Eben Barlow on why governments & armed forces fail at COIN

[davidbfpo]

Eben Barlow (occasional SWC poster) has a blogsite and has added two posts 'Why governments fail', with forty comments:http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecuri...s-fail_26.html

There is no single reason why governments fail in countering an insurgency; rather it is a colliding of a host of different factors and reasons that culminate at the right time to give impetus to an insurgency......a COIN conflict’s main effort is aimed at restoring faith in the government and redressing real or perceived wrongs against the populace who are partaking or supporting the insurgency. Failure to do so will simply fuel the insurgency.

In the Comments he adds:

To me, “hearts and minds” means where possible, reduce collateral damage, treat the locals and their property respectfully when encountered and if the situation and time permits, we can provide some medical care. Our mission is to kill the enemy – government’s mission is to do its job and govern – and that implies providing the services and support to the populace that they ought to. Hearts and minds has sidetracked us to the point where we seem to think it is our primary mission and the hunting and killing the insurgent secondary.

In mid-July Eben added 'Why Armed Forces fail at Coin', with four comments:http://eebenbarlowsmilitaryandsecuri...t-coin_19.html

As it is an internal problem, countering the insurgency is essentially a law enforcement responsibility. The problem is that often the law enforcement agencies do not realise that an insurgency is developing and through ignorance and denial, mislead government – and the nation - on the seriousness of the situation. This provides the insurgents with numerous advantages, most crucial being time to organise, train and escalate the insurgency.

The role of the armed forces, once it has been mandated by government to take control when the law enforcement agencies are unable to contain the insurgency, is to create an environment that will allow government to negotiate from a position of strength – and govern. To achieve this, the armed forces must destroy the armed elements of the insurgency and “out-guerrilla the guerrillas”.

(He ends with) It is furthermore crucial that the armed forces know when to stop and when government must take over and govern and the law enforcement agencies enforce the law.

There is plenty to mull over here, even if there is a mixture of Wilf and Bob Jones in his points.