Equipment list

[Fuchs]

I disagree.
For example, one might write "rations and water filter for three days: *** grams" and write that it's good practice to support infantry on longer missions, not the least because they might easily run out of ammo within hours, well short of three days.

Simply don't assume the ultra-risk-averse attitude that all eventualities need to be known or even prepared for. Competent soldiers are supposed to improvise if #### hits the fan. Loadouts only need to cover the probable needs.


I see, it's the first conflict of philosophies and background-driven attitudes.


Fight, woods, villages, spring in moderate climate, maybe rain, 5 kg carried for others - go!


By the way; maybe some day I will get behind the anglophone obsession with patrolling infantry. You can read a randomly selected 10,000 pages of German military literature and field manuals and are most unlikely to read more than two or three paragraphs about infantry patrols.

[JMA]

By the way; maybe some day I will get behind the anglophone obsession with patrolling infantry. You can read a randomly selected 10,000 pages of German military literature and field manuals and are most unlikely to read more than two or three paragraphs about infantry patrols.

So now you know where the Germans got it wrong.

[Fuchs]

So now you know where the Germans got it wrong.

Patrol focus versus Stotrupp focus. Guess who won.
Answer.

[Distiller]

That's a topic with a strong cultural angle. Look at Soviet infantry during WW2, or the Viet Cong. Handful of semitchki or rice, kanteen-like thing, gun (or not) with a little bit of ammo. No way any Western troops would run around like that.


Let's try it, graded VITAL > USEFUL > NICE TO HAVE:

(1) -- Stay warm, stay dry, stay fed and watered, stay healthy, on a level that allows you to maintain operational effectiveness.

(2a) -- Basic Personal Field Tools (knife, spade, multitool, canteen - whatever needed to assists in achieving (1), can vary widely with ops environ)

(2b) -- Basic Personal Medkit (generally oriented towards covering small lesions as they happen every day to keep them from getting sore, but also a wound closure kit to stop a bleeding long enough till a medic arrives)

(2c) -- Smartphone. Not as absurd as it sounds. Even when not used as a com device it still is very useful.

(3) -- Optional special mobility equiment (e.g. skis, or snow shoes, or mountaineering equipment)

(4) -- Weapon. Can be all kind of things. Maybe better called "Offensive Mission Equipment". Can be a laser designator, can be a barrel and extra ammo for the machine gun. Can be a rugged notebook with some EW or cyber magic. Not limited to an assault carbine.

(5) -- Optional mission equipment: Navigation + Communication (as far as not provided by smartphone), Night Vision Equipment, NBC Equipment

(6) -- Optional special load carrying equipment (e.g. a hiking trailer)

(10) -- Optional armor

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Distiller

That's a topic with a strong cultural angle. Look at Soviet infantry during WW2, or the Viet Cong. Handful of semitchki or rice, kanteen-like thing, gun (or not) with a little bit of ammo. No way any Western troops would run around like that.

Of course we could and we have; just not in recent years. You have to put it in context, if we were fighting in the U.S. against an occupying power we would become the guerrilla army and be able to live off the land the goodwill (or coerced will) of the people to support us.

Don't confuse today's industrial Army with what we could be, Americans are as hard as any other nationality when they need to be.

We go heavy today due to risk adverse leaders and the mindset that if it is available we ought to carry it with us because you never know. In a different scenario the risk adverse leaders would be privates and we wouldn't have the kit to carry with us even we wanted to.

[jcustis]

I disagree.
For example, one might write "rations and water filter for three days: *** grams" and write that it's good practice to support infantry on longer missions, not the least because they might easily run out of ammo within hours, well short of three days.

Simply don't assume the ultra-risk-averse attitude that all eventualities need to be known or even prepared for. Competent soldiers are supposed to improvise if #### hits the fan. Loadouts only need to cover the probable needs.


I see, it's the first conflict of philosophies and background-driven attitudes.


Fight, woods, villages, spring in moderate climate, maybe rain, 5 kg carried for others - go!


By the way; maybe some day I will get behind the anglophone obsession with patrolling infantry. You can read a randomly selected 10,000 pages of German military literature and field manuals and are most unlikely to read more than two or three paragraphs about infantry patrols.

I still firmly believe we'd need to define the conditions and other factors (such a mechanized versus dismounted light infantry) or means of resupply, to be able perform some realistic analysis, but let's go ahead and assume he is a member of a company conducting a movement to contact in mixed terrain environment including small villages/towns, with resupply expected within 24 hrs of request, and can have his existence load brought up when resupply arrives.

