Nigeria 2013-2017

[Echo Bravo]

Dayuhan, I don’t comment on this site for numerous reasons.
However, I need to point out that as “mercenaries” we operated – and still operate -under the domestic laws of the governments that contracted us. That places us in a very different position to other PMCs that operate under their own country’s domestic laws and are therefore not accountable to the host government’s laws. Although we were (and still are) usually called when all other options have failed and the contracting government is close to collapse, we apply and enforce a very strict code of conduct.
I can also add that many of the African troops we have recently encountered and that have been trained by foreign military advisors and PMCs need to be retrained as their “training” has been shocking at best. Similarly, advice given to some African governments by “foreign Africa specialists” has been very poor and in many cases, has done more harm than good.
A lack of credible intelligence, unrealistic strategies, poor operational designs and ill-prepared troops can never result in success. Add to that a lack of political and military will and a misunderstanding of the enemy and his support base and, at best, you have a disaster in the making.
Considering the above, it will most certainly pose “untenable limits on an intervention, it's better not to go there in the first place”.

[Dayuhan]

Operating under local law makes sense, assuming that the government behind local law has some degree of legitimacy. Local law is to some extent linked to the conflict environment and will to some extent be understood by the people in that environment. A force operating under an utterly remote rule set will certainly be handicapped.

Law, though, is just the beginning of the problem. My own observation of US interventions, particularly those in places not considered strategically critical, is that they are usually designed not for their impact on the target country, but for their impact on the domestic political audience, a circumstance that is not conducive to success.

The US (again in my observation) typically ignores places that are not immediate concerns: there's little effort to develop serious understanding or expertise on environments that are not on today's problem list. When something does break out they are caught flat-footed and there's a mad rush to find some "expert" that will tell the political powers of the day whatever they have already decided they want to hear. At this point the "intelligence" community is tasked with providing a justification for whatever course of action is deemed most salable to the domestic political audience. At the end of it, whatever poor schmuck ends up out in the field is burdened with unachievable goals, unrealistic expectations, inappropriate strategies, and a whole host of other problems.

Unless that changes, and I don't think it will, I'd rather see the US keep it's collective putz in its pants with the zipper well up, and resist the temptation to meddle in places they don't understand. If you can't play by local rules and you aren't there with a clear and realistic objective, better not to be there at all.

IMO, obviously.

[KingJaja]

I knew this was going to happen.

1. Cameroon is even more badly governed than Nigeria & Northern Cameroon is worse off than Northern Nigeria.

2. There's no real difference with Northern Cameroon, Northeast Nigeria or parts of the middle of Thad - they are all Kanuri, colonial borders don't mean much.

Yaounde - The Nigerian Islamist movement Boko Haram has recruited and trained hundreds of young Cameroonians to carry out attacks in their own country, according to the police and civilians.

As the militant group seeks to gain a foothold in the poor, rural north of Cameroon, experts warn that violence may spread beyond border areas to other parts of the central African country.

"Boko Haram has recruited many young people" from Cameroon's Far North region, a police officer from the area told AFP on condition of anonymity

http://www.news24.com/Africa/News/Bo...eroon-20140808

When I say that colonial era boundaries are simply not viable long-term, this is what I mean. In other parts of Africa, these borders are being eliminated by trade, not conflict.

Paradoxically, decades of Western aid have led to less, not more capable African governments - and one of the goals of aid (as I hear) is to produce more capable African governments.

Paul Biya is old, tired and probably unwilling to fight a long-drawn out battle with Boko Haram. I hear Cameroonian Army strength is only about 20,000. True, the French will pitch in, but for how long - and what political solutions will be considered?

I don't know what a viable long-term political & economic solution to the crisis in the Sahel will look like. However, I'm not sure anyone else does either.

[Echo Bravo]

KingJaJa, I agree wholeheartedly with you concerning the colonial borders that were arbitrarily drawn into the sand and that resulted in nations/ethnic groups being incorporated into 2 or 3 different states. Your argument is sound and cannot be faulted.

However, that happened decades ago and Africa needs to come to terms with itself and move forward. We cannot continue blaming the past without taking responsibility for the present and planning for the future.

Insofar as Boko Haram is concerned: There are some who are fully aware of the fact that we issued a warning to the Nigerian government in 2012 of an upcoming BH offensive. This was discarded and instead other advice was accepted – such advice intimating that all is good and well, when in fact it wasn’t. By accepting unsound advice, governments erode their own powerbases and often bring their legitimacy into question. The populace take note of this as they are not blind or deaf.

