View Poll Results: Evaluate Kilcullen's work on counterinsurgency

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  • Brilliant, useful

    26 45.61%
  • Interesting, perhaps useful

    26 45.61%
  • Of little utility, not practical

    1 1.75%
  • Delusional

    4 7.02%
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Thread: The David Kilcullen Collection (merged thread)

  1. #161
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Pluses and minuses in EVERYTHING to do with war.

    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    But a road without troops to patrol it only lends mobility to the enemy. As Foust points out, the Romans learned this to their chagrin.
    There are no absolutes other than getting killed if you screw up too badly. Every action seeks an equal and opposite counter reaction; the key is to anticipate that, plan accordingly and be prepared to adapt.

    None of which negates the fact that one most usually does not have all the troops available one would like -- that's always been generally true and is unlikely to change -- and thus, one must have alternatives.

    As for the Romans, to include the Kilcullen and Foust citations, there's always only so much one can do with troop constraints -- and, far more immutably, the terrain and people of a place.
    Last edited by Ken White; 04-25-2008 at 05:28 PM.

  2. #162
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by tequila View Post
    But a road without troops to patrol it only lends mobility to the enemy. As Foust points out, the Romans learned this to their chagrin.

    Roman roads were a significant part of what we would nowadays call a kinetic solution to their problem of border security. Perhaps had the Romans chosen to explore and employ other, non-kinetic solutions to the problem besides maintaining a mobile army that could react quickly to threats because of interior lines, they might not have been hoisted by their own petard (or is that run over on their own roads?). If the people view the maintenance of a road network as important enough to their way of life, they will ensure it is taken care of and used for the right reasons.

  3. #163
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Road History

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    Roman roads were a significant part of what we would nowadays call a kinetic solution to their problem of border security. Perhaps had the Romans chosen to explore and employ other, non-kinetic solutions to the problem besides maintaining a mobile army that could react quickly to threats because of interior lines, they might not have been hoisted by their own petard (or is that run over on their own roads?). If the people view the maintenance of a road network as important enough to their way of life, they will ensure it is taken care of and used for the right reasons.

    The Assyrians were using roads for military and economic purposes around 1 BC:

    The Assyrians were the first to institute, control and maintain a system of roads throughout their empire. Pony expresses with regular way stations for messengers to rest and/or exchange horses were established. Later, these would form the basis for the Persians to expand this system to their own empire.
    Rome used their roads for much than just military warfare. The economic benefits to the Roman Empire were many. Roman GDP Estimate:

    The first writer to complain about trade deficits seems to have been Pliny the Elder, in about 75 AD. Gloomily cataloguing luxury imports -- Persian perfumery, Chinese silks, Indian diamonds, Arabian incense and pearls -- he blamed Roman women for costing the Empire 100 million sesterces a year. (Pliny, apparently a bit of a kill-joy, considered silk immoral -- "we seek this material from the end of the earth, so Roman ladies can show off their see-through clothes in public" -- and called perfume "the most pointless of all luxuries.") He seems to have been unduly worried, at least on economic grounds: the Empire ultimately did fall, but not until 400 years later, and not because of balance-of-payments problems.

    Some modern analysts calculate 100 million sesterces to be about 2 percent of Roman GDP.
    China is working the roads issue in Africa...

    According to Akwe Amosu, an Africa expert for the Open Society Institute, "over 800 Chinese companies, the vast majority of them state-owned, are operating in 49 African countries." They are drilling for oil, extracting minerals, and building roads, railways, hotels, and factories.

    China's willingness to support some of Africa's worst regimes in exchange for special access to African resources raises a number of serious worries, such as those laid out last year by Joshua Kurlantzick in The New Republic.
    Sapere Aude

  4. #164
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Default

    Quote Originally Posted by Surferbeetle View Post
    T
    Rome used their roads for much than just military warfare. The economic benefits to the Roman Empire were many.
    Important parts of the Roman Imperial road network are still operative today (or at least the routes those Roman roads first followed). This re-emphasizes my point that if the road network is important enough to the economy/economic well being of the people, they will do a lot to defend/maintain it on their own.

  5. #165
    Council Member Surferbeetle's Avatar
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    Default Road Reference

    Quote Originally Posted by wm View Post
    Important parts of the Roman Imperial road network are still operative today (or at least the routes those Roman roads first followed).
    Wm,

    Too true, the Appian Way is still going strong (although maintenance funds are short as usual). Vicenza has some beautiful examples of Roman Construction (to include roads - the trainstation there has a nice example). Mosul/Ninevah Iraq has some amazing examples of Assyrian Construction.

