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Thread: Mechanization hurts COIN forces

  1. #121
    Council Member Hacksaw's Avatar
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    Default A liability...

    Short answer -- No!!!
    If used improperly, yes but...
    a clankety clank and whop whop are real useful tools in the COIN tool kit...
    FM 3-24 doesn't do a good enough job of saying this, but COIN does not mean you don't kill bad guys, and insurgent forces sometimes gather to conduct direct action against govt forces (especially if you don't have adequate firepower)....
    From a strictly COIN perspective... I might not need an armor division in Northern Iraq, but an AR BN sure is handy...
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    Note JWater, a new SWC posed his question as a new RFI and the moderators moved it here.

    As you may infer from my handle - the notion that armor is counterproductive in COIN is ahistorical and lacks anything other than academic speculation which conflicts with historical fact. Leadership and organizational mentality, not the platform, matters.
    Last edited by davidbfpo; 04-20-2010 at 09:19 PM. Reason: Edited by moderator and PM to author to explain.
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  3. #123
    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default I'm not sure you're asking the correct question...

    Quote Originally Posted by jwater View Post
    My question is this: are weapon systems like the M1 and the AH-64 liabilities in a strictly COIN environment?
    The quick answer to that is that all wars differ and that ANY attempt to establish an all encompassing parameter is likely to do more harm than good. Any other 'answer' to that question is liable to allow formation of a supposition that the current wars and their specifics are transferable to other places, people and times. That is not at all true.

    Each war and set of ethnicities involved will have differing attitudes toward other nations, toward technologies and those and other variances including the terrain are inimical to an academic or scientific hypothesis.
    I understand the morale boost that such systems can bring to beleaguered infantry in a firefight, but my concern is that their destructive capabilities can really endanger the overall mission. Political considerations about troop levels aside, wouldn't the costs associated with such systems be better spent on more, better equipped troops on the ground and other lower-key systems to support a less kinetic approach?

    Again, let me cover my ass here: I'm not trying to knock cav or aircav in any way, I don't think such weapon systems should be phased out, but I wonder if they're really appropriate in our current COIN operations.
    In order:

    - The morale boost is not at all significant, the killing power is the significance. As you allude, it can cut both ways. That's why an individual assessment not only of the war in question but even of various regions and populations affected or in contest is imperative.

    - If you say the weapons systems should be available, they will be used if at all appropriate -- and perhaps if not. That is dependent mostly on the quality of your commander and not really on weapon or system procurements and inventories. If you elect to not procure them and procure other systems designed specifically for low intensity operations, I believe history suggests that you have guaranteed that your next war will involve major combat operations...

    - The correct question really is; Are or were our current COIN operations necessary.

    The Tanks and attack helicopters are used for their combat power. That power is sometimes needed and sometimes not. The root issue in your query is weapons employment, not location, procurement or possession. That employment varies widely and should be based solely on assessment of the METT-TC factors. Those factors will not only vary from war to war but from time to time within a given war. One 'T' in that mnemonic indicates terrain and that, urban or rural, jungle or desert also impacts not only tactics but weapons usability and survival. There is no one size fits all...

    We are involved in COIN operations not because we had no choice but since elected to be so involved. That will almost certainly be the case if we are foolish enough to decide to be involved in another -- and it may be a totally different war than either current theater. Better diplomacy and thinking along with full spectrum capability can preclude our involvement in COIN-like situations which are far too costly for the benefit derived.

  4. #124
    Registered User jwater's Avatar
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    Hacksaw, Cavguy & Ken:

    Thank you for the responses, I had a gut feeling that this research question would not pan out, it seems I may have been caught up in the wave of 'academic speculation' (and it is purely that) on this topic which has suddenly become popular. That said,

    Hacksaw:
    FM 3-24 doesn't do a good enough job of saying this, but COIN does not mean you don't kill bad guys, and insurgent forces sometimes gather to conduct direct action against govt forces (especially if you don't have adequate firepower)....
    From a strictly COIN perspective... I might not need an armor division in Northern Iraq, but an AR BN sure is handy...
    This I understand, certainly I'm not arguing that we shouldn't be killing 'bad guys', there will always be a cadre of hardcore insurgents in conflicts like Iraq and A'stan, if there weren't this category of undesirables, we could turn it over to mediators and be on our way!

