Ukraine (closed; covers till August 2014)

[OUTLAW 09]

Stan--the video links are far more interesting than you assume they are---the third video was the most interesting as it was a heavy rocket launcher Regt on the move in a traditional travel formation I have not seen since the 80s.

A complete Regiment on the go to catch is a great opportunity to actually do a headcount, watch the actual rail movement configuration and see the support vehicles and reloader vehicles. There has been some open source comments that for this particular launcher there are various calibers that can be simply loaded onto the launcher much like we reload a Patriot missile battery---meaning one launcher can fire different calibers as needed by the field force.

The emphasis is on the term "heavy". This type of equipment is what the Russians have fielded since 2008 and it is just the tip of the modernization they have gone through.

Tanks---heavy defines the T80s and T90s or what is usually called a "main battle tank".

Nomenclature is as follows:

The BM-30 Smerch (Tornado) or 9A52 is a Soviet heavy multiple rocket launcher. The system is designed to defeat personnel, armored, and soft-skinned targets in concentration areas, artillery.

If this is being seen via OSINT then I now fully understand Breedlove's concern as he is seeing other Int. information.

This type of equipment headed for a border region resets us back to the Cold War days of Soviet maneuvers in the GDR where we would watch this type of equipment literally "like a hawk" in order to confirm or deny "intent"

IMO Breedlove as determined "intent" and the open question he now has is just the "when".

When your intent is to make a dash to the Odessa port and on to Moldavia it is usually led by mech infantry covered by main battle tanks with the Smerch providing fire cover. The first video indicated they standard towed heavy artillery in the BN strength.

In reality if this is just a portion caught on the move then in fact IMO the Russians have positioned enough man/firepower on the southern border of the Ukraine that can support troops crossing over from the east in a common drive to Odessa and Moldavia.

[Stan]

Stan--the video links are far more interesting than you assume they are---the third video was the most interesting as it was a heavy rocket launcher Regt on the move in a traditional travel formation I have not seen since the 80s.

Outlaw,
Glad you liked the links. Ironic, but I assume you will eventually do the same after repeatedly asking for the same.

My analyst from the 80’s would have responded with “of no intelligence value” and for very good reasons. Where and when are not in the videos.

A copy of Janes would have answered most of these questions.

We are throwing around the term heavy armor and it seems most don’t understand that term, but thanks for the nomenclature regarding rocket launchers.

I’d be concerned too if a USAF Flag is watching rail video with no known location or date, from a home video, and then concluding “very, very, very" in an open press statement to the world.

[CBCalif]

Stan: I'm still trying to figure out how to manuever through here, hopefully this works.

If one recalls the countless video reporting showing the Russian forces invading Georgia, while they succeeded, they were often slovenly looking lot with vehicles that seemed to be both obsolete and in desperate need of maintenance. Their drivers appeared to be new at the game. See e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qQMR8kAhyfo
titled Russia Invades Georgia, or one of the many other videos one can link to from there.

The see:http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/wo...tary.html?_r=0
and http://www.theguardian.com/world/vid...r-crimea-video.

Observe the Russian military that moved into the Crimea and the forces conducting operations near the border with the Ukraine. In a phrase, what a deference! That change over the past 6 years takes substantial investment in training time, equipment acquisition, etc. Hopefully this explains my intended meaning of “investment” in their Army.

[Stan]

Stan: I'm still trying to figure out how to manuever through here, hopefully this works.

If one recalls the countless video reporting showing the Russian forces invading Georgia, while they succeeded, they were often slovenly looking lot with vehicles that seemed to be both obsolete and in desperate need of maintenance. Their drivers appeared to be new at the game. See e.g. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qQMR8kAhyfo
titled Russia Invades Georgia, or one of the many other videos one can link to from there.

The see . http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/world/europe/crimea-offers-showcase-for-russias-rebooted-military.html?_r=0
and http://www.theguardian.com/world/vid...r-crimea-video.

Observe the Russian military that moved into the Crimea and the forces conducting operations near the border with the Ukraine. In a phrase, what a deference! That change over the past 6 years takes substantial investment in training time, equipment acquisition, etc. Hopefully this explains my intended meaning of “investment” in their Army.

CBCalif,
Thanks for the links and your views !
You need a bit of work with the last two links, but I found them and get your point.

Yes, the Russian troops in Georgia were defined as regular Army soldiers and the troops in Crimea are being defined as special forces.

The BBC in Georgia and the news feeds from Crimea are also like night and day.

We only get to see what they want, and the angle they want. Putin would like us to believe him when he says the Russian Army is better equipped and ready than ever before. He would also like us to believe that Russian freed Europe from oppression and the Nazis without casting light on what his freedom fighters did for the next 50 years here.

