Influencing and Information Operations

[William F. Owen]

More difficult quite probably, but more complex I do not think so. Essentially we are doing the same thing in conventional warfare as we are in COIN except with emphasis on different parts of the system.

Hurrah!! My work here is done... Wilf to Mother Ship, smoke out!

Digressing slightly, but on the difficulty side; I wonder if we put two evenly matched opponents (in terms of military capability) against each other whether thay would find conventional ops any more difficult then COIN ops? Of the 'find, fix, strike and exploit' elements; in COIN none of them leap out as any more difficult to do then in conventional ops, less I think 'exploit'.

Well that's the Wargame Model, where the winner simply destroys more of the fielded force. It's excellent for teaching tactics, if the loss-exchange ratio is factored in. - but the contest is made simple by understanding that the enemy is exactly like you. Why not make them both Irregular Forces? As in UVF v PIRA? or Northern Alliance v Taliban?

With COIN the insurgent has an assymetric advantage in 'find, fix, strike., exploit' but we tend to regard conventional ops as easier because historically in the mid-late 20th century we've had the advantage in 'find - strike'.

I'm not sure the British in Normandy or Korea would have viewed life as easy.

[Tukhachevskii]

... I have always thought that the Political Warfare Executive had it down pretty much pat with regards to the definition, uses and effects desired from Political Warfare/IO. The way I see it we have, with our stylish terminology, methodological fuzziness and cultural relativism (which defangs our messaage in favour of watering it down to prevent the yokels from being offended and thereby end up with wishy washy programmes that the wily village types can see through/or goes over their heads), lost the plot slightly.

The attitude to the enemy and to his subject peoples is belligerent; the attitude to friendly and still independant peoples is persuasive. One is disruptive behind the lines of the enemy; the other is concilliatory in the councils of our freinds. One requires the mentality and techniques of subversion; the other, in open relationship, means frankness and information. The one seeks to destroy the confidence of the enemy; the other seeks to win the confidence of friends.
(vii) To clarify this distinction, it is necessary to define (a) Publicity, (b) Propaganda, (c) Political Warfare.
(a) Publicity- Publicity is the straightforward projection of a case; it is the build-up of a picture in the mind of the audience which will win their confidence and support. It is information which we want them to have, but also information they they want to have. It seeks to create the right impression and to remove the wrond impression. Its object is mutual goodwill. It is the presentation of the evidence, leaving the judgement to the audience. It is succinctly, as the Americans expressed it in their original information organisation; "Facts" and "Figures".

(b) Propaganda- Propaganda on the other hand, is the deliberate direction, or even manipulation of information to secure a definate objective. It is an attempt to direct the thinking of the recipient, without his conscious collaboration, into predetermined channels. It is the conditioning of the recipient by devious methods with an ulterior motive. Propaganda emphasises those facts which best serve its purpose. It creates the atmosphere in which the audience is most susceptible to suggestion. By power of suggestion, which in favourable circumstances becomes instruction, it secures positive action.

(c) Political Warfare- Political Warfare employs both publicity and propaganda. That is to say, it can and must be as objective as possible in its projection of the British or Allied case. It, too, has to seek the goodwill of those in the enemy and enemy-occupied countries who are already sympathetics to that case. It has to demonstarte and not merely claim the certainty of victory. It has to show by force of example that we have something better to offer than the Nazis.
[...]
Political Warfare could be described as "Propaganda in Battledress" in the sense that it has to convert propaganda into a striking force and to ensure that, at the right moment and under proper discipline, ideas and emotions are translated into action. It must, psychologically, disarm the enemy. It must instil in the hidden armies behind the Axis lines not only the spirit of resistance to the enemy, but the will to strike down that enemy. (pp.3-5)

[Red Rat]

I'm not sure the British in Normandy or Korea would have viewed life as easy.

Not easy but probably more straightforward.

I am struck by Tukhackevskii's contribution. In 1942 we produce a masterpiece of brevity and clarity in the dark arts, but let no-one read it.

Today we produce tomes of the stuff, distribute liberally but no-one can understand it! When it comes to doctrine and influence I think we may have 'blue on blue'd'

[William F. Owen]

Today we produce tomes of the stuff, distribute liberally but no-one can understand it! When it comes to doctrine and influence I think we may have 'blue on blue'd'

I hear you! I think we could save a lot of drama by burning down DCDC for a start.