Deterrence of Irregular Threats

[Bob's World]

I'm getting a little lost here. How is deterrence different from suppression? - suppression, meaning a failure to act through fear of harm.

In order to deter, you merely have to present a credible and lethal threat (capability plus an intent). The perception of that threat means the other side is either suppressed from action or not.

What am I missing here?

I think it comes up short. How do I make a quasi-state actor like Hezbollah "fear" me if I have constrained myself by granting them an artificial sanctuary based upon their status? Do I violate the soveriegnty of Lebannon to do so? To what potential provocation of other actors? Do I punish the populace of Lebanon? Again, to what potential provocation of others?

This recalculation of the deterrent and provocative effect across the spectrum is the essence, in my mind of shaping more holistic and effective schemes of both deterrence, but also COAs of responses.

How does one deter a non-state like AQ? Do I violate the soverignty of the state they take sanctuary within to attack AQ? Do I attack the state? Do I attack the members whereever I might find them? Again, to what second and third order effects of provocation across this expanded list of actors?

Old think of simply making the cost exceed the benefit for one particular actor or category of actor falls far short these days.

Similarly how does one deter an insurgent Saudi populace that perceives that they must first break the protective support of the US Govt to their own before they can achieve change at home? Fire missiles into their homes in Mecca? In this case I believe these groups are best deterred indirectly by addressing the perceptions of inappropriate legitimacy over their government at a minimum, and by also enabling evolution of better governance in these important states where we do have critical national interests that require our presence.

I don't have the answers, but do believe that the old model is dangerously lacking for the current environment.

[William F. Owen]

I think it comes up short. How do I make a quasi-state actor like Hezbollah "fear" me if I have constrained myself by granting them an artificial sanctuary based upon their status? Do I violate the soveriegnty of Lebannon to do so? To what potential provocation of other actors? Do I punish the populace of Lebanon? Again, to what potential provocation of others?

Well you've already painted yourself into a corner, with all those highly contextual assumptions presented as questions. If Hezbollah believes you are constrained by those assumptions, they simply will not take you seriously. Very simply, if you cannot make them physically fearful for their lives and all they love, you cannot deter them.

I suspect that the recalculation of the deterrent your leadership will opt for is bargaining, and diplomacy because the political will to deter, does not actually exist, despite the language.

[Entropy]

In this case I believe these groups are best deterred indirectly by addressing the perceptions of inappropriate legitimacy over their government at a minimum, and by also enabling evolution of better governance in these important states where we do have critical national interests that require our presence.

This would seem to change the traditional notion of deterrence significantly. A primary component of deterrence is fear - either the fear of repercussions of an action, or fear of failure or whatever. It seems to me if one takes the fear out then it's not deterrence anymore, but something else.

BTW, you are probably familiar with this:

Deterrence (Old View)-The prevention from action by fear of the consequences. Deterrence is a state of mind brought about by the existence of a credible threat of unacceptable counteraction. (Joint Pub 1-02 definition)

vs.

Strategic Deterrence (New View) --The prevention of adversary aggression or coercion that threatens vital interests of the United States and/or our national survival. Strategic deterrence convinces adversaries not to take grievous courses of action by means of decisive influence over their decision making.

Again, while I don't think that "new view" is invalid as a concept, I don't think it's "deterrence." Perhaps "strategic influence" is a better term or something else.

[Entropy]

Wilf raises an excellent point that deterrence is dependent upon credibility and if the adversary believes you are constrained (for any number of reasons) from acting, then deterrence has failed.