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| FID & Working With Indigenous Forces Training, advising, and operating with local armed forces in Foreign Internal Defense. |
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#1 |
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Registered User
Join Date: Mar 2011
Posts: 2
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I am attempting to find any information concerning these newly formed FSF-TT (Foreign Security Force - Training Team). I've called random contacts down at the 162nd @ Polk to little / no avail. I have the option to stay at my current unit (Light Infantry) and deploy with them as a member of this team. What I don't want to be doing is staying in the rear strictly training / organizing forces, rather than training in addition to advising the ANA whilst on patrol, forward deployed. Any information would be greatly appreciated, thanks in advance. Basically, my last tour we experienced both ends of the spectrum. First 6 months we had Marine ETT's...good dudes. We could go into the valley and do a clearance while the USMC/ANA conducted a KLE...two separate autonomous units that could successfully do two separate acitivties at the same time. Ganjagal happened, Marines peaced out and we were then "partnered". Combined patrols decreased to maybe one every two weeks (in part due to kinetcs / korengal closure), and when they did combine with us, they left when it was time to play and our combat power was halved. PVT Snuffy, who knows only call of duty and MTV, is buddied up with PVT Ahmed, who knows only hasheesh and war...sufficed to say not much progress was made. Anyone else have a similar experience? TIA Last edited by davidbfpo; 05-10-2011 at 06:57 AM. Reason: Moved to RFI and PM to author |
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#2 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Feb 2012
Location: the ghan
Posts: 18
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Gator,
As one of the first SFA Teams currently being used IAW the Army's vision, I have a wealth of knowledge for you and others that will be receiving orders soon. Rather than vomit alot of information on this first reply, I'd rather you ask specific questions to ease my typing load... So... with that being said, whatcha wanna know? |
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#3 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Oct 2005
Posts: 1,837
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SFAT,
Please send a link to any papers or articles that accurately describe the current SFAT concept (to minimize your typing). First set of questions: - What is the selection and training process for the SFATs? - What is the rank structure? If you do have E-3s and below, are they value added, or are both the E-3s and below and the partnered force being hurt? I am suggesting that perhaps E-3s and below in this role are missing key professional development opportunities as members of a squad or section. Hard to teach with confidence without personal experience. - Are the SFATs meant to be enduring, or are they adhoc teams that form for one mission, and when the mission is complete do they disband and the soldiers return to the ranks? - What did you see as the biggest success of the program? The biggest failure? - If you were king for a day, what three changes (if any) would you impliment to improve SFAT concept? |
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#4 | |||||
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Council Member
Join Date: Feb 2012
Location: the ghan
Posts: 18
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Bill,
First, thanks for the questions. I truly want to help others understand the dynamic of this new concept. I was absolutely clueless when I was first informed of this mission and had to feel my way through- up until now. Second, I’m sorry to say I’m nowhere close to an academic so my responses might not be as “scholarly” as a typical reader may be accustomed to. Lastly, I’ll say this truly is a thankless job and has been by far my most challenging assignment, being the first one away from the troops that is. I will also add, the context of my writing is of my own opinion and does not reflect the opinions of other SFA-T members across the Army. So let’s begin… Quote:
The training process included training we conducted ourselves at home station and JRTC. While at JRTC we attended the Advisor Academy ran by the 162nd INF BDE. It was ten days in duration which was acceptable. My only issue with the AA was the generalities of Advising in Afghanistan. If I had it to do over again I would want region specific training. Quote:
With all that being said, the two man team TO&E was not followed. Our BDE leadership broke us down into eight, six man teams. Two teams would be assigned to the OCC-P/Rs -- I’m not 100 percent sure what the OCC-P stands for but I’m inclined to believe it’s Operation Coordination Center-Provincial/Regional. The other four, six man teams were assigned to specific ANA/AUP/ABP units. I will attach the modified TO&E as well. Quote:
With help from the big guy, I will assume a 1SG position when the deployment is over and all but a few Officers will move back to the units they came from or to a new unit. 98 percent of the Officers assigned for this mission are TDY. All of the NCO’s are PCS'd into our current unit and will fill PSG/1SG/SGM slots upon redeployment. Quote:
