FOB Keating attack repulsed

[82redleg]

And the bottom line is?

Are those percentages accurate?

What I'm attempting to establish is whether the 70 : 30 ratio is correct or is a 7 : 1 ration more accurate.

The bottom line is that there are a lot of support types for not a lot of shooters. The definitions (as Fuchs pointed out) can be blurred, both by mission types, and by the COIN/SFC mission. Are the ETTs that combat advise ANA units daily tooth or tail? (I'd argue tooth, but by Fuchs definition, they are tail).

The percentages for uniformed pax are probably about 70:30, that leaves out the approximately equal number of contractors (counting them would result in a number closer to the 7:1).

[JMA]

The bottom line is that there are a lot of support types for not a lot of shooters. The definitions (as Fuchs pointed out) can be blurred, both by mission types, and by the COIN/SFC mission. Are the ETTs that combat advise ANA units daily tooth or tail? (I'd argue tooth, but by Fuchs definition, they are tail).

The percentages for uniformed pax are probably about 70:30, that leaves out the approximately equal number of contractors (counting them would result in a number closer to the 7:1).

OK so enter the civilian contractors. That's another story then.

The question this probably then, do the 7 actually assist each soldier to fight more effectively?

[jmm99]

in the tooth and tail area. A brave or foolish man (perhaps being Irish accounted for it) did a study of Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R): John J. McGrath, The Other End of the Spear: The Tooth-to-Tail Ratio (T3R) in Modern Military Operations,The Long War Series, Occasional Paper 23, Combat Studies Institute Press Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (2007). The Occasional Papers are here; but the .pdf link to McGrath's paper ain't a-working.

Strarting with the AEF in WWI, he came up with a 105 page monograph. Now, tooth to tail stuff is not Industrial Management 101 and cannot be reduced to a motion and time study. For example, he placed all of the AEF's Corps of Engineers in the combat component because (p.56, note 2):

2. The AEF maintained a force of nondivisional Corps of Engineers units consisting of 241,613 troops, representing 12 percent of the total AEF force. Categorizing this force is problematic. I have chosen to place the whole engineer element in the combat category, but undoubtedly, at least some of this force belongs in the logistical category as the engineers also maintained the railroads. However, determining what portion of the 241,613 belonged in which category would require a level of research beyond the scope of this work. The placement of the 241,613 in the combat category is, therefore noted. Accordingly, up to 13 percent of the total of combat troops could possibly be placed in the logistical category instead. See “The Organization of the American Expeditionary Forces,” 8; COL Carl Schmidt, “The Operational Slice in Two World Wars,” Military Review 31 (October 1951), 56.

However, McGrath provides his methodology throughout, and comes up with a number of charts and graphs. A comparison in the combat category over the years is found on page 103 (Table B-2. Theater Comparisons by Category):

AEF 1918 - 53%
ETO 1945 - 39%
Korea/Japan 1953 - 33%
Vietnam 1968 - 35%
Germany 1974 - 27%
KTO 1991 - 30%
Iraq 2005 (military in country only) - 40%
Iraq 2005 (incl. Kuwait & contractors) - 25%

Note these are "T3R" for theatre deployed forces, not for the Army as a whole. The 30%-70% combat to non-combat (82redleg & Ken White) pretty much hit on the head the last 2 decades of deployments.

Here is his graph showing combat % of the Army as a whole:

Whole Army - Combat.jpg

So, here we see much lower "T3R" - as low as ~ 1:15. Perhaps that's where the 1:7 ratio derives ?

Regards

Mike

Working link to McGrath paper is here at CGSC.

[JMA]

Yes. A video and Powerpoint linked here re: 1431 Sappers in Astan.

That unit goes back to WWI (107th Engineers), reorganized recently to reflect combat engineering specialization and to allow deployment by individual companies (from May 2008 Bull Sheet):



So, combat engineers can be the tip of the spear or very much rear echelon builders - depends on the speciality and mission.

Regards

Mike

This is a very difficult task demanding great skill and bravery. How have the IED incident statistics dropped as a result?

