All matters Rhodesian / Rhodesia (merged thread)

[Condor]

JMA,

First, before I answer your questions, let me say something and you can take it anyway you want. How you respond is up to you. I would appreciate it if you stop using a broad brush to paint all Americans as "arrogant and stupid". While no doubt America has it's fare share of "useful idiots" as you so like to throw out, I'd argue that there is a silent majority of Americans who are smart and hard working people who on top of all that would be willing to hand you the shirt off their back if you were in need. To continue to talk that way is an insult to the many fine people in this country. I'm sure you would take offence (<-- proper Queen's English for those so inclined) if I continually painted all former white Rhodesian's as racists and I'm sure you know that isn't correct right?

Now, back to what this thread and specifically your questions in regards to the philosophical differences of how you and your fellow Rhodesians were forced to operate and innovate as compared to the large, highly funded, culturally diverse branches of the US armed forces currently operate.

First, smaller can sometimes be better as the Rhodesian military so aptly demonstrated in its operations during the Rhodesian Bush War (if that is not the proper term you prefer to use I am listening and more than willing to correct myself). While you made it quite clear that you were unhappy with the Journal's publishing of that article about Rhodesia, the fact is that if it hadn't been for that article my thoughts and interests about your conflict may very well have stayed dormant in my memory banks forever. I was a small child living very far from that conflict when it was winding down so my first hand knowledge is pretty much non-existent except for all those Soldier of Fortune articles I read when I was young. With that being said, especially after jcustis made his remarks about how the US Marines has employed its aviation assets and specifically its rotary wing assets over the last decade plus, this entire subject has piqued my interest tremendously.

One of the problems we arrogant Americans continually make is that we want to continue to fight the large naval and amphibious battles of the Pacific, the air campaign over Nazi Germany, the rapid blitzkrieg across France and western Europe or the grinding frontal assaults of the Civil War. What I think we tend to lose focus on is the small wars, the ones we have continually been fighting since we took our independence from the Brits (no offence towards my fellow Brits who are reading this). In fact, I wouldn't be on this site if it wasn't for my interest in small wars. From these small wars there is a wealth of information to be learned, the hard part is knowing where to find it. That is what I like about this site, it helps point you in the right direction when a particular subject catches your eye.

Getting back on track, I feel that there is A LOT of tactical and operational levels to be learned from the Rhodesian Bush War. I think the Rhodesian use of aviation assets could be very beneficial for lots of militaries around the world, especially ones who are fighting "insurgents/freedom fighters/guerrillas" in some lonely long forgotten piece of land. The problem we Americans have is that we are used to abundance and in a military that spends the equivalent of many countries yearly military budgets one weapon system like a B-2 stealth bomber or a nuclear powered aircraft carrier it can be hard to be innovative. Between our gluttonous appetite for expensive weapon systems and our ever increasing technology addiction we tend to forget that the greatest asset is the person. The less a person has the more innovative they will have to become in order to achieve success when faced with challenging circumstances. So from a pure "doing more with less" mentality most of the US and its military are poor examples of that. The one traditional exception to this role has been that of the US Marines but over the last 20 years I'm starting to believe that even Marines are becoming addicted to the "large expenditure/ fancy weapon systems" crowd. Classic examples of this are the Corps primary replacement aviation assets of the MV-22 and F-35 aircraft. Both of these aircraft are tremendously expensive and I'm still skeptical of how useful they really would be in a conflict such as the one Rhodesia found itself in. I believe aircraft like the H-60 and A-10 would be much more useful, appropriate, survival and most importantly cheap, like REALLY cheap compared to the MV-22/F-35. When you take into account the increase in night vision device technology (which itself can practically be bought off the counter now) and small cheap UAVs these things could be integrated into lethal utility without high overhead costs. You made mention about how the Rhodesian Air Force was pretty much "grounded" at night due to limitations of available night vision devices, can you image how much they would have changed the picture if your air force had access to these back then?

