop commander and thereafter 18 months/two years per posting.

Let's assume a small platoon of 20 and 100% officer retention for 30 years. Plus: The entire army is made up of platoons and all-officers staffs, nothing else.

5% of the platoon force would be officers, and 100% of the rest.
With officers serving 1/10th of their career as Plt Ldr, this would mean that there are 9 times as many officers outside of the platoons than inside.
It would be a 2/3 platoon 1/3 staff force with a ratio of enlisted/NCO : officer of 19:10.


Reduce officer retention and the qty of needed Plts would rise, increase platoon size and the army size needed to train enough officers as preparation for worse times would rise. Add non-officers to staffs and staffs would be even more bloated.
Additional layers of command can for the sake of simple math be considered represented by the staff pool.


3 years Plt command for every officer is simply unacceptable. Feel free to calculate it with variables of your choice; you end up with the conclusion that there are simply not enough platoons.



It might be debatable to send a 2nd Lt to a Coy, then promote him to 1st Lt once accustomed with the Coy's mode of operation and assign him to a Plt command for a year. The feel free to extend this for the best 1st Lts - not as an arrested career, but as a distinction and preparation for higher commands.

3 years for all is too much.

[Ken White]

It is also possible to have NCO Platoon Leaders, thus capitalizing on experience and placing the most capable leader where he -- or she -- can be most effective. A Company commanded by a Major with a Captain Executive Officer / 2iC plus two Lieutenants as Company Officers with no permanent Platoon Assignments would be a far better approach.

The current process (and in the US, certain procedural efforts and requirements) produces too many Lieutenants. That is beneficial in producing a large pool of potential Company Commanders but it is costly way to achieve that minor advantage when better selection and initial entry training would negate that cost and the presumed advantage. When the 'requirement' to keep those excess Officers around for various reasons is considered, it is obvious that a 'requirement' for an excessive number of overly large Staff positions is a natural by product. A study to determine the number of excellent Officers driven out of the Armed Forces by this approach might be instructive.

The Lieutenants would be assigned all the myriad peacetime additional duties and for operations, to missions as needed. This would among other things accustom them to NOT working only with people they 'know' (no matter how cursorily or briefly) but with a changing number of persons, tasks and capabilities. It would build in a requirement for and training in flexibility and trust.

A beneficial side effect would almost certainly be insistence by all four of those officers and all their contemporaries that training be improved...

[JMA]

It is also possible to have NCO Platoon Leaders, thus capitalizing on experience and placing the most capable leader where he -- or she -- can be most effective.

It seems obvious that you commission them rather than mix say warrant officers with officers. One would need to look at their future utilisation after say a maximum of three years as a platoon commander. Training? Admin? Logistics? How many would make it to company commander?

I suggest if one worked the numbers carefully one would be able to calculate the minimum number of (direct entry) officers needed to fill the posts required above the rank of major... because IMHO they have had served their 'apprenticeship' as a platoon commander (preferably in a war).

A company commanded by a Major with a Captain Executive Officer / 2iC plus two Lieutenants as Company Officers with no permanent Platoon Assignments would be a far better approach.

This US business of having a captain command a company with less training/experience/whatever than a major seems strange when compared to the Brit (and probably others systems).

I don't think floating officers serve any real purpose nor does the time so served provide any real experience.

The platoon commanding phase must IMHO mean living with, fighting with and if necessary dying with the platoon. That is the required 'apprenticeship'.

The current process (and in the US, certain procedural efforts and requirements) produces too many Lieutenants.

Easy to fix. Make the selection more arduous.

That is beneficial in producing a large pool of potential Company Commanders but it is costly way to achieve that minor advantage when better selection and initial entry training would negate that cost and the presumed advantage.

Exactly!

When the 'requirement' to keep those excess Officers around for various reasons is considered, it is obvious that a 'requirement' for an excessive number of overly large Staff positions is a natural by product. A study to determine the number of excellent Officers driven out of the Armed Forces by this approach might be instructive.

Excellent officers would be driven out if their careers are being blacked by 'dead wood' blocking their route to command companies, battalions etc for a reasonable length of time (two years). There are also other reason why the retention of officers suffers and those are mainly not service related - wife pressure, chasing higher income etc - and the hidden one which none will admit being not wanting to be exposed to combat again (among those who had a bite of the cherry in Iraq or Afghanistan and found it sour to their taste).

The Lieutenants would be assigned all the myriad peacetime additional duties and for operations, to missions as needed. This would among other things accustom them to NOT working only with people they 'know' (no matter how cursorily or briefly) but with a changing number of persons, tasks and capabilities. It would build in a requirement for and training in flexibility and trust.

Ditch the surplus... don't accommodate them. *

A beneficial side effect would almost certainly be insistence by all four of those officers and all their contemporaries that training be improved...

Training for whom?

* In earlier posts I stated and still believe that young men who have given the best years of their life to the service should be able to exit it with dignity if the service no longer requires there service. This would entail funded study etc etc.

[JMA]

Let's assume a small platoon of 20 and 100% officer retention for 30 years. Plus: The entire army is made up of platoons and all-officers staffs, nothing else.

5% of the platoon force would be officers, and 100% of the rest.
With officers serving 1/10th of their career as Plt Ldr, this would mean that there are 9 times as many officers outside of the platoons than inside.
It would be a 2/3 platoon 1/3 staff force with a ratio of enlisted/NCO : officer of 19:10.

Reduce officer retention and the qty of needed Plts would rise, increase platoon size and the army size needed to train enough officers as preparation for worse times would rise. Add non-officers to staffs and staffs would be even more bloated.
Additional layers of command can for the sake of simple math be considered represented by the staff pool.

3 years Plt command for every officer is simply unacceptable. Feel free to calculate it with variables of your choice; you end up with the conclusion that there are simply not enough platoons.

It might be debatable to send a 2nd Lt to a Coy, then promote him to 1st Lt once accustomed with the Coy's mode of operation and assign him to a Plt command for a year. The feel free to extend this for the best 1st Lts - not as an arrested career, but as a distinction and preparation for higher commands.

3 years for all is too much.

Sorry, don't follow your reasoning.

First I speak only of the infantry here (as high command usually falls to those from the infantry or armour with rare exceptions of course).

Getting to major is usually by time served. In my system it was normally nine years from commissioning to major (making it ten years with one year officer training included).

So we start with three years as a platoon commander, followed by two years (during which the Lt to Captain promotion exams must be completed). This could be as a support platoon commander, Bn Intelligence Officer, Regimental Signals Officer, or at some training establishment.

That brings you to acting-captain. Then follows four years to major in two two year stints. Probably one as a staff officer and one as a company 2IC (or possibly one in training) and during which the 'Company Commanders' course (or later termed the Combat Team Commanders course) would have to be completed. Then the best get command of a company in their parent regiment (don't think the US use this in the manner of the Brits?). The also rans may get posted to other regiments/battalions where there are vacancies and some may not get given command of an infantry company at all.

So some basic math.

12 rifle platoons = 12 subalterns. A rotation of four per year. By a simple projection 5 of the eight would likely return to command a company. The other three might have left the military, died, fired/court marshalled, failed their promotion exams, not deemed suitable to command a company or given command of a company where there is a vacancy.

So of the company commanders only one out of five would go on to command the battalion. Of the others some will have left the service, some fired, died, failed staff course, not deemed the best of the 'vintage' available to be given the command (and get streamed into staff forever).

And so on.

You follow my drift?