[JMA]

To answer your question, Obese about 5-10% on a guess (none morbidly so); simply overweight another 10% or so and marginally heavy about 10 more -- that means 70± % are okay. In the US population at large, we've got BIG problem (pun intended) (LINK). That's what happens when you have too much money and too much free time. The interesting thing is that we've had the problem for about 25-30 years and got to be a laughing stock to the rest of the world -- who are now catching up. (LINK). In South Africa you do a bit better: LINK. Also, we've already started cracking down on the excess, it was allowed to slide to keep troop numbers up with on and off deployments. now that we're able to one on and two offm the housekeeping will get caught up.

The stats you post indicate that in South Africa the white population shares the same obesity levels as the US. So what significance does that have? We are talking fat soldiers in Afghanistan here and the availability of junk food to rear echelon troops.

The 'new' South African defence force is made up of quotas of soldiers from the old forces and the various "liberation" forces. The sad fact is that the army is in a sorry state. When you put an army together on the following basis what do you expect: (not mentioned is the requirement to comprise 30% females)

"It's composition must be 34.15% ex-SADF, 24.48% civilian, 14.14% ex-MK (ANC military wing), 10.06% from former Bantustan armies, 5.5% ex-Apla (PAC military wing), 2.61% ex-IFP militia. The remaining 9.27% must consist of members who joined since April 1994."
http://www.globalsecurity.org/milita...d/rsa/army.htm

Obesity is the least of the problems right now.

[Ken White]

The stats you post indicate that in South Africa the white population shares the same obesity levels as the US. So what significance does that have? We are talking fat soldiers in Afghanistan here and the availability of junk food to rear echelon troops.

I gave my guess on the troop overweight problem; I'm sure there are figures on the internet somewhere but I also see no point in searching for them as they'd change by the day.

I provided the national stats partly for comparison of the troop guess to nominal US national stats and partly to emphasize my point that 20 years ago the US had an obesity problem; the rest of the world is now catching up.

I added South Africa stats only because they were not on the list in the other link. There was no linkage, implied or otherwise to the SADF on obesity.

The 'new' South African defence force is made up of quotas of soldiers from the old forces and the various "liberation" forces. The sad fact is that the army is in a sorry state. When you put an army together on the following basis what do you expect: (not mentioned is the requirement to comprise 30% females).

No intent to accuse the South African Army of a weight problem or to pick on South Africa in any way, just pointing out that, just as the US Army has several problems, it sort of goes with the territory that ALL armies have problems of one type or another that get fixed then replaced by other problems in a never ending cycle -- and virtually all of which can be traced back to Generals or Politicians.

But I repeat myself...

[jmm99]

from JMA
This is a very difficult task demanding great skill and bravery. How have the IED incident statistics dropped as a result?

From Army Times, Military to combat IEDs on multiple fronts (from summer 2009, when the 1431 Sappers were one of several companies contributing to route clearance):

U.S. works to stem rise in Afghanistan casualties
By Michelle Tan - Staff writer
Posted : Tuesday Sep 29, 2009 15:35:12 EDT

The U.S. military is taking a multi-pronged approach to battling the rising threat of improvised explosive devices in Afghanistan, particularly in the southern part of the country.

“We’ve basically seen the number of IEDs double over a one-year period,” said Rear Adm. Michael Tillotson, the deputy J-3 for CentCom. “But ... we’ve [also] put a lot more forces out there also.”

There were 810 IED incidents there in August compared with 420 during the same month in 2008.
......
Of the IED incidents, 51 percent of the bombs were found and cleared, about 30 percent were effective — which means the bomb resulted in casualties or loss of equipment — and about 20 percent were ineffective, Tillotson said.
......
Route clearance packages, made up largely of engineers, explosive ordnance disposal experts and those who provide intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance are among the types of troops the U.S. will continue to grow in Afghanistan, Tillotson said.

He added that the military has already added a battalion’s worth of EOD forces in the south and increased the number of route clearance packages.

“It’s an increase in engineers and EOD forces in order to take care of the devices,” he said. “It’s an increase in [intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance] to get a better idea of what the enemy is doing to ensure we’re interdicting and make sure we’re getting to the left of boom.”

