Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan

[omarali50]

I will bite; We can look at things at many levels, and all are valid in their own way. In this case, I was not looking at either the details of administration or military tactics and capacity (e.g. how corrupt is Zardari? how competent is Rahman Malik? what is the tactical plan for conquering Afghanistan? etc etc), I was looking at what I imagine to be "deeper trends" whose actual working out can be very unexpected and even paradoxical. My thinking is based on some extension of the following:

1. There is a certain network of ideas that is built around the "two-nation theory"and "an Islamic system of government". These ideas (like all such ideas) are partly someone's idea of "this works well to achieve my immediate and practical political aims", but they do have their own momentum and some sort of elastic but not infinitely elastic limits about what can be done in their name.
2. The second is a live issue in all Muslim countries and may eventually develop into a workable system (Iranians claim they have one example, though I personally think its workable parts are derived from Western sources and its problem areas from Shia theology and the two have not been fused as successfully as the Iranian regime sometimes claims). The first is a peculiarly Pakistani (or Indian) issue and is much shallower than the second. The second will eventually throw up workable systems, the first cannot bear the weight of any actual contact with reality and all attempts to align it too closely with actual practice run into brick walls that are visible to outsiders but sometimes invisible to true believers. These are large claims. I can write a book about them and not answer all possible questions. But with time we can clarify what I mean.

3. These ideas (two nation theory or TNT in all its manifestations, and “Islamic system of govt” as currently imagined in Pakistan though not necessarily in all future forms) are inherently illiberal (in the classic sense of the word liberal) and difficult to reconcile with currently fashionable notions of nation states and their permissible aims and methods. To make Pakistan work as a modern nation state, they have to be "defanged", e.g. by being relegated to meaningless propaganda rather than being used as actual guides for decision making. The Pakistani state initially ignored some of their implications because the administrative apparatus and political forces were creations of British India and in practice (if not always in name) they functioned like any other post-colonial state derived from the British empire (naturally, with many local variations and historical contingencies). But over time, the karma of British raj is fading and what is being put in its place is insufficiently imagined (and, in my view, see 2 above, the Pakistani elite cannot possibly find the a way to make it “sufficiently imagined”).

4. The army, for various reasons, has systematically undermined the British colonial administration and the parliamentary system created in Pakistan in 1969 (and formalized in 1973). But it has nothing to put in its place except its own organizational strength and a superficial and shallow ideology of “Paknationalism”. Not only is this inherently flawed, the army leadership lacks the intellectual ability to even comprehend what the problem may be. It is constantly surprised by the fact that its “patriotic” attempts to save Pakistan reliably end with public upheaval and ever more serious fractures in the ideological foundations of the state. But over time, the army has improved and perfected its levers for manipulating public opinion and politics at least within the Pakistani elite. The entire elite (not just the army high command) tends to mindlessly repeat some (but never all) of the army’s own shallow and self-destructive worldview.


5. In the 1980s, general Zia and his henchmen added a more potent form of Islamism to the army’s toolkit. This new addition was never a majority view, even within the army. Its hardcore is relatively small and their full set of beliefs still has the capacity to shock naïve bystanders. But this jihadist hardcore has successfully manipulated the anti-Indian obsessions of the majority (those derived in turn from the so-called “two nation theory”) to get its way. For example, what sane military high command would actively encourage, support and facilitate the creation of multiple militant armies WITHIN its own state, all led by fanatical ideologues and all protected from “ordinary” law enforcement by the army and its ubiquitous intelligence agencies? Yet that is exactly what the “secular” officers of the Pak army did in the 1990s (see the moron Musharraf for details). EVERY village has some youngsters who were trained in jihadi camps and madressas that provide new recruits. Dozens of such organizations long ago escaped from their controllers and creators and became autonomous. Even those that are still in control (e.g. LET) are committed to an ideology that is completely at odds with the existing “system”. Many armed men have become professional kidnappers, extortionists etc. It’s a recipe for disaster and its STILL cooking.

6. 9-11 created an opportunity to bring this monster under control. That attempt was undermined by continued to commitment to the (irrational) anti-Indian component of Paknationalism, which in turn led to policy decisions that distinguished between “good” and “bad” jihadis and aimed for a vision of “India-free Afghanistan” that doomed the entire enterprise.


