COIN Reading Lists (merged)

[Starbuck]

T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom. He assisted in developing many of the insurgent tactics now used by many of the groups in Iraq (notably the IED, economy of force, blending into the surrounding territories, de-centralization of command, etc). He also makes comments on the organizational culture of the British Army that are actually quite similar to the organizational culture of the US Army in the War on Terror, which followed a long period of peacetime.

[kaur]

Modern Irregular Warfare (originally published 1972).

http://www.wlym.com/pdf/iclc/modernwarfare.pdf

[William F. Owen]

T.E. Lawrence's Seven Pillars of Wisdom. He assisted in developing many of the insurgent tactics now used by many of the groups in Iraq (notably the IED, economy of force, blending into the surrounding territories, de-centralization of command, etc).

I have great deal of difficulty in believing T.E. assisted in developing any tactics at all, despite that which he claims. The Jordanians certainly make no claim to his expertise, other than he knew how to use explosives. Command detonated IEDs had been widely used in the Boer War, against rail networks.

The real power behind T.E. was General Allenby and a small team of British Intelligence experts who told him what to do and when to it. T.E. was actually only a small part of far larger picture, conceived and executed by that small team. There is ample evidence to suggest Lawrence was wise after the fact, and greatly "gilded the lily," which the OPSEC controls of 1927 as quite happy for him to do, in order to disguise the other means used.

He also makes comments on the organizational culture of the British Army that are actually quite similar to the organizational culture of the US Army in the War on Terror, which followed a long period of peacetime.

I'd take T.E. with a huge pinch of salt. He's another poster boy for the post modern avant-garde, that was as bad in 1930's as they are today.

[Gian P Gentile]

Wilf as usual is spot-on and has it right with the recommendation to read Clausewitz first!! Ironic though that FM 3-24 chose to leave Clausewitz off of the classics bibliography list in the back of the manual. The purpose of this action was to bludgeon the American Army out of its perceived "conventional mindset."

Also strongly suggest reading CE Callwell's "Small Wars: Their Principles and Practice." The intro in the University of Nebraska edition by historian Doug Porch is superb.

[MikeF]

Patton,

I've been given some thought to this question as of late. Specifically, we've been debating how to teach the institutional army about COIN. I learned from On the Job Training followed with my current academic pursuits. With that in mind, I'd suggest starting with the basics of how and why.

1. To answer the Why, I'd recommend two books.

A. Why Men Rebel- Ted Gurr
B. Revolutionary Change- Chalmers Johnson

Summary of Gurr...

Amazon Review
In this book, Gurr examines the psychological frustration-aggression theory which argues that the primary source of the human capacity for violence is the frustration-aggression mechanism. Frustration does not necessarily lead to violence, Gurr says, but when it is sufficiently prolonged and sharply felt, it often does result in anger and eventually violence.
Gurr explains this hypothesis with his term "relative deprivation," which is the discrepancy between what people think they deserve, and what they actually think they can get. Gurr's hypothesis, which forms the foundation of the book, is that: "The potential for collective violence varies strongly with the intensity and scope of relative deprivation among members of a collectivity."(p.24) http://www.beyondintractability.org/booksummary/10680


John T. Fischel SWJ summary- excerpt from another thread
1. The absolutely deprived/oppressed do not rebel.
2. Neither do those who are doing well.
3. Rebellion happens after a period of social/political/economic improvement is followed by a sudden and relatively steep downturn causing the government to lose its legitimacy.
Gurr calls this "perceived relative deprivation."
It's still the best theoretical explanation for insurgency out there.

COL Bob Jones adds

A couple of points worth considering:

In general, insurgency occurs when a government "fails" its populace. Failure being not meeting some issue or issues that can fall across the full range of Maslows heirarchy that a significant segment of the populace feels is important enought to fight over, and where legitimate means for addressing the failure are not available. Not the same as effective governance, as government can be effective (British governance of American Colonies) and fail; or it can be ineffective and succeed. The only metric that matters is how he populace feels about its governance.

Insurgency falls into three broad categories: Revolution, to change the governance of the entire state; Separatist, to break some segment of the state off and form a new state; and Resistance. (In Iraq you see all three forms at the same time, and each requires a tailored approach to resolve).

COIN efforts tend to be long, drawnout affairs largely because Governments (politicians) are even worse than most people at taking responsibility for their shortcomings. Far better to blame such failures on others and focus on "fixing them," rather than being introspective and adjusting your own actions as your main effort, and addressing the symptoms of that failure as a supporting effort.