Must-have items, for an easier start:

(1) jacket and clothes behind
(2) trouser and clothes behind
(3) boots and socks [one spare pair socks]
(4) carbine/rifle with iron sights, accessories are up for debate [should have a magnified optic and an infrared designator, minimum]
(5) Minimum magazine capacity (loaded) 60 rds. More is up for debate. [minimum 140 rds]
(6) emergency ration one day (may be a simple chocolate bar, of course)
(7) filled small canteen [should be minimum 100 oz hydration bladder]
(8) individual bandages for own consumption
(9) dog tags
(10) some means to open emergency ration (small pocket knife, for example)
(11) a single hand grenade (may be a small defensive one)
(12) (5 kg for others, including the necessary containers)

Additions to this basic loadout are:

-Assault pack or hydration carrier of at least 20L capacity. This would serve as the means to carry the other 5kg of additional equipment. It would also hold a mortar round and one of the following: 200 rounds of belted ammunition, anti-personnel mine, extra batteries, or some command and control/surveillance tool component (think micro UAV controller)
-Plate carrier for a front only protective plate, rated to 7.62x39, vice the 7.62x54R we currently use
-Night optic device
-One entrenching tool per team of four men (perhaps two)
-15m paracord (a million uses)
-3-5m riggers tape (a million uses)
-weapons cleaning kit

[Fuchs]

Few countries consider Claymore-type AP mines even only necessary enough for having them in their inventory. We should treat the 5 kg carried for the small unit as a black box, though.

Cleaning -while a personal responsibility with NCO oversight- does not require an individual kit.

Interesting; nobody mentioned a helmet yet, not even only a camo boonie with kevlar insert (protective function unsatisfactory, yet not completely absent).


We're still nowhere near the usual loads.

[jcustis]

A helmet was an ommission. I missed that it wasn't on the original list.

Even if they are only a few components in the kit, individual cleaning is indeed a required capability. I do not expect someone to help me remove a stuck casing, and even a quick brush down of the chamber and reapplication of lube during consolidation, post-attack. I'm not talking about scrubbing rust from thr outside of barrels when I refer to cleaning, and I don't want someone exposing themselves to hand a cleaning kit around. It's an inefficient waste of time.

We're still nowhere near the usual loads.

Please clarify what you mean. What usual loads? Which country's forces?

[Ken White]

Cleaning -while a personal responsibility with NCO oversight- does not require an individual kit.

What you wrote is accurate but it is subject to misinterpretation IMO.

The way it's seen by too many senior uniformed people -- Officer and NCO -- is that old saw "An organization does well onlt those things the Boss checks." That's a dangerous statement. It is indicative of a terribly flawed approach which actually relieves the individual of responsibility, is subject to misapplication, charges NCOs to 'supervise' or oversee a function in a manner that leads to oversupervision and micromanagement and which far from least important and in this particular case, causes troops to over-clean / over-maintain their weapons and equipment. Far more military small arms are ruined by excessive maintenance than by over use...

The individual has to be charged with and held responsible for all his own equipment and NCOs should check -- minimally -- only sporadically and somewhat superficially. In good units, this is the norm and the good NCOs simply keep an eye on their people and know who's taking care of their gear and who is not. Individual equipment checks and maintenance at all lulls and halts are vitally important habits.

Any suggestion that implies supervision is a key attribute will be misinterpreted to segue into micro management.

[Fuchs]

Micromanagement is by definition impossible if the NCO meets all his duties with adequate time effort each.
To micromanage means to spend much time on one or few things, which equals neglect of others because there's so much to do.

This is especially true if said NCO is forced by his supervisor to not exhaust himself (enough sleep on campaign), which is necessary because an exhausted NCO cannot lead by example any more.

[Ken White]

To micromanage means to spend much time on one or few things, which equals neglect of others because there's so much to do.

In US parlance, to micromanage generally involves excessive 'supervision' and failure to trust subordinates. Whether one task or a number, the degree of generally superfluous meddling is the issue.The US problem with micromanagement is, as someone stated elsewhere, generally at the Field Grade and above level. The Generals learned to do it in Korea after the line stabilized and they had little to do; Viet Nam merely made it worse and the current 'wars' have continued that. I recall someone in Afghanistan back in 2005 telling me that one operation required the approval of five General Officers and I'm sure that's worse today...

This is especially true if said NCO is forced by his supervisor to not exhaust himself (enough sleep on campaign), which is necessary because an exhausted NCO cannot lead by example any more.

True -- and a recurring US problem induced by our five day a week, forty hours of work mentality. While that 40 hours is rarely more than a floor in the Armed forces; how productive the usually extra 20 plus hours a week in garrison or on base are happens to be a separate question...

We're focused on short term efforts and the normal routine of four five days of field training a couple of weeks a month is not helpful. Everyone can stay awake for most of that so no one sets up rest and sleep plans...

[Fuchs]

We're focused on short term efforts and the normal routine of four five days of field training a couple of weeks a month is not helpful. Everyone can stay awake for most of that so no one sets up rest and sleep plans...

Reminds me of reports how company leaders inadvertently fell asleep in ODS and OIF on the fourth and fifth day, exhausted by not having had enough sleep.

Also reminds me of post-WW2 opinions that infantry and other combat troops should not use a garrison during their training phase, but live in woods for the duration of their training (this may be influenced by German early WW2 training shortages which were caused by a lack of garrisons for the training of more recruits, though).


It doesn't help regarding the weight problem, though.