7. Departure of American forces and receding American influence will be followed by a return to “full-frontal” paknationalism. This will initially look like an improvement to many people. Maybe there will be more effective administration in the core areas. But the jihadi problem will become even more acute. It has been built up as an alternative to the existing (barely existing) political system based on parliamentary democracy and the “Wesphalian” state. The army imagines that everything will be fine because their own organization will run the country so there is no need for “bloody politicians”. They have no idea with which to provide legitimacy to that state beyond their juvenile notion of paknationalism. They don’t know what disasters await them once the “bloody politicians” are all put in their place and the existing decaying state structure is further undermined. They also have no idea of the differences between their own position and the position of the Chinese communist party in China. They also think their Chinese patrons will take up the slack where Uncle Sam left off. That will not happen. The effects of operating without a near-coherent ideology are not immediate, but they are very persistent and cumulative. Disaster will follow.

Got to run, but you may be starting to see what I mean….more to follow.

[omarali50]

http://tribune.com.pk/story/259459/w...tan-should-do/

[davidbfpo]

The BBC's headline and some appropriate quotes:

Afghan President Hamid Karzai has said his government will no longer hold peace talks with the Taliban. He said the killing of Burhanuddin Rabbani had convinced him to focus on dialogue with Pakistan.

Mr Karzai, speaking to a group of religious leaders, said there were no partners for dialogue among the Taliban. It was not possible to find the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, he added. "Where is he? We cannot find the Taliban Council. Where is it?" he said.

"A messenger comes disguised as a Taliban Council member and kills, and they neither confirm nor reject it. Therefore, we cannot talk to anyone but to Pakistan," Mr Karzai told the meeting.

"Who is the other side in the peace process? I do not have any other answer but to say Pakistan is the other side in the peace talks with us."

Link:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-15134128

Being unable to phone Mullah Omar is a potentially new factor, given the previous reported history of all Afghan power-brokers being able to call each other. Is this a spin-off from drone avoidance?

[Bob's World]

Not saying that politicians lie... but I question both the veracity and the purpose of this announcement.

If I was a cop working a murder investigation on Rabanni, Mr K. would definitely be a person of interest. He has far more motive than the Taliban does in sidelining the reconciiation process.

I also find it odd, that a man who freely admits to meeting with Taliban leaders, and who has threatened to join the Taliban last April when frustrated with his ISAF allies pressuring him to implement governmental reforms; suddenly has no idea how to make contact. Right.

[davidbfpo]

Robert,

Perhaps I should amend my comment:

Is this a spin-off from drone avoidance?

To is this a spin-off from responsibility avoidance?

The new inability to call the Taliban struck me as laughable; Afghan tradition of talking to all, including your enemy, maybe amended slightly as others listen in.

[Bob's World]

I believe that GIRoA has pretty firmly established that they have no intent to expand governance beyond the control of the former Northern Alliance, or to share in any way with those who we helped them to displace. So long as we are dedicated to protecting the status quo with ISAF I believe that they will tell us what we want to hear, and then generally let it ride.

Perhaps if we left they would get serious about talks to avoid open civil war; but that is impossible to predict.

The key thing for the West to stay focused on is that we went there to punish AQ, and that the key to evicting AQ from AF/PAK lies with the Taliban, not with GIRoA or Pakistan. Nieither government can, nor sees it in their interest to do so. Efforts to preserve GIRoA or create some sort of mini-me modern state in Afghanistan are well intended, but I don't see how they are cost effective or helpful toward reaching our primary goal.

[Dayuhan]

I believe that GIRoA has pretty firmly established that they have no intent to expand governance beyond the control of the former Northern Alliance, or to share in any way with those who we helped them to displace.

Surely nobody expected that sharing was ever going to be part of this picture.

Perhaps if we left they would get serious about talks to avoid open civil war; but that is impossible to predict.

Since neither side would see "talks" as anything but a device to advance their own plans for victory and control, it hardly matters. As Omar has pointed out (correctly IMO) the Taliban aren't after reconciliation, they're after victory. There's little reason to think an American departure would change that.

The key thing for the West to stay focused on is that we went there to punish AQ, and that the key to evicting AQ from AF/PAK lies with the Taliban, not with GIRoA or Pakistan.

