Studies on radicalization & comments

[Bob's World]

You call something a war, and you will treat it like war.

You call someone a terrorist and you will conduct counterterrorism against them.

You go to a foreign country and claim that your own mission is COIN, and you will suppress the COIN efforts of the HN beneath your own.

The world is changing; we are indeed in an era of strategic uncertainty. We were attacked and we attacked back. We are evovling, coming to grips with what is changing, what stays the same, what still works and what must be discarded or updated.

But at the end of the day, there is no nation on this earth with a better philosophy of populace-based governance, or that is better situated to be a major success as well as to provide leadership by example (rather than controls) than the U.S. of A. There is a long and rocky road before us, and we will continue to have a mix of successes and failures, but I am confident that we will ultimately overcome the inertia of the past 60+ years of heading in a particular direction to set a new course better suited for the current environment.

[Dayuhan]

You call something a war, and you will treat it like war.

You call someone a terrorist and you will conduct counterterrorism against them.

You go to a foreign country and claim that your own mission is COIN, and you will suppress the COIN efforts of the HN beneath your own.

If we invade a foreign country, conquer it, toss out a government we don't like, put in a government we do like, and declare that this government is now the government (because we say it is) and anyone who doesn't accept it is an "insurgent"... what do we call that, other than "trouble"?

If we're discussing Afghanistan. I really don't think our problem is our policy toward Saudi Arabia, Libya, Yemen, Algeria, Palestine, or the Muslim world. Our problem is that we're occupying Afghanistan and a lot of Afghans don't like it. We've installed a government that looks the way we think a government should look, and a lot of Afghans don't like that either, for which I can't much blame them. I suspect that the quality of governance is for many a secondary issue: they don't want foreign forces in their country and they don't want foreigners telling them what their government should be, regardless of how it governs... and honestly I can't blame them for that either.

For me the root problem here lies in our own inability to accurately assess the complexity and difficulty of tasks before we take them on. We can't build a state, a nation, or a government in Afghanistan. Nobody can do that but the Afghans, and realistically it will probably take them generations to do it. There is no "government in a box". There is no way we can "install" a democracy. These are things we cannot do. We we assigned ourselves a task we do not have the capacity to accomplish. We bit off more than we could chew, and now we're looking at the possibility of choking on it. To extricate we will probably have to abandon the original goal and perform something akin to a Heimlich maneuver on ourselves - ain't gonna be pretty but it's better than choking.

For the same reason, I don't think it's practical for us to try and re-form our relations with the Muslim world by challenging the vast range of autocratic governments that exist in that world and trying to make them accountable to their populaces. I don't think the populaces in question want our intervention, I don't think we have the capacity to accomplish that task, and I think that if we try to do it we're likely to bite off more than we can chew all over again, and ending up choking ourselves some more.

But at the end of the day, there is no nation on this earth with a better philosophy of populace-based governance, or that is better situated to be a major success as well as to provide leadership by example (rather than controls) than the U.S. of A. There is a long and rocky road before us, and we will continue to have a mix of successes and failures, but I am confident that we will ultimately overcome the inertia of the past 60+ years of heading in a particular direction to set a new course better suited for the current environment.

Our way of government has worked out reasonably well for us, but our track record at bringing it to others is mixed, at best.

I don't think "they" need or want our control or our example... they need to work things out their own way, and we need to let them do it, with the understanding that people who attack us or shelter those who do are going to have very serious problems. Personally, I think this whole issue of "control" is blown way out of proportion: as I said before, we have not done a whole lot of controlling in the Middle East. There's a certain virtue to the simple message, and my preferred simple message runs something like "leave us alone and we will leave you alone, attack us and we will kill you, or chase you to the end of the earth trying".

[Steve the Planner]

Bob:

I, for one, am very proud of what we did in Iraq at the end of 2007-2009 to shift authority and capability to Iraqis to govern themselves, believing that only they are capable of finding the ways to govern themselves (even if it doesn't look like what US folks think it should). Iraqcracy is not something we created or promoted.