In regards to inter-service rivalry, vested interests, rank structure, rules etc I think this becomes a two way street. First, I think inter-service rivalry can be healthy as it breeds competition and this competition can force people to take pride in their unit/organization and to push themselves to be better. At the local level, I've worked with every branch of the US armed forces including the Coast Guard and all of them have had their share of go-getters and a few turds sprinkled in here and there. I think the problems were are seeing today within the US have to do with leadership but I have faith that if a large enough crisis came about the cream would actually rise to the top and we'd see a completely different military than what we are seeing right now. I'm kind of a Churchill student in the sense that I have faith in my fellow citizen when the time comes for the hard work to be done. When it's easy going, the sloths seem to appear and take over (no offense to the animal).

Yes, I think vested interests, rules and the like can be bad especially if they become self serving and take away from the greater good. I'm an idealist when it comes to the greater good, I always hope people will set aside their petty differences to do what's RIGHT for the big picture. Unfortunately, this is often not the case as some of us well know.

Your war was unique in many ways and much of what Rhodesia went through will never apply or carry over to the US. I'm sure fighting for your very existence gives one plenty of incentive to put their heart and soul into it and equally devastating when it doesn't work out. Remember, the US went through a Great Civil War many decades ago. I often think about what it must have been like for those people back then whenever I read about the US Civil War. The thought of taking up arms against men who I had previously served with in combat is unfathomable to me but remember this was the norm when the Civil War broke out. Men who had come into the service together, went through schooling together, fought in other wars together, then woke up one day, switched uniforms (if they went with the South) and then engaged in mortal combat with their former brothers-in-arms. People can say what they want about General Robert E. Lee, but here is a guy who fought and served the US and when war broke out between the states, he had to make the decision which side he would take. When he took it, it meant fighting against the very country he had served all the while throwing the lives of thousands of his (Southern) countrymen into the cauldron of fire. When defeated he laid down his arms and asked that his men join him in defeat and not to continue the hate against their former enemy (who had once been their former countrymen-talk about a mind trip).

So in closing, the truth is a strange animal. I think there are many things about the experiences in Rhodesia that are worth studying and remembering. I also know that the innovation and approach to some of the issues you all dealt with will never apply to the US. However, for the man who is willing to dedicate his life to the profession of arms to dismiss another conflict because of its differences is a grave mistake. It is only with open discourse and rigorous study can someone become a better rounded person who can help find his way when things start to become dark. Hubris, arrogance, and complacency are sure to get you killed no matter how big a stick you carry.

[JMA]

JMA,

First, before I answer your questions, let me say something and you can take it anyway you want. How you respond is up to you. I would appreciate it if you stop using a broad brush to paint all Americans as "arrogant and stupid". While no doubt America has it's fare share of "useful idiots" as you so like to throw out, I'd argue that there is a silent majority of Americans who are smart and hard working people who on top of all that would be willing to hand you the shirt off their back if you were in need. To continue to talk that way is an insult to the many fine people in this country. I'm sure you would take offence (<-- proper Queen's English for those so inclined) if I continually painted all former white Rhodesian's as racists and I'm sure you know that isn't correct right?

Condor let me respond in this manner.

What I am continually led to believe through the international media (and privately from individual Muslims) is that the jihadists are a small minority and not representative of the so-called ‘silent majority’ of the Muslim community.

My response to them (the individuals) and anyone else who asks is that it is surely up to this supposed silent majority to ‘deal with’ the vociferous minority, yes?

In the case of the Muslim jihadists this craven ‘silent majority’ do clearly not have the balls to suppress them (what ever that entails).

Now apply that to the US.

You have no doubt heard of the “Ugly American”. Sadly the American ‘silent majority’ continues to elect the most reprehensible arrogant narcissists to national office who in turn dispatch equally arrogant (and most often ignorant) people (I’m being kind here) out to represent the nation in the world.

It should be obvious to all in the US that as a result the reputation of the US is at an all time low globally.

So what are the ‘silent majority’ doing about this?

Zip.

When last has anyone heard, “ hey you shut up… you are making Americans look bad”?

The vast majority of Americans are indeed fine people but like the majority of Muslims they don’t have the balls to deal with the arrogant a..holes who give all Americans a bad name.

OK… let’s move on.

[JMA]

Now, back to what this thread and specifically your questions in regards to the philosophical differences of how you and your fellow Rhodesians were forced to operate and innovate as compared to the large, highly funded, culturally diverse branches of the US armed forces currently operate.