    Ken:
    The quick answer to that is that all wars differ and that ANY attempt to establish an all encompassing parameter is likely to do more harm than good. Any other 'answer' to that question is liable to allow formation of a supposition that the current wars and their specifics are transferable to other places, people and times. That is not at all true.

    Each war and set of ethnicities involved will have differing attitudes toward other nations, toward technologies and those and other variances including the terrain are inimical to an academic or scientific hypothesis.
    Fair enough, again I'd say in my enthusiasm to nail down a thesis topic I probably went too far in such a generalization.

    If you say the weapons systems should be available, they will be used if at all appropriate -- and perhaps if not. That is dependent mostly on the quality of your commander and not really on weapon or system procurements and inventories. If you elect to not procure them and procure other systems designed specifically for low intensity operations, I believe history suggests that you have guaranteed that your next war will involve major combat operations.
    I'm with you and Cavguy regarding the quality of the commander, I just wanted to clear up that I was not suggesting phasing out systems designed for conventional combat, I understand the merits of the M1 and so forth, my concern remains in the practicality of their deployment in a zone like Iraq or A'stan. Like you said, conflict is not one size fits all, and I'm curious if it's really necessary to have M1s deployed at all. Obviously I'm not on the ground, so if I'm mistaken, please educate me!

    The correct question really is; Are or were our current COIN operations necessary.
    Great question, but probably beyond the scope of my thesis!

    We are involved in COIN operations not because we had no choice but since elected to be so involved. That will almost certainly be the case if we are foolish enough to decide to be involved in another -- and it may be a totally different war than either current theater. Better diplomacy and thinking along with full spectrum capability can preclude our involvement in COIN-like situations which are far too costly for the benefit derived.
    Trust me, I'm right with you here! My last paper was actually on the subject of our allies in COIN operations and how we needed to get a lot better at picking our friends before we pick new enemies - our track record is pretty atrocious!

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    Quote Originally Posted by jwater View Post
    This seems to be somewhat of a hot topic recently, which is good for me since I'm working on a thesis on military policy and I want to focus on the use of armor (and probably also airpower) in asymmetric warfare, but more specifically COIN operations.

    SWJ Blog recently posted this http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/2010/04/more-on-armor/ and Tom Ricks' recent post on Armor is generating some good discussion as well http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts...t#commentspace.

    So first let me make a couple things clear: I am not interested in whether US armor is becoming defunct or outdated, and I do not believe that armor should be sacrificed in the face of asymmetric warfare. Ricks' note that X number of Staff Sergeants are not qualified on the M1, or commenters' discussion of the Israeli fiasco in Lebanon are really aside from what I'm interested in.

    My question is this: are weapon systems like the M1 and the AH-64 liabilities in a strictly COIN environment?

    I understand the morale boost that such systems can bring to beleaguered infantry in a firefight, but my concern is that their destructive capabilities can really endanger the overall mission. Political considerations about troop levels aside, wouldn't the costs associated with such systems be better spent on more, better equipped troops on the ground and other lower-key systems to support a less kinetic approach?

    Again, let me cover my ass here: I'm not trying to knock cav or aircav in any way, I don't think such weapon systems should be phased out, but I wonder if they're really appropriate in our current COIN operations.

    Thank you for any feedback you can give me on this!
    Cost benefit.
    There is a huge psychological advantage ini having the biggest stick, and if you use it wisely, the negatives are minimal.

    If you don't think watching apache's hover around hampers TB recruiting, you are crazy.
    As for the cost/benefit, you need these pieces of equipment for the overall mission of support and defend against all enemies, so you need to have them anyway. The question becomes how much do you need.
    The Canadian Leos ( I think they were Leos, not an armor guy) were really counter productive in Kandahar. Apaches, when handled correctly, were huge force multipliers.

