Weight of Combat Gear Is Taking Toll

[Ken White]

Did OEF 02' and OIF 03' with 101st. Went SF in 04.

Both do good work -- but they don't understand each other.

Almost as bad as SF and the whole Army.....

[sapperfitz82]

I did eleven day patrols in Afghanistan and saw no water any where the whole time. Other times, it would have been unsafe regardless of the cholrine tabs. Water in that AO is so polluted with heavy metals, you would not want to risk it (in most places.)

Conditioning? You're kidding right?

I won't toot their horn, but the platoon I was attached to were good, very good, at staying in shape. Yeah, we rucked twice a week, lots of weight, usually 6 miles. The did IBA and pro mask runs. The regime was tough. Regardless, they did not make more than about 1200 m a day around Babol Kehyl. I think some of you may know the area, it was the scene of OP Anaconda. The loads were not excessive, but the mortars and MGs were toting a lot of weight. We simply could not move fast enough to be of any tactical use. Sure, could drop weight and work out of a PB, we did, but the bad guys know where you are and simply avoid contact.

This scenario is specfic to illustrate a larger point. We are conceding a great deal of our mobility. I don't see the payoff. Those with enough rank to refuse the pressure to add more armor, or set theatre policy to wear all of it, have that rank to ensure the soldiers are employed within their capability for a successful mission. It aint happen.

[Ken White]

I did eleven day patrols in Afghanistan and saw no water any where the whole time. Other times, it would have been unsafe regardless of the cholrine tabs. Water in that AO is so polluted with heavy metals, you would not want to risk it (in most places.)

Sometimes you don't. Usually you don't. Most of the photos my kid in the 82d sent back from the 'Stan showed some water nearby.

Dicey water can hurt -- or not. Having drunk out of more rice paddies than I care to recall and never really having had an problems from eating or drinking locally all over the world, I'll now reveal my secret :

Old Marine Gunnery Sergeant who had been around most of Central America between the world wars, as well as on a Cruiser in the Asian Squadron and all through WW II told me "Whenever you get to a new country, eat and drink the local stuff. Your stomach will rebel at the change of diet for a day or two and then you'll be okay. That way if you have to live off local food you can do it without getting dysentery when you least need it." He seemed to know what he was talking about so I did that in about 20 or so countries over the next 40 plus years. Worked for me.

When I got all the later pitches about not eating or drinking locally because of this or that bug, I just ignored 'em and continued to eat and drink local food and water. Annoyed the daylights out some folks...

[Schmedlap]

My personal best is 94 days without a shower and fourteen days on the button without shaving or brushing my teeth.

We may be neck and neck there. I don't have the exact dates. I took a shower in Kuwait in March 2003. My next was in June - at a car dealership in Baghdad. That was one funky uniform.

Proper training would enable more people to do that, partly by letting them know what's possible and how to do some things if they become necessary, partly by letting them know it's not only alright to think differently, it is in fact, in combat a really good idea to do so.

On most threads, I'm with you on the lackluster training. I don't think it's an issue here. If I'm not caching supplies, purifying water, going 3 months without a shower, or eating bugs - it's not for lack of training. It's because it's been unnecessary since the summer of 2003.

Most of the skills discussed are not the lost art that they are perceived to be. When we first arrived in Baghdad in April 2003, we were chlorinating and rationing water, conducting operations without night vision, radios, or flashlights (we had no batteries), living off the city (rather than the land), and not shaving or bathing. There was no "uh oh" moment where we thought, "yikes - chlorinating water wasn't part of our last gunnery density - how do we do this?" or "Gee, I can't go patrolling at night without seeing everything in a shade of green." Everybody knew how to use tracers and knew that it was easier to see objects at night if you don't look directly at them.