Firstly, I am a South African who after my National Service in South Africa volunteered to serve in the Rhodeisan Army. But yes, I fought the Rhodsesian war and afterwards returned South to serve again there for a while before packing my webbing away for the last time.

The main difference is that Rhodesians were fighting in and for their own country... and as such have an emotional component which few outsiders can understand or share. Here very specifically I would include US expeditionary forces who, rather like me, had a safe home to return to if things went belly up.

First, smaller can sometimes be better as the Rhodesian military so aptly demonstrated in its operations during the Rhodesian Bush War (if that is not the proper term you prefer to use I am listening and more than willing to correct myself).

The term "Rhodesian Bush War" is the least emotive as oppossed to Chimurenga 2 or the 'War of Liberation' (the second of which is like a bad joke to the Zimbabwean people after their experiences of the last 30 odd years of 'liberation').

While you made it quite clear that you were unhappy with the Journal's publishing of that article about Rhodesia, ...

It wasn't an article, it was a paper based on a thesis for a masters or doctorate to some fourth rate university... and it was garbage.

His principle argument was that all the Rhodesian forces did were atrocities and the all the killings carried out by the insurgents were justifiable.

My comment was "I guess I am surprised that there has been such a limited reaction to this deliberate attempt to deceive and sanitize depraved killers. This is the great tragedy."

Obviously I am not attempting to claim that the Rhodesian forces did not commit any 'atrocities' (this needs to be defined) but I continue to be outraged that the Journal saw fit to publicise the lie that the insurgents were guiltless. The publishing of the paper unfortunately displays the naivet and gullibility that comes from media and politically correct conditioned ignorance of the situation.

(But on the lighter side it did bring muscle mouth Richard B out of the woodwork who despite his claim to being an expert on matters Rhodesian was unable to answer the question as to what happened in 1974 which was the turning point in the war. Here's one for your list of arrogant yet ignorant Americans.)

A year or so earlier the MR review had published another piece of garbage on Rhodesia again an extract of a masters thesis:

Quote from #296 of the Rhodesian COIN thread:

"The Military Review published a paper by one Marno de Boer in its November / December 2011 English edition: Rhodesia's Approach to Counterinsurgency: A Preference for Killing'.

One wonders how he was able to defend such drivel first at thesis stage and then manage to slip it past the editorial committee of the Military Review. Quite appalling. This reflects very badly on the Military Review of course."

Another case, this time from the editorial staff of the MR, for your list of incidences of US ignorance.

In the RLI we were mainly on heliborne/parachute Fire Force operations. For the three year I was a troop commander on constant operations we were contstanly reminded of the importance of captures from an intel point of view. We killed thousands, but we also captured many... but I never allowed my troopies to be placed at risk in order to effect a capture... neither did I ever allow gratutitious killing.

To allow the people and forces of Rhodesia to be labled through the publishing of this garbage is like supporting the media lie of the time that every soldier in Vietnem was a 'baby killer'.

...the fact is that if it hadn't been for that article my thoughts and interests about your conflict may very well have stayed dormant in my memory banks forever. I was a small child living very far from that conflict when it was winding down so my first hand knowledge is pretty much non-existent except for all those Soldier of Fortune articles I read when I was young. With that being said, especially after jcustis made his remarks about how the US Marines has employed its aviation assets and specifically its rotary wing assets over the last decade plus, this entire subject has piqued my interest tremendously.

jcustis commented as follows in the Rhodesian COIN thread:

"There are a great number of limitations that would make it difficult to translate the Fire Force of old into an effective counter-insurgent force for Afghanistan. Part of the problem is simple fact of training. We didn't fight that way before the Long War began (though I certainly advocated it some while ago), and trying to adapt to these tactics would require paradigm shifts of enormous proportion.that the Army and Marine Corps just simple cannot make these days."

