How the West was Won (well, at least Ramadi)

[Boot]

I know quite a few Marines who were in Ramadi during this time, and spent time at Blue Diamond and Hurricane point, nice to see a different view, I have seen plenty of AAR's from Marines through professional journals, reports themselves, or the actual people involved. I know Col Devlin only in passing and I am a little surprised that he would say something like that especially working for a guy like Gen. Gaskin. One of the Army Captains who was in my team out of FOB Loyalty had an IP checkpoint outside of Ramadi. I have also been to Tal Afar, and I was pretty impressed with how quiet it was.
Lastly your not implying that the Army BCT is solely responsible for the success out west...are you?

[Cavguy]

Lastly your not implying that the Army BCT is solely responsible for the success out west...are you?

I hope not ... 1/6 and 3/8 Marines was part of 1/1 AD, and the article clearly credits the Army and Marine members of the BCT, and notice I talk of the USMC Air Support. 4 of 5 maneuver BN's in AO Topeka were Army - but it was a joint fight. It would be no different if it had happened in RCT's to the East and west, both of which have army units working in them but I rarely see them mentioned either, not out of omission, but because most of the forces in those areas are Marines.

The article also credits 1 and 2 MEF. However, it is undeniable that the (most recent) Awakening began in AO Topeka, and it was under control of a US Army BCT operating under 1 and later 2 MEF, utilizing lessons and mindset largely developed elsewhere.

If you notice, the article is about the Awakening, and only really mentions (in action) one of the five BCT's under our control 1-9 IN, because they were at the decisive action.

[Eden]

I'm curious about the role of higher headquarters in helping or hindering operations. The impression I get is that your brigade commander was left to his own devices and allowed to get on with it. I wonder whether he had to gain approval for his plans, how closely operations were monitored, and how difficult (or easy) it was to get resources from higher. I ask because a very fine brigade commander in Afghanistan was consistently micro-managed and forced to jump through several briefing hoops each time he wanted to mount an operation.

I suspect partly this was a matter of scale; there was only one combat brigade with a two-star and several deputy CGs to help him in Afghanistan. I just wonder if the same thing went on in Iraq.

[Ken White]

My son reported the same problem you note in his two trips to the 'Stan but noted the absence of GO micro management in his trip to Iraq. All those were with the same Bde but with different Flag Officers each time.

To state the obvious, the uppermost elephant sets the tone for the herd and scale can affect the personality -- or at least modulate the display thereof.

[Cavguy]

I'm curious about the role of higher headquarters in helping or hindering operations. The impression I get is that your brigade commander was left to his own devices and allowed to get on with it. I wonder whether he had to gain approval for his plans, how closely operations were monitored, and how difficult (or easy) it was to get resources from higher. I ask because a very fine brigade commander in Afghanistan was consistently micro-managed and forced to jump through several briefing hoops each time he wanted to mount an operation.

I suspect partly this was a matter of scale; there was only one combat brigade with a two-star and several deputy CGs to help him in Afghanistan. I just wonder if the same thing went on in Iraq.

I'd really have to have COL MacFarland answer that. I believe in one of his media interviews he half-jokingly says he was given the AO and basically told to keep the lid on it, because no one expected anything out of it. I'm not sure how much/little interaction with MG Zilmer on day to day ops he had, but I never felt 1MEF or 2MEF meddling much in our operational plans. Outside of Baghdad, the size/scope of the MND AO's pretty much limits how much a division commander can actively control, the BCT commanders are kind of like kings of their kingdoms. That is a good and bad thing - allows initative, but also accounts for the "mood swings" that sometimes occur after RIP/TOA's, where a BCT commander with an opposite tactical philosophy takes over. I know that was 3d ACR's fear with us in Tal Afar, and our fear about 1/3 ID. 1/3 ID performed superbly in our place, and I know (despite Ricks' out of context quote in FIASCO) we did well in Tal Afar, violence by October 2006 there was 60% less than the 60% reduction during 3ACR's tour.

From personal experience, as the BDE Battle Major, I never had tactical interference from the MEF, in fact, I would say they went out of their way to be supportive to our tactical efforts. The CG and ADC were regularly in our AO, so I am sure they were quite familiar with our plans and course of action. How much they gave Ready 6 specific guidance I am unaware.