Having watched that particular sausage being made from a unique vantage point, there were and are huge gaps and learning curves for the US to lead that process.

War, we do. Post-conflict is not a current US skill. We are learning PR, but there seems to be a lot more PR than productivity. It is falling flat at home, and, I think, causing the originators to become confused by it.

Iraq was a routine stabilization/reconstruction effort which, regrettably, was often delayed and confounded by US aspirational philosophies, and complete lack of adequate planning and execution.

Afghanistan is, at its core, aspirational, and transformational on the most radical levels---change everything, create new stuff, make things happen which never happened (or even been dreamed of happening before), and do it very fast with people who are not ready for it, and with institutions and structures yet to be defined or created.

I'm not sure that a lot of folks on the military side really understand the profundity of what is being proposed as the civilian foundation for their efforts. Somewhere, there is always a pitch that the real work has to be done elsewhere by somebody else (State Department? USAID? Karzai?) but there is never any clear connection to an actual plan or resource to do this stuff.

I could buy into Nad Ali, Now Zad, Marjah, etc.., if the idea was simply stated that we have to control these areas to deprive the Taliban of poppy revenues and safe zones---and hold those places at any cost (yadda, yadda). That makes sense as a military prerequisite to the looming effort for Kandahar.

But all this silliness about governments in a box, winning the hearts and minds of people, and making their world beautiful is either delusional, or just propaganda aimed at some unknown audience.

I would feel much more comfortable establishing these places under a provisional military control, and skip the PR. That way, any understandable opposition to provisional control would be short-lived, and understood as a necessary exigency of war. Jockeying could then legitimately focus on post-occupation power placements. That's how the Brits managed colonial controls during the last ten years---everyone knew British control would end, so they were all positioning for the next phase. Discharging much of the anti-Brit sentiment.

Under the new scheme, it sounds like opposition can immediately move to the new government before it is even ready to perform, and with no expectation for change (except by restoration of the poppy-minders). Makes no sense to me.

Problem in Afghanistan is that the 30 years prior has not been easy or conducive to a proactive future pattern of self-governance. And there is little to build on or hope for (except through foreign aid which doesn't seem to trickle down to these places). Just trading one tough situation for another.

Personally, I would rather have the aspiring opponents fighting with each other for position in the post-occupation period, than to become the direct subject of their wrath or the supporter of their enemy.

Just seems like not a very smart way to manage things.

[Steve the Planner]

Dayahan:

Your description is bulemic. But I don't know that it is wrong.

"We bit off more than we could chew, and now we're looking at the possibility of choking on it. To extricate we will probably have to abandon the original goal and perform something akin to a Heimlich maneuver on ourselves - ain't gonna be pretty but it's better than choking.

For the same reason, I don't think it's practical for us to try and re-form our relations with the Muslim world by challenging the vast range of autocratic governments that exist in that world and trying to make them accountable to their populaces. I don't think the populaces in question want our intervention, I don't think we have the capacity to accomplish that task, and I think that if we try to do it we're likely to bite off more than we can chew all over again, and ending up choking ourselves some more."

I was reading some of the alternate press coverage on the gamesmanship between DoD and DoS for funding and responsibility, and playing out in congress now.

Word is that DoD is trying very hard to distance itself for governance responsibility and to pin the tale on State, despite the lack of resources for it to perform (Mullen comments).

The same kinds of games are also going on in the aid world over control of programs and funding. All playing out in a Congress embattled with other issues, and no public interest in these endeavors.

A recent report indicated a 2-4% public interest in Afghanistan, and huge focus on the budget and economy.

This is not a good time to be mission-creeping into ill-defined hearts, minds and Heimlich manuevers in far away places.

If the Afghan mission is retaliatory and suppressive, there is support.

As it continues to be limitlessly defined in creating new worlds in far off places, the elections-clock will bring a lot to an end quicker than many folks imagine.

I'm afraid these domestic realities are moving rapidly forward.

[Dayuhan]

Your description is bulemic. But I don't know that it is wrong.