Now compare that with that quote I posted:

Fire Force was the end product of a philosophy, a philosophy that ignored the inter-service rivalry, vested interests, convention, rank, petty rule books and personal agendas so prevalent in the behaviour of the modern military. Fire Force was a manifestation of an ethos that like-minded commanders of all ranks and of all arms needed to combine their considerable talents in a collective effort to constantly evaluate the battlefield, to be self-critical in all analyses, and to strive to work for the greater good. - NIGEL HENSON

I am left hoping that it is not the 'philosophy' which Henson describes that jcustis believes is unattainable in the US military.

One of the problems we arrogant Americans continually make is that we want to continue to fight the large naval and amphibious battles of the Pacific, the air campaign over Nazi Germany, the rapid blitzkrieg across France and western Europe or the grinding frontal assaults of the Civil War. What I think we tend to lose focus on is the small wars, the ones we have continually been fighting since we took our independence from the Brits (no offence towards my fellow Brits who are reading this). In fact, I wouldn't be on this site if it wasn't for my interest in small wars. From these small wars there is a wealth of information to be learned, the hard part is knowing where to find it. That is what I like about this site, it helps point you in the right direction when a particular subject catches your eye.

Much of what was done in Rhodesia is not directly transferable to another war... but what is of value is the mindset which explored all the options and allowed commanders on the ground to innovate and develop new concepts and methods.

[JMA]

Getting back on track, I feel that there is A LOT of tactical and operational levels to be learned from the Rhodesian Bush War. I think the Rhodesian use of aviation assets could be very beneficial for lots of militaries around the world, especially ones who are fighting "insurgents/freedom fighters/guerrillas" in some lonely long forgotten piece of land. The problem we Americans have is that we are used to abundance and in a military that spends the equivalent of many countries yearly military budgets one weapon system like a B-2 stealth bomber or a nuclear powered aircraft carrier it can be hard to be innovative. Between our gluttonous appetite for expensive weapon systems and our ever increasing technology addiction we tend to forget that the greatest asset is the person. The less a person has the more innovative they will have to become in order to achieve success when faced with challenging circumstances. So from a pure "doing more with less" mentality most of the US and its military are poor examples of that. The one traditional exception to this role has been that of the US Marines but over the last 20 years I'm starting to believe that even Marines are becoming addicted to the "large expenditure/ fancy weapon systems" crowd. Classic examples of this are the Corps primary replacement aviation assets of the MV-22 and F-35 aircraft. Both of these aircraft are tremendously expensive and I'm still skeptical of how useful they really would be in a conflict such as the one Rhodesia found itself in. I believe aircraft like the H-60 and A-10 would be much more useful, appropriate, survival and most importantly cheap, like REALLY cheap compared to the MV-22/F-35. When you take into account the increase in night vision device technology (which itself can practically be bought off the counter now) and small cheap UAVs these things could be integrated into lethal utility without high overhead costs. You made mention about how the Rhodesian Air Force was pretty much "grounded" at night due to limitations of available night vision devices, can you image how much they would have changed the picture if your air force had access to these back then?

Yes there are many modern technology innovations that would have been very valuable to us back then - 1st generation night vision was in use back then but we did not have it - but I suppose the Russians would have made weapons available to them too - thinking mainly anti aircraft - which would have made attacks on their external bases more difficult or impossible. So what I am saying is that technology itself does not ensure victory. It is how it is applied that makes the difference.

In regards to inter-service rivalry, vested interests, rank structure, rules etc I think this becomes a two way street. First, I think inter-service rivalry can be healthy as it breeds competition and this competition can force people to take pride in their unit/organization and to push themselves to be better. At the local level, I've worked with every branch of the US armed forces including the Coast Guard and all of them have had their share of go-getters and a few turds sprinkled in here and there. I think the problems were are seeing today within the US have to do with leadership but I have faith that if a large enough crisis came about the cream would actually rise to the top and we'd see a completely different military than what we are seeing right now. I'm kind of a Churchill student in the sense that I have faith in my fellow citizen when the time comes for the hard work to be done. When it's easy going, the sloths seem to appear and take over (no offense to the animal).

But the US does not fight wars where the national interest is sufficient to override the the inter-service rivalry, vested interests, rank structure, rules etc.

Yes, I think vested interests, rules and the like can be bad especially if they become self serving and take away from the greater good. I'm an idealist when it comes to the greater good, I always hope people will set aside their petty differences to do what's RIGHT for the big picture. Unfortunately, this is often not the case as some of us well know.

