Understanding Airmen

[Steve Blair]

Rather than assume I understand what you are saying, could you elaborate please?

Sure. What I refer to here is what I have taken over the years from the writing of air power theorists as well as some of the semi-official AF writing about Vietnam and Korea. My take is that they in essence view warfare as a zero-sum exercise: you are either at war or you are not. If you are at war, you should be able to use all weapons and methods at your disposal to defeat your opponent. You see strains of this in most discussion of Korea and Vietnam, where complaints are raised about (with Korea) not being able to attack bases in China or (in Vietnam) not bombing Hanoi soon enough or with enough severity. Political limitations are viewed with hostility - as shackles on the true effectiveness of air power - and not as a common feature in warfare (since war stems from politics in many if not all cases). If the population is part of the production system, they should be subject to attack. The same goes for political centers and the like. LeMay was a vocal advocate of this, but there have been others. You bomb power plants to cut off power to the populace, hit the Red River dikes (a VN example) to flood out food production areas, and so on.

You see strains of this in Warden's air campaign theory, although he does tone down the rhetoric. But even there you can see an attempt to shape warfare to the air power-centric doctrine and not adapting the doctrine to the political situation as dictated by national policy. One of the main points of this doctrine is maximum force (weapons, systems, etc.) delivered to vital points (as many as possible) as quickly as possible. Under such a mindset problems quickly become a question of what weapon to use and in what quantity, not if weapons should be used at all.

This ignores the contributions of lift (mentioned by Tom and I know you've talked about it as well, John), real-time recon like the SR-71 provided, and other functions. Dunlap mentions the Misty FACs, but he also fails to mention that they were marginalized by the AF when they were operating and have only recently enjoyed a resurgence of interest and semi-official approval. He also doesn't mention the number of times the AF has tried to retire or transfer the A-10 or other systems that don't really fit into the high-speed, lots of bombs on target mission that the total activity vision of warfare calls for.

[LawVol]

My take is that they in essence view warfare as a zero-sum exercise: you are either at war or you are not. If you are at war, you should be able to use all weapons and methods at your disposal to defeat your opponent.

Probably because I simply was not looking for it, I failed to see evidence of this statement. But then I came across this article this morning:

http://aimpoints.hq.af.mil/display.cfm?id=21646

Of particular interest is this quote:

The doctrine defines irregular warfare as "a violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and influence over the relevant populations."

But Peck cautioned this was not necessarily the same as a battle for hearts and minds.

"It doesn't have to be kinder and gentler," he said, citing the Viet Cong, who he charged had "won influence over the population how? Not by going in and immunizing the kids and building schools. Â… They'd go in and they'd grab a couple of the tribal elders and hang them."

I'm not quite sure how to take this. I've reread it several times to try and gleen a different read, but it just seems like he's calling for a sort of total war -- kill them all and let God sort this out. I'm flabbergasted. Even in COIN there is a need for putting steel on target and even being relentless in doing it, but surely it shouldn't be the rule. Like I said, maybe I'm misreading but, especially in today's globalized and liberalized society, we can't take a butcher and burn approach to COIN.

That being said, there is a statement that I believe does make sense.

The storyline that "They are afraid to fight us face-to-face but not to bomb us from the air and kill our women and children" is "a good recruiting tool for the enemy," he said.

"I don't even know how to respond to that," said Peck, when a reporter put Richards' views to him.

"I take great pride in the fact that we can do these things without putting our forces at risk -- to me that's the goal. We don't want to fight a fair fight."

I don't buy into the argument that we should make ourselves available as target simply to adhere to some machismo version of fighting because the failure to do so taints our image in the eyes of our adversary. Who cares? Killing your enemy without being killed has been the goal since the beginning of time. We have simply developed better ways to do it. Within the confines of the laws of war, I completely agree that we should not engage in a "fair" fight if we can gain some sort of advantage.

Also, I'm not sure that this is a great recruiting tool anyway (the failure to fight aspect; civilian casualties will always play a role in recruiting). I guess it's possible that some may join the insurgency solely for this reason, but I doubt the numbers are significant. In their minds they have plenty of other reasons for joining. However, once engaged in the fight against the US, wouldn't the enemy become frustrated at their inability to kill US military personnel? I would think so.

[Tom Odom]

I don't buy into the argument that we should make ourselves available as target simply to adhere to some machismo version of fighting because the failure to do so taints our image in the eyes of our adversary. Who cares?

