And Libya goes on...

[jcustis]

I am honestly surprised we haven't seen the employment of several well-placed, simple IEDs, to give the tankers reason for pause.

[Fuchs]

There's nothing channelling on the terrain. Where should the mines be laid? Almost all vehicles can quite easily travel off-road, especially the military ones. No mountains or hills, thus no narrow valley. No irrigation channels limiting choice of route, nor drainage channels.

A couple wadis and the streets in settlements offer the only canalized terrain afaik.

Mines only played a significant role in Africa during 1940-1942 in the defence of fortified settlements (Tobruk) and at the natural bottleneck El Alamein.

[jcustis]

There's nothing channelling on the terrain. Where should the mines be laid? Almost all vehicles can quite easily travel off-road, especially the military ones. No mountains or hills, thus no narrow valley. No irrigation channels limiting choice of route, nor drainage channels.

A couple wadis and the streets in settlements offer the only canalized terrain afaik.

Mines only played a significant role in Africa during 1940-1942 in the defence of fortified settlements (Tobruk) and at the natural bottleneck El Alamein.

These guys aren't driving across the open expanses of desert. They could, but they don't, and won't. It would only work with the first few dozen or so strikes astride the main roads they are following. After that, it could set them up for other counterattacks that employ other tactics. Again, I'm talking about giving them reason for pause, not necessarily to try to grind them to a halt, although I wouldn't be surprised if a few burning T-72s didn't really wreck a lot of motivation to fight.

[Stan]

I am honestly surprised we haven't seen the employment of several well-placed, simple IEDs, to give the tankers reason for pause.

JC, good point. Beginning to wonder who and when. The neighbors will eventually help with that though

There's nothing channelling on the terrain. Where should the mines be laid? Almost all vehicles can quite easily travel off-road, especially the military ones. No mountains or hills, thus no narrow valley. No irrigation channels limiting choice of route, nor drainage channels.

A couple wadis and the streets in settlements offer the only canalized terrain afaik.

Mines only played a significant role in Africa during 1940-1942 in the defence of fortified settlements (Tobruk) and at the natural bottleneck El Alamein.

Not mines, Fuchs, but everything else is fair game. How about dead bodies, bicycles, live bodies, animals ? Ever spent a tour in Africa?

[Fuchs]

I don't get what you mean. Do you suggest to reduce the loyalist morale with graphic displays?

[Steve Blair]

I don't get what you mean. Do you suggest to reduce the loyalist morale with graphic displays?

I think what Stan means is that they would use anything to conceal an IED.

[Stan]

I think what Stan means is that they would use anything to conceal an IED.

Exactly !

There's nothing channelling on the terrain. Where should the mines be laid? Almost all vehicles can quite easily travel off-road, especially the military ones. No mountains or hills, thus no narrow valley. No irrigation channels limiting choice of route, nor drainage channels.

A couple wadis and the streets in settlements offer the only canalized terrain afaik.

Mines only played a significant role in Africa during 1940-1942 in the defence of fortified settlements (Tobruk) and at the natural bottleneck El Alamein.

JC made reference to Improvised Explosive Devices, not AT mines. As far as your reference to the use of mines in Africa, I think you should check what happened as late as 2005 in Chad (with some slight German support I might add).

BTW, a mine does not necessarily need to be underground to function effectively. In fact, before the real IEDs were born, most were little more than purpose-build military ordnance used in very unconventional ways. Something like thinking outside of the box !

Regret the confusion

[Entropy]

I am honestly surprised we haven't seen the employment of several well-placed, simple IEDs, to give the tankers reason for pause.

I suspect the two main factors are lack of expertise combined with a lack of time due to the rapid retreat.

[jcustis]

I suspect the two main factors are lack of expertise combined with a lack of time due to the rapid retreat.

I need a rolling on the floor emoticon, as if I could show you video of how fast the Afghans are able to put them in, you'd be a little shocked.

And as for expertise, a pressure plate is ridiculously simple, in both construction and materials, and emplacement.

[Entropy]

I need a rolling on the floor emoticon, as if I could show you video of how fast the Afghans are able to put them in, you'd be a little shocked.

And as for expertise, a pressure plate is ridiculously simple, in both construction and materials, and emplacement.

You're right about Afghanistan, but Afghanistan is not Libya. Afghans have a decade of experience. Afghans have an established training and supply network. Afghans are more organized. The Libyan's are a ragtag bunch who are starting from square zero. Afghans are emplacing in the context of an occupation against a force that largely operates in a predictable fashion from known positions, not as a consequence of retreating from superior forces, etc., etc., etc.

Set your wayback machine to 2001-2003 in Afghanistan. Why didn't we see many IED's (a total of 7 ied fatalities from 2001-2003 and none in 2001) from retreating Taliban forces?

I'm not completely confident in my assessment (hence use of the word "suspect") so if you have an alternative then by all means, let's hear it.

[carl]

I am honestly surprised we haven't seen the employment of several well-placed, simple IEDs, to give the tankers reason for pause.

How would you keep the wrong people from driving over them and blowing themselves up?

[Stan]

How would you keep the wrong people from driving over them and blowing themselves up?

Carl,
Sadly, 70% are innocent victims (55% are children).

If we just employed Anti Tank mines, then the worst case scenario of an innocent victim would be a tractor-trailer driver.

