Iraq: Out of the desert into Mosul (closed)

[OUTLAW 09]

AFAIK, it's not 'the intelligence'. At least 'not any more', and that 'since long'.

Contrary to what happened in the Ukraine (where there seems to have been a lack of expertise, which resulted in nobody correctly predicting Russian reaction to the Maidan Revolution, see bellow), intel is doing its job in regards of Iraq (and Syria). And quite decently too. Just, and precisely like the military, intel has political masters. And that's where the problem seems to be - which is what I get to hear from a number of (unofficial) contacts in the DC, which in turn are confirmed by what can be read in articles like Saving Syria Is No ‘Fantasy’



Obviously, one can have all means of intelligence on hand, all the necessary info, best advice - and still insist on making wrong decisions. Perhaps being a 'Nobel Peace-Price laureate' makes one 'knows better'...?

Who knows.


That situation was different, and here one gets to hear an entirely different set of comments - usually in following direction: Funding cuts, lack of opportunity leave US without expertise on international hot spots. Specifically:



Another 'influential' problem can be found few levels below that one, within circles of various advisers. These are not only lacking the expertise in regards of Russians, but excel at ideas that are 'better' than Startrek and similar, science-fiction productions. For example, one of 'closed doors' discussions in the DC I was able to follow the last few months was characterised by specific (usually rather 'vocal') talking-heads providing ideas like, 'arm Israelis with B-52s, so they can bomb Russia in return for its invasion of the Ukraine' or 'ask Beijing to send troops' (whether to Syria or Ukraine, pick your choice).

Overall, I have absolutely no concern about the WH applying 'maskirovka' upon the ISIS. Nor about the functionality of the US intel. It's simply so that crucial advisers and 'the man' in the WH are better at playing golf than at running US foreign politics.

Crowbat---here is where we disagree.

1. US in 2003 did not know about the underground Salafist fight against Saddam ongoing since the mid 90s---how did the CIA/DIA/NSA miss that one after Desert Storm?---especially if we were providing assistance to Iraq up to 1988.

2. did the US IC have a full understanding of the various Sunni groups even after 2010---no not really even now they fully do not understand them nor the tribes current positions in relationship to IS---one just needed to see up through 2009 the utterly countless intel reports on what they thought the strengths were for each group and AQI

3. even now the US leadership and that includes the IC seems to not fully understand just how the IS became so successful---that does not lend itself to believing as you do they in fact know a lot via intelligence---this by the way contradicts statements made recently by the JCoS about IS

4. we do not even know the intentions of the current Shia milita leaders and the individual Shia militias and the interconnections--even less on the Iranian involvement via Quds and the SU25s

So the idea that the US IC knows everything is a tad off---do you not think?

And I go back and again ask --just what is the US strategy for both Iraq/and Syria?--there is none for the Ukraine.

And I go back and state again--billions literally billions was spent on new intel equipment/software/drones, ISR sensors/aircraft and thousands of intel defense contractors and what we know nothing in the Ukraine?---come on where--- then where is the failure?

But then if we do know then why the silence?---- because that silence is totally deafening here in Europe.

Check the blogging space --they know more now than does Obama on the current battlefield status in the Ukraine--ask the simple question--how is it possible that social media using 30000000% less in costs ----out reports and reports quicker than the IC can do? But again notice the silence from the IC on the Ukraine---deafening.

[JWing]

Iraq is suffering through one of the most intense car bomb campaigns seen in years. Before the Islamic State would have gaps of up to a week between VBIED series. In August there has only been one day in between the waves. IS probably stockpiled explosives before their summer offensive started, but then their capture of so many ISF bases has probably given them access to a huge new amount of artillery and mortar shells, etc. which helps explain why the car bombs are coming so intensely in recent weeks. Here's a link to the article.

[CrowBat]

Crowbat---here is where we disagree.

Not sure if it's 'disagreement' or simply different POVs.

IMHO, you're talking about the IC as if it would be a stand-alone enterprise. It's not. Like the military, it's doing what its political masters tell it to do, and 'period'. And: from my POV, you're talking about three periods with entirely different priorities.

