A Modest Proposal to Adjust the Principles of War

[Gian P Gentile]

While no names are mentioned, are some of those experts also advocates of 4GW theory?

wm:

I don’t know; as you point our there are some obvious links from Coin to 4GW. Some Coin experts who are friends of mine, from knowing their work and writings no I don’t think they fall into the reductionist 4GW camp. Many Coin experts have written some quality stuff and played an important role in bringing fresh ideas to our Army especially when we needed them in 2003/4. The two that come to mind is my old Cav Squadron XO Bob Cassidy and a former colleague in the history department at West Point, Kalev Sep. Con Crane at the War College too has written some top-flight stuff; Steve Metz of course along with many others.

My point all along to respond to others in this thread is not that we don’t need Coin doctrine, capability, and thinkers because we do. My point is that we have become so focused on it due to current operational demands that that is all that we can do now and all we can think about. Moreover, because we are so dominated by Coin operations and thinking I do believe that it has caused us to become dogmatic and non-creative to the point where we read events--past and present--through a Coin prism which then determines future action. For example, Coin experts tell us that in any Coin operation the people must be the center of gravity. But in theory, the enemy certainly can and there are plenty of historical cases to back this theory up. So as we look to the future and where we as a nation might commit to next, the dominance of Coin and the perception that we can make it work almost anywhere because we have this great doctrine compels us to charge right in there and, naturally, protect the people. This is what appears to be happening in Afghanistan now. The notion that we have been doing it wrong but now with the new doctrine and experience in Iraq hey we can do Iraq 2 in Afghanistan and succeed; in my mind problematic at best.

gian

[Ron Humphrey]

Ron, I've just been informed by a very credible source that at least part of the reason for the VII Corps delay was logistical; the fighting units simply out-ran their supply lines. This is a critical factor, obviously, and must be accorded very great weight in considering the course of the VII Corps attack in GW1.

Roger that

[Ron Humphrey]

In reference to the center-of-gravity for any given environment. What is the difference between the Military COG and Civilian Strategic COG.
I could definately agree to both, not the same, or somtimes same.sometimes not.

In Iraq as stated by Gen McCaffrey and by several posters on this an other threads - National Government

Is it really the COG for the military or for the mission as a whole.
If a military becomes the overarching builder/trainer/gov rep to a populace it would it seems lose some of it's outside the representative government scope.

Now I'm sure the demands placed on us through combinations of circumstances/ Gaps in civilian capabilities, etc. have required us to fill this role and one would think this is probably what really concerns many of those in the pol sector. (the old once it tastes blood deal).

But if security and defense are to be the focus of a defense force than their efforts(COG-sortof) must be focused on those who need securing. The whole idea of securing the government takes my brain for a spin in trying to relate to how a military really has any part other than advisory there. That probably is too much to ask of a service that it be able to play both sides of all tables at the same time.

Therein is the importance in quickly growing our civilian capabilities to the point where they can do their job and the soldiers focus on theirs. One of the largest and heaviest duties of a government is to make the calls of what is best for those they represent. If we place our forces in a position of continually doing that as well as just doing their jobs how long before you end up with some who lean towards taking it the next step, some who can't take it , or some who simply begin to look elsewhere for employment.

No wonder theres so much concern at Echelons above reality

[Ron Humphrey]

A quick conversation I had with an instructor brought a question to mind reference Doctrine in and of itself.

If Doctrine is taken as the base point( or premise) for any deliberation concerning decision making in a given study or environment. Does the following make sense and if not why not?

You start out with a problem and a set of guidlines from which to work your way through it. Through reseach, collaboration, discussion, etc the group will work their way around the problem starting from those guidelines and would in all intention by seeng and discussing both sides of any come back to the median and thus have not only a solution but of course validation of said decision making process.

If we were to draw a line and consider it the baseline then this would seemingly make sense as the variation above and below it ( ref discussion,questions) would generally come back to around the same horizontal place as the baseline.

