The Importance and Role of Training in Creating/Sustaining the Best Possible Forces

[jcustis]

I think much of the disconnect between the non-uniformed (not meaning uninformed in the least, though) out there who may postulate about the military, technologies, and strategic underpinnings, is the fact that it often takes a uniformed mind to appreciate the impact of training.

The realities of the training grind are often lost on those who would propose wholesale shifts in capabilities, mission, T/O&E, etc. Heck, it's even lost on the procurement folks who at times throw equipment at the troops when it has only been tested by Marines in their formal MOS school.

I concur wholeheartedly that main forces can do so much more (and probably have a baseline of training to do so well) than they currently have the authority for. It's that trust and confidence that's lacking. The opposite attitude rears its ugly head when SOF cannot accomplish some things (I'm currently reading Robert's Ridge) and the more conventional folks start to throw the Rambo moniker around.

When I was in Australia this summer, I had an interesting discussion with one of my counterpart umpires. He mentioned that among the Australian Army, the main forces are generally considered better prepared for COIN, humanitarian assistance, FID, and all-round small wars, while their SOF formations are better trained to execute conventional ops.

[Norfolk]

I concur wholeheartedly that main forces can do so much more (and probably have a baseline of training to do so well) than they currently have the authority for. It's that trust and confidence that's lacking. The opposite attitude rears its ugly head when SOF cannot accomplish some things (I'm currently reading Robert's Ridge) and the more conventional folks start to throw the Rambo moniker around.

When I was in Australia this summer, I had an interesting discussion with one of my counterpart umpires. He mentioned that among the Australian Army, the main forces are generally considered better prepared for COIN, humanitarian assistance, FID, and all-round small wars, while their SOF formations are better trained to execute conventional ops.

As jcustis pointed out, there is quite a difference of perspective between what Commonwealth Armies (and to a certain extent, the USMC as well) view as properly belonging to Main Forces and Special Forces, respectively, and what the US Army views in said matter. Most COIN and unconventional warfare that the Commonwealth (and for that matter, the USMC) has ever waged, has been done with Main Forces; Special Forces more often than not simply played a supporting role, and in some cases were not even present.

The US Army of course, takes a different view, and has two or three times as many Special Forces troopers as it does Rangers. While that certainly makes sense from the US Army's point of view, from a Commonwealth (and I suspect to a large extent, the USMC) point of view, it's just bizarre. Look at Commonwealth SF - even the UK has no more than a single Regular Army SF Battalion - 22 SAS, and only 2 Reserve Battalions and a Reserve Company (The HAC), plus the Royal Marines' Company-sized SBS. The only US SF of the same calibre - 1st SFOD-Delta (or whatever it's calling itself these days) and SEAL Team Six similarly amount to quite small proportions of the entire Army (or Navy's) force.

And like Commonwealth SF, they do guerrilla warfare very rarely, and only when necessary - if at all. So why all the other Army SF ("Green Berets")? The Commonwealth had its delusions of raising guerrilla armies dispelled over the course of WWII and the 15 years or so following its end; in the end, most of them tend to turn on their teachers. I would suggest that the US experience with the Montagnards/Hmong in Indochina was quite atypical and extraordinary.

So why have thousands of top-notch, highly-trained and experienced NCOs (I know the latter has changed recently) and officers separated from the rest of the Army and placed into Units that rarely get to perform their main mission, the raising of guerrilla armies - a mission with ultimately dubious consequences - and not in the regular infantry? The Commonwealth learned in the decades after WWII that the old way of giving someone 3 or 4 months of "training" (too much of it spent on nonsense and not real training) didn't cut it when you had to perform LIC and COIN in former colonies and still prepare to fight WWIII in Europe, all the while on very constrained budgets.

That's where the 6-month Infantry syllabus for Riflemen came from - necessity in the face of shrinking budgets with attendant lower manpower levels and cuts in equipment procurements. While SF became even more specialized, most of the roles previously reserved for Commando Forces were (sucessfully) taken over by Line Battalions (with vastly improved training), and the remaining Commando Forces concentrated on Mountain, Amphibious, and Airborne Operations (as the Royal Marines and the Rangers do). Fewer troops have to be able to do it all (or almost all), with less.