The Taliban could probably evict AQ, but they aren't going to do it because we want them to. They may be a key, but it's not a key that has any incentive to cooperate with us.

[davidbfpo]

As we ponder where the Afghan roadmap is heading today it is fitting to look back before 9/11/2001 and the linked article looks at the late Abdul Haq's Afghan solution:http://www.spectator.co.uk/essays/al...ot-taken.thtml

From my faraway armchair I paused reading this:

The West’s decision to work with (and pay) Afghan strongmen or warlords was flawed from the start. It revealed a complete failure to understand the desires and needs of the ordinary Afghans who would in the end determine the outcome of the war. Ordinary Afghans wanted justice, security, good governance involving the local leadership, and services. Instead, the West is perceived to have delivered an unwanted regime, visceral corruption and spiralling insecurity. By ignoring ordinary Afghans, the West drove many of them back to the Taleban.

The author is Lucy Morgan Edwards, a former political aviser to the EU ambassador in Kabul and author of 'The Afghan Solution: the Inside Story of Abdul Haq, the CIA and How Western Hubris Lost Afghanistan':http://lucymorganedwards.com/

[Steve the Planner]

David:

The same identical story, along with the pro-King structure, is what is consistently referenced by the Harvard/Carr School cohort, whose knowledge base extends before 2001, and beyond US/ISAF.

The core problem is: Given this, then what?

It keeps coming back to this idea of a very loose national structure (that may, actually dissolve or become irrelevant), and a very de-centralized structure (some of which will be terrible (in our eyes).

The Lords of Kandahar. The Mayor of Kabul. The Northern Alliance. None is 9or possibly has any interest in) national or nation-state issues, except to the extent they affect their turf.

[Bob's World]

Surely nobody expected that sharing was ever going to be part of this picture.



Since neither side would see "talks" as anything but a device to advance their own plans for victory and control, it hardly matters. As Omar has pointed out (correctly IMO) the Taliban aren't after reconciliation, they're after victory. There's little reason to think an American departure would change that.



The Taliban could probably evict AQ, but they aren't going to do it because we want them to. They may be a key, but it's not a key that has any incentive to cooperate with us.

"Sharing" is the essence of stabilty. They either share or they fight, their choice. Similarly with talks, but this is a culture that is much more open to talking with opponents that our own is. "Victory" is not ours to define, and I doubt Omar's definition is an all or nothing one. He knows he has a broad powerful base of support in Afghanistan that has historically dominated. Really not our concern. I do think they can learn to adopt more balanced approaches than the historic all or nothing, but it is not our job to make that happen.

As to the Taliban motivation to evict AQ, if we make them the right offer, they will take it. Happened in Anbar, happened in Mindanao, it can happen in AF/PAK. None of those had much to do with military tactics. Karzai abandoned the US years ago. I feel no loyalty there. Same with Pakistan. We dragged the Paks into this against their will and interests and now get upset when they don't do what we want. Silly. We need to just be as pragmatic as all the other players in the region are.

[Dayuhan]

"Sharing" is the essence of stabilty. They either share or they fight, their choice. Similarly with talks, but this is a culture that is much more open to talking with opponents that our own is. "Victory" is not ours to define, and I doubt Omar's definition is an all or nothing one. He knows he has a broad powerful base of support in Afghanistan that has historically dominated. Really not our concern. I do think they can learn to adopt more balanced approaches than the historic all or nothing, but it is not our job to make that happen.

Sharing may be the essence of stability, but stability may not be everybody's preferred outcome. I very much doubt that sharing power with the Karzai government is on any of the Taliban agendas, except as a transitory step toward full control.

Of course it's not our problem. We can walk away. This will be chalked up as defeat, especially if (as is likely) the Taliban win and AQ resettle, but we've survived that before and we'll survive it again. In some ways that most pragmatic outcome would be to impose something resembling a negotiated solution for just long enough to declare victory and bolt, knowing full well that it will collapse... but of course that will be pretty transparent.

As to the Taliban motivation to evict AQ, if we make them the right offer, they will take it. Happened in Anbar, happened in Mindanao, it can happen in AF/PAK.

No such thing has happened in Mindanao.

If we leave with tail between legs, what are we supposed to offer to a new government that will produce a renunciation of AQ. What's to stop them from doing exactly what the Pakistanis are doing now: accepting the deal, taking whatever we offer, and not delivering on their end of the deal?