The argument is about legitimacy in the eyes of the population. Who has it? And who gets it? There is no machismo attached to fighting in ways that help secure that legitimacy. Peck again uses "hearts and minds" as a red herring, implying that we are trying to love our enemy to death. We and our host nation allies try to convince the population that we are legitimate and the insurgents are not.


best

Tom

[Steve Blair]

Probably because I simply was not looking for it, I failed to see evidence of this statement. But then I came across this article this morning:

I first noticed the trend when reading about Air Force involvement in Vietnam. I came across it again when reading about Korea. There was a constant "airpower could have won everything if we had been allowed to do it our way" thread, which usually translated into bombing everything that moved (and most things that didn't). There's often a disconnect between the theory and its application in a world where political constraints are ALWAYS a part of military operations.

In terms of the failing to fight consideration, I don't think it's a recruiting tool as much as it is an IO consideration in many areas and with some cultures. By failing to put people on the ground, you can appear to be afraid of the insurgents, giving them a sense of legitimacy they might not have otherwise. You also deprive yourself of invaluable COIN intelligence: being able to SEE and HEAR the people. Sensors are great, but they just don't substitute for the impressions that can be formed on the ground.

Peck's VC example is nothing short of ludicrous. Intimidation has always been a part of insurgent operations, but most COIN attempts to "pay them back in their own coin" have been total failures. Part of successful COIN is being able to offer real alternatives to the insurgents, not a choice between who's going to shoot you in the back of the head.

[Van]

In the article, GEN Dunlap says

Airmen shamelessly seek to destroy adversaries with as little risk to themselves... as possible.

All the way back to the Iliad, close combat is considered valient and couragous, and stand-off weapon users (then archers, now airmen) were considered lacking in martial virtue. Note that 'couragous' literally means 'having heart' and 'virtue' comes from vir, Latin for man so means manliness. So, stand-off weapons make the user heartless and unmanly...

Pretty archaic attitude from folks whose basic weapon has a maximum effective range of 500m against point targets and 800m against area targets (M16A2).

I think the central, unspoken issue is that most air force folks do not display the degree of respect for folks who go into close combat that ground forces feel is their due. And possibly, the air force folks are doing this to compensate for their own questions about their virtue when compared to us knuckle-dragging ground pounders.

In the current conflict, we are seeing a similar pattern to early Viet Nam. If the enemy has no strategic infrastructure to bomb, strategic bombing can continue 24-7 without effect. I would argue (as an Army guy) that precision munitions were one of the two things missing from the Douhet/Mitchell vision of air power (the other being information operations) to minimize collateral damage that turns into an IO victory for the opponent. In other words, were are closer now to the capabilities required for strat air to carry the day than ever before, but strat air requires an opponent who has an infrastructure that can be targeted with bombs. The bad guys in Iraq don't have big IED factories, they have dozens of home workshops, they don't have electric power plants discrete from the friendly power plants, their comm system might be a guy on a scooter who looks just like every other scooter in the city from 30,000 ft. In this circumstance, airpower is the big fire base in the sky, with someone on the ground as the forward observer, not an independant, autonomous fleet of airmachines envisioned by Douhet.

[LawVol]

I think the central, unspoken issue is that most air force folks do not display the degree of respect for folks who go into close combat that ground forces feel is their due. And possibly, the air force folks are doing this to compensate for their own questions about their virtue when compared to us knuckle-dragging ground pounders.

Perhaps the following link would be useful to you.

http://www.truesilence.com/psychological-projection.htm

[Steve Blair]

All the way back to the Iliad, close combat is considered valient and couragous, and stand-off weapon users (then archers, now airmen) were considered lacking in martial virtue. Note that 'couragous' literally means 'having heart' and 'virtue' comes from vir, Latin for man so means manliness. So, stand-off weapons make the user heartless and unmanly...

This is very much a Western myth of warfare, and ignores the experiences and cultures of the various nomadic/semi-nomadic horse tribes of Central Asia....not to mention the whole longbowmen myth. However, it can also tie into the fighter pilot "kill tally" idea and their own arguments about prowess (and lack thereof) with their bomber pilot brethren.

It's also worth remembering that the Romans trained their soldiers to use sword AND the pilum, which was a missile weapon and a central part of their tactics through at least the early Empire period. One of the key parts of the Byzantine military was the heavily-armored horse archer. I suspect the "unmanly" part may have crept in during the romanticism of the Medieval period....

[wm]

This is very much a Western myth of warfare, and ignores the experiences and cultures of the various nomadic/semi-nomadic horse tribes of Central Asia....not to mention the whole longbowmen myth. However, it can also tie into the fighter pilot "kill tally" idea and their own arguments about prowess (and lack thereof) with their bomber pilot brethren.