Maybe the old school techniques are necessary in Afghanistan - but I'd be surprised. I'd be curious to know the competing variables, such as impact on the mission (route selection, likelihood of water being too contaminated to purify, etc), how much weight is actually going to be shed, troops and time available, likelihood of cache sites being discovered and boobytrapped/stolen or observed as they are emplaced. Mr. Tallyban knows those hills better than the Soldiers. For many discussions on this board, lack of training is an obvious culprit because we can see substandard performance that would not exist were it not for substandard training. In the case of what Soldiers carry versus what they cache, leave behind, obtain en route, etc, that's not so obvious. We don't know the competing variables.

My take on the issues on this thread are as follows...
1) If the part of the mission is to significantly minimize casualties, then that is a risk aversion imposed by the civilian masters. That's not a error on the part of the chain of command. As much as I hated the mentality of the Army pre-9/11, it was driven by the civilian leadership. Risk aversion was a specified task in Bosnia. Just because the leadership made it happen, it didn't mean that they thought it made any sense. Given that it was simply absurd, as opposed to unlawful, I don't see what choice they had. Though less drastic, the same dynamic is pushing against us in Iraq and Afghanistan. Can you imagine the hoopla that would have surrounded combat death number 5,000, had it occurred when President Bush was still in office? The media and anti-war protesters would have been dancing in the streets.
2) Earlier suggestions on this thread that leaders weigh down their Soldiers due to concern about their OERs are, for the most part, absurd and insulting. Who are these commanders who care more about their OERs than their men? I've had my share of oddballs and even some incompetent ones, but none that were just flat out evil.
3) 85 pounds in flat terrain - ok. 140 pounds in steep terrain - probably not. The former can be (and has been) solved by physical training. The latter is a physiological issue if it's continuous.
4) If your equipment gives you a significant edge, then I don't care if it's heavy, unless the loss of mobility offsets the edge that your equipment gives you. In Afghanistan, maybe that's the case. I find it hard to believe that leaders are routinely failing to adequately balance those variables.

[Ken White]

On most threads, I'm with you on the lackluster training. I don't think it's an issue here. If I'm not caching supplies, purifying water, going 3 months without a shower, or eating bugs - it's not for lack of training. It's because it's been unnecessary since the summer of 2003.

I think you just made one of mine. Point, I mean.

The fact that it's been unnecessary in your experience in a theater for five plus years is, all things considered, an anomaly -- and a dangerous anomaly. Other wars in other places may be vastly different and while I have no doubt that you and millions of other Iraq-style combat veterans can and will adapt to other forms and locales, the question is how many people will be killed unnecessarily while the Army learns anew?

Recall that the year and a half after the summer of 2003 were painful for the Army and th units that were there -- simply because they didn't know what they were supposed to do. The Army there had not been trained for the situation they were in. Conversely for the Army to take the post 2005 Iraq and turn it into the teaching model would do a great disservice to those who might confront different situations in the future.

Most of the skills discussed are not the lost art that they are perceived to be. When we first arrived in Baghdad in April 2003... Everybody knew how to use tracers and knew that it was easier to see objects at night if you don't look directly at them.

I'm sure -- welcome to the world of mobile warfare as opposed to a static COIN Op. Now take your OIF 1 experience and tack another 11 months on it while forgetting your later Iraq experience...

That experience gives you an edge over those who didn't make OIF 1 but only were there subsequently and think all war is like that. It isn't and most everyone knows that deep down -- but on the conscious level, that's the experience and that's what they'll try to emulate elsewhere. Unless initial training is thorough and firmly inculcates the basics. Right now it is not thorough it leaves most of the basics out of the mix. Those gaps are filled by 'experience' -- and if the experience confirms bad habits that may not be applicable in another war, another place...

Maybe the old school techniques are necessary in Afghanistan...We don't know the competing variables.

I'm fortunate in having a son who's been an infantryman (light; a mildly different world) in both theaters and there are some very significant differences not only in terms of opponents and terrain, in rural versus urban but in the characteristics of the local populations. I think the answer is that for some units there, some older ideas are better, for others, not so much. Distance away from the flagpole and other things. METT...