But what if instead it were a timeline type design where any movement through discussion were left and right along verticle axis. Now in this case wouldn't where you plase the baseline(y axis) actually determine how much deviation there actually might be from the original premise. If you start out from the uper end then after your left and right adjustments you still end up on the upper half, the same going for any where else on the line.

Here's the overall gist of my question. If a principle or doctrine is the right one it shouldn't where you start from you always end up somewhere close to the same after deliberations. If it doesn't necessarily apply in any given instance you should end up somewhere completely different.

I got to thinking about the proven principles I was taught in my youth and thought: Knowing not to eat yellow snow is great but probably not anything thats going to help if I'm in a place that never snows

[William F. Owen]

Doctrine

Sorry to harp on about this, but Doctrine is what is taught. That's it. That is what the word means and how it should be applied.

The problem with most military "Doctrine" is that it is not supported by evidence, or valid principles, and its often vastly too complex, wordy, and the product of opinion. The acid test should always be "is this useful in making me better at my job."

[selil]

I respectfully disagree. Doctrine is the common body of knowledge (aka CBK) (knowledge, skills, and abilities). Often with the military doctrine becomes dogma but that is a political discussion. Doctrine (CBK) is what you build curriculum from. Doctrine informs the requirements of what you teach through curriculum. For example contrary to what you "think" in basic infantry training you do not teach pupils (soldiers) to shoot the enemy. You teach them to shoot a target (unless you have a few terrorists running around you want to let recruits poke holes in). As instructors we rely on cognition and near-transference of the expertise found in shooting the target to inform shooting the enemy.

It might be easy to dismiss this slight triviality in the concept of instruction and semantic nonsense, but when you look at training there are certain "leaps" that we make without explanation. Those leaps occur all the time and are a drag on high performance education and more important reasoning and understanding. Finding those "leaps" where we teach one thing and expect another is also important when we look at military acumen in any subject. This concept of transference also lends a certain gap in credibility for what we think we are teaching and what we are actually teaching leading to criticism such as "is this useful for my job". It is useful you just haven't had the AH HA! moment yet.

It is very likely that a certain task or function found on a syllabus may have no relation to the job on the surface but have severe and substantial import under the bonnet so to speak. These are some of the basic principles of outcome based learning objectives (which I'm told the military is absolutely in love with). The concept of transference is informed by successful modeling of one activity that a recruit/trainee/pupil is aware of and then expanding that activity to something new.

[William F. Owen]

I respectfully disagree. Doctrine is the common body of knowledge (aka CBK) (knowledge, skills, and abilities).

...and I can respect that, but a common body of knowledge is not doctrine. The OED, is quite unequival on this, unless we are all happy about military theory butchering the English language and all it's inherent prescision and usefulness.

Even the 1990 DOD JCS definition is "Fundemental principles by which military forces, or elements thereof, guide their actions in support of national objectives." -or close enough. These principles need to be imparted and explained, thus taught.

The body of knowledge you refer to is, in the UK and NATO, called "Military Knowledge."

I cannot see how skills forms any part of doctrine, other than to define the reason as to why certain meaures of performance should be used. EG - The reason why weapons qualification is done at XXX meters.

...but if the membership of this board collectively believe that Doctrine is a common body of knowledge I will adapt my conduct on this board to that condition.

[selil]

I cannot see how skills forms any part of doctrine, other than to define the reason as to why certain meaures of performance should be used. EG - The reason why weapons qualification is done at XXX meters.

Skills drive capability. If you do not build a particular skill you have no known measure of knowledge that a capability or skill exists. If you need soldier x to meet a mission objective that objective will have inherent skills required (for example walking, breathing, eating, sleeping, as simplistic answers), and it will have specific skills (orienteering, fire support, marksmanship, target selection). We all know there are different levels of skills too. A infantry rifleman would not be expected to meet or surpass the "sniper" skills for marksmanship. These set up expectations of doctrine and mission capability.