    One of many keys in COIN is manueverability. Nothing beats a helocopter in that regard. Now, if only we had a proximity fused 30mm round...

  6. #126
    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Sylvan View Post
    Cost benefit.
    There is a huge psychological advantage ini having the biggest stick, and if you use it wisely, the negatives are minimal.

    If you don't think watching apache's hover around hampers TB recruiting, you are crazy.
    As for the cost/benefit, you need these pieces of equipment for the overall mission of support and defend against all enemies, so you need to have them anyway. The question becomes how much do you need.
    The Canadian Leos ( I think they were Leos, not an armor guy) were really counter productive in Kandahar. Apaches, when handled correctly, were huge force multipliers.
    Interested in your source on the Leos in Kandahar. Every Canadian soldier I know and their professional journal articles speak otherwise, as well as the two officers I shared a panel with once.

    http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=4046010

    Because of the increased use of roadside bombs in Afghanistan, tanks have become critical in protecting the lives of Canadian troops, said Lt. Gen. Andrew Leslie, the Army's commander.

    "The tanks overseas are good," Leslie said during a recent appearance before the Senate defense committee here. "We had one that was hit by an improvised explosive device this morning. The crew is fine. That tank has done its job."

    Leslie said the tanks have also proven their worth in mobility on the battlefield, as they are capable of going over obstacles that limit the Army's wheeled Light Armored Vehicles (LAVs).

    The Leopards have also proved their worth in destroying insurgent fortifications. Mud walls found in Afghanistan can be more than a meter thick and as hard as concrete.

    "Prior to the deployment of the Leopard tank, massive volumes of 25mm fire from the LAVs achieved limited results against these structures, often requiring the [battle group] to resort to the use of aerial bombardment or risk the deployment of dismounted soldiers forward to affect a breach with anti-tank weapons or demolitions," Army Maj. Trevor Cadieu wrote in the Winter 2008 edition of the Canadian Army Journal.
    and:
    http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs...2-1481efef8964


    Maj. Cadieu quotes Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, commanding officer of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group as saying, “If you’d asked me five months ago, ‘do you need tanks to fight insurgents?’ I would have said, ‘No, you’re nuts.’” But “Because [the Taliban] are acting conventionally, then conventional assets like tanks, armoured engineering vehicles, and armoured bridge-laying vehicles certainly have their place here.”

    One of the big knocks against using tanks and heavy artillery in a COIN fight is that both weapons systems have the very real potential of killing innocent civilians and causing collateral damage. In Maj. Cadieu’s estimation, this isn’t the issue that many make it out to be. Since commencing combat operations nine months ago, he writes, “Canadian tanks have killed dozens of insurgents in battles throughout Kandahar Province, yet there has been no suggestion of civilian deaths attributed to tank fire during this entire period.”

    Maj. Cadieu admits that tanks are difficult—and expensive—to maintain and service in the harsh conditions of Afghanistan, and cautions against splitting tank units up into sub-squadron teams, since doing so detaches them from the logistical support that the whole squadron comes equipped with. But other than those difficulties, his article is a full frontal assault against those who don’t think big guns and heavy weapons platforms have much of a place on the asymmetric battlefield.

    He has a point where Afghanistan is concerned, since the Taliban still emerges from time to time to try and fight conventional-type battles, but in other places—like Iraq—his love of the tank might prove less useful.
    And from the Army Journal

    http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/doc...l10.4_03_e.pdf

    Many of the force developers and critics of armour that informed recent Army
    Transformation initiatives argued that tanks had become increasingly irrelevant in the
    COE for a multitude of reasons: they are expensive to maintain, they are not easily
    deployable and they can be vulnerable in complex and urban terrain. These
    observations are true, but they are self-evident and apply to most other elements of the
    combined arms team, all of which have their own weaknesses and deficiencies when
    operating independent of the other enablers. Providing increased firepower, protection,
    tactical battlefield mobility, and a definitive psychological impact, the tank will remain an
    invaluable tool in the arsenal of the Canadian Army for the foreseeable future.
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    Council Member Cavguy's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jwater View Post