Rob's right; the SOF-type training that his CO was able to let him pursue in his old Unit was exactly the right thing to do. As the Marines say, a Rifleman can do anything - provided he is afforded and allowed the proper training, and sufficient of it. There certainly is a role for Special Forces - of the SAS/SBS kind, which is in line with what Lord Slim described as being the sort of unit that requires no more than a handful of men for its missions. But realistically speaking, I rather doubt there is a real justification for maintaining seven 1,200 or 1,500-man Groups of first-rate officers and NCOs for a (primary) role that has rarely panned out in practice. Much better to take Slim's advice and put these fine men into the Regular Army and to help assimilate the standards of the Main Forces much closer to that of the US Army Special Forces than those of a draftee mass-army.

The English-speaking Armies are only going to get smaller for the most part, and on even tighter budgets. There's only so many (or rather, so few) troops to go around, and funds to kit them out. One of the main antidotes to this problem is going down the road that Rob proposes: SOF-type training for all Infantry.

[Uboat509]

With all due respect, Norfolk, you clearly don't know what SF does. If "building guerilla armies" was all that we did then we might have ceased to exist a long time ago. We perform a whole series missions, many of which are not for public consumption. We do not simply duplicate what the big Army is already doing. On the contrary, we avoid certain missions because other units are already doing those missions and it would be a pointless duplication of effort and a waste of resources. Much of what we do, we do because no one else is trained or equiped to do it.

I fail to see how MAJ Thornton's training, awesome as it was, could be considered SOF training. SOF training is training for SOF missions it is not simply regular infantry training with more resources. Contrary to popular belief we do not have unlimited budget and resources either. Could regular forces be brought to a higher standard, given suficient budget and resources? Of course, but can they do do the same missions that SOF does as well as SOF? If they could then the conventional Army would have gotten rid of us long ago.

SFC W

[Norfolk]

Uboat, I am well aware that the US Army SF perform a very wide range of roles, from Strategic Reconnaissance to Mobile Training Teams to Humanitarian Assistance, et al. But their raison d'etre to begin with was guerrilla warfare, and they would not have been formed in the first place had that not been defined as their primary mission at the time; much of the rest has followed in subsequent years as guerrilla warfare receded into the background for being increasingly unlikely.

And if you had undergone a Commonwealth 6-month infantry syllabus followed by service in a Battalion, you might have found much of it to be suprisingly familiar, and strenuous - and not like what you would have experienced (or expected) in many a regular US Army battalion. One of my old Battalion's (a Reserve Bn) US Army training partners was a NG SF Bn - 3rd Bn, 20th SFG. Perhaps much of Rob's Unit's training was not SOF-type per se, but a lot of it was honing the basics to a much higher level of proficiency, which is essential for handling tasks that in the US Army are typically reserved to SOF. In the Commonwealth, things are mighty different. Get yourself attached to an RCR Battalion or a Royal Marine Commando for a year or two; it's not like the US Army.

[Surferbeetle]

Rob,

Good thread, as we all know education/training is the keystone of success in both the military and civilian world.

I have been lucky enough to serve in the AUS, ARNG, USAR, & civil service (Army & Navy) as well as having worked a few years in the private sector prior to joining the USG. This experience has shown me that trained individuals (completing training is a mark of the individuals motivation and suitability for the task) who are adequately resourced (and understand the difference between need and want) and who have good leadership are in general more successful at accomplishing the work mission than those who lack these things. Gear is good, but good people are better than good gear.

The US Military, in my opinion, does a good job of balancing societal needs and the requirements of necessary expertise to accomplish its mission of defending the Nation. Teams/Nations benefit from having members/inhabitants with shared experiences and shared education/training. One of the missions of the US military is to provide this training/education to our citizens. On the flip-side of training/educating all-comers our organization still needs experts who can guide the organization to success. To use the bell curve analogy the bulk of a population will always end up in the middle and those at the upper and lower ends of the bell curve are small in number. Adequately educating a population for a required task is a function of limited time and resources and always will be.

Conventional Forces need to accept that full-spectrum operations are the required skill set and ensure that their teams/units are continually and heavily trained. Since the bulk of the Conventional Force will not stay for more than 4 years training time and thus skill developing time is limited. Good NCOs, many CTC rotations, extensive military schooling which teaches full-spectrum operations, and of course operational experience are the keys to training success. The bulk of the US Military can accomplish this. Conventional Forces are more generalists than specialists and need to be assigned missions with this in mind.