Though I will honestly admit I may be butchering the jargon and lexical definitions of the military (I'm only an old slow fat former Marine corporal who spent to many years in school after a brief tour of duty). I would suggest that you have a continuum of knowledge diffusion that starts with doctrine as a vision or capabilities and abilities catalog. That doctrine is what drives your training and metrics for success as objectives. Those objectives drive your learning methods and models. Well that is how I would do it if anybody ever asked.

[marct]

Hi William,

...and I can respect that, but a common body of knowledge is not doctrine. The OED, is quite unequival on this, unless we are all happy about military theory butchering the English language and all it's inherent prescision and usefulness.

Happens all the time .

I cannot see how skills forms any part of doctrine, other than to define the reason as to why certain meaures of performance should be used. EG - The reason why weapons qualification is done at XXX meters.

...but if the membership of this board collectively believe that Doctrine is a common body of knowledge I will adapt my conduct on this board to that condition.

I'm having a Humpty-Dumpty moment here....

I think this is a case of semantic confusion over a linguistic taxonomy. Selil's point about skills being inherent in doctrine is, to my mind at least, valid. If we define the term "doctrine" as "Fundemental principles by which military forces, or elements thereof, guide their actions in support of national objectives." then we have a semantic rift with the actuality of what is produced and termed "doctrine".

The problem with that definition lies in several assumptions. First, what does the term "fundamental principles" mean? Is it being used as a semantic equivalent to "axiomatic assumptions" (which is how I would read it)? Second, the idea of "fundamental principles" "guiding" military actions is, to my mind, very different from the lived reality of operating within a military unit. Does each private consciously consider, or sub-consciously process, these "fundamental principles" each time they are sent out on patrol? Nope, they follow a TTP for that action; said TTP having been defined (in part) by "doctrine" (loosely construed) and modified by lived experience.

This gets us into the real of skills and knowledge transference that Selil is talking about, as well as into an analysis of professional knowledge systems. It also puts us smack into the centre of a problem discussed by Michael Polanyi when he was playing with the distinction between tacit knowledge ("gnosis", experientially based as well as "thumos", intuitively based - aka "gut knowledge") and overt knowledge ("logos", formalized). Given current, Western educational systems, we do passably well at transferring the second (say a B-), and only mediocre at the first (say a D- or F+). Military training tends to do better with the first than civilian education does (probably a B or so) but, I suspect, it does worse with the second (probably a C+).

Back to doctrine...

In its essence, "doctrine" refers to the rules accepted by a group that are used to structure interpretations of reality (cf. Gregory Bateson's Angels Fear). You can think of it as a set of "mapping conventions" which defines specific symbols and the relationship between those symbols. Let me give a case in point; the concept of a "centre of gravity".

This has become such an axiomatic concept within the US doctrinal system that it has, basically, achieved reification (become a "thing" in and of itself). Why? The Clausewitzian concept was based on Newtonian physics, has an implied mechanistic metaphor that structures perceptions, and is probably a pretty poor reflection of the current territory (this goes back to Bateson's discussion of the map-territory problem). Still and all, it is a useful concept in some forms of conflict, and those forms (aka "conventional warfare") have dominated the desired warfare type of the US military, regardless of the actuality. Why did that happen? I'll let Steve Blair play with that one, but my hypothesis would be because it comes out of a nicely formalized system of knowledge that as enough looseness in it that it can a) be taught and b) can be modified to meet many conflict requirements. In other words, it's a simple mapping convention that may or may not have utility in a particular problem, but is simple to teach so it gets taught. Another, related, hypothesis is that the requirements of military organization since William the Silent and Maurice of Nassau has predisposed members of the military to think in mechanistic terms as a requirement of the technology available to the military (a case of tacit knowledge conditioning formal knowledge).

