Let's talk about "design", and the death of the MDMP

[Menning]

For anyone who hasn't seen it, you can download a copy of Design: Tools of the Trade here.

[Steve Blair]

..........(ten characters)

[Spud]

For anyone who hasn't seen it, you can download a copy of Design: Tools of the Trade here.

My apologies for dragging up a somewhat dated thread but I'm head down preparing a position paper on the applicability of design for us as part of my staff college work.

Been reading far too much on operational art and operational design over the past few weeks and finally stumbled on this document by Dr Jack (thanks Menning)

After reading it (which is thankfully a very easy read after some of the papers I've struggled through recently) I remain concerned with a couple of things. Forgive me if there are some cultural misunderstandings that lead to my concerns ... we are only separated by the same language after all

Firstly I get the feeling (like that articulated by Hacksaw) that this new focus on Design is actually in response to some commanders getting it and others not (particularly after watching HBO's Gen Kill over the past few nights). From my reading so far it seems to provide new words for what I would have considered common-sense in command and leadership. Perhaps I'm looking at this wrong but reading it all I'm becoming increasingly concerned with professional military competence if we have to spell out in such detail that #### happens in war and that you need to be flexible and adaptive to maximise opportunities for success. Chapter 8 in this paper (Ridgeway in Korea) does not highlight the value of design to me at all ... it highlights the value of competent command and leadership. Frankly if we're not doing the things that General Ridgeway saw as essential on taking command there is a far greater issue at stake here and that goes to the very core of PME.

Secondly (and perhaps my greatest issue) is that Design seems to be offered as the panacea for the constraints imposed on modern combat operations through its ability to ensure we are solving the right problem. This is great if we are divorced from policy but we're not. The planners back in 02/03 identified the post conflict problem and attempted to ensure it was addressed (or that at least forces were there to adapt to the problem if it did ensue) yet the constraints placed on them led them to refocus their efforts. Identifying the problem is all well and good but the nub of it is the ability to do anything about it. In our case it is the constraints imposed on our level and type of commitment that define the problem that we can solve not the problem that needs solving. It leads to the "niche capability" and "punching above our weight" tripe that we offer as an excuse for limited action while still being a great Coalition partner.

My head hurts even more now.