The remainder are idiots that place the IEDs, and those are for some strange reason, not counted in the stats

Entropy is dead on the money... a very high learning curve for Libya and the consequences for making a single mistake are usually fatal

[M-A Lagrange]

About IED, I believe the best answer is lack of skills. Don't forget that Lybian army was divided into 2: the regular with old WW2 material and 45 days training. And the special forces that were affected to G and his sons.

Anyways, as planed G is pulling back at the announce of air strikes. Which was the aim of it.
Now he is asking for discussions.
With a crowbar strike on his knees i'll advice!

[jcustis]

How would you keep the wrong people from driving over them and blowing themselves up?

You tell them as you are putting it in the ground,

[carl]

You tell them as you are putting it in the ground,

In that case you could only lay it if there were people living full time very close to the point of emplacement. If you did that perhaps the dictator's forces would figure it out and tell the people living near all the places they were going that if any of their vehicles were blown up, everybody in a say a 1000 metre radius would be killed. They don't seem concerned about their pr.

I think it an impractical plan.

[Ron Humphrey]

those with more experience but just curious why explicitly targeted attacks against both kad affi and others seen to be key partners inthe last two weeks crackdown coupled with assistance humanitarian and otherwise would not be a good strategy?
exactly who does anyone think he would actually become a martyr to.
and one last question if history is meant to be a guide to inform not rule why exactly would anyone "have" to do anything. it seems the choices are what to do when and by whom in what manner to what ends.
all of which will only be answered only once something is done?
i realize the past has many examples of how something like this can go wrong, does that have to mean thats what will happen here?

[JMA]

those with more experience but just curious why explicitly targeted attacks against both kad affi and others seen to be key partners inthe last two weeks crackdown coupled with assistance humanitarian and otherwise would not be a good strategy?
exactly who does anyone think he would actually become a martyr to.
and one last question if history is meant to be a guide to inform not rule why exactly would anyone "have" to do anything. it seems the choices are what to do when and by whom in what manner to what ends.
all of which will only be answered only once something is done?
i realize the past has many examples of how something like this can go wrong, does that have to mean thats what will happen here?

It is already going wrong.

The moment to have acted on a low risk - high return basis has passed.

It is clear the US Administration (I add this because it is the Keystone Cops like Administration who are the idiots and not the American people) got the strategy all wrong... pathetically wrong.

Read the following from the New York Times: Obama Takes Hard Line With Libya After Shift by Clinton

They got this wrong of course:

The shift in the administration’s position — from strong words against Libya to action — was forced largely by the events beyond its control: the crumbling of the uprising raised the prospect that Colonel Qaddafi would remain in power to kill “many thousands,” as Mr. Obama said at the White House on Friday.

This garbage is merely face saving from an Administration who failed to anticipate (or were not so briefed by the less than competent CIA) that Gaddafi could strike back. The world will have to wait to see how many Libyans were killed by Gaddafi in the last few weeks to see how much blood this dithering (and most likely ill-advised) president has on his hands.

This is a case of the US waking up late to the issues at stake and then wanting to push/muscle the French and the Brits out of the way.

Its going to get worse.

[JMA]

35 hours after the UNSC resolution there is still no action (other than from Gaddafi).

First Mistake: The Brits and French should not have threatened imminent action when they were in no position to do so. (such an elementary error)

Smart Move: Gaddafi announces a cease fire which will give the impression of compliance with the UNSC resolution and will lead the weak and fainthearted to question why armed action is needed if there is a cease fire. He then calls on potentially neutral countries to monitor the cease fire. There is no cease fire (does anyone think there ever was to be one?)

Second Mistake: Instead of a private ultimatum to be followed by non-telegraphed air strikes Obama chose to grandstand and make a public ultimatum on TV. This will now require US action to force compliance with that referendum. Not smart to conduct such negotiations in public.

So 35 hours on the US, Britain and France has a foot in its mouth while Gaddafi forces are attacking Benghazi. Round one to Gaddafi.

[Fuchs]

The world will have to wait to see how many Libyans were killed by Gaddafi in the last few weeks to see how much blood this dithering (and most likely ill-advised) president has on his hands.

This is more than just a little stretch. There's no obligation to intervene, the U.S. is on a different continent, it has no close relations to the people of Libya.

An intervention is an option, not an ethical obligation.

[Dayuhan]

The moment to have acted on a low risk - high return basis has passed.

That's only true if you calculate risk and return purely with respect to Libya, which the US is not in a position to do.

The last thing the US wants at the moment is to be seen as eager to intervene in the affairs of another oil-producing Muslim country. Intervention while the rebels were ascendant would have been efficient in terms of impact on the Libyan rebellion, but it would have created the overwhelming impression that the US was trying to take control of the rebellion and the aftermath for its own oil-addicted purposes, which are universally presumed to be nefarious. Whether its true or not is irrelevant, all of the ME and much of the US and Europe would have bought the narrative.

By delaying the US supports the narrative that it sees intervention as a last resort, not a default response (a last resort is what it reasonably should be), that it is reluctant to intervene, and that it does not seek a leadership position that would promote post-intervention control. If we can back out after the early stages and leave it to the Europeans, so much the better.

All that is rough on the Libyans, but we didn't tell them to rebel or encourage them, and they didn't ask our permission or approval. As oft stated here, there's no obligation on our part... and the reality, harsh though it may be, is that dismantling the Bush-era image of the US as aggressive, eager, arrogant intervenor in the affairs of Muslims is more important to US interests than removing Gadhafi.