The Clausewitz Collection (merged thread)

[Bob's World]

OK, so the Southern Secessionists in the Civil War had a point? Lincoln failed them?

Agreed. Warfare has to involve the promotion of a political aim, by violence and has to be of scale where it can reasonably effect policy.

Why should I seek to make peace with or in anyway ameliorate the agendas of those I dislike to the point of violence? Once they use violence against me, why should I listen?
- so don't build badly!

1. OF COURSE Southern Seccessionists had a point! Would their point have destroyed America and led to a Europe-like cluster of small countries in North America? Certainly. They felt that States rights were being inappropriately curtailed by National rights, and voted as states to succeed from the Union. This wasn't insurgency, it was divorce. This was not the failure of a single man, it was, however a failure to appreciate the dire consequences of forcing a significant, and geographically united, segement of ones populace to adopt a course that they saw so counter to both their rights as citizens and to their livlihoods. Growing pains of a young nation experimenting with new forms of popular government.

2. As to your next to last point, I never said you should make peace with those who act illegally to oppose the government in insurgency. I simply said that it isn't war (in a Clauswitzian sense), and that if a true insurgency it is happening for a reason that you must deal with as the COIN government with every bit as much dilligence as you deal with the illegal actors. I would just caution constraint, becuase governments who employ organized violence against their own populaces too freely or injustly (as perceived by the populace, not as rationalized by the government) are on a slippery slope.

3. Your last point is a shot at the US Declaration of Independence. I don't need to remind you what happened to the last Brit to take that document lightly...

[PhilR]

2. As to your last point, I never said you should make peace with those who act illegally to oppose the government in insurgency. I simply said that it isn't war (in a Clauswitzian sense), and that if a true insurgency it is happening for a reason that you must deal with as the COIN government with every bit as much dilligence as you deal with the illegal actors. I would just caution constraint, becuase governments who employ organized violence against their own populaces too freely or injustly (as perceived by the populace, not as rationalized by the government) are on a slippery slope.

I still haven't read anything in this thread that suppports the assertion that Clausewitz isn't relevant. If you choose to think that On War only provides insight when two established states fight each other with militaries, then I think you are overlooking alot.

Clausewitz talks about the use of violence in the pursuit of policy and the primacy of that policy. He discusses the need for policymakers to understand the strengths and limitations of the forces the use in violance and the peculiar nature of violent conflict itself. Once one side chooses a violent option, things happen that may alter the nature of the policy goals or the route to obtaining them.

I'm not making the case that he has all the answers, but I think he prompts most of the correct questions.

Phil Ridderhof

[Surferbeetle]

I still haven't read anything in this thread that suppports the assertion that Clausewitz isn't relevant.

Phil/Sir,

There are some of us who equate the years of relentless attempts to indoctrinate us with a CvC-uber-alles viewpoint as symptomatic of a systemic inability by DOD as a whole to truly see, understand, and formulate cost effective solutions to what is before us. The rhetorical question...if CvC is so great why are we still fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan? My answer is that a monotheistic belief in CvC and that one great final Fulda Gap battle still clouds a significant part our collective sight.

Clausewitz talks about the use of violence in the pursuit of policy and the primacy of that policy. He discusses the need for policymakers to understand the strengths and limitations of the forces the use in violance and the peculiar nature of violent conflict itself. Once one side chooses a violent option, things happen that may alter the nature of the policy goals or the route to obtaining them.

Ich lese Deutsch, spreche Deutsch, habe in Deutschland gewohnt, und I question the ability of translations, and not just ones from German, to fully capture the multidimensional interactions and influences (often time dependent) which create the written word. There is always a loss coefficient as well as an error coefficient associated with any translation.

I'm not making the case that he has all the answers, but I think he prompts most of the correct questions.

Agreed, with my caveat that if this were my sentence I would change most to some... no one man or woman has a lock on this complex world.

Best,

Steve

[MikeF]

1. OF COURSE Southern Seccessionists had a point! Would their point have destroyed America and led to a Europe-like cluster of small countries in North America? Certainly. They felt that States rights were being inappropriately curtailed by National rights, and voted as states to succeed from the Union. This wasn't insurgency, it was divorce. This was not the failure of a single man, it was, however a failure to appreciate the dire consequences of forcing a significant, and geographically united, segement of ones populace to adopt a course that they saw so counter to both their rights as citizens and to their livlihoods. Growing pains of a young nation experimenting with new forms of popular government. emphasis added mine

Col Jones,

To the last statement, isn't that a bit pre-determined/pre-destined or are you just suggesting that 'growing pains' are something all young nations go through?

Interestingly enough, I was considering the Civil War this weekend while y'all discussed it. I was trying to consider what CvC would have recommended to Lincoln when the first states secceeded from the Union. Both CvC and Machiavelli would probably have recommended to intervene quickly with military force to squash the dissenters. Instead, Lincoln gave the South the time to grow (organize, equip, mobilize, and capitalize on popular support) into a formidable opponent. If he intervened early militarily, then he probably could have stopped or at least postponed the bloody Civil War. However, the political issues of states rights, slavery, race, and equality would still persist. To a degree, these issues persisted violently well into the 1960's, and they are still around today.

In any case, multiple issues remained. These issues were not simply government, governance, ideology, grievance, or economics. Instead, they were a combination of all parts coupled with escalated emotions to stir the pot. Ken would sum this up as we're humans, and he's right. But, Ken's answer is like me trying to answer any question with METT-TC .

Thoughts?

And before everyone gets to busy, just wanted to wish the SWC a Merry Christmas.

Mike

[tequila]

Instead, Lincoln gave the South the time to grow (organize, equip, mobilize, and capitalize on popular support) into a formidable opponent.