Some African governments have apparently chosen to ignore their responsibilities and continue to rely on the West to jump in to solve their problems. The message this propagates is loud and clear to all who care to listen. But, many of these problems are the result of a lack of national strategy, a lack of a national security strategy, poor governance, a lack of direction and so forth – not the result of colonialism. Of course, without sound and credible intelligence, no focussed or realistic strategy can developed. Without valid predictive intelligence, there can be little to no flexibility.

So, back to BH: Where was the intelligence that indicated this was coming? If it was available, why were the armed forces incorrectly trained, equipped and postured and therefore caught by surprise? The same questions can be asked of Cameroon who are now suffering a similar onslaught.

The toppling of Ghadaffi must surely have allowed the intelligence services to make very valid intelligence predictions. Why didn’t they?

Yes, the colonial borders will always remain a point of disagreement but, we cannot continue blaming them for what is now happening. Besides, do you think any of our governments will willingly hand over large tracts of their territory to a neighbouring government? Personally, I doubt it.

The bottom line is that Africa needs to wake up and take control of itself. We cannot continue looking to the West to solve problems we in many instances have caused ourselves.

[davidbfpo]

Eighteen months ago I was party to a conversation with Africa watchers about BH. One watcher with years of experience in Nigeria remarked that Western diplomats had been warned about BH, but dismissed the threat. When the chat turned to Cameroon it was noted that non-French engagement was minimal - almost as if the country didn't exist. It was claimed that there was no UK capacity to even review what Cameroon's security forces had and what was needed.

[Bill Moore]

Eighteen months ago I was party to a conversation with Africa watchers about BH. One watcher with years of experience in Nigeria remarked that Western diplomats had been warned about BH, but dismissed the threat. When the chat turned to Cameroon it was noted that non-French engagement was minimal - almost as if the country didn't exist. It was claimed that there was no UK capacity to even review what Cameroon's security forces had and what was needed.

If it is a Francophone country is it so unusual that the UK wouldn't get involved? I think the appropriate question is are the French helping? The next question is are they coordinated efforts across the borders since the threat doesn't reside in our nicely defined geographical boundaries?

[davidbfpo]

If it is a Francophone country is it so unusual that the UK wouldn't get involved? I think the appropriate question is are the French helping? The next question is are they coordinated efforts across the borders since the threat doesn't reside in our nicely defined geographical boundaries?

The Cameroon is a relatively new nation, being formed from two colonies, one British and one French. Upon independence the UK's interest evaporated, the French were far happier to stay around. According to a little reseach after this chat I found the French did have a military linkage, although like most of Africa small arms were of communist origin. Wiki:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cameroon

The president has been in power since 1982, which suggests - well, fossilisation.

Regarding the cross-border coordination; of late statements of intent exist, but I have my doubts it means much.

[KingJaja]

KingJaJa, I agree wholeheartedly with you concerning the colonial borders that were arbitrarily drawn into the sand and that resulted in nations/ethnic groups being incorporated into 2 or 3 different states. Your argument is sound and cannot be faulted.

However, that happened decades ago and Africa needs to come to terms with itself and move forward. We cannot continue blaming the past without taking responsibility for the present and planning for the future.

Insofar as Boko Haram is concerned: There are some who are fully aware of the fact that we issued a warning to the Nigerian government in 2012 of an upcoming BH offensive. This was discarded and instead other advice was accepted – such advice intimating that all is good and well, when in fact it wasn’t. By accepting unsound advice, governments erode their own powerbases and often bring their legitimacy into question. The populace take note of this as they are not blind or deaf.

Some African governments have apparently chosen to ignore their responsibilities and continue to rely on the West to jump in to solve their problems. The message this propagates is loud and clear to all who care to listen. But, many of these problems are the result of a lack of national strategy, a lack of a national security strategy, poor governance, a lack of direction and so forth – not the result of colonialism. Of course, without sound and credible intelligence, no focussed or realistic strategy can developed. Without valid predictive intelligence, there can be little to no flexibility.

So, back to BH: Where was the intelligence that indicated this was coming? If it was available, why were the armed forces incorrectly trained, equipped and postured and therefore caught by surprise? The same questions can be asked of Cameroon who are now suffering a similar onslaught.

The toppling of Ghadaffi must surely have allowed the intelligence services to make very valid intelligence predictions. Why didn’t they?

