Quote Originally Posted by Gian P Gentile View Post
Niel:

At least with the slide I could understand your implied point to it.

But the implied point is the problem since it is fundamentally a slide that depicts the premise to population centric counterinsurgency and the usual critique of how the American Army doesn't get coin because we dont get the political aspect of it and only want to do tactics whereas the insurgent does and focuses on politics. Mao, Galula as opposite sides to the people's war construct would accept you slide and its implications. But why do you think it is relevant for today? Does the triangle for the insurgent fit the local villagers in the Korengal Valley?

Too, the implication to your slide for the "correct" action on the part of the American counterinsurgent is to invert our triangle so that the majority of our focus is on the political like the insurgents. But the flaw with this approach just like it is with the American Army's current flaw in how we have templated Galula and Thompson which is to treat counterinsurgency as a symmetrical response to a perceived people's war. This is why I have argued that CE Callwell's book still has relevance and insights for today in that he saw small wars as essentially wars to create moral effects among local populations and leaders but saw the use of military force not in symmetrical but asymmetrical sense.

some thoughts from the other side, thanks for posting your slide.
Sir,

Good point. This slide (as you can see), doesn't give the answer, and neither does the discussion of it.

What it attempts to do is highlight what the average Stage 1/2 insurgent is doing in a broad sense. Ahmed the IED emplacer is not thinking in these terms. But his leadership knows that his IED strikes and attacks have political value far more than their tactical value.

Examples:

* COP Wanat battle. Tatical US success (assault repelled with heavy Taliban casualties) 9 US KIA. Political/Strategic victory for Taliban (can inflict pain on coalition, coalition weak/unprepared). Goal is to demoralize USA and also show local populace Americans are vulnerable despite technology. (among possible others). We tout our tactical success, and wonder why no one cares. (See also: Tet offensive)

* Any given week, A-Stan. TIC situation results in JDAM drop. Taliban clames XX civilians killed. US says they were all bad, or at least most of them. US believes its reports, locals believe the Taliban. Truth is muddled. Advantage: Insurgent, because it is the local people's perception that really counts. (Though US's matters too)

* Insurgent places IED on Route Tampa in Iraq, destroying one of 20 5k fuelers. Is he trying to halt fuel shipments to CF in Iraq? No. He doesn't have that capability (though Sadr tried in April 2004, and failed). He videotapes it and uses it as a recruitment video. US people worry about vulnerability of our soldiers and seeming inability to halt these IED attacks. Home support dwindles, attack by attack. We are tactically successful because my M1 tank still gets gas every day, and the other 19 fuelers made it in.

Solutions:

Depends on where you are. But do we always understand things in this light? The first step on an appropriate solution is understanding the problem. We have tended to look at enemy attacks from the S2 perspective about "What are they trying to do to us tactically?" (i.e. Close MSR Tampa). Less often we ask "What is the enemy trying to accomplish pol/strategically by this action".

It goes back to my fundamental mindset changing question -

It isn't "Where is the enemy"

It is "Why is the enemy there? (and why did he just do that)"

Which leads to "what things did he need to have to do it?", etc.


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The goal isn't to guide people to a box, the goal is to understand and begin asking the questions that arrive at the appropriate answers for that location.

But yes, many people simply want a checklist to success, whether COIN or HIC. Doesn't exist.

Niel