Sanctuary (or perhaps just area) denial operations at the Afghanistan village level

[davidbfpo]

Jon,

In post No.57 I said:

(Taken from)..surely the local populace need to know what the message is? What is the minimum level of co-operation expected etc. ...In the Afghan village context is this message clear? I do not mean 'fight with us', give us information how to fight and the rest.

Jon Custis replied:

(Taken from) Tough question David. My experience in Iraq leads me to think that the answer lies in having the time to be present and watch/observe/judge what is going on around you in the village... It takes time and presence to make sure any message does "sink in."

Hat tip to Zenpundit pointing at http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/category/tribal-chief/ a series of interviews of a chief in Paktia Province (eleven) and for ease I cite the answers to five questions posed by Zenpundit:http://zenpundit.com/?p=3288

(In part)Yes, the Afghans are great fighters, but that does not mean they wish for a war all their life. We needed to fight against the Russian invasion and I still strongly believe we have done the right thing defending our country and nation against Communism; as I said earlier, things went wrong when these so-called Mujahideen or Freedom fighters leaders started fighting one another. I believe every Afghan wishes for peace and stability in Afghanistan. Yes there are some who will continue fighting, but we all know they are small in numbers and are not significant. (My added emphasis)The reason many young men are part of the Taliban and other insurgents is the lack of employment , lack of better life conditions and of course lack of any positive attention from their government in Kabul. At this moment if you ask me, why are these young men are turning to Taliban and are fighting the US, NATO and the Afghan government? You will hear a simple answer from me and that is lack of employment opportunity for these youth who are mostly uneducated.

I believe the Afghan government and the US/NATO should provide training programmes to all those young Afghan men at around age of 16 and above who have lost the chance to go to school and get education. By learning skilled trades, I believe they will be in a position to earn a loaf of bread for themselves and their family and in this way we will prevent many young men from falling in the trap of believing being a suicide bomber means a life in the hereafter with the 72 virgins which will await them at the corridor of heaven.

I still think we, GoIRA and ISAF coalition need a 'message' to deliver. Hope this helps.

[Ron Humphrey]

Jon,

In post No.57 I said:

Jon Custis replied:

Hat tip to Zenpundit pointing at http://blog.stevenpressfield.com/category/tribal-chief/ a series of interviews of a chief in Paktia Province (eleven) and for ease I cite the answers to five questions posed by Zenpundit:http://zenpundit.com/?p=3288



I still think we, GoIRA and ISAF coalition need a 'message' to deliver. Hope this helps.

Pretty certain this is something thats been brought to the forefront time and again. The interview hopefully helps reinforce why its important.

[jcustis]

The narrative is no doubt METT-TC dependent, and tied closely to what the dialog needs to convey.

David had a good snippet "in We were attacked, we came for revenge, we ended up seeking to help you, giving Afghans our blood and money. We do not intend to stay." A variant could be based off of the "No better friend, no worse enemy...we would prefer to be your friend." theme.

Engagement at lower levels will be muddied a bit by the need to ensure that the village leadership does not lose face above all else, so diving right in and posing threats to try a coercive approach will not work. I can only assume that eventually waving the stick requires getting to a tipping point before that approach needs to be used. A softer approach and narrative could go much further towards establishing how the Taliban have woven themselves into the life of the village.

Does the GIRoA need to be in the lead? That's a sticking point I have difficulty resolving, especially if the security forces are clearly seen as a disruption/corrupt. The narrative cannot be allowed to run counter to what clearly makes sense on the ground.

[Ron Humphrey]

The narrative is no doubt METT-TC dependent, and tied closely to what the dialog needs to convey.

David had a good snippet "in We were attacked, we came for revenge, we ended up seeking to help you, giving Afghans our blood and money. We do not intend to stay." A variant could be based off of the "No better friend, no worse enemy...we would prefer to be your friend." theme.

Engagement at lower levels will be muddied a bit by the need to ensure that the village leadership does not lose face above all else, so diving right in and posing threats to try a coercive approach will not work. I can only assume that eventually waving the stick requires getting to a tipping point before that approach needs to be used. A softer approach and narrative could go much further towards establishing how the Taliban have woven themselves into the life of the village.

