End of Empires: who and what was responsible? (post WW2)

[jmm99]

that is, those who elect to argue their somewhat unique views of history - with their lists of 100% totally unblemished heroes and 100% totally besmirched villains. I'm presently jumping back and forth between a half-dozen histories of the Vietnam War which fit that mold.

The role of FDR in Southeast Asia (only one of the many regions affected to some extent by FDR) is a complex topic. I think it's fair to say that he knew and cared a lot more about precinct by precinct voting in Dutchess County than the aggregate geopolitics of Indochina.

In any event, here is a syllabus, Southeast Asia During World War II; and an accompanying handout. These outlines are useful as a simple check of one's knowledge - how much don't I know about this limited regional topic and FDR ?

More particularly, and with reference to and quotes from many original documents, we have (among many other sources to the same FDR and HST periods), U.S. Policy & Indochina in World War II. One might well question the "FDR Effect" on such agreements as the following from March 6, 1946 (pp.18-19):

1. The French Government recognizes the Vietnamese Republic as a Free State having its own Government, its own Parliament, its own Army and its own Finances, forming part of the Indochinese Federation and of the French Union. In that which concerns the reuniting of the three "Annamite Regions" [Indochina, Annam, Tonkin] the French Government pledges itself to ratify the decisions taken by the populations consulted by referendum.

2. The Vietnamese Government declares itself ready to welcome amicably the French Army when, conforming to international agreements, it relieves the Chinese Troops. A Supplementary Accord, attached to the present Preliminary Agreement, will establish the means by which the relief operations will be carried out.

3. The stipulations formulated above will immediately enter into force. Immediately after the exchange of signatures, each of the High Contracting Parties will take all measures necessary to stop hostilities in the field, to maintain the troops in their respective positions, and to create the favorable atmosphere necessary to the immediate opening of friendly and sincere negotiations. These negotiations will deal particularly with:

a. diplomatic relations of Viet-nam with Foreign states

b. the future law of Indochina

c. French interests, economic and cultural, in Viet-nam.

Hanoi, Saigon or Paris may be chosen as the seat of the conference.

DONE AT HANOI, the 6th of March 1946

Signed: Sainteny

Signed: Ho-chi Minh and Vu Hong Khanh

By that time, FDR was almost a year dead; and Harry S. Truman had begun to shape his own initial policy toward Indochina, U.S. Neutrality in the Franco-Viet Minh War, 1946-1949.

By 1950, HST's Worldview had shifted and we began what Bruce Palmer called our 25-Year War (1 May 1950 - 30 April 1975). As opposed to liberation from colonialism (a policy which the US did adopt re: Indonesia), our policy from 1950 constituted US support of what the Viet Minh were more than happy to call an alliance of colonialism and neo-colonialism.

The attitude of the War College Class of 1951-1952 was more "direct hands off" in Indochina than anything else.

War College Class 1951-1952, U.S. Policy in Sourheast Asia, Reports of Student Committees # 13-17 (Carlisle Barracks, Pa: U.S. Army War College, 1951), presented in October 1951. From Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25 Year War (University Press of Kentucky, 1984), pp.2-3:

.... Although opinions were somewhat divided, a large majority opposed any major U.S. involvement. The conclusions of the majority could be summarized as follows:

(1) The United States had probably made a serious mistake in agreeing with its allies to allow French power to be restored in Indochina. As a colonial power, France had done little to develop indigenous civilian and military leaders and civil servants in preparation for the countries' eventual independence.

(2) Indochina was of only secondary strategic importance to the United States. The economic and military value of Vietnam, the most important state in the region, was not impressive. Politically and socially Vietnam was obviously entering an unstable period with uncertain consequences. In any event, it did not warrant the commitment of US forces to its defense.

(3) General war planning by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) envisioned a strategic defense in the Pacific, drawing the U.S. forward defense line to include Japan, South Korea, and the offshore island chain (Okinawa-Taiwan-the Philippines). But in Southeast Asia the line was drawn through the Isthmus of Kra on the mainland, excluding all of Indochina and most of Thailand. Thus, the Straits of Malacca and populous, endowed Indonesia were considered to be the prime strategic targets of the region.