I would not count on being able to negotiate the Taliban into renouncing AQ,

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

The right deal for the Taliban: Leave and don't come back. Leave it to us.

The problem of face-saving. How do we make this look like a win-win?

[Dayuhan]

Dayuhan:

The right deal for the Taliban: Leave and don't come back. Leave it to us.

The problem of face-saving. How do we make this look like a win-win?

Since we've already publicly embraced the goal of keeping the Taliban out, it would be hard to pitch that deal as a win-win in any credible way. If the Taliban actually did keep AQ out we could claim that as a win... but would they? Maybe, if they believed we'd come back if they didn't, but would they believe that?

If we had gone the Ken White route, come in, kicked some backside, and left while we were still fearsome... then yes, the possibility of a return would be very real and there would be real concern about not provoking a return. If the prevailing belief is that we were driven out, that sentiment is unlikely to prevail.

[Steve the Planner]

Right.

My understanding is that "the" Taliban long-ago indicated that it would not sponsor AQ IF we left (Leave first, trust us).

The problem of unscrambling who the Taliban actually is remains as local fighters bring long traditions of opposition to foreign forces, the official Taliban was already on its last legs in Afghanistan before we came along, and, as with Karzai's latest pronouncements, Pakistan is probably the controlling factor to negotiate with anyway (as most on this site have known for a long time).

[omarali50]

I think there is a substrate of Afghans who just hate infidels and foreigners ruling them and there are local grievances in the Pashtoon areas and so on, but the eye does not see what the mind does not know: I think most "sensible" commentators in the West have a very incomplete notion of the Islamist and paknationalist ideals that flow FROM educated modern Islamists in Pakistan (and beyond) down to the Afghans, not the other way round. Traditional notions of pakhtoon hospitality, honor and religious pride are used by these higher order forces to secure a physical base for a dream that extends beyond that rather primitive base. It certainly extends to central Asia and India, and in the next phase, to Iran and China, but does not necessarily extend to the US in any realistic way...so the argument that its not America's problem is still an argument that can be made. But at the same time, it would be silly to think that the cadres (and their mentors in factions in higher level positions in Pakistan) who determinedly resisted the "de-quaida-fication" of Waziristan and other tribal agencies in the face of drone attacks, monetary rewards, Pak army double dealing and so on, will suddenly want to "de-quaida-fy" their newly liberated Islamic state of talibanistan once NATO pulls out of Eastern Afghanistan? No way.
Again, an argument could be made that its not really America's problem. Vigorous (and frequently unconstitutional) law enforcement, spying on people with freshly sprouted beards, reducing contacts with Pakistan and Afghanistan, drones and so on, all that would make it difficult for anyone to "repeat 9-11" even if the liberated "first Islamic soviet zone" extended further into Afghanistan. But if anyone (hint hint, Robert sahib) is imagining that you can negotiate a deal with the Taliban where they win and still change their policy towards hardcore Islamist militants..that is unrealistic. Local Afghan issues are irretrievably entangled with larger Islamist dreams in the hardcore Islamist faction in the region..and (shades of the Bolsheviks), the hardcore is more likely to grab power than any softer alternative...useful idiots will be used, but will not remain in charge for too long.

[Bob's World]

No such thing has happened in Mindanao.

Actually it did, but such things are very temporary in nature when not followed up with significant changes in governance. One can rent stability, but not buy it.

[Dayuhan]

Actually it did, but such things are very temporary in nature when not followed up with significant changes in governance. One can rent stability, but not buy it.

If we're talking about anyone renouncing AQ or anyone else in return for a US offer of favors, no such thing has happened in Mindanao.

The overt AQ presence in Mindanao withdrew by 94/95, not because of any US offer but because they'd lost control of the ASG and Manila operations had been rolled up. Contact and limited cooperation with elements of the MILF continued, but with little actual AQ presence.

JI presence has continued and continues to this day; it fluctuates largely according to the degree of heat JI people are feeling in Indonesia, not according to anything the US does.

ASG recruitment and manpower has been impacted not by the carrot but by the stick: shutting down the KFR and banditry operations has largely removed the profit motive that drew fighters to ASG in the first place. Popular sympathy continues, not because anyone in Basilan or Jolo gives a flying &%$# about a jihadi agenda, but because any Muslim fighting the government will always have support: that's about clan, tribe, and blood affiliation, us and them, not ideology.

