Kashmir: a simmering, sometimes brutal small war

[Gurkha]

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

Gurkha,

I also recall a BBC documentary a few years ago, perhaps by Mark Tully, which found that locally recruited light infantry battalions had also contributed to Indian success. Given the numbers involved - from the main Indian Army - I assume these local units were only a small proportion of the total.

As Bill Moore commented your comparison with the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is noteworthy. Given the once strong Indo-Soviet/Russian relationship, including with the military, did that assist in observing and learning? For example by attendance at staff colleges.

1. Locally recruited light infantry, the JAMMU & KASHMIR LIGHT INFANTRY, recruiting Hindus & Muslims from J & K , is a standard regiment of the line. It tends to do well as the Kashmiri (Muslim) soldiers are able to generate excellent intelligence.

2. There is very limited Army inetrafce with the Russians notwithstanding the IA equipment profile, so no exchange of tactics or docrtine. In fact the joke is that given our finances we are constantly trying to implement operations as per western doctrine with Russian equipment on Indian scales !!http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ons/icon12.gif

[carl]

Originally Posted by Gurkha

THE INDIAN APPROACH TO COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

Colonel Behram A Sahukar, The Parachute Regiment, Indian Army retired

This was a good piece. It was easy to read and gave good review of all the small wars ops the Indian Army has been involved in, and there have been a lot. It had almost no acronyms! Imagine that, plain English that anybody can follow. Its free on the net.

Gurkha: Do you have a link for "Doctrine for sub-Conventional Operations"?

[Ray]

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

Gurkha,

I also recall a BBC documentary a few years ago, perhaps by Mark Tully, which found that locally recruited light infantry battalions had also contributed to Indian success. Given the numbers involved - from the main Indian Army - I assume these local units were only a small proportion of the total.

As Bill Moore commented your comparison with the Soviet experience in Afghanistan is noteworthy. Given the once strong Indo-Soviet/Russian relationship, including with the military, did that assist in observing and learning? For example by attendance at staff colleges.

The Scouts were the first who were raised from locals and they were to operate in their own native area. However, they got amalgamated. Only the Ladakh Scouts remain in such a role.

JAK Light Infantry were initially the JAK Militia funded by the J&K Govt, but under op control of the Indian Army, staffed by IA officers and they operated in J&K.

As far as I remember, one unit was of J&K Sikhs and Hindus and the remainder of the Regiment was composed of Jammu and Kashmir Muslims. I am not aware of the composition now. They have been amalgamated in the Indian Army and are posted all over India as any regular unit.

[Ray]

Do you have a link for "Doctrine for sub-Conventional Operations"?

Try this:

Doctrine for Sub Conventional Operations, Ist issue Dec 2006, 45 Pg, 16.5 MB
http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm

[carl]

Originally Posted by Gurkha

As Kashmir was mountainous, the standard operating units was a rifle company averaging a strength of 50 - 60 men ( the balance 60 being away on leave, training courses, administrative details, base security etc.). This company would on average have about 100 sq km ( 10km by 10 km) or a small valley to cover. Based on informer intel, surveillance patrols, or police intel, the company would split into 7 - 8 teams and lay a combination of ambushes & cordon around villages at night. A search would be carried by day ( DAY ONLY). The police, including policewomen, would assist in controlling the civil population except in really remote villages where we would do it ourselves. Normally 3 -4 militants would be caught / killed in such operations. The area was also extensively dominated by patrols & ambushes to restrict freedom of movement. A very, very important reason for our success is that we were just not road or track bound. The hardiness of the average Indian soldier & the immense strength of the regimental system were critical factors in achieving tactical success. Also all that we would carry would be ammunition, no bullet-proof jackets, no helmets, little food & water. It helped very much to move light. In those days we didnt even have NVDs.

Gurkha:

I have some questions that are probably obvious to others but not to me.

How long would the 60 man unit stay in its small valley or 10x10 km area?

Where would they stay? Would they stay in houses, police stations, purpose built facilities etc.?

Would the 60 man unit put out 7-8 cordons or ambushes every night or only on some nights? How many guys did you normally have on each ambush?

How far would each little ambush group normally walk to get to their set-up site? What was the max distance they could set something from where they slept and ate?

In the little area or valley, who was the king so to speak, the Indian Army commander, the local police commander or did the the two work together?

Where did the intel used by the 60 man unit mostly come from, the unit itself, the police or a source outside the small area or valley?

Could outside units swoop in to do things without the approval or knowledge of the king of the little area or valley?