    I'm with you and Cavguy regarding the quality of the commander, I just wanted to clear up that I was not suggesting phasing out systems designed for conventional combat, I understand the merits of the M1 and so forth, my concern remains in the practicality of their deployment in a zone like Iraq or A'stan. Like you said, conflict is not one size fits all, and I'm curious if it's really necessary to have M1s deployed at all. Obviously I'm not on the ground, so if I'm mistaken, please educate me!
    Try this issue of ARMOR mag for starters, and let me know what you think. Armor has been hugely successful in Iraq. The most famous successes in Tal Afar and Ramadi were done by Armored Regiments/Brigades, and the heavy city fighting in Sadr City, Karbala, Najaf, and Fallujah reinforced the usefulness of tanks in urban combat.

    This unit in particular is probably alive because of the actions of CPT John Moore and C/2-37 Armor.
    and on and on and on....
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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by jwater View Post
    My question is this: are weapon systems like the M1 and the AH-64 liabilities in a strictly COIN environment?
    No, if they are employed skilfully and sensibly. I might suggest that the question should be, "How are platforms like M1 and the AH-64 best employed against Irregular Forces."
    Maj. Cadieu quotes Lieutenant-Colonel Omer Lavoie, commanding officer of Princess Patricia’s Canadian Light Infantry Battle Group as saying, “If you’d asked me five months ago, ‘do you need tanks to fight insurgents?’ I would have said, ‘No, you’re nuts.’”
    That quote shows just how badly educated some armies are about modern combat operations. On what planet was the use of armour against insurgents ever deemed a bad thing?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

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    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
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    I've operated beside tanks for the last 7 months in a low-intensity conflict. Are they cumbersome at times - absolutely, and they require judicious use, especially in and around fragile local infrastructure. Would I say they weren't suited for COIN or low-intensity fighting? Never. Nothing deters insurgents like 70 tons of steel.

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    That quote shows just how badly educated some armies are about modern combat operations. On what planet was the use of armour against insurgents ever deemed a bad thing?
    The quote is pretty inaccurate to boot - now Col Lavoie was never in the PPCLI nor a CO of one of its Battlegroups. I guess its just another example of poor extrapolation of soundbites....

  10. #130
    Registered User jwater's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Cavguy View Post
    Try this issue of ARMOR mag for starters, and let me know what you think. Armor has been hugely successful in Iraq. The most famous successes in Tal Afar and Ramadi were done by Armored Regiments/Brigades, and the heavy city fighting in Sadr City, Karbala, Najaf, and Fallujah reinforced the usefulness of tanks in urban combat.

    This unit in particular is probably alive because of the actions of CPT John Moore and C/2-37 Armor.
    and on and on and on....
    Read over most of ARMOR, it's reassuring to know COIN is featured so predominantly. Tal Afar is a textbook case of great COIN, very impressive. I was also seriously impressed with DeRosa's article and the ingenuity used to cover all their bases. Seems like the Army really needs to be combining infantry and armor brigades to take advantage of the strengths of each. It's great that M1A1s could act as a deterrent on the main highways, but it seems like the mechanized guys were stretched to the limit to get all the dismounted action done.

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    Is war not about applying the correct resources to a theater based on a thorough understanding of the terrain and the enemy? If operations are tailored to fit based on the forces allocated, (mech, para/airborne) then we are wasting our time. The military appreciation if correctly done will lead us in the correct direction. Maybe night bombing based on thermal imaging followed by a coroners team to pick up the pieces (literally) is good for one area while a Fallujah (Op Al-Fajir) type operation is good for another. Enemy and terrain, enemy and terrain.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Well, Yes. But...