Perhaps this is jcustis was alluding to here when he said:

"There are a great number of limitations that would make it difficult to translate the Fire Force of old into an effective counter-insurgent force for Afghanistan. Part of the problem is simple fact of training. We didn't fight that way before the Long War began (though I certainly advocated it some while ago), and trying to adapt to these tactics would require paradigm shifts of enormous proportion.that the Army and Marine Corps just simple cannot make these days."

Your war was unique in many ways and much of what Rhodesia went through will never apply or carry over to the US. I'm sure fighting for your very existence gives one plenty of incentive to put their heart and soul into it and equally devastating when it doesn't work out.

This failure by US forces to put themselves in the position of the combatants (especially those they side with) in foreign wars is the principle weakness.

Remember, the US went through a Great Civil War many decades ago. I often think about what it must have been like for those people back then whenever I read about the US Civil War. The thought of taking up arms against men who I had previously served with in combat is unfathomable to me but remember this was the norm when the Civil War broke out. Men who had come into the service together, went through schooling together, fought in other wars together, then woke up one day, switched uniforms (if they went with the South) and then engaged in mortal combat with their former brothers-in-arms. People can say what they want about General Robert E. Lee, but here is a guy who fought and served the US and when war broke out between the states, he had to make the decision which side he would take. When he took it, it meant fighting against the very country he had served all the while throwing the lives of thousands of his (Southern) countrymen into the cauldron of fire. When defeated he laid down his arms and asked that his men join him in defeat and not to continue the hate against their former enemy (who had once been their former countrymen-talk about a mind trip).

If you can get your head arround that you can start to figure out the ultra complex issues around wars and insurgencies around the world.

So in closing, the truth is a strange animal. I think there are many things about the experiences in Rhodesia that are worth studying and remembering. I also know that the innovation and approach to some of the issues you all dealt with will never apply to the US. However, for the man who is willing to dedicate his life to the profession of arms to dismiss another conflict because of its differences is a grave mistake. It is only with open discourse and rigorous study can someone become a better rounded person who can help find his way when things start to become dark. Hubris, arrogance, and complacency are sure to get you killed no matter how big a stick you carry.

Yes indeed, I remember right here on the Council some guy stated that because the French had resorted to torture in algeria there was nothing to be learned from that conflict. Appalling logic.

However, superficial study is worse than no study.

Thank you for taking the time to respond in detail. Much appreciated.

[jmm99]

Yes indeed, I remember right here on the Council some guy stated that because the French had resorted to torture in Algeria there was nothing to be learned from that conflict. Appalling logic.

I "recalled" the same "memory", but the "halibut" was not "recalling" in which SWC thread. Initially, France's war in Algeria: telling the story, seemed the likely candidate - it begins with A Lesson About Torture, Half Century On. Your comment caused me to read through the thread (only 7 pages), which includes for 2010 over a dozen posts by each of such as Wilf (William F. Owen), JMA and jmm99 - some have actually stood the test of time.

The thought occurs that compilations of some "interactive" SWC threads (which often involve "peer review" plus) would be more useful to the practitioner than an equal number of SWJ articles - but, I digress (well, not too much).

"Alas", in the Algeria thread, I found no idiot ("useful" or otherwise) whose equation was "French resort to torture in Algeria = Nothing to be learned from that conflict".

Perhaps, however, this post by you in another thread, Counterinsurgency and Its Discontents, is what we remember (#116), which was your negative review of Demarest, Let's Take the French Experience in Algeria Out of US COIN Doctrine. (2010; in Military Review !).

Your BLUF on that was:

Study the Algerian war and read what Galula and Trinquier have to say and then figure it all out from there. Because it was a brutal war (from both sides) and where torture was the order of the day does that necessarily detract from other measures adopted such as the quadrillage system?

Why does it have to come down to selecting one person's idea and trying to force fit it into every insurgency situation you experience? The strategy options should be like a set of golf clubs. Pick what club you need for the shot you face.

Which is a good point, but you make another one:

I really don't understand the US military. They had McCuen and it seems he was as good as you get and he was a product of the US system speaking the same language and sharing the common culture but he was all but ignored.