Before this mission, Counterinsurgency was a word I had heard from Field Grades and alike. Now I truly understand and practice it every single day. Further, I can use my own team's success as an example. To make a long story short, you couldn't pry my boss and his counterpart Kandak CDR apart with a crow bar. Those two are inseparable. I can honestly say, that our team has made one hell of a lasting impact on at least one Infantry Kandak in the Region. And for lack of better terms, you can't buy that with any amount of Government funds. Failures: I wouldn’t say there are any failures. There are many things we could do better but failure is a strong word. In a few, blunt words: The Selection Process must be improved; DA must narrow down the selection criteria in order to select the right Officers and NCOs for this challenging role. Quote:
![]() 2. I think SFA should be centrally controlled by USASOC or at least have oversight ; they are the experts in what we do here. 3. SFA should not be an adhoc organization every BCT should have a dedicated SFA company with its own METL, Property Book, and CoC—heck, maybe even its own branch. I'll look through my collection unclassified write-ups on SFA to share with the group. If you have other specific questions please send them my way. If I don't have the answer I'll ask someone smarter than me....there's plenty of those guys around. Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-13-2012 at 11:08 AM. Reason: Questions in quotes |
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#5 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Dec 2006
Location: Estonia
Posts: 3,581
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SFAT,
Welcome aboard and thanks for some great info ! Regards, Stan
__________________
There are very few problems, which cannot be solved by the suitable application of High Explosives
Last edited by davidbfpo; 02-17-2012 at 03:09 PM. Reason: Redundant text removed, thread moved in & out of Members Only area |
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#6 | ||||
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Council Member
Join Date: Oct 2005
Posts: 1,837
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SFA-T,
Thanks for your detailed and insightful response, I found it helpful in assessing how the GPF is approaching this. To be frank it is better than I suspected. Your comment here speaks to your success in my opinion: Quote:
Quote:
Quote:
Quote:
Last edited by Bill Moore; 02-15-2012 at 03:46 AM. |
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#7 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Jun 2010
Location: Kentucky
Posts: 110
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The Army announced today a new mission to meet requirements in Afghanistan. Four brigade combat teams (BCTs), one separate brigade and an Army command, each in a modified configuration, will deploy between April and August 2012. Approximately 1,460 active component officers and senior non-commissioned officers along with approximately 300 DoD civilians will deploy in 18-person teams to provide training assistance to Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF).
The majority of those BCT soldiers and leaders not deploying will be reassigned to other units, in most cases on their respective installations. The remainder will focus on schooling, training, gunnery, and equipment maintenance and accountability. Beginning in the 3rd quarter of fiscal 2012, these security force assistance teams will help to further generate, employ, and sustain the ANSF during the transition of security responsibility to the Afghan government and its security forces. The units ordered to deploy are: 2nd BCT, 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), Fort Campbell, Ky. 2nd BCT, 3rd Infantry Division, Fort Stewart, Ga. 3rd BCT, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colo. 4th BCT, 1st Armored Division, Fort Bliss, Texas. 162nd Infantry Brigade, Fort Polk, La. 1st Army, Rock Island Arsenal, Ill.
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#8 |
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Registered User
Join Date: Mar 2010
Location: Auburn, Maine, USA
Posts: 3
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I have been reading the above and its great info. But does anyone have any more recent information or SFAT experience since?
I'm a young/new officer that's going to be on an SFAT heading over to Afghanistan April/May. I'm psyched to be dealing with a lot of FID, but I don't have the raw first-hand experience. Trying to read up and do as much hw as I can before I get over there. Thanks! |
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#9 |
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Council Member
Join Date: Feb 2007
Location: Camp Pendleton, CA
Posts: 304
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I haven't been on SFAT (yet), but worked with Border Advisory Teams on my deployment to southern Helmand last year. I've also got a pretty good short AAR from a buddy who was a kandak advisor further north. PM me with your .mil and I'll send it your way.
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