Quote Originally Posted by Galrahn View Post
...We can field light infantry on land without major technologies, indeed low tech light infantry rules in many parts of the world.
I broadly agree but would suggest some care -- our Light Infantryman today costs about 25 to 50K to equip, job dependent and they have some high tech gear that took a long time to develop; and there's more on the way.
...meaning every technology decision shapes several generations. Even the JOE doesn't look out far enough to cover the life of a new program.
Totally true, ergo...
Policy isn't enduring because it changes. However, strategy is driven by policy so it is constantly changing too, which tends to reinforce your point.
I believe that our policies have changed not nearly as sweepingly or as often as our Strategies. Strategies are changed not only at our whim but alos due to situational changes and opponenets actions. Polices are less affected by those outside factors.
...I would argue the Navy's Surface Combatant 21 program, the DDG-1000 and LCS, is a failure not of policy, but strategy. The Navy's littoral strategy is severely flawed in several ways.
I totally agree -- but submit that was mostly because of a poor understanding of the environment AND a 'blue wate' lust plus Congressional influence.
...1) 14,500 ton ships could somehow be stealthy in populated maritime littorals.
Don't think so. They believed that a 14,500 ton ship could stand off and dominate the littorals -- not the same thing at all. For proof of that, simply look at the original weapons fit. Ask the Navy why they're playing with ATACMs or what happened ERGM -- and the Mk 148.
2) Unmanned systems can replace manpower in complex human terrains, like the littorals
A littoral is not complex human terain; it's shallow near shore water, nothing more. The use of unmanned systems may or may not prove viable; we'll see. What the nearby humans in the littorals do won't have nearly as much to do with that as the technology.
3) Speed is protection, as if a ship will outrun a missile.
Don't think so. Not at all correct (regardless of what some know nothing may have said...) -- speed was and is seen as affording flexibility in employment and rapidity of movement from one action location to another. The M1 tank did not change the speed of comabt -- but its ability to move to blocking or reinforcing positions at very high speed complicates the planning of opponents.

Point is that those STRATEGIC assumptions made by one person (or several...) are now being questioned by others. As they should be.
...we build the LCS, not because it actually makes any sense as a technology for the littorals, but because it is relatively cheap as navy ships go.
Doubt it -- I believe the LCS will be seen as significabnt over match for its actual job description and a significantly cheaper alternative of the same or slightly less size will appear.
In the end, policy drives future naval capability because strategy failed, and as a result was ignored...

Make sense?
Sure it does. I thought that's what I said...

Or, differently put; strategy is infinitelt variable and MUST change as circumstances direct. A policy cane exist for years and survive numerous minor differences in the environment.

Strategies are short term efforts to achieve specific goals -- try to make them long term (as in Grand Strategy) and you will screw the pooch. Take a look at WW II Strategies and ships / shipbuilding. Five years and myriad changes...

The US can and has adopted long term policies. Long term strategies are beyond us and that's a good thing...