I don't think caches are the be all and end all and they're only really appropriate for small and stealthy patrols (I know there are some in Afghanistan but also know there aren't nearly as many as I think there should be). Caching doesn't work for Platoons and above, the signature is too great. Hiding small ones from natives under their noses is totally possible if you know what you're doing.

That, however is off the track -- the track IMO is training people to fight competently with minimal equipment rather than having them have to learn things are possible by default when the system fails to keep up. We are masters of ad-hocery; good for us. We should also better prepare people to deal with ALL the vagaries of combat so they do not have to learn by doing but shift to low maintenance mode automatically with no hitches -- and no unnecessary casualties...

My take on the issues on this thread are as follows...
1) If the part of the mission is to significantly minimize casualties, then that is a risk aversion imposed by the civilian masters. That's not a error on the part of the chain of command...Can you imagine the hoopla that would have surrounded combat death number 5,000, had it occurred when President Bush was still in office? The media and anti-war protesters would have been dancing in the streets.

Totally true on both counts. However, I believe there is a valid question of how readily the Armed Forces military leadership bowed to the civilian masters on the issue of force protection back in the 70-90 time frame (which developed the habits that do us no favors today). I'm suggesting that the lack of push back on their part for several reasons was in fact a tactical error that has compounded things to the point where your second aspect takes over. I'm pretty sure that if the casualty count edges upward significantly next year that the noise directed at Obama will not be as strident or as well publicized but will exist. The problem is academic -- we are where we are and force protection is and will be unduly emphasized to the detriment of getting jobs done. So be it. Until there's a war involving HIC. Like Armor vests in the tropics, the leaders will learn that excessive force protection efforts cause more friendly and civilian casualties; in a COIN Op, that's justifiable and acceptable -- it is not likely to be in a mobile, HIC war.

2) Earlier suggestions on this thread that leaders weigh down their Soldiers due to concern about their OERs are, for the most part, absurd and insulting. Who are these commanders who care more about their OERs than their men? I've had my share of oddballs and even some incompetent ones, but none that were just flat out evil.

If you say someone said that, I'll take your word for it, I don't recall it but unlike you, in a longer career, I have seen some who cared more for their OERs than their troops -- very few but some. I've met a far greater number that would prefer not to fight city hall on an issue that they're pretty sure they'll lose. Fortunately, I've met an adequate number that would fight -- or would just do what they thought was right without asking.

3) 85 pounds in flat terrain - ok. 140 pounds in steep terrain - probably not. The former can be (and has been) solved by physical training. The latter is a physiological issue if it's continuous.

Agreed. I'd also say that one cannot fight well if one is carrying more than 30-40 pounds. Some Metrically inclined soul ought to do a cost benefit study on the number of casualties due to excess weight x the number of persons saved by Armor x the loss of mission capability due to excess weight and the resultant casualties from that lack of success.

4) If your equipment gives you a significant edge, then I don't care if it's heavy, unless the loss of mobility offsets the edge that your equipment gives you. In Afghanistan, maybe that's the case. I find it hard to believe that leaders are routinely failing to adequately balance those variables.

In reverse order; I do not find it hard to believe that too many but certainly not all leaders are failing to balance those variables (City hall fights one will lose...). On the issue of 'the edge' I broadly agree with your statement but I also believe that the definition of that 'edge' will vary significantly from leader to leader and that variance will all too often depend upon his or her own skills and training (or lack thereof -- and not education...) and, more importantly, his or her (or, regrettably, their Bosses...) perception of the skills and capabilities of the led.

The technological edge can be disrupted by EMP or battery resupply . Or even dumb directives from above (Among several others, I'm thinking of the change to AR 190-11 years ago that said all vehicles carrying ammunition had to have an armed SFC or higher aboard. Every tank in Germany had to offload their ammo to ASPS well in the rear...). Well trained troops have an edge all their own and they are far, far less easily disrupted.