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Is war not about applying the correct resources to a theater based on a thorough understanding of the terrain and the enemy? If operations are tailored to fit based on the forces allocated, (mech, para/airborne) then we are wasting our time. The military appreciation if correctly done will lead us in the correct direction. Maybe night bombing based on thermal imaging followed by a coroners team to pick up the pieces (literally) is good for one area while a Fallujah (Op Al-Fajir) type operation is good for another. Enemy and terrain, enemy and terrain.
    You left out the rest of the mnemonic -- Mission, Troops available, Time, and Civilian considerations.

    Maybe some can afford a multitude of units of all types in order to have the correct mix for every situation. Most nations cannot and even those with a good mix may have commitments (or civilian legislative tinkering) that affect the availability of the best type of unit in the requisite quantity(ies) for a mission or operation.
    Last edited by Ken White; 04-22-2010 at 02:10 PM.

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    Quote Originally Posted by Ken White View Post
    You left out the rest of the mnemonic -- Mission, Troops available, Time, and Civilian considerations.

    Maybe some can afford a multitude of units of all types in order to have the correct mix for every situation. Most nations cannot and even those with a good mix may have commitments (or civilian legislative tinkering) that affect the availability of the best type of unit in the requisite quantity(ies) for a mission or operation.
    Its all about round pegs in round holes.

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    Council Member Ken White's Avatar
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    Default Most assuredly and I agree.

    Quote Originally Posted by JMA View Post
    Its all about round pegs in round holes.
    However, the number of pegs versus the number of holes has an effect.

    I can place a square peg in a round hole, it will have to be smaller than the required round peg but I can get it in there. Can do the same with a triangular peg -- or an Octagonal (which can be almost as good as a round one...). All depends on how many pegs I can afford and have. That and how many and what type holes on the board but I can adapt.

    It also depends on how many holes the board maker places on the board. Unfortunately, I can't predict that, so I have to get as many pegs as I can afford of the types that I guess I'll need. And that will always be a guess and fiscal and political constraints on the number and type of pegs will always exist on my end...

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    My background includes only one brief trip in a fairly permissive peacekeeping/peace enforcement environment in a light infantry role with a balance of foot and light vehicle mobility patrols.

    One thing I noticed was the often negative attitudes by locals towards a coalition partner's forces which might have been strongly correlated with their quite infrequent debus-ing and lack of direct interaction with the locals...their vehicles seemed to create a significant barrier at times.

    In my mind, I wonder if mechanized versus light infantry in COIN might be VERY ROUGHLY analagous to the squad car based versus beat cops on foot argument in crime ridden urban environments that comes up now and again?

    While I understand the threat environment can be, and often is, quite high in the AOs in question...far higher than I've personally experienced.....and can warrant the real need for mechanization and the benefits it provides......but I wonder if the mechanization(when not actually necessary or warranted) creates some significant barriers along the same lines as I perceive things in this linked photo:

    http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3167/...462a20f862.jpg

    Sorry if my post might come across as too remedial/intro 101 COIN...just trying to learn!

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    Quote Originally Posted by flagg View Post
    My background includes only one brief trip in a fairly permissive peacekeeping/peace enforcement environment in a light infantry role with a balance of foot and light vehicle mobility patrols.

    One thing I noticed was the often negative attitudes by locals towards a coalition partner's forces which might have been strongly correlated with their quite infrequent debus-ing and lack of direct interaction with the locals...their vehicles seemed to create a significant barrier at times.

    In my mind, I wonder if mechanized versus light infantry in COIN might be VERY ROUGHLY analagous to the squad car based versus beat cops on foot argument in crime ridden urban environments that comes up now and again?

    While I understand the threat environment can be, and often is, quite high in the AOs in question...far higher than I've personally experienced.....and can warrant the real need for mechanization and the benefits it provides......but I wonder if the mechanization(when not actually necessary or warranted) creates some significant barriers along the same lines as I perceive things in this linked photo:

    http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3167/...462a20f862.jpg

    Sorry if my post might come across as too remedial/intro 101 COIN...just trying to learn!
    Flagg,

    The beat cop vs. squad car is a great analogy. Perception is reality, and this classic piece by James Q Wilson about broken windows I think cuts to the heart of what you're after.

    http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/...-windows/4465/

    Additionally, another name for COIN that was used by the Brits back in the day was Imperial Policing.