For example:
- Back in the 1980s, nobody cared if Zia ul-Haq was an extremist Islamist working on getting nukes and training terrorists. He was 'fine' and has got F-16s as 'thanks' for running Mujaheddin in the fight against Soviets in Afghanistan. And in Iraq - which came long after such priorities like Libya of that time - the priority was not 'finding Salafists' (I guess you actually mean 'Wahhabists' here?), but 'what can we do to help them not lose against Iran, but not win that war either'?

- Then came the 1990s, post-Cold-War disarmament because 'we've got no enemies', followed by 'it's the economy stupid' times, and priorities were Saddam's Scuds and Special Republican Guards, helping those plotting against him etc. For example, Clinton could've easily got Ossama back in 1996, but didn't want to do so: not because of any kind of IC failures, but because Clinton said no. Instead, his admin was more interested in obtaining control of Congolese mineral wealth with Rwandan help, than 'war on terror'.

- In early 2001 topic was 'China', by the end of that year 'al-Qaida' & Afghanistan', and in 2002 all the attention returned to 'Saddam', with emphasis on his (supposed) WMDs. With politicians attempting to argument that Saddam was 'collaborating with AQ' in order to find a reason for invasion of Iraq, nobody came to the idea to 'search for Wahhabist opposition in Iraq'. Come on... I doubt anybody wants to seriously recall how much effort was squandered in regards of searching for the WMDs (or on search for the 'smoking gun' in Iran, in subsequent years). And this simultaneously with the 'hunt for Osama's beard'.

All of these ops were dictated by interests of the WH, Congress etc., and not by those 'in the field'.

So, it's not as if the IC is doing mistakes or missing threats all the time: no doubt, the quality of its products is periodically suffering from overreliance on ELINT/SIGINT/SATINT etc., from 'the faster you run through different stations, the faster you're climb the career ladder' (resulting in plenty of 'jacks of all trades and masters of none' in this business), and - even more so - from insistence of its superiors on 'political correctness', but actually the IC knows very well what's going on. That is: its people in the field know what's going on. The question is always: what kind of tasking are they getting, i.e. what kind of information is in demand, and how much of what they report (and exactly what of what they report) is channelled upards.

As next, you're citing various statements from specific high officials. I think here you should not forget the 'typical behaviour of top managers and politicians'. Military or not, bosses of the IC are foremost politicians, and - hand at heart - 'arseholes'. One is not getting into such positions without quite a few 'bodies in the cellar', but also organizational and networking skills, and plenty of 'political manoeuvring', so much is sure.

So, when they make specific statements for the press, there is a question of what kind of message are they actually 'airing' and to what address. For example, their first issue is always 'money': more money means more and bigger departments, and that means power. And 'they' can never have enough money. So, when somebody there is - for example - complaining the IC 'does not fully understand just how the ISIS became as successful', we don't know 100% for sure if:
- a) the official really means precisely and just that (I would be actually surprised if this is the case), or
- b) if his actual message is not something like, 'listen arsehole (in WH), I told you years ago what's going to happen and you didn't listen, perhaps if I babble this in public now, something's going to change', or
- c) or if he simply means little else but the usual, 'gimme more money so I can do this or that'.

We'll know about this only once they all are at least in deep retirement, if not all dead.

4. we do not even know the intentions of the current Shia milita leaders and the individual Shia militias and the interconnections--even less on the Iranian involvement via Quds and the SU25s

Here I must ask similar question like in another thread: define 'we', please.

So the idea that the US IC knows everything is a tad off---do you not think?

Nope.

And I go back and again ask --just what is the US strategy for both Iraq/and Syria?--there is none for the Ukraine.

That's a question for politicians, not for the IC.

And I go back and state again--billions literally billions was spent on new intel equipment/software/drones, ISR sensors/aircraft and thousands of intel defense contractors and what we know nothing in the Ukraine?---come on where--- then where is the failure?

With politicians. If politicians insist, 'bring me Osama's beard', then the IC is doing whatever is possible to find that beard. But, that means that the IC is then also doing little else - even more so if the politicians are not asking for anything else.

But then if we do know then why the silence?---- because that silence is totally deafening here in Europe.

Ah, Europe is its 'own, special, and extremely dusty' case. The situation here is usually much worse - with few exceptions, where everything is done in rather 'subtle' fashion.