It's also worth remembering that the Romans trained their soldiers to use sword AND the pilum, which was a missile weapon and a central part of their tactics through at least the early Empire period. One of the key parts of the Byzantine military was the heavily-armored horse archer. I suspect the "unmanly" part may have crept in during the romanticism of the Medieval period....

Romans threw the pilia, which had soft, hollow heads, first. The soft head embedded the spear into an opponent's shield. The shaft then distorted, pulling the opponent's shield downward as well. Thereby, the enemy was uncovered and made easy prey as the Roman legionnaires closed to use the gladius, the heavy short sword, which was designed as a stabbing rather than a slashing weapon.

The Romans had no compunction about using their allies as archers and slingers to soften up their opponebnts first. Roman's didn't use these weapons themselve primarily because they didn't know how. Why waste time learning how to use them if you have allies available who are better at this than you--sort of like the US Army using Native American scouts during the frontier conflicts of the 1800s.

I think Steve is partly correct about the the unmanly aspect of "indirect fire" weapons/long distance engagements creeping in during the Middle Ages--it was, I believe, a hallmark of the Germannic "barbarians'" style of fighting to engage in one-on-one combat rather than long distance "missile" exchanges. Thes folks became the martial leadership of Western Europe as Rome was supplanted and brought the values of their heritage with them. One proved one's fitness to lead through succeeding in a direct challenge of arms with an incumbent (AKA duel), not by killing the incumbent at a distance with a sling or bowshot. BTW, unlike steel swords, slings and bows were relatively cheap to make, becoming, therefore, the weapons of the hoi polloi, not the elite.

[tequila]

The first "Western" example of disdain for archers/missile weapons that I could find is the Greek hoplite disregard for such "lightly" armed troops. Aeschylus specifies arrows as "barbarian" weapons in The Persians, Euripides calls them "coward's weapons" in The Madness of Heracles, and both Thucydides and Herodotus note Spartan disdain for "spindle"-like arrows as effeminate. This despite, of course, numerous examples of the slaughter of hoplites by light-armed troops - i.e. the Athenian invasion of Aetolia, the Spartan surrender at Sphacteria to Athenian rowers, etc.

Like the men-at-arms' hatred for archers and crossbowmen in medieval Europe, this downgrading of the effectiveness of projectile weapons was largely class-based. Rights, social regard, and also responsibilities were based on economic prosperity. Athenians below a certain property threshold could vote but not hold office. Above such qualifications came the perquisites of both eligibility for religious office, political office, and also the legal obligation to serve as hoplites. A hoplite panoply of hoplon-style shield and thrusting spear could be afforded at lower costs, but was still far more expensive than a bow and arrows or light javelins.

Thus by purchasing the comparably expensive hoplite armor, shield, and weapons, a Greek declared himself a substantial member of his society, a social equal or near-equal with the wealthier legally-obligated hoplites who formed the elite of society. Naturally this required the casting of aspersion on the impoverished men who showed up to the levy with nothing but javelins, bows, or just a sling. Thus the idea that fighting with such was cowardly, unmanly, or even unethical.

[Norfolk]

I first noticed the trend when reading about Air Force involvement in Vietnam. I came across it again when reading about Korea. There was a constant "airpower could have won everything if we had been allowed to do it our way" thread, which usually translated into bombing everything that moved (and most things that didn't). There's often a disconnect between the theory and its application in a world where political constraints are ALWAYS a part of military operations.

In terms of the failing to fight consideration, I don't think it's a recruiting tool as much as it is an IO consideration in many areas and with some cultures. By failing to put people on the ground, you can appear to be afraid of the insurgents, giving them a sense of legitimacy they might not have otherwise. You also deprive yourself of invaluable COIN intelligence: being able to SEE and HEAR the people. Sensors are great, but they just don't substitute for the impressions that can be formed on the ground.

Intimidation has always been a part of insurgent operations, but most COIN attempts to "pay them back in their own coin" have been total failures. Part of successful COIN is being able to offer real alternatives to the insurgents, not a choice between who's going to shoot you in the back of the head.

The fundamental problem with the Air Force isn't so much its preoccupation with high-techology or its focus on the pilot's point of view, or numbers of systems, but its doctine, or rather ideology. The founding (and continually evolving) myth of the Air Force derives from the Doctrine of "Victory Through Air Power", but as anyone can read for themselves, from Douhet to Warden to Dunlap's piece (not that I'd necessarily rank Dunlap up with either of those two theorists), that "Doctrine" is really more of an Ideology masquerading as a doctine and is seeking its fulfillment in History (and like Marxists, they're going to be waiting forever).