Yeah, Jack McCuen was (r.i.p.) a Troll from below the Mackinac Bridge and I'm a Yooper; but that's not a good reason to ignore him (besides, ya gotta watch them Trolls from Lower Michigan).

That led me to ask how often McCuen has been mentioned on SWC.

"McCuen" has been mentioned only 75 times on SWC, with a limited number of people doing the mentioning and discussing him substantively:

jmm99 - 34 posts

JMA - 17 posts

Cavguy - 6 posts

Ken White - 4 posts

The balance of the remaining 14 posts include McCuen only in quotes, or are one-timers.

"McCuen's" adds 16 posts; 1 isolate and:

jmm99 - 11 posts

JMA - 2 posts

Cavguy - 2 posts

I suspect that McCuen is generally ignored because of ignorance of his concepts (the book isn't read); but then there may be some slam dunk argument that debunks him. I've yet to see it.

Of course, McCuen can enter the discussion without his explicit mention. E.g., here's a conversation in the Algeria thread (not based on Algeria, but generalized from Country "X") that Wilf and I had, where my take on the concurrent "military struggle" (Wilf) and "political struggle" (jmm99) was largely based on Jack McCuen (at least in my mind) - #79, #81, #82, #83, #86, #87, #88, #89. Our conversation ended there - obviously, it could have gone on from novella to novel. Wilf always wanted to steal "my" Special Branch.

Just some of my generalized thoughts, hopefully not extraneous here.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

I "recalled" the same "memory", but the "halibut" was not "recalling" in which SWC thread. Initially, France's war in Algeria: telling the story, seemed the likely candidate - it begins with A Lesson About Torture, Half Century On. Your comment caused me to read through the thread (only 7 pages), which includes for 2010 over a dozen posts by each of such as Wilf (William F. Owen), JMA and jmm99 - some have actually stood the test of time.

The thought occurs that compilations of some "interactive" SWC threads (which often involve "peer review" plus) would be more useful to the practitioner than an equal number of SWJ articles - but, I digress (well, not too much).

"Alas", in the Algeria thread, I found no idiot ("useful" or otherwise) whose equation was "French resort to torture in Algeria = Nothing to be learned from that conflict".

Spent a good few minutes looking for that offending post myself. Closest I came was this one in the Journal:

Galula Relevant Anymore?

My comment was:

by JMA (not verified) | November 16, 2010 - 8:42am
Why the attempt to narrow the field of study? If anything students of war should widen their area of study and absolutely resist the temptation of hooking onto one particular view. Earlier we saw an attempt to to write off lessons from Algeria because the French used torture (so there, I guess, goes every war). Open minds must function like sponges there can be not limit to what can be studied.

Not sure how much earlier that was... clearly before November 2010.

[jmm99]

Your negative review of Demarest was 8 Aug 2010.

The comments on Galula also include one by Gian Gentile (snips):

by gian p gentile (not verified) | November 15, 2010
...
Moreover, why the defense of him? sheesh, how would it sound if I were calling for the complete relevance, at the operational and strategic levels, of Enrst Junger and "Storm of Steel"? In a sense we have elevated the tactics and operational method proposed by David Galula, based on his experience as an infantry company commander in an area about 10k by 10k in the mountains of North Algeria with about 10,000 local inhabitants and a handful of insurgents, to the level of high relevance. In short, Galula was a tactician of coin, hence the comparison to Junger as a tactician of offensive maneuver in WWI trench warfare.
...
Besides, and back to the comparison to Junger, remember that the French lost in Algeria. But the consumption with the tactics of coin causes folks to overlook this essential fact. It is not that Galula should not be read because he should, but the danger is to place faith in the notion that better tactics at coin can rescue failed strategy and policy. What saved the French in Algeria was not the better tactics of David Galula, but the better policy of de Gaulle when he decided to leave.

To understand what Gian is talking about, one must have at least passing familiarity with Enrst Junger's "Storm of Steel", and Galula's "Pacification in Algeria" (freebie), which indeed describes Galula's "experience as an infantry company commander in an area about 10k by 10k in the mountains of North Algeria with about 10,000 local inhabitants and a handful of insurgents." (JMM: a bit more than a "handful").