So, about 50% success given 2009 IED levels and anti-IED force levels.

That being said, the SovComs also mounted a strong route clearance effort. From DoD Buzz, Afghan IEDs Hammered Soviets (Dec 2009):

By Greg Grant Tuesday,
December 15th, 2009 12:17 pm

When Defense Secretary Robert Gates announced creation of yet another counter-IED Pentagon task force, he was clearly frustrated with the inability of the military, the intelligence agencies and industry to come up with answers to the simple yet devastatingly effective roadside bomb as the IED war shifts from Iraq to Afghanistan.

The number of IED “incidents” in Afghanistan, defined as IEDs either found before detonating or actual IED attacks, have jumped from around 100 a month during 2006 to over 800 a month this past summer; in August IED incidents topped 1,000. In 2006, 41 U.S. and NATO troops were killed by IEDs. So far this year, 260 coalition troops have been killed by IEDs, according to the web site icasualties​.com that tracks troop casualties. IED casualties in Afghanistan don’t approach those of Iraq during the height of the fighting there when some days saw 100 IED incidents, but the trend lines are headed in the wrong direction. As more troops arrive, casualties are sure to increase.
....
Route clearance was a high priority and the Soviets sent specialized combat engineer units to Afghanistan equipped with mine sniffing dogs (that often proved effective), electronic mine detectors (which reports said didn’t work very well) and tanks fitted with mine plows, rollers and flails. Opening roads to convoys became major combat operations that involved up to a battalion’s worth of combat power, including helicopter borne units and extensive close air support. The engineers were kept busy throughout the war and became more skilled as their experience increased: in 1980, engineers cleared 1,032 mines and IEDs; in 1986, they cleared 35,650 mines and IEDs. Yet, the Mujaheddin were highly adaptive and continually created new IED tactics that remained a step ahead of the Soviet learning curve. (much more in article) ....

Thus, for every action, an opposite reaction - and so it goes. Sappers are but a partial answer.

Regards

Mike

[Cavguy]

This is a very difficult task demanding great skill and bravery. How have the IED incident statistics dropped as a result?

Sort of. They clear routes so convoys can travel safer. They don't target IED cells or do COIN for the long win. But yes, we hit many less IED's because of route clearance teams.

[JMA]

Sort of. They clear routes so convoys can travel safer. They don't target IED cells or do COIN for the long win. But yes, we hit many less IED's because of route clearance teams.

This pre-clearance of routes together with road use only when absolutely necessary is the best bet (I guess)

[JMA]

From Army Times, Military to combat IEDs on multiple fronts (from summer 2009, when the 1431 Sappers were one of several companies contributing to route clearance):



So, about 50% success given 2009 IED levels and anti-IED force levels.

That being said, the SovComs also mounted a strong route clearance effort. From DoD Buzz, Afghan IEDs Hammered Soviets (Dec 2009):



Thus, for every action, an opposite reaction - and so it goes. Sappers are but a partial answer.

Regards

Mike

50% success rate for the TB which translates into what in terms of loss of life and limb for the troops?

I would have thought that by now the "brass" would have applied the same level of preventive instructions for vehicle movement as they do for actions where civilians may be caught on the 'crossfire'.

Do troops on the ground have to get authority from the higher HQ before they can take a vehicle out on the road? No? Then it appears the life of a soldier is pretty cheap then.

[JMA]

I gave my guess on the troop overweight problem; I'm sure there are figures on the internet somewhere but I also see no point in searching for them as they'd change by the day.

I provided the national stats partly for comparison of the troop guess to nominal US national stats and partly to emphasize my point that 20 years ago the US had an obesity problem; the rest of the world is now catching up.

I added South Africa stats only because they were not on the list in the other link. There was no linkage, implied or otherwise to the SADF on obesity.No intent to accuse the South African Army of a weight problem or to pick on South Africa in any way, just pointing out that, just as the US Army has several problems, it sort of goes with the territory that ALL armies have problems of one type or another that get fixed then replaced by other problems in a never ending cycle -- and virtually all of which can be traced back to Generals or Politicians.

But I repeat myself...

