COIN case: LRA Lords Resistance Army

[Ken White]

(How's that for a feeble Parthian shot as my horse limps over the hill with her hindquarters shot full of arrows?).

...and not feeble, no arrows.

[Bob's World]

I, for one, wish they'd learn down in Tampa what SF is really supposed to do and stop trying to force it into other things. The US needs competent conventional forces, it needs highly trained Shooters, Strat Recon and SF -- and those are four very different missions requiring, really, at least four different kinds of folks. The fact that SF can switch hit is a plus, no question -- but is it really desirable?

Amen. For what it's worth, there is confusion at Bragg and all of the TSOCs as well. We're working on it. In simple terms I say "we don't need SOCOM to be a bag of hammers." It's designed to be a diverse mix of tools to address a wide range of situations, but the focus of the past several years has shaped all of those tools into some variant of a hammer, IMO. As I said, we're working on it.

[M-A Lagrange]

From: RDC : Pouvoir - Opposition, tricherie contre contestation ?
http://afrique.kongotimes.info/rdc/r...testation.html

(I translate)
There is also the arrival of U.S. troops in Uganda, officially to hunt the LRA of Joseph Kony. Why these 100 U.S. military personnel have to be deployed in Uganda now, not after the elections in the DRC? These U.S. Marines came with sophisticated equipment that was not even waited by Ugandan officials. According to information relayed in The Monitor, the Ugandan army spokesman acknowledged that his army was surprised by the arrival of U.S. military hardware. Some sources claim that three Drones are also expected in the next few days in Kampala. These unmanned aircraft, which can be remotely from California, scare several senior African policy makers who fear their use for purposes other than tracking down the LRA of Joseph Kony.

What bothers African “policies makers” is not so much LRA than what US intend to do with 100 guys in Kampala.
But I personnaly think it's a good thing to have 100 US SOF ready to be deployed in Uganda. Just in case of... things turn ugly in Kinshasa.

[ganulv]

(I translate)
These U.S. Marines came with sophisticated equipment that was not even waited by Ugandan officials.

Does «marines américains» really mean U.S. Marines (i.e., from the USMC) or is it more likely that the writer’s frame of reference includes the French troupes de marine?

What bothers African “policies makers” is not so much LRA than what US intend to do with 100 guys in Kampala.
But I personnaly think it's a good thing to have 100 US SOF ready to be deployed in Uganda. Just in case of... things turn ugly in Kinshasa.

Is it too far fetched to wonder if the recent independence of South Sudan might factor into the deployment in some way?

[M-A Lagrange]

Does «marines américains» really mean U.S. Marines (i.e., from the USMC) or is it more likely that the writer’s frame of reference includes the French troupes de marine?



Is it too far fetched to wonder if the recent independence of South Sudan might factor into the deployment in some way?

Gav,

First: US marines means any US soldiers.
Seccondly: yes South Sudan is a matter of concern but with 100 green berets you can take Kinshasa and kill some LRA. But you have a limited impact on the North/South Sudan war to come.

[Dayuhan]

M-A...

You're closer to this than any of us, so a question:

In your opinion, how dependent is the LRA on the personal presence of Joseph Kony?

I realize that the group is split up and some parts may not be under Kony's direct control. At the same time, though, he's the founder, he's always been at the head of it, and there doesn't appear to be any real ideological agenda. I'm wondering if some level of superstition has emerged around him, as it sometimes does with these leaders... perhaps rumours of supernatural powers, invulnerability, the ability see faraway places and to track down and exert revenge on defectors. That sort of thing would be enhanced by his ability to survive, and can hold people even when he's not physically present.

I'm wondering only because the LRA seems to be as much a cult as a political movement... all speculative of course, but I have to wonder what impact Kony's death would have on the remaining groups that identify themselves as LRA.

Thoughts?

[M-A Lagrange]

Hey Dayuhan

In your opinion, how dependent is the LRA on the personal presence of Joseph Kony?

I realize that the group is split up and some parts may not be under Kony's direct control. At the same time, though, he's the founder, he's always been at the head of it, and there doesn't appear to be any real ideological agenda. I'm wondering if some level of superstition has emerged around him, as it sometimes does with these leaders... perhaps rumours of supernatural powers, invulnerability, the ability see faraway places and to track down and exert revenge on defectors. That sort of thing would be enhanced by his ability to survive, and can hold people even when he's not physically present.

I'm wondering only because the LRA seems to be as much a cult as a political movement... all speculative of course, but I have to wonder what impact Kony's death would have on the remaining groups that identify themselves as LRA.

In deed, Konhy has a strong hand on his troops. LRA use very low technical level of communication. Commanders take regularly orders from Konhy for a period that can be of several monthes. All orders are exchanged through direct communication between Konhy and his commanders. He call them regularly for meetings where they receive the commands from "god konhy". All of them are remains of the first LRA (Acholy ethnic base). When they are in the bush, they are capable to conduct quite well organised operations several weeks after receiving their orders. What keeps the things tide is their fear from Konhy and his super powers.


