Warrior Ethos

[Brandon Friedman]

What language? Whose customs?

No idea. I mean, it's an important question that would have to be worked out. Fortunately, there's a lot of overlap--as in, Muslim culture has similarities from Indonesia to Morocco. Also, because we don't start new conflicts every year, we could target relevant regions for languages. For instance, we're not leaving Afghanistan or Iraq any time soon, so you could start with Arabic and the Persian languages. But it would likely have to also include a random mix of languages and customs (like Somali, Korean, Urdu, etc.)--that is, unless the Army went along with Schmedlap and started PCS'ing people every five or six years and sending units back to the same places. In that case, you could really target soldiers for regions.

Bottom line, I don't know. It's just an idea. I just think that having half a dozen trained and qualified counterinsurgents in each platoon would alleviate a lot of this debate on "fighting" versus "COIN."

[Ken White]

No idea. I mean, it's an important question that would have to be worked out.

There are also other problems...

Fortunately, there's a lot of overlap--as in, Muslim culture has similarities from Indonesia to Morocco.

If you believe the cultures of Indonesia and Morocco have much in common, you need to travel more. Afghanistan and Iraq are far more closely located and they're two totally different cultures. Plus, who says the issues will occur in Muslim areas.

I spent 45 years training or helping others to train for a land war in Europe. Never been there but I've eaten a whole lot of rice on many occasions in several nations over a good part of those years...

Also, because we don't start new conflicts every year, we could target relevant regions for languages. For instance, we're not leaving Afghanistan or Iraq any time soon, so you could start with Arabic and the Persian languages.

During the Viet Nam unpleasantness, we trained people to speak Viet Namese -- then sent a lot of them to work with Montagnards who did not speak Viet Namese. I have visions of Dari speakers playing with Urdu speakers -- or Arabic speakers.

But it would likely have to also include a random mix of languages and customs (like Somali, Korean, Urdu, etc.)

That doesn't address the personnel turbulence issue -- US Army units typically rotate about 20-30% of strength annually, thus your Dari speaker goes on PCS to Korea. We may improve on the turbulence and we should but it will still affect your proposal.

...that is, unless the Army went along with Schmedlap and started PCS'ing people every five or six years and sending units back to the same places. In that case, you could really target soldiers for regions.

That's the point -- do not target soldiers for regions, that will in any implementation fragment units. Units are very important even though the US Army due to a 1917 derived personnel system consistently refuses to recognize that. Individuals are trained to be a part of a unit; Reed and Schmedlap are right, once you get an individual trained to be a competent soldier, he or she goes to a unit and that unit trains to do its job; COIN or MCO, the differences in what that unit does are relatively minor. How well -- or poorly -- it performs is largely a function of its leadership (the collective).

You have to train Units for their job; the effort should be toward generic training with occasional forays into specialized training for various environments. For deployment to specific areas, Training Packages, tailored to echelon (Plat/Co; Bn/Bde; Div/TF/JTF) with language and cultural stuff and structured for rapid learning are used. Those package have to offer EXTRA information and guidance for NCO leaders, for Co Officers and for senior commanders (and their vastly oversized staffs). The Packages must contain not only cultural and custom information but also should be very current politically and culturally -- that currency would not be present in a School course; I spent seven years in TRADOC and they do not do current...

Well, not very well, anyway.

Bottom line, I don't know. It's just an idea.

Nothing wrong with ideas, the more the better. However, in the end, the Army has to settle on ideas that are effective (not that it always does...); training individuals for specific locations faces the difficulties of which locations and how much training coupled with when and where those individuals are assigned. The bureaucracy doesn't handle those aspects at all well. The probability is that an excessive amount of training will be given on areas an individual never sees -- or that is dated and no longer relevant.

I just think that having half a dozen trained and qualified counterinsurgents in each platoon would alleviate a lot of this debate on "fighting" versus "COIN."

I suggest that it would merely move that debate into the Platoon that had a half dozen 'counterinsurgents.' The Platoon should be focused as a unit on its job -- which can be performed in all spectrums of combat.

The key to that transition ability is well trained and competent leaders. For a variety of reasons, some valid, some specious, we do not address that fact as well as we should.