I actually enjoyed working for a MEF HQ much better than an Army DIV HQ, micromanagement wise.

[Cavguy]

All,

COL MacFarland wrote an addendum to last month's Military Review article on Ramadi. He wanted to address the mistaken perception of some that it was an Army-centric effort. In reality, it was highly joint - from the squad on up.

You can read the addendum here, and the original article here.

Money Quote:

"You old guys need to get over that s—t."
- Young Marine to Marine Sergeant Major when asked how he felt about fighting alongside an Army unit in Al Anbar, Iraq.

and

One of the great legacies of the fight for Al Anbar province will be the enduring, mutual respect earned by the various service-members who fought side by side. This respect was nowhere more evident than in Ramadi, where our Army brigade combat team, the 1st BCT, 1st Armored Division (Ready First Combat Team), fought under the command of I Marine Expeditionary Force (I MEF). The Ready First was not a pure Army BCT. It contained U.S. Marine Corps (USMC) elements, including a reinforced rifle battalion (initially 3/8 Marines and later 1/6 Marines), two rifle companies from a Marine Expeditionary Unit (2/4 Marines), a riverine patrol unit, an air and naval gunfire liaison platoon, and a civil affairs detachment. The Air Force supported the Ready First with an air liaison team embedded in the BCT. The brigade staff itself was a de facto joint organization—it had Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine officers and NCOs throughout. The electronic warfare officer, a Catholic chaplain, and the head surgeon were all Navy commanders. The civil affairs and public affairs officers were Marines. Outside the brigade, support came from a Marine logistics group and I MEF’s air combat element. Numerous other external USMC units, including a platoon from a radio battalion, a postal unit, explosive ordnance disposal teams, fire-fighting teams, air traffic controllers, and military transition teams, also provided support. So did the Navy, in the form of surgical teams and corpsmen, SeaBee battalions, electronic warfare experts, and SEAL platoons from SEAL Teams 3 and 5.

[Boot]

I hope not ... 1/6 and 3/8 Marines was part of 1/1 AD, and the article clearly credits the Army and Marine members of the BCT, and notice I talk of the USMC Air Support. 4 of 5 maneuver BN's in AO Topeka were Army - but it was a joint fight. It would be no different if it had happened in RCT's to the East and west, both of which have army units working in them but I rarely see them mentioned either, not out of omission, but because most of the forces in those areas are Marines.

The article also credits 1 and 2 MEF. However, it is undeniable that the (most recent) Awakening began in AO Topeka, and it was under control of a US Army BCT operating under 1 and later 2 MEF, utilizing lessons and mindset largely developed elsewhere.

If you notice, the article is about the Awakening, and only really mentions (in action) one of the five BCT's under our control 1-9 IN, because they were at the decisive action.

Cavguy,
I sent you a PM and no I didn't think you were implying that, my question was totally tounge in cheek. I have great respect for Col McFarland and what was accomplished in Ramadi, and what is being accomplished in Al Anbar. Sorry if I came across that way.
I worked for Gen Pittard and Gen Yarbrough at the IAG and have great respect for both and the rest of the Soldiers I worked with there.
I worked with 4-1 BCT in MND-N and was extremelly impressed with the support they gave TT's and the team I was on when we rolled through there. It was overall better than what my Marine brothers were giving Marine TT's.
Now if the 3/69th Armor would give back the radio gear they stole from one of the MiTT's!...


Boot

[Ken White]

When 1st Recon Co moved from the east coast of Korea to the west, they started with the two 1/4 tons, two 2 1/2 tons and one 100 cubic foot reefer they were authorized; when they arrived on the west coast two weeks later they had about 20 1/4 tons, five new GMC 2 1/2 tons and three reefers -- all painted Marine green with yellow reg and unit numbers. Consider your lost radios payback

[Boot]

When 1st Recon Co moved from the east coast of Korea to the west, they started with the two 1/4 tons, two 2 1/2 tons and one 100 cubic foot reefer they were authorized; when they arrived on the west coast two weeks later they had about 20 1/4 tons, five new GMC 2 1/2 tons and three reefers -- all painted Marine green with yellow reg and unit numbers. Consider your lost radios payback

HEY! I was in 3rd Recon EVERYONE knows 1st Recon are liars and cheats!

As for us Angels in 3rd Herd...