I am firmly convinced that we are too prone to substitute technology for training because buying the technology:

- Is easier than training people thoroughly and adequately.

- Is cheaper than training people for jobs two levels above their current ranks.

- Provides more jobs in more Congressional districts.

So, again, I don't disagree with what you say, if it gives an edge, use it -- if it's 90% or better reliable -- just don't succumb to "I can't go to war without it..." and do be prepared to think it through -- and get along without it.

[Schmedlap]

I think we're largely in agreement and you raise a few more good points.

I'm thinking of the change to AR 190-11 years ago that said all vehicles carrying ammunition had to have an armed SFC or higher aboard.

I recall getting a call one night when I was acting S-3 (in garrison) because our hand grenades were dropped off at the range on the night prior to training. The problem was that the Soldiers who signed for the pallet and were assigned to "guard" the pallet did not have a weapon or ammo - a regulation that I either overlooked or was not aware of. I responded to the staff duty officer: "of course they have an armed guard. The guards are armed with hand grenades." I then quickly hung up.

Brigade mulled for 2 hours over whether it was acceptable that the guy be armed with frags. That was enough time for us to open the arms room, obtain a weapon and some ammo, and send it out to the guys guarding the frags. In hindsight, I guess it makes sense to guard a pallet of frags, but I'd spent the previous 3 out of 4 years in places other than garrison and I just wasn't well versed on regs.

[Ken White]

I think we're largely in agreement and you raise a few more good points.

On the agreement; points may be good or not -- all learned the hard way...

I responded to the staff duty officer: "of course they have an armed guard. The guards are armed with hand grenades." I then quickly hung up....I'd spent the previous 3 out of 4 years in places other than garrison and I just wasn't well versed on regs.

Good Job! Who can be well versed on Regs. Penalty of hiring civilians to write them; once you hire 'em, you can't fire 'em and they have to have SOMETHING to do -- so they rewrite Regs. Dumb.

My pet was a one page -- one sentence, actually -- change to FM 21-75 that came out of Benning in the late 80s or early 90s. Sayeth: "Patrol is a verb, the word will not be used to name an operational element."

I'm still a strong devotee of the dictum "Regulations were meant to be intelligently disregarded." Dangerous attitude in this age but that's only because DA and DoD have been at peace since 1947. Yeah, I know -- but they don't or, well, too many up there forget too often...

Not a big prob; the guys on the ground make it work in spite of things on high, they always have and by far the largest majority mean well, do well and make up for the slackness here and there.

[ODB]

To those recently returned from Afghanistan what the hell were you carrying?

Why did you carry said items?

Could go on but think we get the jist of it......

Let's get to the heart of this, lets disect the loads and maybe help some future leaders in their decision making process. More knowledge on these boards than most units, lets put it to work and see what we can come up with.

Additionally we can look at Iraq, but think the main issue lies with Afghanistan.

Again this is key IMO: Finally I'll add that we need to get out of the risk averison mode we have entered. We are the business of accepting risks, but we must not continue to avoid risks. Yes, risk mitigation is a must. How do we learn to mitigate those risks, through training.

And can anyone answer this one: Why did the Army stopped doing top down building clearing?

In regards to caches, water purification etc..... just throwing out other options, imagination is a good thing, after all I seem to remembering hearing somewhere that war is a thinking mans game.

Speed balls don't work so well when they are in a compression sack being kicked out from a UH-60 as it is screaming by trying to get the hell outta there.

[Schmedlap]

And can anyone answer this one: Why did the Army stopped doing top down building clearing?

