Edward Luttwak - Counterinsurgency as Military Malpractice

[davidbfpo]

I've admired Luuwak's writings before, but this article is a painful read. His final paragraphs, with many illustrations from WW2 German actions stretch credibility. One small quote should enliven SWC:

'Is it therefore the case that counterinsurgency doctrine has been evolving backward, from the doubts of the 1950s to the certitudes of 1890? That is no accusation, alas, because one needs to go back even further to find convincing models of success in defeating insurgents by military means'.

davidbfpo

[Granite_State]

I've admired Luuwak's writings before, but this article is a painful read. His final paragraphs, with many illustrations from WW2 German actions stretch credibility. One small quote should enliven SWC:

'Is it therefore the case that counterinsurgency doctrine has been evolving backward, from the doubts of the 1950s to the certitudes of 1890? That is no accusation, alas, because one needs to go back even further to find convincing models of success in defeating insurgents by military means'.

davidbfpo

Agreed. But I think his larger point about the unsuitability of high-tech, conventional armies to fight small wars is worth repeating.

[Tom Odom]

Luttwak has been a consistently good writer on the Arab-Israeli Wars. In that capacity, he often looked at the issues of technology and war fighting. Two notable cases: the 73 War when the IDF's long-standing preference for CAS as flying artillery cost the Israelis dearly on the Sinai and the Golan fronts; and in the 82 invasion when rapid advances led to the decision to enter and seize Beirut on the assumption that maneuver warfare advantages for the IDF would play equally well in a city.

Best

Tom

[J Wolfsberger]

Luttwak is always worth reading, especially when you disagree with him. I haven't completely digested everything he says in the article, but here is a telling quote:" The armed forces of the most advanced countries, and certainly of the United States, all formidable against enemies assembled in conveniently targetable massed formations, are least effective in fighting insurgents. That was demonstrated in Vietnam in many different ways over many years..." If you want to know how the war looks to one of the (rare) intelligent members of Lower Manhattan's elite, this is a good read.

One further comment. He makes it clear that he sees strong parallels between the current war in Iraq and the 19th century Spanish guerrilla war against France. I agree that there are strong similarities, and possibly stronger than even he suggests. But his implied argument, that similarity of circumstances results in similarity of outcomes, seems weak.

[Old Eagle]

I love to read Ed Luttwak because he challenges me to really think through everything I have developed to that point in time. The theory of COIN as malpractice is exactly that type of challenge.

In the end, I believe that COIN has to evolve to meet the challenges outlined by Dave Kilcullen in his "Counter-insurgency Redux". We are not automatically doomed to failure, and history does not automatically repeat itself.