You mentioned Ranger School and the 'philosophy' of having Ranger trained folks scattered through out the Army to sort of stiffen everyone. Good theory; in practice it doesn't work. Nor does Ranger School develop superior combat leaders -- it is too short and too intense; too much important stuff has to be left out. What Ranger School does accomplish is teaching future leaders that they're tougher and can do more than they might think. That's a big plus and is applicable in any spectrum of conflict. I can see no pluses in a Counterinsurgency School that would be short, intense and leave too much out.

OTOH, if 'counterinsurgency' techniques which are universal were simply embedded in ALL training as it was at one time...

It ain't that hard.

[Bill Moore]

The debate about language training has been ongoing in SF for years. How much time to dedicate to it, what combat training do you drop so you can conduct language training, what languages do we train on, etc.

It should be no surprise that there are several schools of thought in SF on this important topic, but of course the guy who has the most stars on his chest tends to carry the day on what school of thought is implemented.

A couple of thoughts on the topic that may be worth considering:

1. During the Cold War it wasn't unusual to have SF teams (ODAs) where everyone on the team spoke the same language, whether Polish, Russian, Chinese, etc., so just in case the ballon went up and we went to war they could deploy to that locale which they studied and conduct their mission (assuming they survived infiltration). IMO no argument, language was a critical capability for this mission set. You're not going to hire interpreters in a denied area.

2. Over the past 20 our so years (and there are still exceptions) teams general have Soldiers who speak different foreign languages. Not only does it make it tougher to manage training, but also is this really a warfighting or IW capability? If Joe speaks Urdu, and Bill speaks Korean, and John speaks Arabic, does Joe become an interpreter for the team when their in Afghanistan, or does he still focus on his main job (medic, engineer, team leader, weapons, etc.)? Or is just a guy on the team who has a relevant language for "this" mission.

3. For conventional forces I imagine the problems will be even more challenging, and as Ken states we rarely know where we're going, and in many countries they speak more than one language. I believe has at least 12 major languages for example. Even in long drawn out wars like OIF and Vietnam, which are somewhat predictable, we don't always get it right. There was at least one unit that recently was scheduled to go to OIF, and was diverted at the 11th hour to go to OEF-A. The Cdr being proactive and someone who gets the COIN fight, sent several of his Soldiers to Arabic language training, now they're going to Afghanistan. I'm not arguing that was a waste, but dedicating time and resources to language training (except for head start type train ups) involves some degree of risk. You're giving up other training venues in exchange for language training, so it is important to weigh that risk and not blindly go down the road that everyone needs to be a linguist. Not to mention it is a perishable skill, so it is the gift that keeps on giving.

4. For SF and for officers in general, I think it is valuable to learn a language in the training pipeline because it does make you more aware of other cultures, so there are benefits that are not necessarily tangible. If you simply realize that words represent concepts and shape the way you think, and that not everyone uses the English language, then you're one step ahead, even if you're a Korean speaker working in Afghanistan.

No recommendations at this time, just a caution to avoid thinking that language training for the GPF will solve the majority of our FID and COIN deficiencies. It is all about finding the right balance, which means conducting realistic risk assessments.

[Ken White]

SF need language capability and cultural knowledge -- and, as you say, there are several approaches on how, precisely, to do that. As you also point out, the vagaries of a change in command can undo a great deal of precision. Plans and priorities change, as do people...

The SF Troop is the FID/ SFA expert and hopefully will get in there, do his thing and preclude the need for the GPF to have to try -- poorly -- to do SF work. If the GPF have to go in and augment the SF effort or expand it considerably, everyone should understand that they will always only do a marginal job. That will generally be adequate but only rarely will they really do it well.

That's okay, it isn't their job. There's a very valid reason for the difference in structure, rank and specialties between an SF ODA and a Rifle Company and that means neither can really do the work of the other, their expertise and construction are designed for different things -- all of us should remember that, remember to use the right tool for the job and also remember "best is the enemy of good enough."

[Brandon Friedman]

There are also other problems...If you believe the cultures of Indonesia and Morocco have much in common, you need to travel more. Afghanistan and Iraq are far more closely located and they're two totally different cultures. Plus, who says the issues will occur in Muslim areas.

I didn't say the cultures were the same. I said there was a lot of overlap. That is, an understanding of the Quran is the common thread through which soldiers could communicate with locals from Marrakesh to Jakarta. And you can't underestimate the importance of that in a Muslim nation.