Smoke and mirrors !

Regards, Stan

[carl]

Outlaw & Stan and anybody else:

I assume that if they choose to do so Russian forces will be able to move anywhere they please in the Ukraine and regular Ukrainian force won't be able to stop them or even slow them down much, at least not without NATO keeping Russian air out of the sky.

My question is will they be able to maintain supply lines after they get to where they are going? That is why I keep bringing up ATGMs and MANPADS. Our real problem over the past 13 years hasn't been going where we wanted, it was running supplies to where we went. During that whole time our opponents didn't have good missile systems to shoot at us. I think we would have had huge trouble if they had.

So, do the Ukrainians have goodly numbers of those kinds of systems? If they don't, do you think they can get them in sufficient numbers? And most importantly, how likely do you think the Ukrainians are to attack and harass those supply lines?

[Dayuhan]

Soon, Buyers Will Use Gas as a Weapon
By Yulia Latynina
Apr. 01 2014 20:03
Last edited 20:04

Taken from The Moscow Times today:

Three weeks ago, just as Russia was in the early stages of annexing Crimea, I wrote in this space that the most strategic move the West could take against President Vladimir Putin would be to help lower world oil and gas prices. On Wednesday, U.S. President Barack Obama announced that Washington was prepared to supply gas to Europe in place of Russia.

People keep saying this, but the reality is that Washington isn't sending gas to anyone any time soon. There are no functioning LNG export terminals. One is due for completion in 2015 or 2016, another in 2018, but both have already committed mush of their output to long term contracts with Asian buyers.

[wm]

To wm/Dayuhan----in all your comments made on a series of my comments concerning Russian nationalism and the intentions of Putin going forward and on military stationing by Russian forces---read this and tell me then that NATO is not only signaling they "see" now the Russian "intent" and they fully "understand the intent" and are issuing via the media that they are in the midst of responding to the threat which they now view as indeed a threat to the Ukraine, the Baltics, Romanian and Finland and lastly Poland.

Let's look at the quotation from the Daily Mail link you posted

From Mail Online article from today:

Russia has amassed all the forces it needs on Ukraine's border to carry out an 'incursion' into the country and it could achieve its objective in three to five days, NATO's top military commander said on Wednesday.
Calling the situation 'incredibly concerning', NATO's supreme allied commander in Europe, U.S. Air Force General Philip Breedlove, said NATO had spotted signs of movement by a very small part of the Russian force overnight, but had no indication that it was returning to barracks.

NATO military chiefs are concerned that the Russian force on the Ukrainian border, which they estimate stands at 40,000 soldiers, could pose a threat to eastern and southern Ukraine.
'This is a very large and very capable and very ready force,' Breedlove said in an interview with Reuters and The Wall Street Journal.
The Russian force has aircraft and helicopter support as well as field hospitals and electronic warfare capabilities.
'The entire suite that would be required to successfully have an incursion into Ukraine should the decision be made,' Breedlove said.
'We think it is ready to go and we think it could accomplish its objectives in between three and five days if directed to make the actions.'

He said Russia could have several potential objectives, including an incursion into southern Ukraine to establish a land corridor to Crimea, pushing beyond Crimea to Ukraine's Black Sea port of Odessa or even threatening to connect to Transdniestria, the mainly Russian-speaking, separatist region of Moldova that lies to the west of Ukraine.
Russia also has forces to the north and northeast of Ukraine that could enter eastern Ukraine if Moscow ordered them to do so, Breedlove said.
Any such actions would have far-reaching implications for NATO, a military alliance of 28 nations that has been the core of European defence for more than 60 years.
'We are going to have to look at how our alliance now is prepared for a different paradigm, a different rule set... we will need to rethink our force posture, our force positioning, our force provisioning, readiness, etc,' Breedlove said.


http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/arti...#ixzz2xj6pwkX7

A significant word to focus on in the commentary is "could". Had the General said "will" then you might have something more to support your asssertions about NATO seeing the Russians' intent.

Otherwise, this article recaps what is pretty much standard intel briefing stuff. It identifies capabilities (the "could") but does not specify the likely course of action (the missing "will") that the Russian forces under discussion will actually take. Nowhere does he say that it (the Russian forces) will actually go. In the Cold War days of I&W, we used to talk about ambiguous and unambiguous warning. Unambiguous warning was when it got time to be doing recalls and uploading for real. We had ambiguous warnings all the time, but I do not remember EUCOM/USAREUR ever doing things like NEO (non-combatant evacuation operations) because of such ambiguous warnings. A Soviet GSFG unit or two deploying unexpectedly to the LHTA (Leitzlinger Heide Training Area) would not be much cause for concern, even though it was probably true that a surprise 3rd SA assault from the LHTA could (there's that word again ) easily have made the Rhine in 2-3 days (my opinion--much disagreed to by others in the community back then).