SOF needs to accept that the population of participants is limited and true joint operations allow us to maximize our effectiveness. SOF work requires specialized professional civilian skills, advanced infantry skills, language capabilities, and extensive in-country experiences in order to accomplish specialized missions. To acquire these skills requires more time and resources in order to vet and educate appropriate people who are suited to the task. Limited time and resources mean that only a small population will be able to get this type of training and experience. SOF are more specialists than generalists and need to be assigned missions with this in mind.

'An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure' and 'Diplomacy is the art of gaining strategic advantage through negotiation' are two truisms that always apply and ones that we as a Nation need to revisit regularly. DOS/USAID/Peace Corps needs to be beefed up and placed upon an equal to or better resource footing than the US Military.

DOS/USAID/Peace Corps, SOF, and Conventional Forces all need to refocus and redouble their efforts on training the team/squad, since teams/squads are the building blocks of successful organizations. This means that team/squads must have extensive shared educational and 'real-world' experiences so that they can gel and excel. Both generalists and specialists are necessary to the Nations success. Bottom line? All of us need more training to excel and this requires steady resource streams, extensive planning, and most importantly good people.

[Uboat509]

Norfolk, I don't think that you are fully aware of what we do given that a good deal of what we do is classified. You seem to be assuming that SF are just extremely well trained infantry but that is simply not correct. Big Army does not, as a rule, like elite formations and would not tolarate any such organiztion that simply duplicates what conventional units already do. We are not simply an elite infantry formation, in fact, many SF soldiers have never served a day in their lives in the infantry. SF is drawn from all branches of the Army. The majority are former combat arms but that is not a prerequisite.

As for the likelihood of needing guerilla warfare skills, 5th Group's actions in the initial stages of Afghanistan are textbook UW. Since then, we have made great use of those skillsets (albeit on a smaller scale) in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

SFC W

[Norfolk]

I am aware that a great deal of what the SF do is indeed classified and for obviously very good reasons. And I am not saying that Line Battalions should fully replace SF, by no means, and certainly not that SF are just well-trained Light Infantry. But I am saying that much of the skills levels - though not all the specific skills, let alone all the roles performed by SF - should be integral to US Army infantry units. Your terms of reference seem to be framed by US Army practice; such practice is not universal by any means.

For example, in the US Army, the Scout Platoon of an Infantry Battalion performs conventional reconnaissance, surveillance, and screening/security tasks for its parent Battalion; a LRS Det or Company handles both the LRRP (to some degree anyway) and surveillance tasks for the Battalion's parent Formation. In The RCR, the Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon (including snipers) had to be, and was, trained and equipped for both roles - tactical and operational reconnaissance tasks of all manner - as well as HUMINT; and whether that meant operating strictly on foot, helicopter, using an assault boat from an O-Class sub (no longer in service - that was a while ago now), or from the back of a Lynx, or whatever, then that's what was done, mission-dependent.

An Infantry Battalion could perform a number of other unconventional tasks. Providing bodyguards for domestic and foreign VIPs, for one - done out of hide - training taken at either Chichester or the Secret Service course in Virginia (a buddy of mine was one of the guys who got the tap for that). A great deal of the Combat Swimmer role was performed either by Pathfinders (not quite the same as their US Army counterparts) or by Combat Engineers. For other, more "strategic" tasks, individuals or certain groups were likewise tapped on the shoulder and received the requisite training (if it was lacking) and detached out of the Battalion to attend to their duties. Since SF have been formally brought back (starting in '92) in the Canadian Army, some of this has since changed. An Infantry Battalion is not an SF Unit, nor am I arguing that it should be; but a well-trained Infantry Battalion is capable of a surprising range of SOF missions, and regular Infantrymen should be, and can be, trainend accordingly.

What I am trying to point out here is that outside of the US Army, there are several Armies where the distinction between Main Forces and SOF becomes decidely blurred. Which is one of the reason why Commonwealth forces prefer SAS and Delta-type SF to handle full-fledged SF missions and tasks, and let the regular battalions handle the stuff on the outer fringers (somewhat as the Rangers do in the US). Many SF units do not have the time to conduct all the myriad missions, some of which are at cross-purposes from a Unit-training standpoint. It's not unknown for one mission or task or set thereof to take up so much time that another becomes neglected, but that's sometimes because a Government sets policies and makes committments - especially to other Governments or actors - that strain available troops and resources.

