Background on AQIM: a growing threat?

[Dayuhan]

The difference doesn't matter, for drones are no answer to either scenario. There's too much faith being put into technology and stand-off solutions.

Drones may not be "an answer" to the problem of a potential Islamist state exporting jihadis, but they can certainly disrupt and degrade efforts to train and deploy them. I don't know that there is "an answer" in any simple and convincing sense, but it is at least worth considering the possibility that in some circumstances simply letting the jihadis have their state and trying to contain the consequences might be a better answer than trying to preserve a non-jihadi state through perpetual occupation. Whether or not that is the case in any given situation would require analysis specific to that situation, but it's not a possibility that should be excluded from the start, IMO.

[Bill Moore]

Drones may not be "an answer" to the problem of a potential Islamist state exporting jihadis, but they can certainly disrupt and degrade efforts to train and deploy them. I don't know that there is "an answer" in any simple and convincing sense, but it is at least worth considering the possibility that in some circumstances simply letting the jihadis have their state and trying to contain the consequences might be a better answer than trying to preserve a non-jihadi state through perpetual occupation. Whether or not that is the case in any given situation would require analysis specific to that situation, but it's not a possibility that should be excluded from the start, IMO.

Agree that disrupting Islamist intentions with drones is a viable "tactic," but it won't result in a strategic victory. If they had their own state then they would have something to lose, at least in theory, and then they may be able to be deterred. Of course that didn't work so well in Afghanistan. Like you said no easy answers. In the meantime finding ways to kill them in a sustainable manner seems to be the best course of action.

[davidbfpo]

A commentary by Andrew Lebovich on the documents found, giving some context and a caveat:

Still, while these documents raise some fascinating subjects and questions, they provide only snapshots in a complicated tableau.

(Later)...Additionally, the documents present more anecdotal evidence that previous conceptions of AQIM may be incorrect, or at least severely deficient.

Link:http://thewasat.wordpress.com/2013/0...ict-documents/

He also refers an:

...her excellent book Smugglers and Saints of the Sahara, (by) the British social anthropologist Judith Scheele discusses the conception that many Algerian traders and their families held — and still hold — about northern Mali as a kind of wilderness that corrupted men and ruined families...

This was published in April 2012, but has no review on Amazon.com:http://www.amazon.com/Smugglers-Sain...+of+the+Sahara

Ah, there is one five* on:http://www.amazon.co.uk/product-reviews/1107022126

[davidbfpo]

Now this is, well, curious; in a tweet by Andrew Lebovich:

RFI got the whole document published in part earlier by AP

The linked story expands a little, so hopefully the full document will appear one day:http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20130224-m...ent-tombouctou

[bourbon]

The War Nerd: It Ain’t Easy Being a Jihadi Middle Manager, Feb 15th, 2013.

Over and over, Droukdel says that it’s not politically smart to start amputating people’s hands and whipping women for not covering up. He talks like middle management—which he is, in the ridiculous Al Qaeda organizational chart. He talks about Mali as a “project,” as if he was dealing with product placement in a new franchise—which he was, according to his terms. And like a good guerrilla manager who’s read his Mao, he tries to teach the knuckleheads working for him that taking and losing territory isn’t nearly as important as winning over the people.

[davidbfpo]

RUSI's Director, Professor Michael Clarke, weighs in with his analysis:http://www.rusi.org/analysis/comment...511D272D72DDC/

He concludes:

What these documents show us is a centrally-directed attempt to achieve all the old Al Qa'ida ambitions; to ally with other political movements in order to hijack them; to fight heroic guerrilla wars for disputed territory, and to build up a new Caliphate that will extend across the Middle East and far beyond. They are aims which are as old fashioned as they are chilling.

Has anyone seen a reaction from AQIM to these revelations?

[davidbfpo]

Clint Watts adds his analysis:http://www.fpri.org/geopoliticus/201...essons-learned

Don’t feel bad U.S. military, you are not the only force struggling to make better decisions from your lessons learned. Al Qaeda and particularly their Sahel affiliate, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), struggle to improve their operations based on analyses of past failures as evidence in the Associated Press’s (AP) recent publication of AQIM leader Abdelmalek Droukdel’s confidential letter to his fighters in Mali. While an incomplete manuscript, three chapters of AQIM guidance discovered in Timbuktu provide some clarity to al Qaeda’s strategic thinking in a post-Bin Laden era.

Later:

The document provides a fascinating peak into the mindset of al Qaeda affiliates after Bin Laden’s death. While flashes of Bin Laden’s intent appear in Droukdel’s dispatch, AQIM’s strategic plan to integrate with local groups appears to undermine itself in two key ways.

[davidbfpo]

Not sure why RFI have taken months to publish this, but this week an update on the Droukdel document was published, in French so the link may need Google's translation to help:

RFI broadcasts all the roadmap for AQIM Azawad, a document signed by the hand of the leader of AQIM, found February 16, 2013 by Nicolas Champeaux and Jean-Louis Le Touzet, envoys of RFI and Liberation in Timbuktu. In this paper edifying, dated 20 July 2012, the bloody Abdelmalek Droukdel reveals black and white its target in northern Mali: create an Islamic state that will not be labeled Jihad. Droukdel clearly shows how: his men are fool local people to armed movements in the North the illusion that they have power, and not to arouse the attention of the international community. To achieve its goals, Droukdel is ready to give the full and immediate implementation of Sharia. This paper therefore reveals a surprising shift in the strategy of the terrorist leader and also confirms the deep tensions within the branch of al-Qaeda. Finally, he said that Mali is not immune to a return of jihadists. This is the first time such an internal document of AQIM is distributed in its entirety.

The document is within the article and is twelve pages long (which may not translate readily).

Link:http://www.rfi.fr/afrique/20131006-m...da-sanguinaire

[davidbfpo]

A short BBC overview of the jihadist threat across West Africa; which fits here I think:http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-35349005

There is a parallel thread on West Africa and the Gulf of Guinea:http://council.smallwarsjournal.com/...ad.php?t=11204

[davidbfpo]

Paul Rogers offers a brief overview of ISIS to AQIM across Africa and most recently an attack in the Ivory Coast:https://www.opendemocracy.net/paul-r...-isis-to-aqim?

He ends:

In late 2015 there was a common view in western security circles that ISIS was in retreat and that AQIM and Shabaab were greatly weakened. In the space of just three months that has been turned on its head. In a familiar pattern, a burst of optimism about the prospects of the 'war on terror' has been shown to have flimsy foundations. The west's continuing failure to understand what is happening fuels a conflict out of control.