(4) Militarily the region in general and Vietnam in particular would be an extremely difficult operational area, especially for U.S. forces. Unlike the relatively narrow Korean peninsula, Vietnam presented very long land and coastal borders that would be almost impossible to seal against infiltration and difficult to defend against overt military aggression. Much of the region was covered with dense jungle and much was mountainous. Weather, terrain and geographical factors combined to present formidable obstacles for military operations and logistic support.

(5) Politically and psychologically the United States, if it were to become involved, would have to operate under severe disadvantages, for it would inherit the taint of European colonialism. The United States should not become involved in the area beyond providing materiel military aid.

This view of these field grades (many to become flag officers) became lost in the shuffle as the US moved toward greater and greater direct involvement in Indochina - and then South Vietnam as a remnant. The focus on Southeast Asia (and the important Staits of Malacca and Indonesia) was similarly pushed into the background.

It was only after a decade passed after withdrawal of our combat units from Vietnam, that our emoticon Vietnam commander recognized that our efforts in Vietnam (however guided, misguided or mixed) had contributed to a Southeast Asia that was able to make its own way.

A Distant Challenge: The U.S. Infantryman in Vietnam, 1967-1972
Infantry Magazine
LTC Albert N. Garland, USA (Ret.)

Foreward

Indeed, history may judge that American aid to South Vietnam constituted one of man's more noble crusades, one that had less to do with the domino theory and a strategic interest for the United States than with the simple equation of a strong nation helping an aspiring nation to reach a point where it had some reasonable chance to achieve and keep a degree of freedom and humanv dignity. It remains a fact that few countries have ever engaged in such idealistic magnanimity; and no gain or attempted gain for human freedom can be discounted.

Although in the end a political default, it is now clearly evident that there was an ironic strategic dividend to our presence in Vietnam; namely the impact of the American military "holding the line" for ten years against communist pressures on Southeast Asia thus provided for the Asian countries (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) a shield and hence a breathing spell toward development of greater political matrurity and self confidence as nations. It encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians and, as time passed, unhappy events in Indochina showed to the people of Southeast Asia the real ugly face of communism and the inadequacy of the communist system. Consequently, the countries of Southeast Asia now seem to be staunchly a part of the non-communist world.

William C. Westmorland
April 1983

Attributing all that occured in this part of the World 30 years after FDR to FDR simply does not hold up to any reasonable historical test. An argument extending his influence as all powerful globally is more unreasonable.

Regards

Mike

[Dayuhan]

The role of FDR in Southeast Asia (only one of the many regions affected to some extent by FDR) is a complex topic. I think it's fair to say that he knew and cared a lot more about precinct by precinct voting in Dutchess County than the aggregate geopolitics of Indochina.

In any event, here is a syllabus, Southeast Asia During World War II; and an accompanying handout. These outlines are useful as a simple check of one's knowledge - how much don't I know about this limited regional topic and FDR ?

Had to note the brief reference to a French request for US assistance to "resistance groups nor fighting the Japanese in Indo-China".

One of the best sources on Vietnam in this period is Archimedes Patti's Why Viet Nam. You can agree or disagree with his opinions, but there is a vast amount of data there, accurate timelines, detailed breakdowns of personalities and organization, and a wealt of other personal observation (Patti was the OSS officer handling liason with resistance groups.

Patti had a very low opinion of the French; concluded that they had no interest at all in fighting the Japanese and were only concerned with reasserting control after a Japanese defeat.

More particularly, and with reference to and quotes from many original documents, we have (among many other sources to the same FDR and HST periods), U.S. Policy & Indochina in World War II. One might well question the "FDR Effect" on such agreements as the following from March 6, 1946 (pp.18-19):

For some very odd reason I read "HST" as "Hunter S Thompson", producing a surreal moment.

Given what had already transpired, it's hard for me to believe that either party ever had any intention of actually following the agreed-upon course. Doubtless they had their own reasons for signing, but it's unlikely that the agreement was ever taken at face value. In any event, by November of that year the French were already shelling Haiphong.

Worth noting that without timely assistance from the British the French would not have been able to reassert control over Saigon.

I wish more people had listened to the War College Class 1951-1952.

This was a bit jarring:

Although in the end a political default, it is now clearly evident that there was an ironic strategic dividend to our presence in Vietnam; namely the impact of the American military "holding the line" for ten years against communist pressures on Southeast Asia thus provided for the Asian countries (Philippines, Malasia, Singapore, Indonesia and Thailand) a shield and hence a breathing spell toward development of greater political matrurity and self confidence as nations. It encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians and, as time passed, unhappy events in Indochina showed to the people of Southeast Asia the real ugly face of communism and the inadequacy of the communist system. Consequently, the countries of Southeast Asia now seem to be staunchly a part of the non-communist world.