As SF don't always have enough time to handle all the missions that their Governments thrust upon them, letting Line Battalions train to standards (though anything like the full skill sets) approaching that of SF makes for far more capable and flexible Line Infantry that may be able to relief SF of some of the "fuzzier" stuff on the blurry line that distinguishes between SF and Main Forces, while at the same time making for regular units that are genuinely capable in the "Full Spectrum" of Operations - not like what happened in 2003, when after crushing the Iraqi Armed Forces, the US Army had to re-learn COIN almost from scratch. It did not have to be that way.

If many people, even within the US Army, look down somewhat at regular US infantry and deride them in terms not far removed from the draftee armies of the past, it's not because the US Infantryman is not capable of being more or less of Ranger-quality. It's because the Army, for various reasons, won't let them.

And this is where the present structure of the US Army SF may in some ways be problematic. "Delta" or whatever it's called these days, represents one of the high-ends of US SOF - comparable to the SAS, etc. But the rest of the Army SF (I'm just talking about the SFGs, not CA, PsyOps, et al.) has no parallels in the English-speaking world at present, or even in much of the rest of the world. In the rest of the English-speaking world, the missions that the Green Berets (exclusive of Delta here) perform are divvied up between an SAS-type SF and the regular infantry, with perhaps a few Commando Forces units for more specialized roles (particularly parachuting and mountain warfare).

Strategic Reconnaissance - amongst other missions, is certainly best handled by a dedicated SF unit. No arguments there. But I suspect that Government policy drives a demand for SF aside from SAS-type units to an extent that may be unnecessary. And some other missions presently handled by SF may be handled quite well by highly-trained infantry battalions.

[William F. Owen]

Gentleman,

At the end of the day, US and UK Infantry training still resides in a WW2 paradigm. You all know my views on this from my Patrol Based Infantry paper. To date, no one has really pushed the envelop of what WELL TRAINED infantry can do, because the mind set is still incredibly limited. Assuming you have men with the intelligence to be a carpenter or plumber, then you have vast potential.

What holds the current debate back is culture and the need to protect the status quo. A very good infantry unit is easy and affordable to train. We just choose to things the way that we think they should be done, and not the ways that allow for a real increase in capability.

At the tactical sub-unit level there is vast commonality in so called COIN and Warfighting TTPs if they are rationally and objectively approached.

A. Infantry Battalion is capable of a surprising range of SOF missions, and regular Infantrymen should be, and can be, trainend accordingly.

B. And this is where the present structure of the US Army SF may in some ways be problematic.

A. Correct, and how the hell did these missions become associated with SF anyway? As Rob Thornton points out, Slim was pretty much correct.

B. More than you know. US SOCOM is a hostage to the institutions and events that created it. You always get back to the "I wouldn't start from there, if I were you." Look at all the mucking about in the re-creation of the 75th Ranger Regiment. If you started with a clean sheet of paper, things would look a whole lot different. - same for UK SF.

[selil]

Norfolk, I don't think that you are fully aware of what we do given that a good deal of what we do is classified. You seem to be assuming that SF are just extremely well trained infantry but that is simply not correct. Big Army does not, as a rule, like elite formations and would not tolarate any such organiztion that simply duplicates what conventional units already do. We are not simply an elite infantry formation, in fact, many SF soldiers have never served a day in their lives in the infantry. SF is drawn from all branches of the Army. The majority are former combat arms but that is not a prerequisite.

As for the likelihood of needing guerilla warfare skills, 5th Group's actions in the initial stages of Afghanistan are textbook UW. Since then, we have made great use of those skillsets (albeit on a smaller scale) in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

SFC W

My Dad was an early SF soldier in 1962 Vietnam... He was a nuclear power engineer for the Navy in the civilian world. I bet he was just a grunt too. ...

[Rob Thornton]

I think Surfer Beetle's post and U-boat's make a good point - we were not training to conduct a SOF mission, and I don't think Slim thought he was either. "Special" I think has a number of connotations - but to me it implies a specialized mission requiring specialized training.

The question that Slim asks I think is appropriate (although it was not really my question) - how much of a "specialized" force is required, and then he ponders the price of creating too many types and in too large numbers - but I think you have to consider his perspective looking back at WWII - what exactly were most "specialized" forces doing - particularly in the Burma and Pacific AORs?

I think his point is that most were operating much more closely to conventional Infantry missions - penetrations, infiltrations, raids, etc. then to some of the missions we now associate SOF with.