You are totally right by saying that Konhy has a cult rather than a political movement. Konhy rules by his personnal interpretation of the Bible and has been given super powers by God and the ancestors spirits (or something like that). His troops gives him power to see anywhere, to know what people think, the receive messages from spirits...
Actually only fools believe that LRA still has a political agenda (And those fools exist in various international organisations). Letting him grow by trying to negociate will give him a political agenda (as he will have a territory).

In my personnal understanding (But I might get it wrong), Konhy is the head of a sect which is trying to survive. He is not even the head of a terrorist group or what ever.

Now, the real question is if Konhy dies, what would do guys like Dominique (His first lieutenant)?
There are no response to this but what I can quietly assure is that they will not surrender.
They will probably keep on doing what they are doing because they have no ways to come back into society.

[Dayuhan]

Now, the real question is if Konhy dies, what would do guys like Dominique (His first lieutenant)?
There are no response to this but what I can quietly assure is that they will not surrender.
They will probably keep on doing what they are doing because they have no ways to come back into society.

I can see why the second tier of leaders wouldn't surrender... but would they have the power over the troops that Kony provides?

It seems universally agreed that the LRA rank and file were forcibly recruited, mostly as children. Many still are children. That raises the question of why they don't shoot the leaders and go home. Belief in Kony's supernatural powers is one answer, and I wonder if the second tier would have the same capacity to hold the troops. Of course fear of reprisal is another answer, and it's possible that LRA leaders emphasize barbarity precisely to assure that the troops will feel that have nowhere to go after what they've done.

[ganulv]

It seems universally agreed that the LRA rank and file were forcibly recruited, mostly as children. Many still are children. That raises the question of why they don't shoot the leaders and go home. Belief in Kony's supernatural powers is one answer, and I wonder if the second tier would have the same capacity to hold the troops. Of course fear of reprisal is another answer, and it's possible that LRA leaders emphasize barbarity precisely to assure that the troops will feel that have nowhere to go after what they've done.

I offer a question in response to your question—How many abusive parents ever have to go mano-a-mano with their children? Almost none. (I’ve known one person who decided he was going to give as good as he got from his dad and he ended up in juvenile detention for a couple of years for the trouble.)

[Dayuhan]

I know there's no absolute answer and you don't have the supernatural powers of Joseph Kony... just asking your opinion!

[Dayuhan]

I offer a question in response to your question—How many abusive parents ever have to go mano-a-mano with their children? Almost none. (I’ve known one person who decided he was going to give as good as he got from his dad and he ended up in juvenile detention for a couple of years for the trouble.)

Many of those press-ganged by the LRA as children are now well into adulthood. I imagine your average abusive dad would feel a bit insecure if his former punching bag was now 20 and walking around the house with an assault rifle.

[carl]

That raises the question of why they don't shoot the leaders and go home.

Peter Singer wrote a very good book called Children at War that covers that. The methods by which they take charge of the child's mind seem almost standardized and are extremely effective. Once the children are removed from their social and family support mechanism they are very malleable. Scarily so. And when their minds are reformed, it doesn't take much to make it stick. If you grasp the basics, and are brutal enough, if you were able to get any group of 14 year olds and have exclusive control of them for two weeks, at the end of that time they would be killing their parents willingly. Like I said, very scary.

The book has the best explanation of the phenomanon (sic) that I've read.

Moderator adds

Link to the cited book, by Peter Singer and published in 2006:http://www.amazon.com/Children-at-Wa...9197163&sr=1-1

[M-A Lagrange]

Just to complete Carl's excellent reading recommendation, specifically on LRA in North Uganda you have:
First Kill Your Family: Child Soldiers of Uganda and the Lord's Resistance Army
For having discussed the subject with friends who worked in Child soldiers reintegration and for having collected several testimonies my self, those kids gives you creeps when they tell you what they did to survive.
Cause in the end, for a 8 to 12 years old boy or girl, it's all about survival of the fittest.

Moderator adds

Link to the cited book, by Peter Eichstaedt and published in 2009:http://www.amazon.com/First-Kill-You.../dp/1556527993

[Bill Moore]

This is the best open source description I have found of the LRA's tactics, weapons, use of technology, etc. Well worth the read for those interested.

http://www.enoughproject.org/files/p.../lra_today.pdf

The ongoing Ugandan army offensive against the LRA and renewed interest on the LRA issue in the West spurred by a bill recently signed in the United States necessitate a better understanding of how the LRA operates. A thorough analysis of the LRA’s modus operandi, leadership, and aims is lacking, even though substantive assets and valuable time are spent fighting the rebels by the Ugandan army with support from the U.S. government.