Remember that at the time, the U.S. Army was incapable of doing this. Much of its officer corps was in the process of resigning and going South, and the southern states had arguably as much firepower as the U.S. Army at the time.

Lincoln also had to contend with very strong political forces in the North that would have likely revolted against any preemptive military action to crush secessionism by force. Only when the South Carolinians opened fire on Fort Sumter did Northern opinion galvanize against secession.

[Steve Blair]

Remember that at the time, the U.S. Army was incapable of doing this. Much of its officer corps was in the process of resigning and going South, and the southern states had arguably as much firepower as the U.S. Army at the time.

Lincoln also had to contend with very strong political forces in the North that would have likely revolted against any preemptive military action to crush secessionism by force. Only when the South Carolinians opened fire on Fort Sumter did Northern opinion galvanize against secession.

Always worth remembering as well that the minuscule Regular Army was scattered throughout the western section of the country in a number of 2-3 company posts (or tied down doing what might be considered COIN duty along the Kansas-Missouri border). And in line with the resignation theme, there was some concern as to just how many officers would answer the call and what they might do if they didn't. The outgoing Secretary of War did little to conceal his pro-Southern leanings, and the commander of the department containing Texas surrendered without any resistance at all...turning over all his arms and equipment in the process.

[Firn]

The rhetorical question...if CvC is so great why are we still fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan? My answer is that a monotheistic belief in CvC and that one great final Fulda Gap battle still clouds a significant part our collective sight.

My answer is even the wisest of heads would have found it terribly difficult to steer Afghanistan toward a state fitting the (differing) political intention(s) of members of the coalition with so meager ressources and so great challanges. As a matter of fact "rebuilding" was the buzzword of 2002 and onwards, as the Taliban were widly considered to be beaten. At least that was the impression in West and that impression greatly influenced the amount of ressources at the disposal of the commanders. One can wonder how important that rebuilding really was for the politicians in power. Maybe they were just happy to have done a "great job" at hammering the Taliban and AQ - a very understandable political goal. Maybe they were buMaybe some had grander projects for their (military) might than to use it for rebuilding...

Lauding and blaming a single imagined factor (in this case CvC) for success or defeat seems a bit simplistic, to say the least. Especially as CvC did consider leadership an important element, but one of a great many. Overall I think that I'm mostly of the same opinon as PhilR.


Firn


P.S: Interesting views on the motivations of Lincoln and on the circumstances leading to the war.

To me it seems that the states in the South had a stronger motivation to fight as many felt their way of life and perhaps their very existence threated by the policy changes of Lincoln. Their rapid (military) mobilization of the population could have surprised the latter and given the dubious and far-flung nature of the Army and the not too great interest in the North he might have ruled out a quick intervention.

[Surferbeetle]

Lauding and blaming a single imagined factor (in this case CvC) for success or defeat seems a bit simplistic, to say the least.

Firn,

Either his work has relevance or it does not, we can't have it both ways. In my view CvC cannot be discarded, but his approach, in isolation, is not enough to accomplish the mission.

My answer is even the wisest of heads would have found it terribly difficult to steer Afghanistan toward a state fitting the (differing) political intention(s) of members of the coalition with so meager ressources and so great challanges.

One could say that this is the crux of the argument; what is the appropriate mix of centralization and decentralization needed to solve the problem. One possible answer is that all roads lead to a trained cadre of CvC devotees massed upon a FOB somewhere who orchestrate devastating moves and countermoves. Another possible answer consists of various small teams, (familiar with the works of Mao, Che, their Islamic counterparts, and others) who live and work among the populace. I would say from tactical and operational experience in the field that neither group can survive/thrive without the other and that our attempt to destroy wanna-be (counterfactual) Carthaginians requires unity of effort and a non-school solution.

Best,

Steve

[PhilR]

Surferbeetle,
We are all prisoners of our experience, both in operations and in learning. By your comments, it’s apparent that we have been exposed to Clausewitz’s writings in a different manner and have developed different perspectives.

-I’ll repeat that I don’t think that On War provides THE answer, or even many answers. I think that, in its relevant parts (and some of it is still mired in the 19th century), it provides a good description of likely relationships, characteristics to consider and a method with which to thoroughly examine history and contemplate operations. It’s not the book to take into operations with you. However, it’s a book to help you think about operations as you examine them in history or hindsight, then apply that gained knowledge to inform judgment in the future.

-I agree with you on the dangers of translation. I understand that what I’m reading and how I’m interpreting it may be a misreading of German and not what he meant. Frankly, that doesn’t matter to me. If trying to pursue “what Clausewitz meant” helps me consider the issues and from a different perspective and adds to the critical thinking process, then I welcome it. However, I guess I’m just too post-modern to feel that I am enslaved to his "intent." The book is a springboard.

-If any writing from the 19th century influenced US tactical doctrine in the Cold War, it is Jomini, with Lines of Operation, Decisive Points, etc. The main piece of On War deployed in this way is the Center of Gravity (COG). I think that it’s been hashed over and argued about ad infinitum. I think that’s a good thing if it helps build a better common understanding of a problem and its facets. However, I rarely have the patience to sit through COG discussions in planning when they become rote exercises of breaking down into Critical Requirements, Critical Capabilities, Critical Vulnerabilities, etc. as a means to fill in a matrix.

-I personally saw a lot of Clausewitz’s influence in Mao’s writings (whether by design or happenstance).

-I’ve been arguing Clausewitz in this forum because that is the stated subject of the thread. Its not the be all, end all. However, I’ll admit that if you agree with what he writes, you will find yourself disagreeing with other theorists who are more sure of the universality of their specific conclusions and statements on conflict.
s/f
Phil Ridderhof