And what I'm saying is that the South African defence force has enough problems with implementing quotas and dealing with rampant HIV infection that IF obesity is a problem it is a minor one in the greater scheme of things.

However, the South African Police Service (SAPS) has taken steps to deal with obesity... http://english.aljazeera.net/news/af...737387514.html

[JMA]

I added South Africa stats only because they were not on the list in the other link. There was no linkage, implied or otherwise to the SADF on obesity.No intent to accuse the South African Army of a weight problem or to pick on South Africa in any way, just pointing out that, just as the US Army has several problems, it sort of goes with the territory that ALL armies have problems of one type or another that get fixed then replaced by other problems in a never ending cycle -- and virtually all of which can be traced back to Generals or Politicians.

But I repeat myself...

Firstly lets get one thing straight I was born in South Africa and on return in 1980 from Rhodesia did 2 and a half years in the Paras (called parabats) and was happy to leave (for a variety of reasons). I have had absolutely no contact with the SADF since then and quite frankly have no interest in the direction the SADF is going. Don't think they (note the use of 'they') can get a few battalions together for peacekeeping duties (certainly not of HIV negative troops) so there is no nerve to try and tickle in that regard.

I don't expect the SADF to attend to the problems they have probably because they don't see them as problems in the first place and because the politicians probably see the army as a place to park off old "freedom fighters" where they can get paid and eventually a pension and avoid the same problem Mugabe had with his ex-combatants which precipitated the economic collapse of Zimbabwe.

But when an army is at war or it sends its young soldiers to a far off war the government and senior military staff have a 'duty of care' towards these men (and women). There is no excuse for military incompetence at the highest levels which leads to the unnecessary deaths of young men and women.

[82redleg]

But when an army is at war or it sends its young soldiers to a far off war the government and senior military staff have a 'duty of care' towards these men (and women). There is no excuse for military incompetence at the highest levels which leads to the unnecessary deaths of young men and women.

If there is any incompetence, it is on the part of the civilian leadership that started a war without defining the endstate, moved the endstate numerous times (all without real definition- although a step in the right direction, what exactly does "destroy, disrupt and dismantle" mean) and then deliberately and consistantly under-resourced the effort and made no effort to mobilize the nation's resources.

I've never met anyone in the service that actively tried to be a screw up. Everyone is doing the best within the constraints and resources available.

[Uboat509]

First of all, blaming Burger King and Anthony's Pizza for fat service members is like blaming Glock and Springfield Armory for violent crime. I have yet to see a service member who was forced to eat at these establishments on a regular basis nor have I seen service members repeatedly denied access to a dining facility, assuming they had their mandated reflective belts. I have also seen the food choices in the dining facility and if you are bound and determined to be a fat sack of crap then you will find plenty to assist you there. I honestly doubt that that many service members suddenly became fat while assigned to a FOB. Most of those who became fat there probably were on their way and simply found an excuse to stop doing PT.

Second, I am not sure the point of all the "tooth to tail" arguments. If you look strictly at the numbers, it's easy to draw the conclusion that we are waaaay over-supporting our troops. If, however, you look at the support being provided, it paints, in my mind at least, a different picture. Certainly there is waste and probably a good deal of fraud to go along with it but just looking at raw numbers (70%-30%)and saying that we are being wasteful is poor analysis. What would you have us drop? It's easy to point at AAFES and throw all sorts of stones, some of them deserved but how much of that 70% figure is AAFES and things like it? Let's say we get rid of all of that, what does the ratio become then? 69-31? 68-32 maybe? Now I'm not going to argue whether or not it makes financial sense to have the support ratio we do, that is well out of my lane. But how does all this support hurt the mission? And again, what would you have us get rid of?

I suspect that some people are under the impression that reducing the size of the "tail" will increase the size of the "tooth" (teeth?). That just isn't the case. You can increase the ratio of tooth to tail but increasing the actual number of "teeth" on the ground is a whole different issue. Support units are not, by and large, staffed by people who wanted to but could not get into combat arms. Less support guys on the ground does not equate to more shooters on the ground, it just means less support.

[jmm99]

from JMA
[1] 50% success rate for the TB which translates into what in terms of loss of life and limb for the troops?

