Health Diplomacy

[Progressive Ranger]

Similar to the ink blot though, the spokes gain strength as the center is solidified - the concentric web rings strengthen the spokes as they expand their area of influence outward from teh nexus of the web...

appreciate the comments, this helps!

[Ron Humphrey]

Similar to the ink blot though, the spokes gain strength as the center is solidified - the concentric web rings strengthen the spokes as they expand their area of influence outward from teh nexus of the web...

appreciate the comments, this helps!

that regardless how thick or strong these spokes are they will always have a weak area which can be exloited and thus as stated before they will be targeted.

The key to ink blot or a more flexible liquid type change is that despite anything the enemy may affect that point is still surrounded by what has already changed and thus the liquid/ink will flow back in.

Just a thought...

[LawVol]

Correct me if I'm way off here...

In the aftermath of the fall of Baghdad, we tried something pretty similar to the theory posed by PR. We set up huge bases and connected them with lines of communication/supply. These were the spokes and the various bases were the spiders. These spiders conducted roving, mounted patrols but were unable to establish security due to the dispersed attacks of AQI and other groups. In other words, we were swatting at flys rather than catching them because the web hadn't been built.

Fast forward to Patraeus and we see something akin to an ink-blot strategy. Our Soldiers and Marines moved into the various sections of Baghdad and other towns/villages and slowly expanded that presence, coverting former enemies as they went. Ultimately, AQI et al, were driven from placed like Al Anbar and Baghdad.

The people want security and stability. They want to be able to send their kids to school without having to worry whether they'll make it home alive. They want to be able to put food on the table and have a stable job. Spokes don't do that because they are too easily broken since presence is never more than temporary. However, with an ink-blot presence, either in the form of US troops or converted allies, is permanent.

It's a much slower process and our American penchant for quick solutions (we are indeed a very impatient people) is severely tested. Using spokes merely satisifies a short-term need (actually a political need) to demonstrate that we're doing something. However, the possibility of backlash is much higher with spokes than ink-blots. Although we can initially show some progress, if a spoke or two is cut, we're back on CNN and in Congress trying to justify our strategy and fending off those that seek to withdraw.

just my .02, I'm certainly no expert.

[Progressive Ranger]

LawVol,

i am with you...but i see all those small COPs throughout B-dad as spiders in their own right, continually going out and returning to home base, ever expanding the surface area of the web.

i think the reason it has worked so well is that we now have enough spiders with enough web coverage that there are very little areas where there is no coverage.

i think everyone focused ont he spoke part of my theory...the spokes aren't what makes the web...the concentric rings of control/influence/stability are the key.

that is why a spide has so many spokes...for support - often times in parallel, sometimes on slight angles - but all for support...if one does break, which is inevitable, the spider can still get to anypoint ont he web to address problems/irritations, and has the ability to rapidly fix any part that breaks.

With the ink blot theory, if some of the ink runs off to one area in a long rivulet, it is surrounded on three sides, for a great distance by nothing...however in the web application, if you drop a spider, while it may be surrounded initially with full encirclement, it slowly and patiently expands its influence, builds more rings of support an dstability, strengthening its web, until its web overlaps with a brother spider.

Seems like we may keep going round and round on this, huh guys? In the end, I think we are all getting at the same thing...just a different analogy...

PR

[Galrahn]

Great Thread, wish I would have seen it when it started. I have a ton of thoughts, but also a lot of questions. I have been and will be blogging this subject a lot lately.

First let me say I see this type of humanitarian support to be a form of expeditionary warfare in the 21st century. Lets face it, the tools of war have changed, and I am excited to see the Navy take on the mission and do more with it. I explain my observations from the perspective of strategy here.

Second, this months issue of Proceedings is on Medicine, and a number of articles are related to this subject. You can check it out on the Naval Institute's website if you are a subscriber, although I will blog on the articles over the coming days if you are not a member and choose not to be.

Third, I have several questions. How do we measure effectiveness in humanitarian assistance ops? Statistics like number of shots, etc... aren't benchmarks. By the same token, how do we measure the effectiveness of regional partnerships that create the environment for health diplomacy? The Navy hasn't been in the business of programming humanitarian operations beyond the last few years, and the DoD less so. How should it be resourced?

[redbullets]

Sorry to join this one so late - have been swamped with work and travel, and haven't gotten up on line much.

I will probably repeat stuff I've written before here, so apologies. Externally delivered assistance such as the ship medical missions, or traditional MEDCAPs, deliver some short-term health diplomacy, but fail to address the fundamental needs in these places.

I was listening to some right wing radio knucklehead last night while driving home from the train station, and he was ranting on about "give a man a fish, feed him for a day. Teach a man to fish, and feed him for life." He was directing this lecture toward the NGO community. Despite the obvious contradictions (some organizations aren't particularly motivated to work themselves out of jobs, which is what our work should really be all about), most major, successful NGOs these days figured out the capacity building deal quite some time ago, and the rant is about ten years out of date. However, these MEDCAPs are often the "give a man a fish" element of the cliche.

There have been recent exmples of which I am personnaly aware of the military and/or the USG parachuting clinics and hospitals into Afghanistan and HOA without a lot of consideration of existing public health capacities, gaps, and plans already underway (usually a race to see who can get a facility up and running and "branded" with the appropriate flag/logo). And this, despite having true public health specialists involved in the process who advised differing, more appropriate applications of resources. The incidents I've observed have pretty much been "so-and-so up the chain wants this to happen, and you need to MAKE IT HAPPEN!" So, someone gets a nice writeup on his/her OER Support Form, but little, if any consideration has been given to the sustainability of the facility created, and the anger that's going to develop as local residents see a dilapidated facility that was gifted to them not-too-long ago, and now of little use.

Perhaps some of this is a misapplication of approach? A tendancy to deliver shorter-term support, such as MEDCAPs or other emergency/relief-style services to places that would be better served with a longer term (and less sexy, less OER Support Form filling) introduction of public health capacity building programs. Capacity development is always a hell of a lot harder to quantify for bean counters thousands of miles away than is the number of bandaids delivered to a site.

Cheers,