    A fun non-mathematical read is 'Roman Roads and Aqueducts' by Don Nardo (ISBN 1-56006-721-7) one in the 'Building History Series' books by Lucent. Mr. Nardo touches upon Assyrian Aqueducts in this book as well. The Dioptra is certainly not a GPS or Total Station but those old surveyors and engineers did some amazing things with them.

    Regards,

    Steve
    Last edited by Surferbeetle; 04-28-2008 at 03:53 AM.
    Sapere Aude

  6. #166
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    Default Killcullen Briefing

    Found this today on Col. Pat Lang's site.

  7. #167
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    Found this today on Col. Pat Lang's site.

    Well, since I was sitting about five feet from Dave when he gave that, it's a bit of a stretch to refer to the event as "trendy." (Apparently I'm sort of the Forrest Gump of the counterinsurgency world). The briefing is also on the Consortium for Complex Operations portal for those of you who use it.

    (I sure wish I knew where I could find a good copper Chinese sink about now)
    Last edited by SteveMetz; 05-22-2008 at 02:43 PM.

  8. #168
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    Default

    I get the sense that Col. Lang is critical of COIN "trendiness" from that and other posts, but he hasn't fleshed-out any detailed criticism yet - at least that I can find - so it's hard to say for sure.

  9. #169
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Entropy View Post
    I get the sense that Col. Lang is critical of COIN "trendiness" from that and other posts, but he hasn't fleshed-out any detailed criticism yet - at least that I can find - so it's hard to say for sure.
    Well, I'm a big fan of Dave's and thought the briefing was quite good.

    Looking at my notebook, here are a few of the points I made during my commentary on it:

    --If we accept the idea that counterinsurgency operations can actually speed or facilitate the evolution of insurgencies by "weeding out" the less adaptable ones, what can we do with that information? In other words, it is possible to design a counterinsurgency campaign that does NOT speed or facilitate insurgency evolution, perhaps by pulsing and rapidly shifting methods rather than sticking with one thing until it becomes ineffective?
    --Is there some other way to inject a pathology into the insurgent adapation process?
    --In Iraq today, are we so concentrated on operational success that we're setting ourselves up for strategic failure by empowering local security forces?

  10. #170
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    Default Great points

    Steve,

    Great point on mitigating the effects of co-evolution. This area should definitely be studied. Injecting the pathology may have to be based on managing their perceptions on how effective they are. It will be a challenge, but definitely worth pursuing.

    As for empowering the local security forces, I tend to agree. On one hand the local security forces are essential (we can't succeed without them in my opinion), but on the other hand if they are mobilized, led and supported by the HN government, then they aren't security forces, they're something else that we will have to deal with later.

    Bill

  11. #171
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Huh???

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    ...On one hand the local security forces are essential (we can't succeed without them in my opinion), but on the other hand if they are mobilized, led and supported by the HN government, then they aren't security forces, they're something else that we will have to deal with later.
    Aren't or are?

  12. #172
    Council Member J Wolfsberger's Avatar
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    Default Steve, Bill,

    Quote Originally Posted by Bill Moore View Post
    ... if they are mobilized, led and supported by the HN government, then they aren't security forces, they're something else that we will have to deal with later.
    I'm not sure I understand the point you're driving at. Isn't the goal of successful COIN standing up local security forces that can hold their own without our help? Shouldn't their principal loyalty be to the HN government?

    In particular, the idea Bill is driving at escapes me. I don't understand what the "something else" might be.
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  13. #173
    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default Along the lines of I should know better...

    I think Bill is hinting at the following:

    If HN Security Forces become too proficient, perhaps they begin to focus outside their borders... ergo become destabilizing; or

    If their culture doesn't have a strong culture of civilian control, the HN Forces could become the basis of a coup.

    Of course these are just assumptions, and I think the least of our concerns at this point.
    Hacksaw
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  14. #174
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    Default Aren't

    Ken, I meant aren't, funny what a major difference a little n't can make :-)

    I think Kilcullen was refering to citizen security forces when he refered to local security forces, e.g. the Anbar Awakening, local home guards, etc., not professional Soldiers and Police. These forces are generally needed in some capacity to help secure the populace, but if they are not mobilized, led and supported by the HN government then what are they? They're a semi-independent 'force' that has the option of supporting, being indifferent, or turning against the government.

    Here is a quick notional example. We clear the insurgents out of town X, but there isn't enough police to hold the town, so we (the U.S. military) mobilize local citizens to form security groups to protect themselves. We may even pay them to do so. Down the road, we reach a point where we want to demobilize them, but now instead of being a security force, these home guards have evolved into gangs or organized criminal elements, and there is no incentive to give up their weapons. That is the something else I was referring to. On the other hand, if they were mobilized and recruited by the HN government to "augment their security forces" and there was a contract in place that included the demobilization process (thus no surprise), and they remained weaker than the police chief or Army officer they worked for, then it would be easier to dissolve them later (maybe).