Clearly there is a high demand for SOF these days- there is also a mandate to grow (as there is a mandate to grow the regular Army and the Marines). There are a number of good reasons I think why we have made decisions to grow them all, clearly our potential commitments for employment have convinced us there is a need. I also think Surfer Beetle's IA growth comments have strong merit - if you recognize that your foreign policy appetite or inter-action is beyond your capabilities, then you better either take an appetite suppressant (unlikely - and maybe impossible given who we are and what we believe), or grow your capabilities to meet it. The state that only grows its military at the expense of its other elements of power is left with few options to resolve its policy issues. It goes to the ounce of prevention - hard for the bean-counter's to justify in quantitative fashion - but its the truth I think.

Its all inter-related. I also like SB's comment regarding rational for investment:

Conventional Forces need to accept that full-spectrum operations are the required skill set and ensure that their teams/units are continually and heavily trained. Since the bulk of the Conventional Force will not stay for more than 4 years training time and thus skill developing time is limited. Good NCOs, many CTC rotations, extensive military schooling which teaches full-spectrum operations, and of course operational experience are the keys to training success. The bulk of the US Military can accomplish this. Conventional Forces are more generalists than specialists and need to be assigned missions with this in mind.

I think William's point:

At the end of the day, US and UK Infantry training still resides in a WW2 paradigm. You all know my views on this from my Patrol Based Infantry paper. To date, no one has really pushed the envelop of what WELL TRAINED infantry can do, because the mind set is still incredibly limited. Assuming you have men with the intelligence to be a carpenter or plumber, then you have vast potential.

is really what I was getting at - I've seen what happens when a talented CDR like Brown (and I've met quite a few leaders like him) brings a vision and a commitment to a unit that gets beyond the "we can do only what is written from on high and anything beyond that is beyond us" - it goes to the art of the possible.

The catalyst seems to be either a need, or an opportunity - Slim had a need - get after and destroy the Japanese Army in Burma with what he had - out of this grew the "art of the possible" using the resources he had available - I think while Slim may have been largely convinced it could be done - it must have seemed almost counter-intuitive to many - can you imagine some of these guys scratching their heads at first when the word came down - "we're going to get rid of a great many of our trucks to achieve greater mobility" - anytime an Army re-invents itself there is probably going to be some skepticism. Look at how his Army innovated in its use of Air, and Armor.

I think we've gone through something along those lines recently - War requires the Art of the Possible in ways that Peace Time can never do - Peace Time training does not require that limits be strained, nor does it really encourage it - some of the stuff that Schaill and Brown underwrote for me I heard of CO CDR's getting relieved for under BN and BDE CDRs who were intolerant of risk or mistakes - it was as much a result of their tolerance and understanding our need to learn from our mistakes, as it was the type of training or resources required - the leader plays a huge role in achieving results.

War changes the level of tolerance for many I think - it more clearly identifies the needs and costs of failure - its not like going home from a CTC and saying - well at least we learned something. As such I think we are becoming better at identifying and managing risk, and as such we are becoming less risk averse - its just a condition we must negotiate in War.

I think if we can bring that forward to our training and apply resources against it we will come away with a much more capable force. Are there areas where GPF/MPF are now doing tasks and some missions that prior to 2001 would have been considered mostly SOF proprietary by the GPF/MPF community - I think so - the Advisory mission comes to mind - but a good deal of the COIN mission set as well. Ask many a GPF fellow who he'd have negotiate for his unit in pre OIF and he'd probably say that is what his CA attachment is for - who'd have thought the demand and operating conditions would require the scale of demand that out paced the traditional resources. Now - a well trained CA fellow with language skills is almost always better (but not always) - but the reality is we don't have enough, and in some cases we have guys with natural intuitive personal skill who are born negotiators and who have continuity in the area.

This did not happen overnight - but over the last 5 years. We now can look back and see more of what is possible. While I think that those missions and tasks that require the most specialization must remain largely the property of specialized forces (barring the demand continues to meet available resources), we have an opportunity to re-evaluate what the words "General" or "Multi-Purpose" really mean when it comes to skill sets. However - we will continue to have to put resources against it - ex. many conventional units have est. partnerships with Local LE and Emergency Services as part of their train up, many installations have hired native speakers to add realism to their training events (way beyond only the CTCs - who have done a fantastic job of making the right resources available and in good quantity - at a quick turn since the war began), many medics get to practice on more realistic GSWs in training, we shoot a good deal more in the post 9/11 world, and many other resources that have made the art of the possible possible.

I think we can still do even better - we must sustain what we've been doing, but because we've realized our potential, we should push the envelope a bit more - I believe there is room and I believe there is justification.

Best to all - Rob