That sounds about right

Does the GIRoA need to be in the lead? That's a sticking point I have difficulty resolving, especially if the security forces are clearly seen as a disruption/corrupt. The narrative cannot be allowed to run counter to what clearly makes sense on the ground.

The easy answer is yes, The more difficult nuance is the fact that in order to lead one requires Capacity, capability, and an overall sense of requirement to do so. As they say Devils in the details

[MikeF]

"We were attacked, we came for revenge, we ended up seeking to help you, giving Afghans our blood and money. We do not intend to stay."

Well stated, but the message must include.

Let's work for peace. Let us not work against each other. Let's cooperate for our children's sake not our own personal interest. If you choose the latter, if you attack us, then we will push every asset to destroy you. Please choose peace. The moment is ours to decide. Let us pray together.

[Surferbeetle]

Our nation has and continues to benefit from an steadfastly apolitical military skilled at the various ways of warfare.

Although we must at certain times and places, outside of our nations borders, walk, wade, or swim in the waters/solvent of politics with all of their unseen currents and various questionable additives it is not wise to drink of the same, nor foolishly conflate our role with that of politicians, native or otherwise.

In the spirit of gaining some understanding about the waters currently roaring through the floodplain and applicable/non-applicable TTP's....

The Prince of the Marshes: And Other Occupational Hazards of a Year in Iraq by Rory Stewart

In August of 2003, Rory Stewart (known to the Arabs of southern Iraq as Seyyd Rory) "took a taxi from Jordan to Baghdad to ask for a job from the Director of Operations". This was four months after the Coalition invasion. Shortly thereafter Stewart wound up as deputy governate coordinator of Maysan. He became, at age 30, the de-facto governor of a province of 850,000 in southern Iraq, in the immediate aftermath of the war. This is his story

"I had never believed that mankind, unless overawed by a strong government, would fall inevitably into violent chaos. Societies were orderly, I thought, because human cultures were orderly. Written laws and policy played only a minor role. But Maysan [province] made me reconsider."

[jcustis]

Bumping this with an edit to the main list in post #18. I was reading a Kimberly Kagan piece in Foreign Policy and began to think about the insurgent's use of shape-clear-hold-build (or some other similar flow) as a continuum to organize his efforts.

We probably need to understand where he is in the process, as there are certain nuances to our approach based on that.

[Surferbeetle]

CNAS, 4 Jan 09: Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan by Major General Michael T. Flynn, USA, Captain Matt Pottinger, USMC, Paul D. Batchelor, DIA and discussed in greater detail here at SWJ.

The U.S. intelligence community has fallen into the trap of waging an anti-insurgency campaign rather than a counterinsurgency campaign. The difference is not academic. Capturing or killing key mid-level and high-level insurgents – anti-insurgency – is without question a necessary component of successful warfare, but far from sufficient for military success in Afghanistan. Anti-insurgent efforts are, in fact, a secondary task when compared to gaining and exploiting knowledge about the localized contexts of operation and the distinctions between the Taliban and the rest of the Afghan population.There are more than enough analysts in Afghanistan. Too many are simply in the wrong places and assigned to the wrong jobs. It is time to prioritize U.S. intelligence efforts and bring them in line with the war’s objectives.

From a SAM's paper entitled Civil Information Management in Support of Counterinsurgency Operations: A Case for the Use of Geospatial Information Systems in Colombia by Major José M. Madera, United States Army Reserve

This section presents the primary research question of this monograph as determining the potential value of using Geospatial Information Systems to assist the Government of Colombia’s counterinsurgency efforts and thus provide a framework for determining the value of using GIS as a tool in other counterinsurgency settings. After a discussion of the doctrinal and conceptual background that informs the project, it discusses the methodology, limits, and delimitations of the project. The following chapter provides a conceptual framework for understanding counterinsurgency and the critical role terrain plays in it.

Google Earth KML programming link

KML is a file format used to display geographic data in an Earth browser such as Google Earth, Google Maps, and Google Maps for mobile.

[Infanteer]

shape-clear-hold-build

Why "shape" - isn't that just an implied task of "clear"?