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    Registered User jwater's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by flagg View Post
    My background includes only one brief trip in a fairly permissive peacekeeping/peace enforcement environment in a light infantry role with a balance of foot and light vehicle mobility patrols.

    One thing I noticed was the often negative attitudes by locals towards a coalition partner's forces which might have been strongly correlated with their quite infrequent debus-ing and lack of direct interaction with the locals...their vehicles seemed to create a significant barrier at times.

    In my mind, I wonder if mechanized versus light infantry in COIN might be VERY ROUGHLY analagous to the squad car based versus beat cops on foot argument in crime ridden urban environments that comes up now and again?

    While I understand the threat environment can be, and often is, quite high in the AOs in question...far higher than I've personally experienced.....and can warrant the real need for mechanization and the benefits it provides......but I wonder if the mechanization(when not actually necessary or warranted) creates some significant barriers along the same lines as I perceive things in this linked photo:

    http://farm4.static.flickr.com/3167/...462a20f862.jpg

    Sorry if my post might come across as too remedial/intro 101 COIN...just trying to learn!
    Don't worry about being "too remedial", certainly people like me appreciate the context - I'm constantly looking up acronyms when I read posts on SWJ.

    The analogy you propose makes a lot of sense to me, and my gut feeling originally would have been to agree, but the point that a lot of guys are making in this thread (one I'm starting to see as the reality), is that the cop car is not a barrier in and of itself - nothing is stopping the cops from parking their cars and doing a little community outreach on foot. In fact, they should, and good leadership would encourage that kind of behavior.

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    In the Caucasus the Russians found the lighter T-62 with its manual gearbox, lighter weight, non-turbocharged diesel engine and larger ammunition supply of various types with four crewmen was better that the T-72 or T-80. The Centurion tank used by the Australian Army in Vietnam with its 20pdr/84mm gun was just as successful as the Leopard C1 with the 105mm gun in Afghanistan. A powerful medium calibre gun, with varied ammuniton types is ideal in a COIN environment.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by GI Zhou View Post
    In the Caucasus the Russians found the lighter T-62 with its manual gearbox, lighter weight, non-turbocharged diesel engine and larger ammunition supply of various types with four crewmen was better that the T-72 or T-80. The Centurion tank used by the Australian Army in Vietnam with its 20pdr/84mm gun was just as successful as the Leopard C1 with the 105mm gun in Afghanistan. A powerful medium calibre gun, with varied ammuniton types is ideal in a COIN environment.
    Sorry, but as someone currently writing a Masters Thesis on Tank Design, I don't understand any of this.
    How can you compare the effectiveness of Centurion Mk5/1 with the Leopard C1 40 years apart in completely different terrain?
    Why is 105mm "ideal"?
    What is the difference between 120mm and 105mm when it comes to using armour in irregular warfare?
    BTW you can put a 120mm gun on a CV-90 chassis.
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    Wilf; 75mm HE was adequate in most WW2 combat (there was a desire for bigger bang and specialist assault vehicles with ~150mm guns, though).

    90mm He proved to be adequate in several conflicts and 105mm HE proved to be adequate or good in several conflicts (a specialist assault vehicle for bigger bang than 75mm offered was the WW2 StuH 42 - with a light 105mm howitzer!).

    The current standard of 120-125mm MBT guns was reached due to APFSDS-T energy requirements (~11 MJ), not because of requirements for soft target munitions. The majority of targets are either soft or thin-skinned hard targets. The Cold War fixation on frontal armour penetration is about to fade away, so we can look again at medium calibres (see Stryker MGS).

    Btw you can put a 120mm gun on a M8 AGS chassis ("Thunderbolt") and have a 125mm gun in a 18 t AFV ("2S25 Sprut-SD").


    I think a medium calibre rapid fire gun with additional kinetic energy missiles for frontal anti-MBT shots is a promising concept. You've probably read about that concept in another place, of course.

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