[John T. Fishel]

In the US Army and the Joint community (which in doctrine follows the Army's approach), doctrine and doctrinal pubs form a hierarchy of how we go about our business. Doctrine informs action and is (there is debate on the degree) prescriptive. At the apex of the system are the Capstone documents: JP and FM 1.0 - N.0. Thus, JP 3.0 and FM 3.0 are both the overaching doctrinal manuals (textbooks) on Operations. 3-07 is MOOTW while FM 3-24 is COIN (operations), a subset within MOOTW (or SASO as the Army now calls it). Below doctrine are the Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTP) pubs although there is some overlap. And, at the lowest level and most immediate are the Lessons Learned pubs from CALL and places like it. The latter pubs, based on experiences in the field in both combat and training exercises provide the raw input for doctinal modification along with other sources. Indeed, doctrinal pubs make a great effort to use empirical data in developing their texts.

That said, there is much that is wrong about the doctrine system. As has been said, it all too often becomes dogma and divorced from reality. Most of it is rewritten by iron majors and LTCs (slugs like us) under pressure of sometimes unrealistic deadlines, too much other work, not enough time to do real research, and a vetting process that may be more form than substance. It probably does produce better textbooks than are used in most civilian schools and universities but that is a pretty low standard!

As William Owen says, doctrine is what is taught. As Sam says, it is more than that - perhaps, a body of knowledge - but also less. Most important, it changes over time. And it is often ignored both to our sorrow and more happily when it really doesn't apply (as the WWII apochryful German complaint goes).

[Gian P Gentile]

Most of it is rewritten by iron majors and LTCs (slugs like us) under pressure of sometimes unrealistic deadlines, too much other work, not enough time to do real research, and a vetting process that may be more form than substance.

To your knowledge, is this about the same way the current version of FM 3-24 was written? This question is somewhat rhetorical because we have been told that Generals Mattis and Patraeus, Nagl, Kilkullen, Con Crane, et al were the primary authors. Is this correct? Was FM 3-24 unique in how it was written? As an Army officer who is familiar with Army doctrine what do you think this tells us about how we devise doctrine--as a system--in the United States Army? If we had such a remarkable battery of individuals writing FM 3-24 as the capstone doctrine for counterinsurgency should we not be doing the exact same thing now for the writing of FM 3-0?

thanks

gian

[John T. Fishel]

of Baron Munchhausen, "Vas you dere, Charley?', Gian, I wasn't involved in the writing of 3-24. That said, I think that the group of slugs assembled was probably better than the run of the mill bunch of slugs. I think rather well of John Nagl and Con Crane who are both better writiers and have greater depth than John Hunt ( a good friend) who was the principal author of the SASO manual that was to replace FM 100-20 of 1990. I would also say that the writers of 3-24 had real support from Petraeus and Mattis and on up the chain of command. Hunt had no support whatever from either CAC or TRADOC. The drafters of 100-20 in 1986 DID have support from the CSA and Larry Welch, the CSAF at the time of the writing. But by 87, the TRADOC commander was so opposed to LIC that he sat on the document until 1990 when he left.

I certainly believe that the doctine writing process can and should be improved. We need the best slugs possible to write and we need enough of them. Moroever, the writing should not be divorced from the schoolhouse - students who have been in the field provide a good reality check. Finally, the vetting process used in 3-24 with outside folk is something to be emulated in major manuals. But, as a practical matter, I expect that these kinds of thing will be the exception rather than the rule no matter what changes are made to the process, Improvement in process will come incrementally, if at all. And improvement of process is no guarantee of an improved product.

In the end, despite sounding pessimistic, I am really the opposite. I see improvement in both process and products over time and in application as well. But there are no silver bullets, just us slugs - old and retired and young and full of piss and vinegar!

Cheers

JohnT

[MattC86]

In reference to the center-of-gravity for any given environment. What is the difference between the Military COG and Civilian Strategic COG.
I could definately agree to both, not the same, or somtimes same.sometimes not.

In Iraq as stated by Gen McCaffrey and by several posters on this an other threads - National Government

Is it really the COG for the military or for the mission as a whole.
If a military becomes the overarching builder/trainer/gov rep to a populace it would it seems lose some of it's outside the representative government scope.