If you have time, I'd be obliged to you if you could answer some of these questions. They are probably blindingly obvious to most but not to me.

[Gurkha]

Originally Posted by carl

This was a good piece. It was easy to read and gave good review of all the small wars ops the Indian Army has been involved in, and there have been a lot. It had almost no acronyms! Imagine that, plain English that anybody can follow. Its free on the net.

Gurkha: Do you have a link for "Doctrine for sub-Conventional Operations"?

Try
http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm

[JMA]

Originally Posted by Gurkha

Try
http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm

I'm getting a corrupt file message

[Ray]

Originally Posted by carl

Gurkha:

I have some questions that are probably obvious to others but not to me.

How long would the 60 man unit stay in its small valley or 10x10 km area?

Where would they stay? Would they stay in houses, police stations, purpose built facilities etc.?

Would the 60 man unit put out 7-8 cordons or ambushes every night or only on some nights? How many guys did you normally have on each ambush?

How far would each little ambush group normally walk to get to their set-up site? What was the max distance they could set something from where they slept and ate?

In the little area or valley, who was the king so to speak, the Indian Army commander, the local police commander or did the the two work together?

Where did the intel used by the 60 man unit mostly come from, the unit itself, the police or a source outside the small area or valley?

Could outside units swoop in to do things without the approval or knowledge of the king of the little area or valley?

If you have time, I'd be obliged to you if you could answer some of these questions. They are probably blindingly obvious to most but not to me.

There are no hard and fast rules of deployment.

It depends on the degree of threat in that area of responsibility of a Battalion.

In some areas, they operate from Battalion bases, and in some areas, the Battalion is dispersed in Company Posts. These posts are located on dominating features and on the estimated likely approaches of the terrorists, as also to have observation over villages that are known to be havens for terrorists.

Based on the intelligence, ambushes are sent out, the strength being such that the post or base has adequate numbers for administration as also capable of defending itself from any terrorist attack.

These ambushes are coordinated on a Battalion grid.

There is no King as such. It is a tacit understanding that since the Army has to do the actual operation, the command and control is that of the Army echelon. The Police are basically to act for Liaison and oversee that no law as such is violated.

Ambushes are laid within a few hours of turnaround from the post. However, when intelligence is there of mass infiltration, the strength goes up and so does the distance and turnaround time.

Intelligence is bottom up and top down. It is constantly collated and disseminated. Electronic surveillance gives immense amount of information of terrorists plan.

[davidbfpo]

Gurkha posted a link to Indian doctrine in these matters:http://ids.nic.in/doctrine.htm

Originally Posted by JMA

I'm getting a corrupt file message

It loaded here and then announced 'Failed to load PDF document'

[davidbfpo]

An excellent article in a hitherto unknown Indian magazine 'The Caravan' in September; hat tip to two "lurkers":http://www.caravanmagazine.in/reportage/departed

The article is based on interviewing several returnees, alongside a general commentary.

[carl]

David:

You were right. That is an excellent article.

One of its themes in stated in this sentence.

"Many others grew disillusioned with the harsh realities of a freedom struggle run by Pakistani intelligence, which showed little concern for the independence or freedom of Kashmiris."

That seems to be a fairly common sentiment among those forced to work with the Pak Army/ISI. Nobody likes those guys. I wonder why we haven't tried hard to take more advantage of that over the years. Just another in a list of things that seem obvious but we never seemed to do.

[Dayuhan]

Originally Posted by carl

Just another in a list of things that seem obvious but we never seemed to do.

When things that seem obvious aren't done, two immediate possibilities spring to mind:

1. Those in charge are complete idiots and incapable of seeing or doing the obvious.

2. Maybe things aren't so obvious as they seem. There may be factors in the picture that you aren't seeing.

Always worth considering the possibility that #2 is in play. Any time things seem simple and obvious it's worth taking a much closer look.

[carl]

Dayuhan:

Give the suits and the multi-stars inside the beltway the benefit of the doubt?

Nah, I don't think so.

[Ray]

Originally Posted by davidbfpo

An excellent article in a hitherto unknown Indian magazine 'The Caravan' in September; hat tip to two "lurkers":http://www.caravanmagazine.in/reportage/departed

The article is based on interviewing several returnees, alongside a general commentary.

The Govt has a scheme to rehabilitate the ex militants.

Apart from that there are many 'reluctant' militants, in that they were 'shanghaied' while young and taken across, many against their will. Many such columns of young school children being taken across have been apprehended in the past. One such column was apprehended during my time.