[wm]

Just a thought on the railway movement of Russian heavy armour. Could it be moving armour into the Crimea? Which would give the currently lightly equipped forces heavy armour to cross into the Ukraine proper.

A "dash" to Odessa and beyond is made easier. Curious isn't it that such a horsed cavalry adjective lives on with tanks.

In the video links I have seen, I have not seen any heavy armor--looked to me like tracked armored personnel carriers --BMP 3 perhaps--not tanks. The still photos of rail-loading tanks posted here are so limited in terms of geo-location and time/date data as to be virtually useless for making any appropriate intelligence assessments.

Nonetheless, I think a dash to Odessa and beyond would be more "doable" using wheeled APCs (BTRs in Russian parlance) rather than tracked vehicles--they would not tear up road ways as badly as tracked vehicles might and tend to be less maintenance intensive.

I am pretty sure that railway movement of tanks in Crimea would have to be preceded by ferry operations across the Kerch Straits or offloading from ships landing in Sebastopol, unless the Russians are relocating Ukrainian military equipment "liberated" with Crimea.

Does anyone have insight into what Ukraine had in the way of ground combat equipment in the Crimea?

[OUTLAW 09]

Stan---just a side comment--first of all if your analyst had not taken anything away from the videos would have astounded me for the following reasons.

OSINT is used a lot of the time to 1) tip and or 2) confirm or deny.

These videos did a number of things;
1. deny or confirm typical movement formations ie in entire BN or REGT formations
2. how are the rail movements designed and what accompanies them
3. types of the units and equipment head counts---does it match held data or varies from held data especially personnel headcounts when one knows how many fit into the accompanying personnel rail cars
4. and more especially it confirmed an open source article from a security advisor to Putin from 2000-2005 indicating that the Russian Army had long term plans for an invasion of the Crimea and simply were putting them into action---
5. thus one could see an actual planned campaign unfold
6. the op se used both in the loading and movement especially totally unmarked vehicles and equipment is new for the Russians and their comms op sec evidently from open source reports caught even the NSA off guard as they moved in silence and using couriers

So yes videos do have a role even if causally taken.

By the way the links indicated approx. locations and dates which again can be used to deny or confirm other int's information.

wm indiated that a dash would need lighter APCs-- not so necessary as the Russian doctrine sees a new evolution towards combined arms maneuver with main battle tanks still taking key bridges and intersections.

The weather has been great and the countryside is dry and capable of carrying free maneuvering main battle tanks and other heavy equipment so one does not need roads and when using CAM weather plays a key role.

[Stan]

Stan---just a side comment--first of all if your analyst had not taken anything away from the videos would have astounded me for the following reasons.

OSINT is used a lot of the time to 1) tip and or 2) confirm or deny.

Outlaw,
As you so well noted, some analysts are capable of a single language and have barely, if ever, served in the field. However, they know what to expect from field reporters.

So, I submit a video with this:

The next video, also posted on March 15, was supposedly shot about 50 miles west of Kerch in the village of Lenine.

I had better be able to confirm or deny all the things you have listed, and much much more. Or, better not to draft the IIR at all.
We have a DATT and ARMA there. They should be doing that sneaky stuff so that some 4 star doesn't look like (omitted) and quantify with words like very, very, very. (Deep Sigh)

So yes videos do have a role even if causally taken.

By the way the links indicated approx. locations and dates which again can be used to deny or confirm other int's information.

"Approximately and supposedly" or even the word "could" are not words I would have used in my IIRs. My happy snaps and reports on Georgia regarding Russian ordnance and armor did not include vague terms nor references.

wm indiated that a dash would need lighter APCs-- not so necessary as the Russian doctrine sees a new evolution towards combined arms maneuver with main battle tanks still taking key bridges and intersections.

The weather has been great and the countryside is dry and capable of carrying free maneuvering main battle tanks and other heavy equipment so one does not need roads and when using CAM weather plays a key role.

I can't comment on WM's post, but I can tell you what Russian tanks are doing in Estonia's forests, bogs and mires: rusting and stuck in the mud

[davidbfpo]

Cited in part:

In the video links I have seen, I have not seen any heavy armor--looked to me like tracked armored personnel carriers --BMP 3 perhaps--not tanks. The still photos of rail-loading tanks posted here are so limited in terms of geo-location and time/date data as to be virtually useless for making any appropriate intelligence assessments.