I actually was wondering this same thing just a couple days ago after reading Gen. McCaffrey's AAR, and after filtering out some of the screwed up stuff that passes for deep thought in my head, I've tried to come up with a distinction between a military and, as you call it, civilian/strategic COG.

The civilian/strategic COG is the lynchpin, as it were, for the attainment of a particular policy goal. For Iraq, that is unquestionably the stability, legitimacy, and functionality of the national Iraqi government, and perhaps a governmental hierarchy (local/tribal, provincial, national) as a whole.

The military COG is the key to meeting the objective of the use of armed force in pursuit of the larger policy goal - Clausewitz and all that good stuff. (Me trying to parse a thousand years of strategic thought. . .) The COG may be different because the political goal is not and should not be the same as the military goal (what my IR professors would call the link between politics and force, and one calls "the diplomacy of violence"). Even in a conventional war, the broad political goal is not going to be the same as the military objective, though in a WWII or something of that nature, the COG for the two objectives would be the same (enemy's forces and war-making capacities).

I think an inherent issue for COIN is that the civilian/strategic COG, that is, the key to attaining the broader policy goal, is different from the military COG. The military can influence the security situation; it cannot force the Iraqi government to legislate reforms. If the COGs are different, unity of purpose and strategy, especially between disparate agencies and governmental capabilities becomes extraordinarily difficult. But you probably knew all that.

Now I'm sure the demands placed on us through combinations of circumstances/ Gaps in civilian capabilities, etc. have required us to fill this role and one would think this is probably what really concerns many of those in the pol sector. (the old once it tastes blood deal).

But if security and defense are to be the focus of a defense force than their efforts(COG-sortof) must be focused on those who need securing. The whole idea of securing the government takes my brain for a spin in trying to relate to how a military really has any part other than advisory there. That probably is too much to ask of a service that it be able to play both sides of all tables at the same time.

Your brain is spinning on that because you already got it right - there is little the military can do to directly affect the political process at a national level. Their role is the security and stability ops at low level (which have a profound impact on local government if done right, as we're seeing with "bottom-up reconciliation.")

Therein is the importance in quickly growing our civilian capabilities to the point where they can do their job and the soldiers focus on theirs. One of the largest and heaviest duties of a government is to make the calls of what is best for those they represent. If we place our forces in a position of continually doing that as well as just doing their jobs how long before you end up with some who lean towards taking it the next step, some who can't take it , or some who simply begin to look elsewhere for employment.

No wonder theres so much concern at Echelons above reality

To me, this is the single most important thing the US still needs to work on to pursue a COIN campaign effectively. No one person or group of individuals (soldiers, Marines, or civilian agency personnel) has the knowledge and expertise for the full spectrum of social, political, economic, and military operations in a COIN environment. With the chronic shortage of DoS personnel, the military absorbs some of those roles, but it does not - through no fault of its own; it cannot - do them as well.

Matt

[TheCurmudgeon]

I actually was wondering this same thing just a couple days ago after reading Gen. McCaffrey's AAR, ... The civilian/strategic COG is the lynchpin, as it were, for the attainment of a particular policy goal. For Iraq, that is unquestionably the stability, legitimacy, and functionality of the national Iraqi government, and perhaps a governmental hierarchy (local/tribal, provincial, national) as a whole.

I think an inherent issue for COIN is that the civilian/strategic COG, that is, the key to attaining the broader policy goal, is different from the military COG. The military can influence the security situation; it cannot force the Iraqi government to legislate reforms. If the COGs are different, unity of purpose and strategy, especially between disparate agencies and governmental capabilities becomes extraordinarily difficult. But you probably knew all that.

We recently did a review of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It became clear that the Soviet Army was doing the same thing there that we are doing in Iraq: The Army saw the COG as the Mujahideen, the Mujahideen (even though they may not have realized it) was fighting a political COG. It didn't matter how well the Soviets fought the Mujahideen, they could never win.

We may have realized that the COG is the government of Iraq, but the Military does not have the tools to affect that directly.