Many of these conclusions seem completely without basis, unless one assumes that the rest of Southeast Asia would have fallen like dominoes. I doubt that the US "holding the line" had any impact at all on the fortunes of Communist movements in the Philippine and Indonesia, which emerged as a response to local conditions. Thailand also had considerable resilience, provided by the absence of a detested colonial power for Communist organizers to build around.

The comment "encouraged Indonesia in 1966 to throw out the Russians" rather notably fails to mention the slaughter of roughly half a million people under the banner of suppressing the Commies.

Attributing all that occured in this part of the World 30 years after FDR to FDR simply does not hold up to any reasonable historical test. An argument extending his influence as all powerful globally is more unreasonable.

I would attribute very little of what happened in SE Asia to FDRs influence... and still less in many other places. David's initial comments kind of sum it up:

several posts have appeared of late on the role of FDR (President Roosevelt) and the demise post-1956 of the mainly European empires

FDR would have had to be quite a remarkable individual to play a significant role in events that occurred 10 years after his death.

[Backwards Observer]

One of the best sources on Vietnam in this period is Archimedes Patti's Why Viet Nam.

Major Archimedes Patti of the OSS makes a brief interview appearance at about 4':37" in this clip from "The Ten Thousand Day War - Episode 2, Dien Bien Phu". There's also a brief interview with General Sir Douglas Gracey in another episode, but I can't recall which one. As far as I remember, General Gracey appears to experience genuine consternation when asked why he re-armed Japanese troops rather than working with the 'wascally webels' of the Viet Minh. Damned scallywags, the very idea!

The Ten Thousand Day War - Ep2 Dien Bien Phu - Youtube

[davidbfpo]

dayuhan,

In Post 93 you asked:

Are there any recorded instances of IJA forces actually fighting communist forces in China post-surrender? I don't know of any, but there might be some. In Indochina the Japanese were technically responsible for maintaining order but in fact exercised virtually no effort to contain the violence. These orders may have been given but I'm not at all sure they were carried out.

When I read the USMC history re the Corps in China there were references to railway guards etc. I do not recall a greater role,it was a quick read. See:http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USMC/V/USMC-V-V-3.html and the successive chapters.

In Indochina the IJA did respond to General Gracey's orders, as part of the agreements and surrender protocols, with defensive and offensive action. I rely on 'The First Vietnam War' by Peter M. Dunn (Pub. 1985) which makes numerous references to the IJA fighting, in particular two infantry battalions outside Saigon and the curious affection the IJA showed when the 20th Division left - replicated in China too.

Yes, some IJA did not obey, others deserted (especially in north Indochina) and others joined the Viet Minh. The vast bulk of the IJA, with masses of civilians in China, wanted to get home and only the Allies were going to get that done.

What happened in north Indochina is less clear and little is said in Dunn's book. The Chinese Nationalists occupied the area, although unclear if beyond Tonkin and Hanoi, say south to Hue (they also visited Laos, to get two opium crops harvested). How the IJA were evacuated is unknown to me.

[JMA]

The role of FDR in Southeast Asia (only one of the many regions affected to some extent by FDR) is a complex topic. I think it's fair to say that he knew and cared a lot more about precinct by precinct voting in Dutchess County than the aggregate geopolitics of Indochina.

Mike, this is exactly the problem.

It would of course be less of a problem if a succession of "most powerful men in the world" (aka US Presidents) did not dabble in foreign affairs as if it was a matter of little consequence.

There is sadly nothing the world can do about this as successive US Administrations continue to display mind-blowing levels of know-it-all arrogance.

We now have another 40 something President who like an earlier one proved to be incompetent and inept until in the former case the world was taken to the edge of a nuclear war when he suddenly grew some spine. What it will take the current version to grow some spine one cannot tell (though some hope the OBL decision may herald a change in that regard).

You want to get really depressed? Then draw up a list of US foreign policy successes and failures since, say, 1945 and then weep.

All that said, an incompetent US remains more desirable than say Russia or China in the driving seat IMHO... sadly I believe that I am in a shrinking minority in this regard.