WM and others,

Although very short this clip does have a Russian (deputy) defence minister, at a railway yard and some heavy armour. I note he too refers to returning Ukrainian equipment:http://www.theguardian.com/world/vid...r-crimea-video

[Stan]

Cited in part:

WM and others,

Although very short this clip does have a Russian (deputy) defence minister, at a railway yard and some heavy armour. I note he too refers to returning Ukrainian equipment:http://www.theguardian.com/world/vid...r-crimea-video

David,
Not all the tanks are heavy armor and not so easy to assume the rail movement was from the purported exercise location.

Was this a Guardian reporter or a feed he scarfed up and wrote about ?

[davidbfpo]

David,
Not all the tanks are heavy armor and not so easy to assume the rail movement was from the purported exercise location.

Was this a Guardian reporter or a feed he scarfed up and wrote about ?

Stan,

At least three photos and a tiny film clip appear to be from the same location. A railway yard, with overhead electric wires spanning some of the tracks. Plus an official statement by the (deputy) Russian defence minister, who talks about Ukrainian kit being moved out and Russian moved in.

My conclusion is that it is a feed written up, rather badly and confusing. Just as I expect the minister wanted.

[OUTLAW 09]

David/Stan ---if in fact the Russians were sending heavy vehicles and or any Ukrainian military equipment back to the Ukraine would have anticipated it being reported by the Ukrainians as a news worthy event---but nothing yet.

Stan---When writing HUMINT reports one tends to see the comments, should, could, approximately often as it is with OSINT---especially when one can place such comments in the Field Comments section.

Reference analysts---USAREUR had only two Russian analysts a GS14 who spoke great Russian and a defense contractor---the 14 was returned to the US early 2013 and the contractor was let go---was not much better for EUCOM.

The reasons given for shutting down Russian analyst positions---peace time no further need.

The 66th MIG still has some but I am guessing it is just as weak as the need for Russian language classes at the Defense Language Institute was also being ramped downward.after 2000 in favor of Arabic.

[OUTLAW 09]

WM---USAREUR/EUCOM pulled off a NEO in Libya under less than what is being reported on Russian troop movements and then moved straight into a no fly zone environment so yes NEOs can be pulled with far less information available to a Commander---single question in NEOs are US civilians endangered yes or no.

There were a number of analysts who in the early to mid 80s stated a number of times the Russians once started would make the Rhine in under three days.

The bigger question was how would they cross thus the constant observation of training and maneuvers to see if bridging equipment came forward.

Now this is the surprise---it never came forward during a single exercise even their really big one in 1989.

There have been theories the Polish commercial river boats during the 80s in large numbers travelling on the Rhine/Main could have with their dumb barges easily constructed pontoon like bridges at any given point on those two rivers as they maintained contact to the motherland via radio.

Thus no need for bridging equipment.

[OUTLAW 09]

Sorry for no link as a friend passed this article to me taken from todays' Moscow Times referencing the new Putin Doctrine a term which I have used from the very beginning of the Crimea issue---I have noticed that the US is tending to shy away from using the term but it is a formulated doctrine and it drives Putin and his actions.

Firmly believe that the WH needs to fully understand this doctrine as it is not going away any time soon. Remember when reading it is in the language often used by Putin--- especially sprinkled inside his Duma speech in the same tone and word usage.

Taken from an article titled The New Putin Doctrine from today's Moscow Times

"The annexation of Crimea highlights not only a sharp change in Russian foreign policy, but also the emergence of a new Putin Doctrine. President Vladimir Putin's successful Crimean land grab might signal the start of a broader trend in which Moscow will annex other regions.

In his historic speech in the Kremlin on March 18, Putin formulated the seven main points of his new doctrine.


Under Putin, Russia has become a powerful country once again and now has the right to flaunt its own double standards, just like the U.S.

1. Russia no longer views the West as a credible partner. He believes that the West dismissed his legitimate complaints against U.S. unilateralism and double standards that he articulated in his 2007 Munich speech. Despite claims that the Cold War has ended, the West continues to pursue a Cold War-like containment policy against Russia, Putin says.

In reality, the West's policy has been to lie to Russia, make decisions behind its back and to try to weaken the country's influence on the global arena. "Russia feels that it has been not just robbed, but plundered," Putin said in his March 18 speech. From now on, Russia will be forced to base its actions on this harsh reality.

2. Russia no longer considers itself part of European — much less Euro-Atlantic — civilization. Russia is a democracy, but of a special type. The country has rejected communist and "pseudo-#democratic" dogmas. If more than 90 percent of Russians support the annexation of Crimea, it means the move had a strong backing and legitimacy based on the fundamental democratic principal of vox populi.