I have interacted with militants who have returned to India and they were quite disillusioned with Pakistan and in what is called by Pakistan as Azad Kashmir, where because they observed that instead of Kashmiris ruling the so called Azad Kashmir, they AK Govt was being run by Pakistan and it administrators with a figurehead Kashmiri.

They also felt that Pakistan was not interested in an independent Kashmir and were merely using them, the Kashmiris, so that they could annex Kashmir and make it a part of Pakistan.

Also, they felt that modernity was there in India but not in the so called Azad Kashmir.

And their biggest worry was that as a part of Pakistan, the Kashmiris would lose their identity, which they have in India since the Valley is predominantly Muslim and hence their singular character was up front and recognised and would not be diluted owing to the provisions of the Indian Constitution wherein in non Kashmiris cannot buy land or settle down in Kashmir and that way the Kashmiri character would be in perpetuity, but would not be so in the so called Azad Kashmir, where all are Muslims in Pakistan and hence the bargaining power would not be there.

[Ray]

You may like to read Dr Shabir Choudhry's blogs:http://drshabirchoudhry.blogspot.co.uk/

Dr Shabir Choudhry was born in Nakker Shamali (near Panjeri) in District Bhimber, Azad Kashmir. He went to UK in 1966, and holds a dual nationality. He left secondary school in 1970 with no qualifications. In 1975 he started part time studies and passed Matriculation from Panjeri, passed ‘O’ and ‘A’ levels from UK, and resumed full time degree course and passed BA (Hons) in 1984. He was awarded Mphil and PGCE in 1990 and PhD in 2002. At present he is self - employed, provides private tuition, translation/ interpretation and consultancy. Dr Shabir Choudhry has done extensive research on the issue of Kashmir and Indo Pakistan relations. He is founder member of JKLF and became its Secretary General in 1985, and got elected President of JKLF and Europe in 1999. At present, he is: • He is author of more than 25 books and booklets in English on various aspects of the Kashmiri struggle. • Through out his adult life he has actively worked for Kashmir cause, and for peace and Rights Movement in Kashmir and South Asia. • Also he regularly takes part in proceedings of UN Human Rights Council and has attended various International conferences on Kashmir.

JKLF is a militant organisation and he is a member of the same.

[davidbfpo]

Hat tip to a "lurker" on Twitter:

An infiltration bid was foiled by the troops on the Line of Control by killing the four militants.....Friday’s killing followed an attack late last month by gunmen on a Srinagar hotel, after they aborted an attempt to ambush an Indian army convoy

Link:http://dawn.com/2012/11/10/four-mili...ed-in-kashmir/

[delhidjinn]

A little of tangent but the Kashmir's militancy decline has revved up the tourism and movie making industry. The endangered deer Hangul has been spotted outside its protected zone. http://uniqueindiatour.com/blog/78-k...s-a-boost.html

[Bill Moore]

Moderator Adds

This new thread was entitled 'Indian troops kill Pakistani soldier in Kashmir' and was today changed to reflect a broader theme 'Kashmir: a simmering, sometimes brutal small war'.

There is a second Kashmir thread, mainly with posts from 2012 on, 'Kashmir militants give up fight and head home', which provides some of the context and recently details of the Indian Army role:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=15691

A third thread covers one particular "hot spot" in 1999, in this small war, 'The Kargil War (new title, all aspects)' and this continues to be updated:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=16595 (ends)


http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stori...246295/1/.html

ISLAMABAD: A Pakistani soldier was killed and another wounded Sunday when Indian troops stormed a military post on the two countries' de facto border in Kashmir, the military said.

It said an exchange of fire was continuing after the Indian incursion across the Line of Control marking the frontier in the Haji Pir sector, 80 kilometres (49 miles) north of Islamabad.

Will be interesting to see what triggered this and how it will play out. It has been quiet for a while. Can't help but wonder if things will heat back up again after we downsize in Afghanistan, if not before.

[Ray]

Originally Posted by Bill Moore

http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stori...246295/1/.html



Will be interesting to see what triggered this and how it will play out. It has been quiet for a while. Can't help but wonder if things will heat back up again after we downsize in Afghanistan, if not before.

I presume it was because the Pakistanis recently killed an Indian soldier in the KG sector and have repeatedly violated the cease fire.

I don't think this will lead to anything serious.

[Ray]

As of today, the Pakistanis have resorted to shelling and exchange of Small Arms fire.

But then that is business as usual and more so, when infiltration is being assisted.