I didn't realize it did. Did this occur in 2008, after I ETS'd? We frequently did this in 2005 during cordon and search operations conducted at night whenever we were able to infiltrate the objective before anyone woke up. We would enter adjacent buildings, climb across the roofs, and then go top-down. If you're strictly speaking about clearing buildings in terms of actually killing the dudes inside, I don't recall ever doing that in a top-down fashion, simply because the situation never dictated it. Whenever we cleared a building under fire, it was in a react to contact mode. We usually had the option of hitting the building that we were taking fire from -OR- hitting the building next to it first and then jumping onto the roof of the target building and going top-down. The extra minute needed to do the latter would result in the attackers getting away.

Most recently, I recall watching, via UAV, at least one ODA go top-down on a raid in 2007, though it was a dry hole.

[sapperfitz82]

Worn on Body/Uniform:
*

·******* M4 Carbine with PEQ-2 Laser/PAQ-4 Laser,
ACOG/CCO,and 30 rounds of 5.56mm
ball ammunition.
·******* Desert Camouflage Uniform with
Infrared Tape on left sleeve (1”x 1”).
·******* Desert Combat Boots.
·******* Dog Tags.
·******* ID Card.
·******* Undershirt.
·******* Socks.
·******* Tactical gloves.
·******* Interceptor Body Armor with two
Small Arms Protective Inserts.
·******* Advanced Combat Helmet with
night vision mounting plate.
·******* Rigger belt.
·******* Notebook and pen.
·******* Watch.
·******* Knee and elbow pads.
·******* Sun, Sand, and Dust type Goggles or
Wiley-X Goggles.
·******* Folding Knife/Multi-tool.
Worn on Fighting Load Carrier/
Interceptor Body Armor:
*

·******* MOLLE Fighting Load Carrier with modular
MOLLE pouches.
·******* 180 rounds of 5.56mm ball ammunition.
·******* Bayonet.
·******* Fragmentation grenade.
·******* 64 ounces of water in two 1 quart canteens.
·******* Casualty and witness cards.
·*******100 ounces of water in hydration system.
Flex cuffs for personnel under custody.
·******* Night vision equipment (PVS-14/PVS-7).
·******* Iodine tablets.
·******* Lensatic compass.
·******* Flashlight.
·******* Chemlight.
·******* First Aid dressing and pouch.
·******* Canteen Cup.
·******* Ear plugs.

The combination of these
two lists makes up the
Fighting Load (Avg=63 lbs)

Carried in Assault Rucksack:
*
·******* MOLLE Assault Rucksack or commercial assault rucksack, with MOLLE attachments.
·******* 500ml intravenous fluids bag with starter kit.
·******* 70 ounces of water in hydration system.
·******* Two Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs).
·******* Poncho and/or Bivy Sack.
·******* Poncho liner.
·******* Undershirt.
·******* Spare batteries.
·******* Two pair of socks.
·******* Polypropylene or silk long sleeve undershirt.
·******* M4/M16 Rifle Cleaning Kit.
·******* Personal hygiene kit.
·******* Rubber gloves.
·******* Sling rope with two snap links.

Assault Rucksack + Fighting Load=
Approach March Load (Avg=96 lbs)

Carried in Main Rucksack: (Main rucksacks were rarely taken
on operations during study)
*
·******* MOLLE main rucksack with Sleeping Bag Carrier or Large ALICE rucksack.
·******* Improved Sleeping Bag (usually Green bag carried one per two men).
·******* Long Underwear or Polypropylene Jacket and Coveralls.
·******* Two Undershirts.
·******* Two pairs of socks.
·******* Cold Weather Gloves.
·******* Knit/Fleece Cap.
·******* Additional ammunition.
·******* Two Meals, Ready to Eat (MREs).
·******* Sleeping pad.

Main Rucksack + Fighting Load +
Assault Rucksack (sometimes)=
Emergency Approach March Load
(Avg=127 lbs)

That was the rifleman, course, he can only move as fast as the slowest guy.

If you want to see more, check out CALL. Look for the Devil CAAT study.