[2] I would have thought that by now the "brass" would have applied the same level of preventive instructions for vehicle movement as they do for actions where civilians may be caught on the 'crossfire'.

[3] Do troops on the ground have to get authority from the higher HQ before they can take a vehicle out on the road? No? Then it appears the life of a soldier is pretty cheap then.

First question is answered approximately in articles (post #167) for 2009. About 800 IED incidents per month, of which 30% are "effective" (military or civilian personal injury and/or property damage; out of 100% planted, 50% are neutralized and 20% are not "effective") - so, 240 "effectives" per month. About 260 Coalition KIA from IEDs for 2009 (article date 15 Dec 2009) - so, about 1 Coalition KIA from 10 "effectives". No idea as to WIAs (5x to 10x more ?).

The remainining two questions are for Cavguy or anyone else who wants to answer them.

Regards

Mike

[82redleg]

First of all, blaming Burger King and Anthony's Pizza for fat service members is like blaming Glock and Springfield Armory for violent crime....

Second, I am not sure the point of all the "tooth to tail" arguments...

I suspect that some people are under the impression that reducing the size of the "tail" will increase the size of the "tooth" (teeth?). That just isn't the case....

Uboat, this post isn't totally directed at you, but your post made me think of it, so...

All your points are correct. Also, at least part of GEN McChrystal's decision was based on the fact that, given the limited inflow available into Afghanistan, the input required to support the myriad of AAFES concessions, etc, conflicted with the true requirements of getting the increased material needed to support the surge. Given this, I don't think any of the other discussions (tooth-v-tail, "luxury" for the large FOBs, etc) are even relevant. You have a limited supply line, you have to prioritize. First is ammo, food, water (if required), CL 8 and POL; second is the rest of the classes of supply that you need to continue to function; third is the "necessary" comforts that make a 12-15 month tour bearable (yeah, we could live like animals for that time, but why if we don't have to)- showers, CL 4 for living/working/eating area, MWR (internet/phones, gyms); everything else has to come after that, and if there is a conflict, the priority is easy to see.

[JMA]

Uboat, this post isn't totally directed at you, but your post made me think of it, so...

All your points are correct. Also, at least part of GEN McChrystal's decision was based on the fact that, given the limited inflow available into Afghanistan, the input required to support the myriad of AAFES concessions, etc, conflicted with the true requirements of getting the increased material needed to support the surge. Given this, I don't think any of the other discussions (tooth-v-tail, "luxury" for the large FOBs, etc) are even relevant. You have a limited supply line, you have to prioritize. First is ammo, food, water (if required), CL 8 and POL; second is the rest of the classes of supply that you need to continue to function; third is the "necessary" comforts that make a 12-15 month tour bearable (yeah, we could live like animals for that time, but why if we don't have to)- showers, CL 4 for living/working/eating area, MWR (internet/phones, gyms); everything else has to come after that, and if there is a conflict, the priority is easy to see.

As they say... any fool can make himself uncomfortable. But then again the guys who make the decisions about the troops not being allowed to forget where they are would be living in comparative splendor.

[JMA]

Are "EN route clearance companies" = e.g., our local 1431st Engineer Sapper Company, which was in Astan during 2009:

1421st /107th deployed to Afghanistan:



and U.P. troops coming home (Nov 2009) and 1431st Sapper Company Freedom Salute (Mar 2010).

Regards

Mike

PS: from Soldier, husband, dad return home:



So, more tooth than tail from the PHs.

I did miss this one Mike, is this your unit?

[jmm99]

the 1431 Sappers are the "Copper Country's Own" (that coy based at the Calumet Armory about 10 mi North of me). The heritage goes back to the Houghton County Volunteers who fought in the Civil War. My best friend, when he retired, was acting topkick for the H&HC of the parent Bn (based at Ishpeming about 75 mi South of here).

Regards

Mike

[jmm99]

JMA: if you were asking, am I or was I a member of the 1431 Sapppers, the answer is negative. We (or at least many of us here) still have the "small town" American view of our NG units as being all part of the family.

Cheers

Mike