Check the blogging space --they know more now than does Obama on the current battlefield status in the Ukraine--ask the simple question--how is it possible that social media using 30000000% less in costs ----out reports and reports quicker than the IC can do? But again notice the silence from the IC on the Ukraine---deafening.

We've got several chaps at ACIG.info forum attempting to disseminate opint from PR-BS and find out what's 'really' going on in the Ukraine, for example. Trust me, no matter how much social media are they scanning, and what classy info are they often extracting, even they are not '100% sure' what's going on but have to cross-examine all the time.

AFAIK, it is a very crude mistake to think the IC - again: IC, not the politicians - is experiencing any kind of similar problems. But, the bottom line is that the politicians have the final word, and if they don't ask for intel, or don't like what they get to hear (keep in mind: 'political correctness')... well, the intel is either not going to be collected, or not going to be used.

[Dayuhan]

Check the blogging space --they know more now than does Obama on the current battlefield status in the Ukraine--ask the simple question--how is it possible that social media using 30000000% less in costs ----out reports and reports quicker than the IC can do? But again notice the silence from the IC on the Ukraine---deafening.

Bloggers tell what they know, even when they don't really know it: a great deal of what appears in blogs and social media is rumor. The intelligence community is supposed to be silent: they aren't reporters. They pass what they know to their own internal customers, not to us. We obviously don't know what the government does or doesn't know about Iraq, the Ukraine, or anywhere else.

[davidbfpo]

Well today's situation could just mean a coalition of enemies become partners:

In Jeddah on Aug. 24, the foreign ministers of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, the UAE, Jordan and Egypt gathered to discuss the Syrian conflict and other “challenges, including the rise of terrorist extremist ideology.” In an official statement, they expressed their agreement on “the need to seriously work to deal with these crises and challenges to preserve security and stability in Arab countries.” .......On Aug. 25, Hossein Amir Abdollahian, Iran’s undersecretary for Arab and African affairs, paid a surprising visit to Saudi Arabia...

Link:http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/orig...peration.html?

[davidbfpo]

This BBC report appears to be based on one psuedonym'd tribal leader's words:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28978941

[Bill Moore]

This BBC report appears to be based on one psuedonym'd tribal leader's words:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-28978941

If true, and it is always a big IF, then it appear that the U.S. and its partners are dealing with Iraq appropriately and the call for more U.S. intervention sooner will be seen as hyperbole. In my opinion you have to set the political conditions for what will follow the military action, or you end up like we did in Afghanistan (understandable) and Iraq 2003 (inexcusable).

To give anyone credit that this was their intention is probably a stretch, and most likely the cards just fell in place, but there is seldom any merit to rushing in if there isn't an immediate threat. Rush in to do what? Then what?

[carl]

If true, and it is always a big IF, then it appear that the U.S. and its partners are dealing with Iraq appropriately and the call for more U.S. intervention sooner will be seen as hyperbole. In my opinion you have to set the political conditions for what will follow the military action, or you end up like we did in Afghanistan (understandable) and Iraq 2003 (inexcusable).

To give anyone credit that this was their intention is probably a stretch, and most likely the cards just fell in place, but there is seldom any merit to rushing in if there isn't an immediate threat. Rush in to do what? Then what?

It is well to remember that the Sunni tribes tried several times to rid themselves of AQI and were unable to do it until an arrangement was made whereby they were backed up by the US military, then the two working together were able to do quite well. The important thing though is they couldn't do it on their own, they needed us. In the article David linked to they are basically saying exactly the same thing, they can do it but not by themselves.

The real chilling thing about the article is the statement that something has to be done about the IS fast because the ideology is hugely appealing to Muslim young men throughout the world and that appeal is growing extremely fast.

[ganulv]

It is well to remember that the Sunni tribes tried several times to rid themselves of AQI and were unable to do it until an arrangement was made whereby they were backed up by the US military, then the two working together were able to do quite well. The important thing though is they couldn't do it on their own, they needed us. In the article David linked to they are basically saying exactly the same thing, they can do it but not by themselves.

The U.S. was the sheriff back then, though. I hear what you’re saying, but I would think the social and political dynamics are so different at this point that that would be an apples and oranges comparison.