The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

[SJPONeill]

My big beef with the current COIN manual, is that for all of its great TTPs on COIN, it is sadly, and I believe dangerously, disconnected from a solid rooting in insurgency itself. They are talking re-write, and I hope like hell USAJFKSWCS is forced (at gunpoint if necessary) to be a full partner in that effort. My one suggestion (besides making SF participate) is to lay a foundation right up front on what insurgency is; leaving room for the fact that reasonable minds can indeed differ on the subject. I would then follow that by a chapter on the American experience (as this goes to our principles as a nation, and suggests how we should approach others based on rights and duties we deemed essential for ourselves). Then, and only then, would I get into how to best go about intervening in the insurgencies of others.

Possibly the issue here is that 3-24 is not really about COIN but more related to what the Marines call(ed) Countering Irregular Threats (CIT) and the UK Countering Irregular Activity (CIA - an unhappy acronym if ever there was one), of which COIN is a subset. We reviewed most of the available 'COIN' doctrine in 2007/Early 08 and were already thinking in terms of CIT when we got to 3-24 and in that context it made a ton of sense but was less applicable perhaps to the classic COIN campaign a la Vietnam or perhaps the myths of Malaya and Kenya.

Also I think it is important to remember that 3-24 was written against the very specific problem of Iraq and so does not lend itself as a template for other campaigns problems - but then, COIN has never been about simply applying a template to pass Go and get $200 and a stable democratic host nation government. Every contingency needs to be considered on its own merits and issues, and plans/policies/strategies developed accordingly. That seems to where we go off the rails in considering COIN 'doctrine'.

The beauty of the CIT?CIA construct is that, even though it brings in a broader more diverse range of potential problems, it all encourages earlier intervention (by the most appropriate arm of government, not necessarily the military) to head off potential instability before the situation goes over the precipice. 20/20 hindsight would probably show that most campaigns since the end of WW1 probably had adequate warning signs (if people had been looking for them) that conflict could have been averted or at least minimised or contaiined.

[William F. Owen]

Possibly the issue here is that 3-24 is not really about COIN but more related to what the Marines call(ed) Countering Irregular Threats (CIT) and the UK Countering Irregular Activity (CIA - an unhappy acronym if ever there was one), of which COIN is a subset. We reviewed most of the available 'COIN' doctrine in 2007/Early 08 and were already thinking in terms of CIT when we got to 3-24 and in that context it made a ton of sense but was less applicable perhaps to the classic COIN campaign a la Vietnam or perhaps the myths of Malaya and Kenya.

I'd see that 100% in reverse. 3-24 is a "COIN" manual, and that is why it is a woeful publication. It views COIN as a distinct form of military/non-military activity. That is rubbish.
An Irregular Warfare manual, would be useful and would be written in an entirely different way. 3-24 is not an "Irregular Warfare" manual by any stretch.
So called "COIN" manuals have to be theatre specific. -which is why the UK never issued one, until they tried to copy the US, and wrote one.

[SJPONeill]

I'd see that 100% in reverse. 3-24 is a "COIN" manual, and that is why it is a woeful publication. It views COIN as a distinct form of military/non-military activity. That is rubbish.
An Irregular Warfare manual, would be useful and would be written in an entirely different way. 3-24 is not an "Irregular Warfare" manual by any stretch.
So called "COIN" manuals have to be theatre specific. -which is why the UK never issued one, until they tried to copy the US, and wrote one.

Woeful compared to what? At the time it meet the need for Iraq and is a big step up from other 'COIN" pubs from the same time e.g. those from Canada and Australia.

Distinct from what? The mil/non-mil mix is more disitnct in COIN/CIT/CIA than it is conventional force-on-force conflict e.g. the good old Fulda gap. I'm not sure which COIN campaigns you have been following but which did not have a strong mil/non-mil mix? Possibly the Soviet ones in Hungary and Czechoslovakia which were, admittedly successful...

Irregular Warfare is not COIN and vice versa...if anything they might be different sides of the same coin (no pun intended) - that manual that Slap posted is a good read and may serve to illustrate the difference. 3-24 never attempted to present itself as an IW manual and nor should it because it is not - there, we agree on something perhaps...

Yes, there should be theatre/campaign-specific manual produced for each campaign/conflict (uh-oh, agreement again) - our rule of thumb was/is that this should be produced no later than the force generation for the first rotation force to relieve the initial intervention/lodgement force (don't think you can count on the lead time to have this ready before the first lodgement). But that each campaign will have its own unique characteristics does not mean that a more generic higher level, broader focus COIN/CIT/CIA (perhaps all three in a perfect world) manual can not and should not be produced. If nothing else it could start by detailing the differences between COIN/CIT/CIA and the conventional force on force state v state conflict most of us were brought up to deal with, at least until those who were the coy and bn commanders in 03/04 are the 2 and 3 stars of the future.

The UK did produce COIN manuals and quite good ones well before FM 3-24 every appeared on the scene - I don't have my notes to hand so can't real them off but some of them were part of the Review, as was some Aussie 60s doctrine derived from the UK that was pretty fine as well - supporting the statement elsewhere in this thread that way we wrote about these topics 40-50 years ago was at least as good and possibly better than how we do it now.

[William F. Owen]

Woeful compared to what? At the time it meet the need for Iraq and is a big step up from other 'COIN" pubs from the same time e.g. those from Canada and Australia.

Woeful as in not needed, overly long, complicated and not useful.

Distinct from what? The mil/non-mil mix is more disitnct in COIN/CIT/CIA than it is conventional force-on-force conflict e.g. the good old Fulda gap.

COIN is not a distinct form or warfare. Fighting an insurgency requires the application of military force. How that force is applied is in the context of Irregular War, not in a "COIN" context. It is very doubtful if the idea of "COIN" as it is currently touted actually withstands any rigour at all.

The UK did produce COIN manuals and quite good ones well before FM 3-24 every appeared on the scene - .

Yes, but they were theatre specific. The CATOM for example was for use only in Malaya. -which is why Kitson was forced to write "Low Intensity Operations" in September 1970, precisely because the UK Staff Collage lacked a viable publication on the issue.

[Chris jM]

Woeful as in not needed, overly long, complicated and not useful.

Would you extend this description to FM3-24.2 Tactics In Counter-Insurgency, as well?

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cointacticsfm.pdf

[William F. Owen]

Would you extend this description to FM3-24.2 Tactics In Counter-Insurgency, as well?

http://smallwarsjournal.com/documents/cointacticsfm.pdf

Still flawed, but its a great deal more useful. It has to be asked, how come it's a different manual?

[Ken White]

It has to be asked, how come it's a different manual?

for 'doctrine writers.' Plus it beefs up the printing, warehousing, distribution and other staffing and budgeting arguments...

We now do process. Not products.