It seems overtly difficult to engage a group of fighters, whether militarily or peacefully, without knowing what they stand for. Such lack of understanding, arguably throughout the entire existence of the LRA, has played a significant role in the failure to resolve the conflict. Erroneous descriptions of the LRA as a Christian fundamentalist group composed of drugged children led by a madman have led to a profound underestimation of the strength and military ability of the LRA.

http://www.theatlantic.com/internati...e-army/246836/

Since the late 1980s, the Ugandan government has tried several times to defeat the LRA or at least compel it to disarm. It even created a senior position dedicated to this cause; the Minister of State for Pacification of Northern Uganda. The first person to hold this office, Betty Bigombe, negotiated directly with Kony, deep-jungle meetings that many of her staffers refused to attend for fear that they would be maimed or killed. But President Museveni squashed Bigombe's hopeful 1994 peace talks, and others since then. Museveni has good reason to want fighting to continue. He is still unpopular in the north, and the LRA gives him good reason to fill that once rebellious region with his troops. They've also given him an opportunity forcibly relocate a number of "vulnerable" northern Ugandans into displacement camps, where he said they might be more easily protected. The LRA's bloody attacks also provide a rallying point for once-fractured Uganda, a common enemy that keeps everyone in line. Whatever Museveni's brutalities, the LRA will always be worse.

U.S. assistance hasn't done much to help. In 2002, the Ugandan military launched a U.S.-aided campaign called Iron Fist against LRA camps in Uganda's north and Sudan's south. The U.S. had pushed the Sudanese government to allow the incursions; it also provided logistical and intelligence support to the 10,000 troops that Museveni sent against Kony. The LRA leadership escaped unscathed. A second Iron Fist campaign in 2004 pushed much of the LRA into Sudan and the neighboring Democratic Republic of Congo but did little else. Kony was later pushed even further west in the Central African Republic.

[Bill Moore]

Based on my reading it appears that President Yoweri Museveni and Kony mutually benefit one another, each provides the other the justification for attempting to expand their power base. Interesting that Museveni may be attempting to undermine/weaken the AU role against the LRA. The U.S. with some success has pushed hard for African solutions to African problems, so whether militarily successful or not, it is politically successful when regional organizations act together to address regional security threats.

While this organization appears to be well informed, it is worth noting that they are very close to the White House so there may be some bias in their slant.

http://www.enoughproject.org/blogs/u...s-lra-end-them

Another potentially critical development is the proposed African Union mission. The plans being finalized would include regional military operations and an A.U. special envoy for the LRA. The mission could provide a multilateral and African partner for a surge of commitment and resources from the U.S. and other countries. However, there are several problems with the A.U. mission as currently proposed, namely:
• Without a surge of U.S. diplomacy and resources, and the engagement of additional partners, the mission is simply a new face for the same faltering efforts.
• However, instead of enhancing the existing operations, the current plans for the A.U. mission appear more concerned with continuing the status quo while attracting funding for the regional governments via the A.U.
• Some governments involved, primarily Uganda, are attempting to weaken the proposed A.U. special envoy position—a post that could invaluably address the intraregional tensions that have inhibited cooperation and coordination on addressing the LRA crisis—and the A.U.’s overall ownership of the mission.

[M-A Lagrange]

In African jungle, US group using new radios to fight vicious militia hunted by US troops
As Ugandan troops track the LRA through the jungle, assisted by U.S. intelligence and special forces advisers, the Crisis Tracker is garnering praise from the U.S. government. Obama, in announcing the U.S. deployments, congratulated Americans who have “mobilized to respond to this unique crisis of conscience.”
“The Crisis Tracker is a really innovative tool, and will be useful as we seek to enhance information-sharing among all protection actors in the LRA-affected area,” the State Department’s Bureau of African Affairs said in a statement.
A spokesman for the U.S. military’s Africa command, Ken Fidler, said the military is aware of the Crisis Tracker website, but he couldn’t reveal whether or how the military is using the information, other than the fact the military gathers information from a variety of sources.

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...u0M_story.html

The LRA crisis tracker website: http://www.lracrisistracker.com/

To follow the LRA in almost real time

[Bill Moore]

The LRA crisis tracker is great illustration on how information technology can be leveraged to break through the stove pipes and leverage the entire population for near real time situational awareness, which expontentially increases our information/intelligence collecting capacity.

There are quite a few in the U.S. military that understand the power of this technology and how to use it, but still too many chicken hawks trapped in old ways of thinking and operating that are preventing us from using it to its maximum advantage.

[M-A Lagrange]

You can find the last ICG report on LRA there: http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/region...-end-game.aspx

After the UN security council congratulating himself for all the good job they did not do, this is kind of fresh air.