At no point has the US (or for that matter the Philippine Government) ever made a deal leading to the severing of ties with international terror groups, explicitly or implicitly.

A long way from Afghanistan, yes, but if we're going to cite a precedent there ought to be one. In this case there isn't.

[davidbfpo]

A long press article, which includes pro & con views of the reconciliation programme:

More than 2,700 insurgents have been reintegrated into mainstream Afghan society since October 2010, with 800 now described as “showing interest in leaving the Taliban”. Of those, about 90 are from Helmand...The reintegration policy has already produced some startling results. In northern Afghanistan, about 900 former Taliban have left the insurgency and violence has decreased by 30 per cent.

This quote has a wider application as it concerns the motivation to fight:

Research had shown that many join the insurgency because of a grievance that is not addressed by central government. Some Afghan men turn to the Taliban for help. In Helmand, for example, the governor of the province believes that the insurgency could be reduced by 25 per cent if disputes over land rights could be resolved.

The contrary view:

Hanif Atmar, a former interior minister, said last week: “Of around 30,000 insurgents, only eight per cent have reconciled so far — and 99 per cent of them are not from the south. “Frankly speaking, it does not work. The eight per cent that are reconciled, most of them are not genuine insurgents, particularly not from the regions that matter.”

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...-fighting.html

[davidbfpo]

An odd article in the Daily Telegraph, I say odd as it has no author or cited source, it opens with:

Prominent al-Qaeda and Afghan Taliban fighters asked Pakistani militants in a pair of rare meetings to set aside their differences and step up support for the battle against US-led forces in Afghanistan, militant commanders said on Monday.

Link:http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worl...ght-US-forces.

It's almost as if AQ & PTT have issued a press release.

I note the calls for unity, stopping factional violence and that the PTT should help more in Afghanistan - the small matter of which many expect ISI would echo, if not facilitate.

This could be posted on a Pakistani thread and of late I've posted contrary information on dissension between the Taliban and PTT. See Post 188: http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...t=8689&page=10

[davidbfpo]

An interesting Reuters article, hat tip to the Lowy Institute, in part reflective on the situation in Afghanistan and after reading a new book (due out on the 18th January 2012):http://blogs.reuters.com/pakistan/20...n-afghanistan/

But what are we actually looking at here? A quick-fix settlement that could provide just about enough cover for war-weary western governments to pull their troops out before Afghanistan descends again into civil war? Or a serious process which might offer an enduring peace? Do we believe the Taliban are now more amenable to talks than they were before? Or rather that domestic political compulsions in the United States are driving it more rapidly towards the exit?

Let’s be clear. The idea the Taliban would be willing to negotiate some kind of power-sharing deal, and that talks could be helped by measures like the release of prisoners, has been around for a couple of years, if not longer. Moreover, a lasting settlement would require not just a deal with the Afghan Taliban led by Mullah Mohammed Omar, but also reconciliation among all the different actors inside Afghanistan as well as deep-rooted governance reform.

One hopes that the ISAF tactic of eliminating parts of the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan has considered this point:

Arguably the chances of reaching a lasting settlement are less now than they were before the United States sent extra troops to Afghanistan in 2010 aiming to decisively turn the tide and force the Taliban to the negotiating table from a position of strength. Since then, the military campaign has splintered the Taliban, making it harder for its Pakistan-based leadership to bring younger and more radicalised fighters into an overall settlement.

The new book is:

... by Kandahar-based researchers Alex Strick van Linschoten and Felix Kuehn could hardly be better timed. “An Enemy We Created, The Myth of the Taliban/Al Qaeda Merger in Afghanistan, 1970-2010” should be compulsory reading for anyone trying to separate reality from political spin. It is also an essential guide to what might yet be achieved through talks, and what might have been achieved had serious talks been held earlier.

Link to publisher's notice, with some impressive reviewers quoted:http://www.hurstpub.co.uk/BookDetails.aspx?BookId=661 and the book's website:http://www.anenemywecreated.com/An_E...d/Welcome.html

I know there is a long-running SWC thread 'Reconciliation and COIN in Afghanistan', but for now this deserves a new thread. For reference the thread is on:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ead.php?t=6048