[Ken White]

HEY! I was in 3rd Recon EVERYONE knows 1st Recon are liars and cheats!

As for us Angels in 3rd Herd...

Only for war stories. Thieve? Constantly. Only due to military necessity, of course...

[Cavguy]

Reporter Jim Michaels has a forthcoming book on 1/1 AD in Ramadi.

A Chance in Hell

Posted by SWJ Editors on June 8, 2010 4:22 AM | Permalink| Print

How one brigade turned Ramadi, Iraq’s most violent city, into a model of stability. The riveting book by USA TODAY’s Jim Michaels is scheduled for release June 22, 2010. A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq’s Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.

Colonel Sean MacFarland’s brigade arrived in Iraq’s deadliest city with simple instructions: pacify Ramadi without destroying it. The odds were against him from the start. In fact, few thought he would succeed.

Ramadi had been going steadily downhill. By 2006, insurgents roamed freely in many parts of the city in open defiance of Iraq’s U.S.-backed government. Al-Qaeda had boldly declared Ramadi its capital. Even the U.S. military acknowledged the province would be the last to be pacified.

A lanky officer with a boyish face, MacFarland was no Patton. But his soft voice masked an iron will and a willingness to take risks. While most of the American military was focused on taming Baghdad, MacFarland laid out a bold plan for Ramadi. His soldiers would take on the insurgents in their own backyard. He set up combat outposts in the city’s most dangerous neighborhoods. Snipers roamed the dark streets, killing al-Qaeda leaders and terrorist cells. U.S. tanks rumbled down the streets, firing point blank into buildings occupied by insurgents. MacFarland’s brigade engaged in some of the bloodiest street fighting of the war. Casualties on both sides mounted. Al-Qaeda wasn’t going to give up easily. Ramadi was too important. MacFarland wasn’t going to back down either. The two sides had fought to a stalemate.

At least until Sheik Abdul Sattar Bezia al-Rishawi emerged. A minor tribal leader, Sheik Sattar had earned his reputation as a smuggler. He carried a large six-shooter on his hip and had a taste for whiskey. But he hated al-Qaeda and was watching MacFarland’s brigade as they battled militants toe-to-toe. This was a different group of Americans, Sattar thought. Sattar approached MacFarland and said he was ready to join with the Americans and fight al-Qaeda. Other officers might have kept their distance. MacFarland didn’t hesitate. He promised Sattar his support.

What followed was one of history’s unlikeliest - and most successful - partnerships. Together, the Americans and Sattar’s growing band of fighters drove al-Qaeda from Ramadi. A Chance in Hell is compelling tale of combat leadership and how a handful of men turned the tide of war at a time when it looked most hopeless.

Jim Michaels is a military writer for USA Today and an experienced war correspondent. He is also a former U.S. Marine infantry officer. Again, A Chance in Hell: The Men Who Triumphed Over Iraq’s Deadliest City and Turned the Tide of War is available for pre-order on Amazon.com.

I read a draft copy, and it's very well written. He covers in detail many of the debates going on at higher levels about our approach, as well as selected stories of units involved in the fighting. Good read, well told, and I learned some things from reading it.

[Cavguy]

Cavguy,
I sent you a PM and no I didn't think you were implying that, my question was totally tounge in cheek. I have great respect for Col McFarland and what was accomplished in Ramadi, and what is being accomplished in Al Anbar. Sorry if I came across that way.
I worked for Gen Pittard and Gen Yarbrough at the IAG and have great respect for both and the rest of the Soldiers I worked with there.
I worked with 4-1 BCT in MND-N and was extremelly impressed with the support they gave TT's and the team I was on when we rolled through there. It was overall better than what my Marine brothers were giving Marine TT's.
Now if the 3/69th Armor would give back the radio gear they stole from one of the MiTT's!...


Boot

No worries, I just was suprised that COL Mac and I did take some shots from a few Marines over the article - they inferred that it was somehow an attempt of the Army to claim all the credit and ignored their contributions. It wasn't just your (jesting) comment. I thought we tried in the original to highlight the joint nature, but it wasn't strong enough obviously.

I have run into a number of Marines (incl you) who were in Ramadi and enjoyed the article. I've often said to peers there's about 10 articles needing to be written about what happened there in each BN AO. 1/6 Marines taking back the "racetrack" would be fascinating.