During the Viet Nam unpleasantness, we trained people to speak Viet Namese -- then sent a lot of them to work with Montagnards who did not speak Viet Namese. I have visions of Dari speakers playing with Urdu speakers -- or Arabic speakers. That doesn't address the personnel turbulence issue -- US Army units typically rotate about 20-30% of strength annually, thus your Dari speaker goes on PCS to Korea. We may improve on the turbulence and we should but it will still affect your proposal.That's the point -- do not target soldiers for regions, that will in any implementation fragment units.

Maybe. But then perhaps the focus of a 10-week course that includes language instruction should be on not only learning the basics of a single language, but on absorbing the principle of the importance of learning a foreign language. Maybe the point is to stress the importance of learning the local language--and to put it on par with other military skills. It's not like anyone is going to graduate from a 10-week course with any fluency anyway. The biggest problem facing U.S. forces on the ground is the inability to communicate in any meaningful way with civilians on the battlefield. Perhaps I don't have the ultimate solution, but I know very well what the problem is.

I suggest that it would merely move that debate into the Platoon that had a half dozen 'counterinsurgents.' The Platoon should be focused as a unit on its job -- which can be performed in all spectrums of combat.

Does that mean requiring one member of the platoon to have a degree causes a debate over the value of a college education in implementing infantry tactics? Does it mean that having 2-3 members of the platoon being Ranger-qualified causes an internal debate over whether all soldiers should be tabbed? And not every soldier is CLS-qualified, right? My point is that there's no issue with having a handful of soldiers in a platoon specially trained and qualified to think or act in a certain way.

[Ken White]

...And you can't underestimate the importance of that in a Muslim nation.

No but you can overestimate it. I lived in the Middle East, on the economy for two years and traveled broadly there; lot of myths about the area and the locals are quite adept at using Islam to gain what they want.

...but on absorbing the principle of the importance of learning a foreign language.

That's one opinion, many agree with it -- many do not. The issue is will that occur; those attending learning that?

Maybe the point is to stress the importance of learning the local language--and to put it on par with other military skills. It's not like anyone is going to graduate from a 10-week course with any fluency anyway.

I think your second point is quite accurate; and I agree -- so why bother? I believe the first point to be incorrect at least if not borderline dangerous; precipitated on one brief experience and aimed at a scenario that may not be repeated in our lifetimes.

The biggest problem facing U.S. forces on the ground is the inability to communicate in any meaningful way with civilians on the battlefield. Perhaps I don't have the ultimate solution, but I know very well what the problem is.

We can disagree on that. I'd say the biggest problem is marginal training in basic skills -- which should include dealing with civilians in combat zones of all types, not just FID missions.

I also suggest you may be fighting the last war -- lot of that about...

Does that mean requiring one member of the platoon to have a degree causes a debate over the value of a college education in implementing infantry tactics?

Not really. Lots of platoons do not have that one member requiring a degree and they work as well or better than many who do have that person. A College degree is not required to be quite expert at Infantry tactics.

Does it mean that having 2-3 members of the platoon being Ranger-qualified causes an internal debate over whether all soldiers should be tabbed?

No but it does usually give rise to Ranger jokes...

There are also many platoons that do not have 2-3 Rangers or even one. Some of them do better than those Platoons that do have some Rangers. All Rangers, just like every other category of humans, are not equal. I've met some real losers with a tab.

And not every soldier is CLS-qualified, right? My point is that there's no issue with having a handful of soldiers in a platoon specially trained and qualified to think or act in a certain way.

I don't disagree with that. I'm just pretty well convinced that the training you suggest will not qualify any soldiers for much of anything -- just as Ranger School does not qualify anyone for much of anything -- and I'm pretty sure based on watching soldiers for some time that such training emphatically will not make them act in a certain way -- that's simply a leadership issue. I also suggest that certain way will be extremely difficult to tailor or orient in a brief course, has rather narrow applicability and may not be required.

If extra training time is made available, it would be far better spent giving Soldier -- and Lieutenants -- a better grounding in the basics of the trade.

[Brandon Friedman]

There are also many platoons that do not have 2-3 Rangers or even one. Some of them do better than those Platoons that do have some Rangers. All Rangers, just like every other category of humans, are not equal. I've met some real losers with a tab.

That's God's honest truth right there.

[Schmedlap]

I'm just pretty well convinced that the training you suggest will not qualify any soldiers for much of anything -- just as Ranger School does not qualify anyone for much of anything -- and I'm pretty sure based on watching soldiers for some time that such training emphatically will not make them act in a certain way -- that's simply a leadership issue. I also suggest that certain way will be extremely difficult to tailor or orient in a brief course, has rather narrow applicability and may not be required.