This ideology, like any other, requires selective use (or abuse) of history to try to prove its truth and efficacy and ultimate, inevitable triumph. Just as Ken said about the Air Force, "It's a servive in search of a mission". I'm not totally convinced, but he may be right that creating an Air Force independent of the Army was a mistake. Both the Navy and the Marines have their own "Air Forces", and while not perfect, I don't hear very many people saying that the Air Force is better than either of them (except the Air Force themselves).

As long as the Air Force remains rooted in the "Ideology of Victory Through Air Power", and its fixation on "all or nothing" Total War, it can be a fairly blunt instrument for large-scale conventional war; for small wars (and unconventional warfare for that matter), it may be just a rampaging bull in a china shop. You can't make the local population feel safe with you and trust you when your flyboys just can't see why they shouldn't be turned loose to take out villages, houses, power plants, and water works with PGMs just because that's where the enemy is (and thus has to be "destroyed" with all the violence available at hand), while you're trying to move amongst the same people whose houses are getting it and who don't have safe water or electricity (if they're used to having it) because the Air Force bombed the utilities.

[Culpeper]

As long as the Air Force remains rooted in the "Ideology of Victory Through Air Power", and its fixation on "all or nothing" Total War, it can be a fairly blunt instrument for large-scale conventional war; for small wars (and unconventional warfare for that matter), it may be just a rampaging bull in a china shop.

Not true. At the risk of quoting you out of context, the USAF is over their strategic mindset of WWII. Reagan's Rapid Deployment Force, which is the little sister of today's Special Operations, put an end to that nonsense once and for all. Also, their own technology put an end to the bull in a china shop. Most actual real-time USAF missions in regard to small wars, on the ground or in the air, are Special Ops in nature. Nevertheless, the argument of victory through air power was made obsolete by Billy Mitchell. Air power during the Gulf War saved numerous lives. In that campaign, air power was the decisive denominator. Also, many Airmen today are earning, sometimes posthumously, the same commendations as Army grunts. Most people have a stereotyped image of the USAF. The USAF is much more complicated and diversified than most people think.

[slapout9]

The USAF is much more complicated and diversified than most people think.

That is absolutely true. One example is at Maxwell AFB where they doing some of the most advanced R&D on negotiation and human influence operations that I have ever seen. They also have and are doing some very sophisticated R&D on less lethal and non-lethal weapons.

[Steve Blair]

But you also have to remember the institutional "face" of the Air Force...which remains victory through air power (although space power and dominance of cyberspace have both been added to the formula).

I don't deny that there is some very interesting research going on within Big Blue, or that there are pockets and individuals that are looking beyond the basic framework...but when was the last time you saw someone with equal (or higher) rank come out with an article contradicting or arguing with what Dunlap and others have written? The public face remains very much the same.

Every large organization is complicated and diverse. That's the nature of a large organization. But if you look at the official writings, the tone set by those in authority, you'll still find the old mantra. The Air Force as an organization (not as individuals) has been dragged into other roles (sometimes kicking and screaming), but the larger whole still struggles to get back to that familiar "high ground" of air power.

No matter what some might think, this isn't Air Force bashing. It's recognizing the reality of the ORGANIZATION as a whole, not the parts within that organization. As far as the organization being "over" the Second World War....I'd have to disagree. The terms have changed, but many within the senior leadership still look for victory through technology and preferably air power. Not all the individuals are like that. There are some great thinkers within the AF...many who are willing and eager to think outside the conventional borders and come up with new roles and ways of doing business. But they are all too often silenced or ignored.

We may see changes in the next 10 years or so...as the next generation of officers (including many who've come into the AF from other services) rise in rank. But I have yet to be convinced that the ORGANIZATION as a whole has changed. Some parts, yes, and there are some interesting steps being taken. But those parts have yet to impact the whole in a major way.

And it's not just the AF. Look at the tug of war within the Army regarding COIN and 3-24. I tend to single out the AF because as an organization they have been the most consistent at shutting out current events in favor of the war they'd like to fight (one could make an argument for the Navy as well in this category).

And Norfolk, I'd also propose that the AF ideology springs from both technology and pilots/aircraft. In many ways you can't discuss one without bringing in the other. And with reference to CAS, one of the former Chiefs of Staff (McPeak) argued toward the end of his tenure that CAS should be given back to the Army, with them and the Marines given primacy for the mission.