    While the Anbar Awakening was/is successful, what is the end game? Is this facilitating Iraqi unity? We defeated the five meter target in some areas (AQI), but in the process did we create a bigger problem that will counter achieving our strategic end state?

    Just thoughts.

  15. #175
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Couldn't have said it better. Totally agree.

    Agree also on what it appears Kilcullen was referring to and that non-HN paramilitary elements can be a benefit but far more importantly, you're correct IMO in that they require very careful planning and handling to preclude a much larger later problem.

    On your last para, agree and we can only hope the guys on the ground are working through that...

  16. #176
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    Local forces MUST eventually be incorporated into the legitimate HN security forces or, as others have pointed out, disbanded. Incorporation, in turn, requires a formal and effective process. It's not good enough to change uniforms and wave a magic wand. The challenge is huge (but not insurmountable.)

  17. #177
    Council Member Ron Humphrey's Avatar
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    Question I have heard this brought up many times in many venues

    But the one thing that always comes to mind is the question of where exactly one would expect the LOCAL police, fire, paramedics, in otherwords general different parts of any vibrant communities local governance to come from if not from those same forces we are talking about.

    It is up in the air about how to make it happen but wouldn't it seem like it has to happen if the actual circumstances for those areas are changing.
    In otherwords plan for successful conclusions and react when necessary to changes in the local dynamics.

    If 20% go to the IA/IP then how many of the other 80 would be able to transition into the health,construction, sewage, education, etc as anything from doctors and teachers to maintenance and physical labor. These are all areas where the government would find beneficial their integration as it both gets them out of the was security now unemployed category and puts them in the helping to make the local populace more comfortable and thus less likely to cause problems one. Also consider that as long as the upcoming elections do allow more representation into the existing governmental structures there will be more pressure to ensure the funds do make it to the provinces.

    It also helps in that the local leaders get to have those they know to hold accountable for what comes from HN gov and the HN Gov has the same benefit the other direction. In a society where bartering takes on whole new meanings this would seem the ultimate way of approaching it.

    As for what Maliki and his group choose to do in this regard it is true that anything can be screwed up more easily than it can be fixed. I would think however that they have even more invested in succeeding here now then many may know.

    Guess we'll see

    Beside's I doubt if the neighborhood watch goes away no matter what their jobs end up being. At least for another gen or so ain't nobody gonna be super trusting
    Last edited by Ron Humphrey; 05-22-2008 at 06:06 PM. Reason: to add:
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    Is there anyone here who can tell me what the Metz effect is?

    I'm guessing the counterinsurgent needs to show results or political support for COIN will drop.
    Quote Originally Posted by SteveMetz View Post
    Sometimes it takes someone without deep experience to think creatively.

  19. #179
    Council Member wm's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Old Eagle View Post
    Local forces MUST eventually be incorporated into the legitimate HN security forces or, as others have pointed out, disbanded. Incorporation, in turn, requires a formal and effective process. It's not good enough to change uniforms and wave a magic wand. The challenge is huge (but not insurmountable.)
    The important point to reflect on in this post is how to incorporate those local forces. Perhaps in this regard it might be a worthwhile endeavor to understand how the US has managed to strike the right sort of balance between its various local forces (AKA state militias and National
    Guard forces) and the national defense establishment. I suspect that the circle out to be drawn some what wider to include the law enforcement community from the local town sheriff/marshall/police through the various forms of state police organizations up to the FBI/US Marshalls.

    My quick rumination suggests that, in America at least, the glue that binds the locals' allegience to the national cause is funding. By this I mean that the local militia/police force is tied to national goals and control mechanisms by budget support, such things as Federal grants, and other forms of financial aid. It is an example of the golden rule--"whoever has the gold, rules." Money talks much more loudly than high flown rhetoric about truth, justice, and national/regional (tribal?) pride.

    Not being an expert on mid-Eastern cultural values, I cannot say that this same dynamic would apply in the AOR. However, I suspect that having the national government pass out (or take away) cool uniforms, shiny weapons and other prized pieces of equipment, as well as nifty badges and other symbols of office might have a pretty strong impact on efforts to control the actions of the local militia forces.
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  20. #180
    Council Member SteveMetz's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Rank amateur View Post
    Is there anyone here who can tell me what the Metz effect is?

    I'm guessing the counterinsurgent needs to show results or political support for COIN will drop.

    Either that or its the after effect of a burrito grande.

    The idea is that the U.S. has about three years of major involvement in counterinsurgency support before public and congressional support starts slipping, irrespective of the national interests at stake. I used this to justify have a serious, whole-of-government surge capacity. If you only have three years, you don't want to spend two of them getting your act together (or, in the case of Iraq, four of them).

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