To me, this is the single most important thing the US still needs to work on to pursue a COIN campaign effectively. No one person or group of individuals (soldiers, Marines, or civilian agency personnel) has the knowledge and expertise for the full spectrum of social, political, economic, and military operations in a COIN environment. With the chronic shortage of DoS personnel, the military absorbs some of those roles, but it does not - through no fault of its own; it cannot - do them as well.

Matt

I would disagree. I would argue that the world has changed and that it is imperative that we create a force capable of doing exactly that. Whether that is a specially organized subset of the Army (like SOF), or a separate branch all together, it has to be done. It is only a matter of time till we realize it and act.

[MattC86]

We recently did a review of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. It became clear that the Soviet Army was doing the same thing there that we are doing in Iraq: The Army saw the COG as the Mujahideen, the Mujahideen (even though they may not have realized it) was fighting a political COG. It didn't matter how well the Soviets fought the Mujahideen, they could never win.

We may have realized that the COG is the government of Iraq, but the Military does not have the tools to affect that directly.

True enough, sir, though I think that US operations are focusing on the population as a COG rather than al-Qai'da in Iraq or even the insurgency as a whole. The military's role is to influence the government and political situation through the provision of security, right? That means the security of the population is the military's objective, the population vs. insurgent support dynamic is the military COG, and all that is subordinated to the political objective of a stable, free, and friendly government in Iraq - and the subsequent strategic/political COG for that objective is the reform and strengthening of the national government.

Plus, I would contend the military has the power to directly influence lower level government systems, which in the long run will have a major impact on the national governance system.

I would disagree. I would argue that the world has changed and that it is imperative that we create a force capable of doing exactly that. Whether that is a specially organized subset of the Army (like SOF), or a separate branch all together, it has to be done. It is only a matter of time till we realize it and act.

I agree with you on the need for such a force, but it would be a bureaucratic nightmare. Not just the turf protectionism and jealousy among the serves (for years the Marines fought joining SOCOM because they wanted to keep Marines under Marine command) but including dozens of government agencies and experts in every field necessary for COIN? And who would command such a group? You'd have a lot of people very much against a military commander, given the 80% political 20% military maxim.

Unless I misread you and you meant something different. . .

Matt

[TheCurmudgeon]

True enough, sir, though I think that US operations are focusing on the population as a COG rather than al-Qai'da in Iraq or even the insurgency as a whole. The military's role is to influence the government and political situation through the provision of security, right? That means the security of the population is the military's objective, the population vs. insurgent support dynamic is the military COG, and all that is subordinated to the political objective of a stable, free, and friendly government in Iraq - and the subsequent strategic/political COG for that objective is the reform and strengthening of the national government.

Plus, I would contend the military has the power to directly influence lower level government systems, which in the long run will have a major impact on the national governance system.

I would agree with you what the COG and main effort should be, the people and the government. My point is that the military does not have the tools nor the training they really need to accomplish that.

I agree with you on the need for such a force, but it would be a bureaucratic nightmare. Not just the turf protectionism and jealousy among the serves (for years the Marines fought joining SOCOM because they wanted to keep Marines under Marine command) but including dozens of government agencies and experts in every field necessary for COIN? And who would command such a group? You'd have a lot of people very much against a military commander, given the 80% political 20% military maxim.

Unless I misread you and you meant something different. . .

Matt

No, you got me straight. It is only hard because we make it so. How about this, we augment Civil Affairs directly with the experts they need rather than relying on any particular civilian agency. Put them in uniform. We include these experts down to the brigade level. If you want, you can build specific division headquarters staffed to do COIN/S&R.

I don't see this any different than the military having doctors. Doctors take an oath that is in direct contravention to what the Army is tasked to do, but we have determined that they are absolutely necessary to accomplish our mission. Why do we have such a problem brining in economists, sociologists, political experts and others needed to really bring a stabile government on line? Of course, this is once we have determined that we are going to take the lead on at least the initial aspects of stability operations: those things that have to be done in the first few years to get the new government off on the right foot.