If our world were perfect, Galula's Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, would be the theoretical preface-introduction to his practical "Pacification in Algeria". That sequence (short theoretical introduction; longer practical historical exemplars) was, of course, Jack McCuen's method of presentation. From "Pacification":

298 Pacification in Algeria, 1956–1958

III.
A Few Concluding Remarks

1. Better a bad plan than no plan at all. The one offered here has the merit of existing.

2. A better plan will certainly be found, but only if one draws on the experience of all the cadres who, whatever their position, were confronted with the various problems raised by pacification in Algeria. They are groping now. One has the right to grope, but not forever. For instance, one can imagine ten methods to make a census, but there is surely one better than the others; this is the one that must be chosen, widely applied, and generally imposed.

3. The best way to assess a plan is to test it in the field. Its imperfections will then appear. It is only thereafter, when the plan has been revised, that one has the right to apply it everywhere. For the experience to be profitable, it must be conducted, not only with the leaders in charge of implementing the plan in the test area, but also with a crowd of observers, who will follow the experiment from A to Z, will take part in its final critique, and will subsequently move elsewhere, not to implement it directly themselves but to instruct and control the local cadres.

March 21, 1957
Captain D. Galula
Colonial Infantry
45th B.I.C.
S.P. 86-836 AFN

Perhaps, that would have slowed down those (apparently Zenpundit, Mark Safranski, among them) who seem to insist that, since Galula looks to Mao for theory, commies and poor people are requisites for insurgencies (revolutions), and thus for Galula's "counterinsurgency warfare" ("counterrevolutionary warfare"). Of course, reading Galula's two books together requires one to absorb the fact that the Algeria revolution was primarily Islamic-nationalistic (although it certainly had communist states among its cheerleaders and materiel supporters).

So, those who ignore the history before them, are ... bound to be ignorant.

Regards (one "sponge mind" to another )

Mike

[carl]

It is disappointing to me that Gian would be so dismissive of Galula's experience. Galula spent almost the whole time between the end of WWII and his assumption of his command directly observing, sometimes very directly observing small wars (the Chinese Civil War post 1945 maybe being not so small) on two continents and at least four countries. That is a very great depth of experience to which he added practical command experience.

There are few contemporary Americans who can match that.

[jmm99]

Gian can defend himself - my only comment is that he read both of Galula's books (unlike some other Galula critics) and only then delivered his opinion - albeit, not what I'd say about Galula (which agrees with your comment re: his pre-Algeria and post-Algeria experiences).

But then, I've followed up Galula's two books with Galula: The Life and Writings of the French Officer Who Defined the Art of Counterinsurgency; and Galula in Algeria: Counterinsurgency Practice versus Theory; as well as some articles in French - e.g., DAVID GALULA: “LE CLAUSEWITZ DE LA CONTRE-INSURRECTION”.

Depends on how much of an Info-Sponge one becomes.

Regards

Mike

[JMA]

It is disappointing to me that Gian would be so dismissive of Galula's experience. Galula spent almost the whole time between the end of WWII and his assumption of his command directly observing, sometimes very directly observing small wars (the Chinese Civil War post 1945 maybe being not so small) on two continents and at least four countries. That is a very great depth of experience to which he added practical command experience.

There are few contemporary Americans who can match that.

But many contemporary Americans are trying to match that... and a few others including an Aussie too.

It appears that to establish themselves they need to demeen those before them. This is a pity and IMHO diminishes the critics more than those being criticised, in this case Galula.

However in the posted quote Gentile says: "It is not that Galula should not be read because he should, but the danger is to place faith in the notion that better tactics at coin can rescue failed strategy and policy."

In this he is quite obviously correct.

However, he makes the same mistake as many youngsters trying to make a name for themselves in haste whereby he uses the win/lose words too freely and fails to understand - yes I mean that - that soldiers at the tactical level can only refine and develop better and more effective theatre specific tactics and methods and have very little effect on strategy and policy.

My guess is that - in keeping with my theory - that he never spent a few years as a young officer learning his trade commanding a platoon in war. This would diminish his opinion greatly IMHO.