RECOMMENDATIONS
For mustering and maintaining political will
To the African Union:
1. Appoint urgently a special envoy with a robust mandate to coordinate African and other international efforts against the LRA, including by persuading:
a) President Museveni to commit more troops and equipment to the military operation while increasing efforts to protect civilians and rendering it more accountable; and
b) Presidents Kabila (DRC), Boziz (the CAR) and Kiir (South Sudan) to grant the Ugandan army access to all areas where the LRA is active for six months, reviewable after five months, and to instruct their armies to increase civilian protection.
2. Set up the special envoys office with sufficient staff, equipment and resources to operate for at least one year.
To the Government of Uganda:
3. Demonstrate full commitment to anti-LRA efforts by accepting a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated AU special envoy; committing more troops and equipment to the military operation while rendering it more accountable; and increasing efforts to protect civilians.
To the Governments of the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan:
4. Demonstrate full commitment to anti-LRA efforts by accepting a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated special envoy; granting the Ugandan army access to all LRA-affected areas; and ensuring national armies increase efforts to protect civilians.
To the U.S. Government:
5. Support fully the launch of a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated special envoy.
6. Maintain pressure on Uganda, the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan to commit fully to a multi-dimensional AU initiative, including a robustly-mandated special envoy.
7. Be prepared, along with other donors, to scale down military and development assistance if the four presidents fail to demonstrate appropriate commitment.
8. Appoint a special envoy for the Great Lakes region to work with the AU special envoy in mustering political commitment for anti-LRA efforts.
To the EU:
9. Provide funds to the AU enabling it to set up an office for the special envoy with sufficient resources to lead anti-LRA efforts for at least one year and to establish a Regional Intervention Force (RIF).
For launching an urgent military push prioritising civilian protection
To the Governments of Uganda and the U.S.:
10. Intensify promptly military operations against the LRA, prioritising:
a) increased efforts to protect civilians;
b) enhanced civil-military relations, including by setting up two-way channels of communication with state authorities and other local leaders, such as church leaders and customary chiefs, and, in the CAR and South Sudan, by working closely with self-defence groups;
c) enhanced information management and coordination, including by setting up joint intelligence and operations centres with national armies in the CAR and South Sudan; and
d) strict accountability measures, including by implementing a code of conduct, rules of engagement and investigations of alleged human rights abuses and accusations of illegal exploitation of natural resources.
To the African Union:
11. Finalise the operational and legal framework for a Regional Intervention Force (RIF) that includes the priorities set out in Recommendation 10 above, as well as the standard operating procedures used by the Ugandan army stipulating the quick transfer of women and children LRA escapees to international protection agencies.
For intensifying complementary civilian efforts
To the UN Stabilisation Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO), the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) and the UN Peacebuilding Office in the CAR (BINUCA):
12. Coordinate a region-wide Disarmament, Demobilisation, Repatriation, Resettlement and Reintegration (DDRRR) program, including by:
a) expanding the communication campaign that encourages LRA fighters to surrender so it covers the whole tri-border region and continue it until LRA groups no longer pose a threat to civilians; and
b) coordinating efforts of international and national NGOs and church groups in the DRC, the CAR and South Sudan to help former LRA members return home safely and reintegrate into civilian life including through job creation programs and psycho-social care.
To the U.S. Government, the EU, the UN and other donors:
13. Support development and implementation of a region-wide DDRRR program and the repair and improvement of communications and transport infrastructure in the LRA-affected area.
For planning ahead
To the AU and its international partners:
14. Draw up a clear exit strategy that foresees the RIF in operation for one year and review after eight months whether a half-year extension is needed.
15. Plan to maintain and support the RIF and DDRRR operations after Kony and his top commanders are caught or killed, until residual LRA groups no longer pose a threat to civilians.
16. Request RIF participating countries to transfer the LRA leaders against whom the International Criminal Court (ICC) has issued arrest warrants (Kony, Odhiambo and Ongwen) to the ICC if they are captured and to hand over other LRA commanders not subject to such arrest warrants to the authorities of their country for prosecution or other appropriate accountability processes.
Nairobi/Brussels, 17 November 2011

[M-A Lagrange]

General: U.S. troops’ Uganda mission likely to last until rebel leader is caught
Ham said the plan is to keep troops in the region until Kony is killed or brought to justice.
“That’s the mission,” Ham said in an interview during a visit to Washington last week.
The Lord’s Resistance Army has been fighting against the Ugandan government and attacking civilians for nearly a quarter century, but Ham predicted that the group “will probably wither” if Kony is apprehended
“This is not like another organization where if you take the top guy out somebody else can step in,” Ham said. “It really is about him personally.”

http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/...ScN_story.html

[davidbfpo]

A question posed by Kingjaja on a post elsewhere and moved for him.

Meanwhile, how long do you estimate it will take to catch Joseph Kony? Is the US sending troops to Central Africa to nab Kony or to keep a tab on goings-on in the Congo?