Anyway, why the hell are we so insistent on ignoring our own FMs? Those old guys already learned these lessons. What does FM 21-18 have to say about all this?

[Cavguy]

Again this is key IMO: Finally I'll add that we need to get out of the risk averison mode we have entered. We are the business of accepting risks, but we must not continue to avoid risks. Yes, risk mitigation is a must. How do we learn to mitigate those risks, through training.

And can anyone answer this one: Why did the Army stopped doing top down building clearing?

1) I think we have developed a much, much greater risk tolerance in the GPF than was present in 2001 or 2003, for that matter. Acceptance of tactical and operational risk defined the turnaround in Iraq.

2) I encouraged top down clearing - whenever possible. Often, it was simply impossible unless I had dedicated helcopters or really tall ladders, neither of which I ever had. I never received any guidance stating not to, nor have heard of such guidance.

[J Wolfsberger]

Not a big prob; the guys on the ground make it work in spite of things on high, they always have and by far the largest majority mean well, do well and make up for the slackness here and there.

Quote from a Soviet general (I think Voroshilov, but can't find the note):

"The difficulty in planning against the Americans is they don't read their manuals and feel no obligation to follow their doctrine."

Case in point: A friend, troop commander in the 11th circa late 1970s. NATO MapEX with Soviet observers. Friend's troop is cutoff. He orders troop on cross border raid to hit Soviet POL dump. Soviets go ballistic. "YOU PROMISED NO ATTACKS ACROSS BORDER!"

Friend gets verbal reprimand: "Bad boy! No biscuit!"

BUT...

After that, in their training exercises, the Soviets started leaving heavier protection at their log points and dumps.

I'm with you, Ken. The troops in the field will find a way to make it work.

[Schmedlap]

Regarding the list posted by Fitz...

The Iraq load differed as such...

For the worn items - we didn't carry the ID card or wear elbow pads; so long as each patrol element had a notepad, pen, and multi-tool, that was good enough for us. But, I doubt this accounts for more than a pound (though ditching the elbow pads significantly helps with blood circulation and mobility)

For the MOLLE - we carried more ammo (at least 9 mags worn) and two grenades. But, we did not bother with bayonets, canteens, the canteen cup, or iodine tablets. One compass per patrolling element was fine. But, those items probably make sense in Afghanistan.

For the Assault Rucksack - for us, just one MRE, no poncho, no bivy, no poncho liner, no undershirt or socks, no cleaning kit (other than a rag and one rod per fire team), and no hygiene kit. But, Iraq doesn't get as cold as Afghanistan. Regardless, I don't see much weight difference - perhaps less bulk. Usually, the team didn't even bother with the assault ruck unless the patrol was going to last more than 24 hours (we did a lot of fire team missions that were 48 to 72 hours).

There are also items such as radios, shotguns, pistols, star clusters, smoke, and 40mm rounds. Those add weight quickly. We tried to maximize use of MBITRs, but some teams had to use the 119 (E model).

No rucks for us.

[Ken White]

Why no ID card?

Why so much Ammo?

Why no cleaning kit per man?

[Schmedlap]

1. No ID card because we had ID tags. The ID card is less durable, so if the ID tags are unreadable, then the ID card most likely will be as well. Besides, if things get that bad, the Army has our DNA samples on file.

2. Extra ammo per man was to compensate for the need for each man to fire more rounds. This was due to us operating in smaller teams than would be ideal. In order to do everything that we were tasked with, we had to do most of our dismounted missions in 3-man teams. The same number of targets, divided by fewer weapons = more rounds fired per weapon and, thus, more magazines per man who carried those weapons.

3. One cleaning kit per team sufficed because no more than one guy per team would ever be cleaning his weapon at one time.

