Revising FM 3-24: What needs to change?

[Ken White]

"However, the high level, end product counter insurgency assessment scorecard is merely the result of a good assessment process that use quality data; common definitions; a systematic, repeatable process; common sense data gathering; and the ability to systematically incorporate non-quantative opinions into an overall commander / staff assessment of the progress of the counter insurgency campaign."

Good luck with that, particularly the data quality and gathering...

[wm]

However, the high level, end product counter insurgency assessment scorecard is merely the result of a good assessment process that use quality data; common definitions; a systematic, repeatable process; common sense data gathering; and the ability to systematically incorporate non-quantative opinions into an overall commander / staff assessment of the progress of the counter insurgency campaign.

Good luck with that, particularly the data quality and gathering...Good luck with that, particularly the data quality and gathering...

What Ken said, and nice marketing pitch by the way.

[Cavguy]

What Ken said, and nice marketing pitch by the way.

Available in training for you via IMPAC for $2500/session! (no kidding)

I believe we discussed the merits of balanced scorecardhere.

[John T. Fishel]

I have discussed the SWORD Model to some extent here and, at Marc T's suggestion, am working on a summary article (with a new twist or 2). Since it will take me a bit to finish, I want to make a couple of comments here that relate to Mark's post.

The SWORD Model is Social Science. It makes use of the scientific method for theory development, data collection, and data analysis. When you see the article, you will recognize its dimensions from 3-24, 100-20, JP 3-07 and lots of other places. Until the research was done, however, no quantitative metrics existed. Moreover, the model works quite well with qualitative data and analysis but only - as Mark says - as principles. Metrics in an ongoing conflict are notoriously difficult to gather and, especially difficult to cull from public sources. In the last chapter of Max and my Uncomfortable Wars Revisited I applied the model to the ongoing conflict in Iraq using only public data (this was as of 2004). I hedged and qualified all over the place but a rigorous read shows that I was overly optimistic at the time and dead wrong on unity of effort.

So, using any Social Science model depends on the quality of the model, the quality of the data (mine was not nearly as good as it should have been), and the art of the interpreter (mine was pretty good since it was almost sufficiently hedged).

On that cautionary note

Cheers

JohnT

[Rex Brynen]

Good luck with that, particularly the data quality and gathering...

...not to mention the lack of an agreed quantifiable model, even in the social sciences, of how states are stabilized, legitimacy is won, etc...

[Doug Ollivant]

Metrics are very hard to get in COIN/stabilization/peacekeeping, particularly leading measures. It's easy to get a metric that will tell you that you were doing really great--or really poorly--six months ago. Short term feedback is much harder.

But I would recommend those who work this should contact the ORSA officers who worked for me in Baghdad--LTC Scott Kain and MAJ Jeremy Newton. Both are incredibly skilled staticians/modelers with a good sensing of the multiplicity of issues involved in doing an credible assessment (and a healthy sense of limitations). While I still believe you have to balance the objective data with subjective assessment (both at a theoretical level of not all is measureable, and at a practical level that we know we don't have the capability to measure as we would like), their model was a good tool--and did pick up the improvements as Baghdad got better.

And I agree--while EBO has obvious shortcomings, we should "harvest" its two primary contributions--non kinetics matter, and assessments matter.

Doug

[Mark O'Neill]

I accept the need for some appropriate metrics in order to assist in planning and undertstanding within the COIN environment. However, I believe that care most be taken that the 'science' of whatever process is used to gather the data to be analysed does not become confused with 'countering' insurgency. Metrics are a part of the puzzle and by no means necessarily as central to 'unlocking' COIN as what some of the discussion would perhaps have us believe.

Our 20th and 21st Century western militaries invariably have a fascination with science, frequently displaying behaviour that suggests we believe that it will clear the 'fog of war' and give us an insight superior to that of our foes. The evidence of this can be seen in instances as diverse as the McNamara era analyses of the war in Vietnam, to the premature truimphalism of the Air power advocates after the 1991 Gulf War (and, to an extent, in the thinking behind the 'light' decapitation of the Ba'athist regime in Iraq in 2003).

When I read and see offerings of 'systems' or 'processes' offering understanding in COIN, I shudder. During my time at the MNF-I COIN CFE I encountered many Officers and NCO imbued with passion and enthusiasm for various such systems. Invariably they struggled with the dissonance that resulted when their process failed to adequately explain or account for the reality of the complex environment they ended up in. Notwithstanding what I said earlier about the need for some metrics, I found that the only way that seemed to really 'help' was a more socratic approach to teaching.

In short I (and my colleagues) found that we had two options regarding COIN education: Firstly , we could teach a 'system' or 'process' (the 'science' approach) that was 'easy' to teach and quickly gave the satisfying illusion that we had passed on knowledge. This also fit nicely with the Army's and USMC's cultural predilection for receiving such process training. But doing this is not COIN education - it is rote learning process. The second approach (the 'art' approach) was to assist people in 'free thinking' based on upon looking at the situation and assessing it somewhat subjectively, relying on their own innate intelligence and based on a doctrinal principles approach. This is harder to do, it required a lot of work and effort (as well as understanding by the instructors). We chose the second approach - it lead to better comprehension and improved confidence in their own abilities amongst the trainees.

The key to being able to use such an approach is doctrine that clearly artiulates principles and concepts that can intelligently applied with a degree of thought. Doctrine that moves towards advocacy of systems or processes will generate an 'industry' of understanding that actually adds nothing tangible to the bottom line of understanding, whilst providing the very illusion of the same. I tender the example of the MDMP as evidence - Commanders and Staff Officers at all levels can gain virtual PhD levels of understanding of such the process whilst at the same time failing to have the faintest clue about tactical or operational art.

To wind up this suddenly long post, I beleive that the next draft of FM3-24 must shy away from any process driven or formulaic approach and seek to build upon an approach that reinforces clear, simple description and principles to aid soldiers in gaining truer understanding rather than rote learning of a system. Simpler is better. As COL Alex Alderson (former MNF -I plans) said ' Counterinsurgency is not alchemy' .

Regards,

Mark