Finally, outbreaks of insurgency tend to occur after any major disruption ends a period of major governmental control that has suppressed the ability of a wide range of populaces to self-determine their own governance. As Spain crumbled as a major power at the turn of the century (led to popular uprisings and also a scramble by other states to take over payments on old colonies), At the end of WWI a major disruption of the European Colonial system occured with similar effect. The end of WWII led to many African and Asian uprisings. Concept of a common ideology for distinct events occurs as many of these populaces turn to an ideology of communism to rally the populace for change. Post Coldwar the areas released from suppression were central europe, the middle east. Russia in large part opted not to resist, so change was relatively bloodless in Central Europe. In the Middle East the US led west is resisting such changes to the political structures the worked so hard to shape and sustain, so there is conflict. Most of these populaces are majority Muslim, so it makes a convenient ideology to rally the populace for change.

Summary of Johnson...

CHPT 8 PG 156-157

"by demonstrating through apparently indiscriminate violence that the existing regime cannot protect the people nominally under its authority. The effect on the individual is supposedly not only anxiety, but withdrawal from the relationships making up the established order of society. .... usually has the opposite effect of calling people's attention to the seriousness of the situation and encouraging them to support any strong reassertion of authority"

"..provoke the ruling elites into a disastrous overreaction, thereby creating widespread sentiment against them. ...transform the political situation of the country into a military situation. That will alienate the masses, who, from then on, will revolt against the army and the police and blame them for this state of things."


More to follow...

Mike

[MikeF]

To understand How men rebel, you gotta go with Chairman Mao...

Here's a quick summary with a little help from Dr. Gordon McCormick and David Kilcullen...

KEY POINTS*:

1. In this ‘game’ of IW, the goal of the state or counter-state is control of the populace. The counter-state is an organization that seeks to take over the responsibilities of the state. The counter-state can be a tribe, gang, insurgent, terrorist, or drug lord.

2. Control is dictated by the perceived security level of the populace. In this type of conflict, control is often coerced as the state and counter-state battle for the physical and psychological so-called “hearts and minds.”

3. If the government stops providing essential services, security, and governance to the populace, then the counter-state will fill the void. For example, an area in Iraq where coalition forces mass in large FOBs and the government does not govern. These areas are often dubbed “denied areas.”

4. The point at which the state cedes an area to the counter-state is defined as the break point. This break point is “achieved by establishing a local military advantage, displacing (or neutralizing) the residual presence of the old regime, and creating an alternative set of administrative and governing institutions” (McCormick, 1999, pp. 26-27).

* These key points are a portion of Dr. Gordon McCormick’s Mystic Diamond Model from his seminar on Guerilla Warfare. Dr. David Kilcullen used the model to introduce his conflict eco-system.

ENEMY COURSE OF ACTION:

Chairman Mao set the ultimate playbook for the counter-state. The Vietcong, NVA, Hezbollah, Hamas, JAM, and Al Qaeda adapted it for their own purposes.

1) Clandestine Organization

2) Psychological Preparation of the People
(a) Propaganda
(b) Reduction of Prestige
(c) Peasant Resistance
(d) Destruction of the Opposition

3) Expansion of Control
(a) Destruction of the Oppression
(b) Land Reform as a Tactic of the Party

4) Consolidation of Power
(a) Paramilitary Forces
(b) Mutual Surveillance
(c) Movement Controls

In China, the Maoist Theory of People's War divides warfare into three phases. In Phase One, the guerrillas earn population's support by distributing propaganda and attacking the organs of government. In Phase Two, escalating attacks are launched against the government's military forces and vital institutions. In Phase Three, conventional warfare and fighting are used to seize cities, overthrow the government, and assume control of the country. Mao's doctrine anticipated that circumstances may require shifting between phases in either directions and that the phases may not be uniform and evenly paced throughout the countryside. Mao Zedong's seminal work, On Guerrilla Warfare,[4] has been widely distributed and applied most successfully in Vietnam, by military leader and theorist Vo Nguyen Giap, whose "Peoples War, Peoples Army"[5] closely follows the Maoist three-phase approach, but emphasizing flexibility in shifting between guerrilla warfare and a spontaneous "General Uprising" of the population in conjunction with guerrilla forces (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guerril...e_Maoist_model)

I hope this helps...

Mike

[John T. Fishel]

at self promotion, I'd recommend my own (with Max G. Manwaring) Uncomfortable Wars Revisited, OU Press, 2008 (paperback edition) which is a "reasonable" price.

Cheers

JohnT

[carl]

RAND has many many things on line, including Galula's first person account of his time in Algeria. And it's all for free.