[Ken White]

Though, since I'm old and out of date, I'm reminded of the ancient (Tutankhamun's army, I think...) Staff Ossfiers Dictum; "Answer the question, answer the question that should have been asked and answer the questions your answer will generate." This is probably my fault for being too dumb to ask the right question and detail. However, more curiosity:

1. In the unlikely event you're asked to produce said card by someone who like an airline ticket clerk or a busybody MP who wants to see a picture ID...

Guess what you did was okay but I'm having trouble following the logic of not carrying a 1/87 ounce item...

2. I understand that. Also understand having to leave a dismount or two with the Brad. However, since I wasn't in Iraq I can't speak to the target sets you might meet but assuming, hopefully, that you almost never if ever fired on anything but semi-auto, nine mags x three people is 810 rounds. Allowing for 10% hits (hopefully better), that's 81 targets??? Not trying to give you a hard time nor am I disputing the need or logic; can't know without being there but I don't think I ever fired more than 100 rounds in any fight -- including one rolling 20+ hour job and one rather intense deal that was almost 8 solid hours. In the several with two to four folks, if you didn't knock 'em down or break contact * in less than a few minutes, you were toast. Just trying to gain some understanding.

3. Understand. Hopefully, no one ever got separated or was the only guy left and had to take care of himself. Or no dodo broke the rod or lost the bore brush. Or the guy with the kit didn't get evaced and we forgot to get the kit...

As we both said, every situation is different and what works well one place at one point in time might not be a good solution for the next place...

I'm not being obtuse or criticizing, just trying to learn and reconcile with significant differences from my experience.

* I don't guess a WP grenade taped to a Claymore with three seconds of fuze and an M60 Fuse Igniter could be used for breaking contact there, huh?

[Schmedlap]

1. In the unlikely event you're asked to produce said card by someone who like an airline ticket clerk or a busybody MP who wants to see a picture ID...

That was the beauty of operating from a patrol base. I did travel to a FOB after being in theater for a few months and encountered what you speak of, but it didn't apply to patrols within our AOR. On that occasion, the gate guard wanted to see our ID cards. We didn't have them. I explained to the old lady (yes, a little old lady wearing a helmet and a plate carrier that I doubt could have stopped a BB), that I was not going to drive 45 minutes back to my patrol base to round up ID cards. If 4 American-looking HMMWVs, full of American-looking Soldiers in American-looking uniforms, carrying lots of American-looking equipment, operating on frequency hop with the correct COMSEC fill, sporting Warlocks, etc, etc, was not good enough, then we were going to have some problems - especially since we would not have enough fuel unless we entered the base and got more. She reluctantly "let" us in after taking down my name, rank, etc. It was a foreshadowing of the madness that we would witness in the next 45 minutes.

Guess what you did was okay but I'm having trouble following the logic of not carrying a 1/87 ounce item...

It had no purpose on patrol and it was easy to lose. At the same time, it was a big deal for a Soldier to lose it. I've also seen ID cards featured prominently in terrorist/insurgent propaganda. I just couldn't think of one good reason to bring them on patrol, nor did anyone ever suggest one.

... hopefully, that you almost never if ever fired on anything but semi-auto, nine mags x three people is 810 rounds. Allowing for 10% hits (hopefully better), that's 81 targets???

