Just a question ?
Regards
Mike
Just a question ?
Regards
Mike
Why not include the peasant revolts of the middle ages? Or 1789? or 1968? Or even the Arab Revolt and the Young Turks (is this a punctuated equilibrium situation or the continuation of a century old process of Arab Nationalism that began with the Arab "revolts" against the European powers and the Ottomans...in which case you could go back farther)? Are they, in fact, comparable phenomena either ontologically or causatively? I can't say, but apparently you have all the answers. I have a problem with universalising comparisons which imply an almost "whiggish" conception of the march of progress/reason/liberty. Sociologist Charles Tilly's classic but oft ignored book Big Structures, Large Processes, Huge Comparisons covers a lot of these concerns better than I could ever articulate them. He also has an excellent criticism of theories of revolution based upon J-Curve hypotheses.
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 04-01-2011 at 12:09 PM. Reason: housekeeping
A true expert on the country, Patrick Seale has a short comment on FP and sub-titled:Link:http://www.foreignpolicy.com/article...yrian_timebombForget Libya. Washington should pay closer attention to the violent protests imperiling the Assad regime in Damascus. If there's one country where unrest could truly set the Middle East alight, it's Syria.
davidbfpo
Seale makes the assertion that:
Is he for real? Surely the US with its massive Department of State and CIA staffs with their various "desks" will be able to juggle a number of balls in the air at the same time?...the United States would be wise to spend a little less time thinking about Libya and a little more time thinking about a state that truly has implications on U.S. national interests.
But then Seale should realise that the key to the whole area is Iran. Even GWB could see that.
Seriously David, isn't this the problem of country specific "experts"? They tend to see their country of interest as the centre of the universe?
...we could also quote Michael Bruning, The Study House that Assad Built...
It is true that Assad has even fewer enthusiastic supporters beyond his small group of co-opted elites than did former Tunisian President Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali and former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, but the regime’s opposition has even less popular support. Unlike other dictators in the region, Assad is seen by many as a counterweight to sectarian disintegration rather than as a champion of sectarian interests. Moreover, Syrians have had frequent and direct exposure to the devastating outcomes of sectarian conflicts in Iraq and Lebanon. In 2005 and 2006, hundreds of thousands of Lebanese and Iraqi refugees flowed into Damascus, reminding Syrians of the dire consequences of religiously fueled carnage. And seeing how sectarianism has stunted Lebanon and Iraq, Syria’s equally pluralist society has good reason to acquiesce to Assad’s leadership.
Moreover, Assad’s comparable youth (he is 45, Ben Ali is 74, Mubarak is 82, and Qaddafi is 68) and his record of staunch anti-Westernism give him a layer of protection that the other leaders did not enjoy. Many Syrians perceive his opposition to the U.S.-led invasion of Iraq and his anti-Israel policies as desirable and in the national interest. In fact, Assad’s reputation in the West as an unyielding pariah has translated into popularity in his own country. In a somewhat twisted way, his willingness to stand up to the United States comports with the theme of Arab dignity that has rallied protesters throughout the region. While a similar anti-Western stance was taken by Qaddafi, Syria’s geographical proximity to the Arab-Israeli conflict (and its direct involvement) has lent Assad’s rhetoric of resistance much greater credibility than Qaddafi’s, especially after Qaddafi improved relations with the United States in the 2000s.
or, as a counterpoint, Tony Burdans', Syria's Assad no longer in vogue...
There were experts a plenty during the Cold War (many of whom failed to predict its end no less), and I can see you your Seale and raise you a Pipes, Fred Lawson, Nikolas van Dam, Rabinovotch, Batatu, Dawisha, Perthes, Lesch, Ziser, Moaz (&c). We could throw "experts" at each other till the cows come home.Other commentators who dismissed the likelihood of the Assad regime falling pointed to solidarity among the Alawite elite. Unlike the Egyptian army, which functioned independently of Mubarak and broke with him at a key moment, the Syrian brass, as part of a small religious minority, views its fate and safety as inextricably linked to Assad’s and therefore will not fail to crack down on protests.
Still, that threat has not deterred all the protesters. And on March 22, the sectarian dimension of the conflict became explicit: the Deraa demonstrators broke a long-standing taboo, chanting, “No to Iran, no to Hezbollah, we want a God-fearing Muslim” -- by which they meant, “We want a Sunni Muslim running the country.” In a show of solidarity with the regime, Alawites replaced their own headshots on Facebook with pictures of Bashar.
Last edited by Tukhachevskii; 04-02-2011 at 11:41 AM.
1. I am not an expert (although I have studied and been taught by a lot of them.
2. My intitial appraisal of the situation based upon what information I have (which I have interpreted contectually based upon past study) is located in post #7 above. It's not detailed, certainly isn't predictive and I don't claim to have any priveleged insight with regards to Syria. Ultimately, we cannot say for certian what trajectory events will take other than events have their own way of altering the situation (how's that for an honourable mention of Macmillan ["event's, dear boy, events..."]). Prior to Ghaddafi digging his heels in people thought that states in the MENA would fall like dominoes. Assad now knows that, with NATO embroiled in a war against the Lybian government (Ghadafi is, after all, still the leader in de facto if not de jure terms; legitimacy is a difficult metric to apply), that elements of international society (among them Russia who has strateguc/naval interests in Syria) as well as other states (such as Turkey which is a NATO member state and almost scuppered NATO's application iof airpower) will not sanction any further extension of the "Bush 2.0" doctrine (that's an attempt at humour by the way, not a polemical statement). With the international and regional balance of opinion tiliting in favour of stability (by any means) as oppsoed to "assisted regime change/state capture", which is essentially what NATO is doing, Asad knows he has to act carefully (they'll be no repeat of Hama, nor need there be). Asad's may rule may be based upon the control of key posts by his fellow co-religionists but has has, since 2000, successully co-opted the Sunni elite/borgeoisie(sp?) many of whom will see their gains in the regime threatened and will stand aside or grumble but, I don't think, they'll "switch" sides. Asad is a shrewd as his father and, geopolitically, he has "friends". Importantly, Syria isn't economically important to Europe nor is it on Europe's doorstep which applys the brakes a little when it comes to prodding regional actors into action. Things are open ended, anyone may make a mistake, or events may take a turn for the worse but I am certain that things aren't as clear cut as statements/commentators that proclaim "Asad will fall" predict them to be.
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