If extra training time is made available, it would be far better spent giving Soldier -- and Lieutenants -- a better grounding in the basics of the trade.

Yup. What do useful courses (airborne, jumpmaster, HALO, scuba, etc) have in common? They teach a specific skill; generally one geared to a piece of equipment or a specific set of techniques that would be prohibitively expensive or likely result in unnecessary death if the introductory training occurred at the unit. Other courses, like Ranger School and Air Assault exist out of nostalgia and as overpriced and overhyped gut checks (why is it that everyone at "air assault" does about 15,000 overhead claps and a 12-mile road march?). The only thing of training value that Ranger School provides, imo, is a concentrated couple weeks of small unit leader training that should occur at the unit or in OBC, but, for some reason, doesn't. We called it IOBC 2 (well, we called it a lot of things, but that one seems most relevant here).

In many ways, the degree of importance of Ranger School for Infantry Officers detracted from other training (at least when I was in IOBC, prior to 9/11). IOBC was nothing but a 4-month pre-pre-Ranger. Pre-Ranger was 2 to 3 weeks of the stupidity that one would endure in the first 2 to 3 weeks of Ranger School. Ranger School - at least once you got halfway through Darby phase - was several weeks of what we should have been doing for several months in IOBC, except you got treated like a moron (lots of "smoke" sessions in the first few weeks intended purely to make the most mentally weak people quit). Rather than training Lieutenants themselves, I know a lot of battalion commanders relied on the tab or no-tab screening process (I think this has since subsided a little bit). I think that I would prefer to train my own leaders.

The school provides debatable value as a vetting process. In theory, I don't want a guy who just flat out quits Ranger School because he is tired or cold or hungry. In practice, of course, you get some duds who manage to graduate and some quality leaders who flunk out because they lose in the game of RI roulette. So the vetting value has lots collateral damage if the school is taken too seriously; kind of like a test that gives 20% false positives. Ranger School has since changed - I graduated from the last hard class - hopefully some of the changes have been for the better.

[Ken White]

We really don't do the training piece as well as we can. Agree with all you say and would only add that many military skills are cognitive skills -- as is a second (or more) language -- and, once taught, if you don't use it you lose it. That's why the practical effort schools teach skills that are incorporated in training or vice versa.

Schools need to be focused on subjects or tasks that are routinely embedded in all training. Teaching the esoteric and nice to have stuff that cannot or will not be routinely trained and reinforced can offer jobs for people and justify another bureaucracy -- it will rarely if ever contribute to combat capability. It will become just another block to be checked...

I went to Monterey for Farsi, one year course. Went to Iran and used it -- didn't prepare me to talk to the many Arabs and Kurds I interfaced with on that tour. Or with all the Iraniha who wanted to practice their English. Came back to the States and within two years had lost virtually all of the limited language skill I once had.

[Schmedlap]

Yup. I would also add that I am no fan of the "subject matter expert" trend that I began to see before I ETS'd. It seemed that we were sending guys off to school for everything under the sun and they were to be the SME's for the company upon their return (small arms master gunner, combatives, Javelin trainer, various commo courses, etc). It was a delegation of training responsibility from the unit leaders to whomever went off to attend the courses. The end result was leaders who didn't care about being proficient because they didn't need to train their men. And lacking sufficient knowledge themselves, they did worse and worse jobs of supervising training because they had no idea what was going on.

It is one thing to have a duty position or highly technical and critical additional duty with special schooling - jumpmaster, tank or Bradley master gunner, for examples. But small arms master gunner? That was certainly "A" way to quickly disseminate new uniform standards for boresighting, zeroing, and qualifying with the slew of new gadgets that we attached to our weapons. But some units were making this into a quasi-duty position (it may have become the norm since then). Within a span of months, I saw the SMMG go from "the guy who attended the course" to being tasked with company SMMG as an additional duty and a bullet point on an NCOER to the SMMG actually being put in the HQ section along with the Bradley MG. He was responsible for supervising skill level 1 tasks and coordinating training that is about as safe and uncomplicated as it gets (25-meter ranges, qualification, etc). Unsurprisingly, I know of more than one 1SG who had laser aiming devices on their weapons that were never boresighted and often did not even have batteries in them.