There were a bunch of reasons - I could probably type until my hands hurt. None of the reasons below, by themselves, justify that much ammo. Taken together, I think they make a good case. I'm familiar with your take on fire discipline from other threads. Without wiping my butt with every bit OPSEC guidance I've ever received, I don't think I can sufficiently convey the nature of how we operated to answer this adequately. But, if I could, I think that you would agree with our rationale (I'm about 90% sure). Keep in mind, for simplicity, I'm only discussing how many Infantry company operated in OIF III.
- Using your numbers above, I would not say 81 targets per fire team. I would say 27 targets per Soldier. Not to nitpick, but the team isn't going to all rush over and focus on one sector - they still need to maintain 360 security. So the relevant concern is targets per Soldiers, not targets per team. Diversionary attacks were common. Obviously, you interlock sectors of fire when possible, but you're just not going to have much overlap with a fire team that's pulling 360. Our rationale was that if you're taking fire from three buildings in your sector of fire that have 5 or 6 windows in each building facing you, then you've got 15 to 18 targets (yes, far less than 27). All of our dismount patrols would establish temporary OPs in mutually supporting positions. If one took fire, it would generally suppress while another team would maneuver onto it. That could take a while, which meant multiple shots into each known or suspected position. If you figure one round through one window every second, two minutes will use 4 mags. The mission doesn't end at that point. You've now had your position compromised and there was more than one occasion when QRF got ambushed.
- I only recall one occasion when a fire team almost ran out of ammo, but that one occasion made it worthwhile. They got hit from 3 directions, the only fire team that could support them had just maneuved upon an attack 5 minutes earlier against a different position and had taken a casualty who couldn't walk, and almost every element within the company was either in contact or in a different part of the city and hauling ass to get there. Aside from that, I don't think that anyone ever fired more than 6 magazines, but there is a certain degree of comfort in having 3 magazines left, rather than 3 rounds.
- More mags allowed Soldiers greater leeway in putting in a fresh mag during a lull in the action. It was conceivable that you could fire half a basic load, but have used all of your mags if there were several lulls in the action where you put in a fresh mag.
- Many of us would load mags differently for day and night or specific targets. For example, many would maintain one mag of just armor piercing ammo, for vehicles. Some leaders would have a mag of straight tracer in their well during the day. At night, most of us kept a mag with no tracers in the well (no need for tracers at night, if your team can see your IR laser). So, if you're engaging just dismounts at night, you're playing with 7 mags - the mag of AP and the mag of tracer aren't getting touched unless absolutely necessary, or until the sun comes up, or until a VBIED comes barreling at you.

I don't recall anyone ever firing on burst. To me, that always seemed like an unhappy medium where it is no more effective than semi and significantly less useful than full auto.

3. ... Hopefully, no one ever got separated or was the only guy left and had to take care of himself. Or no dodo broke the rod or lost the bore brush...

Really, it wouldn't surprise me if some patrols didn't bother with any cleaning kit (other than a rag). Our dismount patrols generally involved dismounted movement for 30 minutes, establishment of an OP for 12 to 24 hours, and then repeat once or twice, and then return to base. Weapons really did not get that dirty, aside from some carbon buildup after a firefight, but if a team got into contact, they were usually extracted shortly thereafter because it was virtually impossible for them move about unobserved afterwards.

* I don't guess a WP grenade taped to a Claymore with three seconds of fuze and an M60 Fuse Igniter could be used for breaking contact there, huh?

Unfortunately, no.

[Ken White]

As I suspected, it all makes sense; I just had some difficulties adapting to today (my wife and kids say that is a constant... ).

Say no more:

"We didn't have them. I explained to the old lady (yes, a little old lady wearing a helmet and a plate carrier that I doubt could have stopped a BB), that I was not going to drive 45 minutes back to my patrol base to round up ID cards...[plus]it was a big deal for a Soldier to lose it..."

The Ammo makes sense in your sitchyation and I do agree -- not that it matters; y'all were there and I as not. I don't second guess under that circumstance; get curious, yeah -- but no "You should have..." from me.

Same deal on the cleaning kit (except I'd have carried mine anyway old habits die hard). Like the man said "Whatever works..."

Thanks again for the effort and detail. Gives me a far better picture.

[GC13]

Yeah, I don't think any soldier who had to fire his rifle in a firefight ever complained about having too much ammunition left over.

... Too much ammunition that he wasn't carrying for the automatic rifleman, anyway.

[William F. Owen]

rusiresources.com/equippingmilitary/Owen%20(Session%204).ppt

This was a presentation I gave at the RUSI. Upset everybody at the time. May be of some use here.

My basic contention should be obvious and one well known to the regular crowd here.