Bulimic to a degree, and I wish it were wrong. But as you wrote in response to BW...

Afghanistan is, at its core, aspirational, and transformational on the most radical levels---change everything, create new stuff, make things happen which never happened (or even been dreamed of happening before), and do it very fast with people who are not ready for it, and with institutions and structures yet to be defined or created.

I'm not sure that a lot of folks on the military side really understand the profundity of what is being proposed as the civilian foundation for their efforts. Somewhere, there is always a pitch that the real work has to be done elsewhere by somebody else (State Department? USAID? Karzai?) but there is never any clear connection to an actual plan or resource to do this stuff.

This is exactly what I'm talking about. When we decided to undertake this radical transformative change-and-create approach, who did we think was going to do the changing, creating, and transforming? The military? DoS? AID? Did we really think the Afghans were simply going to kick back and let us transform their country as we saw fit, without any objection? Did we just think somebody somewhere was going to somehow make it all work?

I just don't grasp the process that led us to believe that we could accomplish that sort of change in a time frame that would be acceptable in our domestic political picture.

[davidbfpo]

A short BBC News item:

how a Muslim man went from being a drug addict in the UK to a militant fighting for the Taliban.

Link:http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/uk/8722955.stm

[davidbfpo]

Here in the UK the official state campaign against violent extremism (known as Preventing Violent Extremism PVE), known as 'Prevent' (a strand of the UK's CT strategy Operation Contest), is under review by the coalition governemnt, partly as they have financial spending to cut and a different outlook on the way ahead.

Not unexpectedly there is a lobbying campaign in private and public over the future of PVE. Some insight into what may happen is available from recently published documents and reports:

1) Quilliam Foundation's private submission that has been "leaked" to: http://www.scribd.com/doc/34834977/quilliamjune2010 (60 pgs long and I am looking to see if there is an alternative to scribd).)

2) Demos (left of centre think tank) published 'From Suspects to Citizens': http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/...ectstocitizens

3) A commentary by Rachel Briggs, ex-Demos and now at RUSI: http://www.rusi.org/analysis/comment...4C331519B8C90/

4) Andrew Gilligan, in The Daily Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalis...ll-report.html which refers to the debate over confronting violent extremism or extremism

[Bob's World]

Here in the UK the official state campaign against violent extremism (known as Preventing Violent Extremism PVE), known as 'Prevent' (a strand of the UK's CT strategy Operation Contest), is under review by the coalition governemnt, partly as they have financial spending to cut and a different outlook on the way ahead.

Not unexpectedly there is a lobbying campaign in private and public over the future of PVE. Some insight into what may happen is available from recently published documents and reports:

1) Quilliam Foundation's private submission that has been "leaked" to: http://www.scribd.com/doc/34834977/quilliamjune2010 (60 pgs long and I am looking to see if there is an alternative to scribd).)

2) Demos (left of centre think tank) published 'From Suspects to Citizens': http://www.demos.co.uk/publications/...ectstocitizens

3) A commentary by Rachel Briggs, ex-Demos and now at RUSI: http://www.rusi.org/analysis/comment...4C331519B8C90/

4) Andrew Gilligan, in The Daily Telegraph: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/journalis...ll-report.html which refers to the debate over confronting violent extremism or extremism

The entire concept of "radicalization" is premised in the flawed construct that good citizens go bad due solely to outside influence. Prevention seems to have been focused at these bad outside influences.

So, a man who largely ignores his wife, fails to show her proper respect, or prioritizes her low in his life relative to other interests may well take the position that she was "radicalized" when she becomes infatuated with the attentions lauded upon her by someone who is also lending a sympathetic ear to her plight. But is it really the "fault" of the guy who lures her away, or is it the fault of the man who foolishly created the condtitions that contributed to the new guy's success?

"Prevent" is fine, but the majority of it must be turned internally under the harsh light of frank self-assessment. What can we change about our own behavior to prevent radicalization? Weight the effort there. Only minor and reasonable measures will then be needed for dealing with the efforts of others.