The USMC in Helmand (merged thread)

**Ken White** · 02-20-2009

I don't know how many posts here have in essence pointed out that little in Iraq can be transferred to Afghanistan -- but there have been a bunch...

Nor do I know how many posts here have bemoaned that fact that US Forces cannot seem to learn from the lessons of others -- but there have been a bunch...

Sigh.

**COMMAR** · 02-25-2009

Originally Posted by Ken White

I don't know how many posts here have in essence pointed out that little in Iraq can be transferred to Afghanistan -- but there have been a bunch...

Nor do I know how many posts here have bemoaned that fact that US Forces cannot seem to learn from the lessons of others -- but there have been a bunch...

Sigh.

Did you read the whole article or did you just draw a conclusion off yet another poorly titled article that was looking for a name to draw readers in.

B/c had you read the article it was already known to the Marines that tactics were going to vastly different in A'stan prior to them deploying.

However the article is mostly about how the Marines were equipped, equipped for Iraq instead of A'stan. B/c HEY, what do ya know, they were trained & equipped to go to Iraq until about 2mths b4 they actually left & found they only had 2mths to get ready for A'stan.

They then had to retrain, but their gear was already allocated, so they had to make due.

Your comment was that "US Forces hadn't learned the lessons other forces."

Thats funny b/c the 2 COIN programs that were intiated by USMC's Task Force 2/7 starting in April of '08, of Focused District Development (FDD) Program & the In-District Reform (IDR) Program, were called 2 of the most successful in the country in the last 7yrs.

Both Programs designed SPECIFICALLY for those Provinces in A'stan, not borrowed fr/ Iraq.

So again the Article was NOT about the Marines having the WRONG STRATEGY for A'stan but the wrong Equipment, which was unpreventable due to time constraints.

**Ken White** · 02-25-2009

Originally Posted by COMMAR

Did you read the whole article or did you just draw a conclusion off yet another poorly titled article that was looking for a name to draw readers in.

B/c had you read the article it was already known to the Marines that tactics were going to vastly different in A'stan prior to them deploying.

And if you had read what I said instead of playing 'Ready, Shoot, Aim' you'd realize that I was pointing out two things -- neither of which was an attack on the Marines of which I was one before you were born:

- Afghanistan is not Iraq. TTP must be modified -- that was directed at many here and the civilians in the Think Tanks and anyone who has not been to both countries who have suggested the two are similar.

- US Forces means 'we' -- all the US Armed Forces. Not just the Marines; If I'd meant Marines, I'd have said Marines.

We are badly parochial. The Army won't adopt a lot of smart things Marines do, the Marines won't accept that the Army might do something right. The Air force and Navy are just as bad. Some of that is normal and healthy, an excess is not. There are of course exceptions and there is no doubt we are better about cross feed today than we were when the Marines replaced 1/82 in Fallujah in 2003. We need to learn and adapt from each other. We're getting better, we need to get better yet.

If you perceived any of that as an attack on the Marines, you need to get your eyeball recalibrated.

So again the Article was NOT about the Marines having the WRONG STRATEGY for A'stan but the wrong Equipment, which was unpreventable due to time constraints.

Nor did I say it was. If you want to get defensive, your call -- do it with me in the future, please shoot at what I say instead of addressing what you want to think I said.

**ODB** · 02-25-2009

This has been debated, redebated, reguritated, and debated again. LINK No one is going to tell someone else how to suck that egg. Bottom line, politics and public opinion have driven that train off the end of the bridge to nowhere and it's still going. Until commanders are willing to assume risk, we will have to figure out ways to make things happen.

If you checked the article I linked in my above post, the main threat is not all that different. When entire vehicles are being blown to hell in Feb in Afghanistan it tells the enemy is changing. Afghans historically do not fight through the winter months, but guess what they are this year. So we can play the who is outfitted properly with what equipment and what training game all day long. Bottom line, you go to war with what you got, not with what you wish you had. I'm not going to say it, aw hell.......TRAINING. Does not matter what country, basics are basics and they apply no matter where you go to fight.

Lastly what are the statistics of gun shot wounds/deaths vs IED wounds/deaths? If I was a betting man, I'd bet a paycheck IEDs are winning in Afghanistan. Answered my own question here OEF Database

Did the leg work

US Deaths
IED - 183
Small arms fire - 84
RPGs - 61

Total CF Deaths
IED - 329
Small arms fire - 122
RPGs - 80

**jmm99** · 02-25-2009

(from the McClatchy article)
U.S. troops also are frustrated by the different rules of engagement they must operate under in Afghanistan. Until Jan. 1, U.S. forces in Iraq operated under their own rules of engagement. If they saw something suspicious, they could kick down a door, search a home or detain a suspicious person.

But in Afghanistan, they operate under the rules of the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force, of which U.S. troops are part. Under those regulations, only Afghans can search buildings and detain people.

Since the Law of War, as seen by most NATO nations, tends to follow the path taken by the Eminent Jurists report (discussed in this thread, posts 188-190), there might be more "one hand tied behind the back" in Astan than in Iraq.

On the other hand, US Forces (including USMC) might not find the ROEs a practical problem - adapt, improvise, overcome, etc. So, are the NATO ROEs[*] part of the problem ?

[*] If they are as classified as ours, discussion would have to be limited.

**Teufel** · 02-28-2009

Originally Posted by ODB

Afghans historically do not fight through the winter months, but guess what they are this year.

The Afghans are not fighting this winter. I just got back from that area and the activity went down considerably from the summer time. Just because they reduce their activity does not mean they stop however.

**ODB** · 03-01-2009

Originally Posted by Teufel

The Afghans are not fighting this winter. I just got back from that area and the activity went down considerably from the summer time. Just because they reduce their activity does not mean they stop however.

From my boys there and the numbers here:

Jan-Feb 2008 = 8 US Deaths

Jan-Feb 2009 = 29 US Deaths

There is more to it than just them ramping up in the winter months, there are also 10,000 more service members this year than this time last year. It does have my boys thinking as they have been hit hard already and at the time of the year when it is realatively calm. Big country a lot depends on what part your in as well. Been some years since I set foot in Afghanistan, but been following it closely as I'm sure my focus will be shifted from OIF to OEF soon.

**Teufel** · 03-01-2009

[QUOTE=ODB;67481]From my boys there and the numbers here:

Jan-Feb 2008 = 8 US Deaths

Jan-Feb 2009 = 29 US Deaths
QUOTE]

I would like to see the numbers for August and July 2008 compared with 2009 as I think enemy activity and CF/ANSF deaths are up in general and not specific to the winter. I was in the Helmand and Farah provinces so I can only speak to those areas. From what I saw all the big timers take off to see their families or take a break during the winter and some of the local players keep some level of activity up.