At the same time, however, Russia does not believe in the universal value of Western-style democracy and human rights, although it will remain — at least for time being — a member of the Council of Europe.

3. International law is no longer a system of rules or set of reference points. Putin argues that international law has been reduced to a menu of options from which every powerful state is free to choose whatever suits its interests. To put down the uprising in Chechnya, for example, Moscow cited the international principle of upholding territorial integrity. But in annexing Crimea, it cited the fundamental right to self-determination.

This is a classical double standard, something Russia has always loved criticizing the U.S. for. But under Putin, Russia is now a powerful country and thus has the right to flaunt its own double standards, just like the U.S., and create its own "sovereign democracy." Meanwhile, a weak Ukraine does not have these rights and privileges.

4. The new Putin Doctrine applies to the entire territory of the former Soviet Union. Putin justifies the right to oversee this expanse by relying on a vague notion of "Russia's historical heritage" and the need to ensure the country's security in its rightful sphere of influence. As it turns out, from now on the sovereignty of the former Soviet republics will depend on how the Kremlin views its strategic interests. The only exceptions are the three former Baltic republics, which are NATO members.

Moscow has drawn its own red line: Russia will take action if any of the former Soviet republics attempt to join NATO or the European Union or agree to host Western military bases on their territory. The Kremlin has a couple of tools to undermine any country that shifts too far to the West. It reserves the right to send in troops, install a government loyal to Moscow and hold a referendum, as it did in Crimea.

The new Putin Doctrine tacitly invites all of the world's powerful states to revise the rules of the game. In his 2012 article titled "Russia Focuses," Putin wrote that Russia would not just follow, but also shape the rules of the game in the world. We are now seeing that strategy applied in practice.

5. The main Westphalian principle upholding state sovereignty and territorial integrity now applies only to the strongest countries that protect their borders with their own armies or the armies of military blocs such as NATO or the Collective Security Treaty Organization. The sovereignty and integrity of weak and especially failed states becomes open game for powerful states and their blocs. States now fall into two categories: the big leagues, with security and other guarantees for its members, and the little leagues, with far fewer guarantees.

According to this logic, if any powerful and strong-willed country believes that its military, strategic, economic or political interests are at risk, it is free to intervene in the internal affairs of weaker countries — and even seize parts of their territory.

6. International organizations such as the United Nations, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe and the Council of Europe now play a greatly diminished role. It is only necessary to adhere to their rules and frameworks as long as they do not compromise a powerful country's ability to defend its national interests. If they do, strong states should simply ignore these organizations. This is how the U.S. and its allies behaved when they bypassed the UN Security Council to conduct several military operations over the past 20 years.

The new Putin Doctrine is based on a fundamentally new balance of power in the world. The West's combined military and economic influence has fallen dramatically and continues to decline. At the same time, Asia, South America and Africa are gaining in influence, and the major non-Western member states of BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and others would like to see new rules of the game devised so that they can also advance their interests.

This new playing field for international affairs will make the world dangerously volatile and increase the risks for more military conflicts. But the problem is that each country believes it will come out the winner in this global wrestling match, while there are few rules, regulations or umpires to help limit the losses and number of innocent victims.

[Stan]

The link is here as are a number of the author's articles.

Articles by Vladimir Ryzhkov

[Stan]

Stan---When writing HUMINT reports one tends to see the comments, should, could, approximately often as it is with OSINT---especially when one can place such comments in the Field Comments section.

Outlaw,
Good thing you didn't work for Clarendon with MG Leide as your rater

[OUTLAW 09]

Stan---then one does not understand the DIAM allowing field comments which is what National has always wanted.

National has always wanted the dialogue between the Collector and Analyst---problem is very few fully understand that even today.

Once had a report in which the biographic data from six KIA jihadi's was given-with burial points--a junior SP4 analyst from Division kicked the IIR back with the statement we do not collect on dead people.

Still rammed the report through.

In today's world not many even understand the term Initiative Reporting also out of the DIAM.

National response---great report we had been wondering where they were.

[OUTLAW 09]

Russia has been demanding that the Ukraine investigate the Maidan killings---has been at the center of a repeated number of demands by Putin and his FM.

Looks like they might not like the answers provided today by Ukraine---as well as the names of FSB agents and documents tying the killings straight to the former president.

There were documents released today as well indicating that the entire national bank gold reserves and foreign currency reserves were flown out by copter on 20/21Feb.

Wonder where?


http://www.thedailybeast.com/world.html