I am not saying any of this is easy and there is at least some risk in "group think" by recruiting experts willing to put on a uniform and deploy with military forces from the beginning, but I think it is worth a try. And we will never find out if it can work or hos it could be adjusted to make it better if we never try.

[TheCurmudgeon]

Check out http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/P...n/cantwell.pdf for more along the same thought pattern.

[Penta]

does the bit about informs being common on the streets pertain to WW II when it was hard to see a male on the streets who was not in uniform?

...I surrender?

[Penta]

I don't see this any different than the military having doctors. Doctors take an oath that is in direct contravention to what the Army is tasked to do, but we have determined that they are absolutely necessary to accomplish our mission. Why do we have such a problem brining in economists, sociologists, political experts and others needed to really bring a stabile government on line? Of course, this is once we have determined that we are going to take the lead on at least the initial aspects of stability operations: those things that have to be done in the first few years to get the new government off on the right foot.

Societal expectations, I think. You can raise the same question with chaplains as you do with doctors (indeed, there's even *more* of a quandary there, it could be argued).

The reason why we have both, in some sense, is because we always have. If chaplains had never been a part of the force since before medieval times, and were proposed to be added these days, do you really think the incorporation of clergy into a military force like that would ever be countenanced? Similarly with doctors...If the question were being newly raised, today, would society, would the medical profession, countenance it?

In both cases, it would be up for debate, I think. (Query: After 1991, did the former Soviet states establish chaplains in their airmed forces? Are there any "First World" states which don't have chaplains?)

Meanwhile, these other professions you may have mentioned...They came of age, in most cases, quite recently (as recognized professions/fields of academia). They've built their whole identities in the societal conditions of the last 50-100 years, which tend to allow less for those in academic fields to apply their talents to war, it seems.

[MattC86]

I would agree with you what the COG and main effort should be, the people and the government. My point is that the military does not have the tools nor the training they really need to accomplish that.




No, you got me straight. It is only hard because we make it so. How about this, we augment Civil Affairs directly with the experts they need rather than relying on any particular civilian agency. Put them in uniform. We include these experts down to the brigade level. If you want, you can build specific division headquarters staffed to do COIN/S&R.

I don't see this any different than the military having doctors. Doctors take an oath that is in direct contravention to what the Army is tasked to do, but we have determined that they are absolutely necessary to accomplish our mission. Why do we have such a problem brining in economists, sociologists, political experts and others needed to really bring a stabile government on line? Of course, this is once we have determined that we are going to take the lead on at least the initial aspects of stability operations: those things that have to be done in the first few years to get the new government off on the right foot.


I am not saying any of this is easy and there is at least some risk in "group think" by recruiting experts willing to put on a uniform and deploy with military forces from the beginning, but I think it is worth a try. And we will never find out if it can work or hos it could be adjusted to make it better if we never try.

To be perfectly honest, I'm not sure I want all those capabilities under direct military control. Putting economists, anthropologists and everyone else under some MG up in Kirkuk is not necessarily a good fit in my estimation.

I see the analogy to doctors, but they have free reign within their sphere - namely, treating soldiers. They can do whatever they have to do in order to save a life. But an economist under MNF control would not have that free reign - to accomplish anything he would need the approval of the local commander or higher, and I don't see the services handing over tactical control to outside experts in uniform.

Granted, that's still a huge problem if they're outside the military chain of command, but, simply put, I am very leery of putting outside experts under direct control of military officers, no matter how "broadened" they may be. Besides, try getting some developmental economists to work for the US Army. The few I've talked to or study under can't stand USAID, let alone the US military.

Of course, the issue then is who can be the overall commander - it can't just go up the chain to the White House. Perhaps you'd have to have some sort of council consisting of the local military commanders, and the heads of various agency task forces.

I did like the article, however. The United States hasn't really used its national power since World War II. It would be eye-opening if it ever did again.

Matt