Yes, the colonial borders will always remain a point of disagreement but, we cannot continue blaming them for what is now happening. Besides, do you think any of our governments will willingly hand over large tracts of their territory to a neighbouring government? Personally, I doubt it.

The bottom line is that Africa needs to wake up and take control of itself. We cannot continue looking to the West to solve problems we in many instances have caused ourselves.

I'm not blaming anyone for anything - it is simple: colonial era borders are simply unsustainable, we could argue about this till we drop from exhaustion, but this fact remains.

We've passed the stage of apportioning blame, just like World Wars 1 & 2 changed Europe's borders & the fall of the Soviet Union resulted in border changes - what is happening in Africa will change borders.

Take or leave it.

The earlier the international community realizes this, the better.

[KingJaja]

A long, but interesting read on the relationship between "citizen" and "state" in Nigeria (and most of Africa).

http://archive.lib.msu.edu/DMC/Afric...s004001006.pdf

Anyone who reads this carefully would understand that imposing a Western understanding of "citizenship" and "statehood" in Africa is largely a waste of time.

Africa may not produce as many media worthy protests as the Arab World, but for 50 years and counting, the post-colonial African state has failed to deliver to its citizens - so people have creating alternative structures to the state which in time, will be strong enough to challenge the legitimacy of the state.

I live in Nigeria, I have a front seat view in all of this - I've noticed the rise of ethno/religious organizations challenging the legitimacy of the state - Niger Delta militants and Boko Haram are only two out of many. With each challenge, the state grows weaker, and this is noted by the next generation of separatists.

Where does this leave us? The nation is of the mind and heart, not simply a flag and national anthem. This is looking a lot like Yugoslavia.

[KingJaja]

US "liberated" Iraq and expected Iraqis to "fight for their country".

I'm seeing quite a bit of that kind of wishful thinking logic being applied to Africa, on this thread and in a lot of the works by Western commentators.

When armed intervention gains traction - people wont be "fighting for their country", they'll be fighting for something else.

[Bill Moore]

Dayuhan, I don’t comment on this site for numerous reasons.
However, I need to point out that as “mercenaries” we operated – and still operate -under the domestic laws of the governments that contracted us. That places us in a very different position to other PMCs that operate under their own country’s domestic laws and are therefore not accountable to the host government’s laws. Although we were (and still are) usually called when all other options have failed and the contracting government is close to collapse, we apply and enforce a very strict code of conduct.
I can also add that many of the African troops we have recently encountered and that have been trained by foreign military advisors and PMCs need to be retrained as their “training” has been shocking at best. Similarly, advice given to some African governments by “foreign Africa specialists” has been very poor and in many cases, has done more harm than good.
A lack of credible intelligence, unrealistic strategies, poor operational designs and ill-prepared troops can never result in success. Add to that a lack of political and military will and a misunderstanding of the enemy and his support base and, at best, you have a disaster in the making.
Considering the above, it will most certainly pose “untenable limits on an intervention, it's better not to go there in the first place”.

After thinking about this awhile I do agree we (the U.S.) generally do a very poor job at training foreign troops, despite all our hoopla to the contrary. I won't bore everyone with why that is, it is just the way it is. A self-evident truth that our leadership refuses to recognize.

I think your comments about unrealistic strategies, poor operational designs, etc., if directed against the U.S. military, may be overstated. You stated you work for the state that hired you as a mercenary. I assume in most cases that state believes they have a significant threat, and are looking for a military solution, which is why they hired you.

In contrast, when the U.S. military deploys to Africa we normally are subordinate to our State Department. This is a huge difference, our State Department is using the military as a foreign policy tool to further their diplomatic objectives. They don't care about winning, and they certainly don't share the same level of threat to their diplomacy interests that the state we're supporting feels.

When the U.S. military is in the lead, as it was in the initial phases of our operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the military did a great job of defeating its adversaries in battle. What came after that is where we lost our direction and momentum. Mercenaries supporting an existing government don't have the same issues of dealing with what comes next after a government falls. On the other hand, this is where we have failed repeatedly. Until we toss out our naïve ideas of installing the least stable form of government, a newly formed democracy, as an end state and develop an occupation doctrine we'll continue to fail when we oust governments with our military.

I think if you take some of our higher end SOF units and better trained light infantry units and allow them to focus on hunting the adversary, like EO appeared to do in Sierra Leone, they would do quite well. Like any military unit operating in a new area they'll have to go through an initial learning curve.

Lots and lots of other issues, but I think the difference of a military unit for working for a state or their diplomatic corps is a significant difference that results in very different outcomes.