Australia: catch all

[Rob Thornton]

Can we get some more info on this one? Who are our folks from down under?

Mr Lancaster told the inquiry this meant the IDG would be equipped to deal with a wide range of security challenges and would need to be able to dispense lethal and non-lethal force to restore order in hot spots such as the Solomons and East Timor

I think we can say the Aussies understand the 21st COE and are organizing to meet it. So, how is it a state with a considerably smaller budget can/would do it and we ..................?

[Steve Blair]

Can we get some more info on this one? Who are our folks from down under?



I think we can say the Aussies understand the 21st COE and are organizing to meet it. So, how is it a state with a considerably smaller budget can/would do it and we ..................?

Because since the end of World War II the major services have remained focused on large-scale conventional warfare. They do look at other things, but that was always the main focus. That focus has allowed (to a degree) smaller countries to specialize a bit more in Small Wars than we have. When they could rely on the large military maintained by the US, it's easier to branch out and undertake more specialized missions. Also, it tends to be easier to effect rapid change in a smaller organization.

Also, most nations have a rather different LE structure. Note that this is part of the AFP, not necessarily their military. In the US that would be something similar to either a US Marshals' task force or some sort of special FBI unit. LE working with the military in many countries is considered nothing unusual, and may even be normal in some cases.

[Rob Thornton]

Steve,
I know, and I'm usually the one asking the straight faced questions, but I'm still acknowledging that here is Australia with a significant, but comparably smaller budget for foreign policy matters (I'm not sure it makes a difference if its military or other - these are $$$s marked for other then domestic policy) that makes a big leap about how its going to spend its $$$ based on how it perceives its 21st Century role in the world.
We can't seem to decide on that. I know our responsibilities are broader, but we have to decide on what role we are going to play in order to make good use of our resources - how we divide them, etc.

[Rob Thornton]

I missed it the first read, but good point about it coming out of the AFP. By building it from the AFP they side step the argument about what the military's mission should be by preserving it.

On the blog LTC Kilcullen mentioned Barnett's SYS-ADMIN approach. If the U.S. FP called for more of X (and possibly less of Y) would it be better to follow the Aussie lead?

Troufion and others have posited similiar ideas on SWC before. Presidential hopeful R.G. has proposed somethng like it too. It has some advantages and disadvantages but it potentially could be born without service loyalties, even if it had to compete for service resources.

[Mark O'Neill]

Hi Rob,

I would not necessarily agree that we 'get' the requirements of 21st C warfare anymore than the US - we have the same excess of rhetoric regarding the nature of what we face, but by and large have maintained an almost one -eyed focus on developing capabilities that anyone looking at the pattern of development since we left Vietnam would find remarkably consistent.

The same applies to our intellectual capital. Our recently released Joint Future Operating Concept describes a 'new' world, then proceeds to describe how the same old structures, conventional equipment and training regimes will 'win' in them through networking the inherent power of trite buzzwords and meaningless phrases that successive Australian exchange officers and visitors to the US have plagarised from the US transformation lexicon....

The IDG is really a case of necessity being the mother of invention. We have been engaged in wide range of stabilisation missions in our immediate region over the last eight years or so that have been demanding on resources -and even a casual scan of the issues would reveal that our requirements to be engaged would appear to be enduring. Quite simply, we had been doing this in an ad hoc fashion with the AFP working the the military in these areas, it made practical sense to institutionalise the arrangements and achieve some efficiencies of planning , training and readiness.

One thing that the devlopments have highlighted to us over the last few years is the profound cultural differences between the Army and the Police. We all get on fine, but that often leads to an assumption that we are on the same page when we are doing things together. The experiences of the last few years have shown that whilst some understandings have developed, there is still a wide cultural chasm between our elements of the interagency that needs to be addressed.

Finally, your point about relative size is not insignificant. It allows us a flexibility and agility that a behemoth like the US interagency probably could not attain. I attended a 'Joint Interagency Symposium' at the NDU last year, the Americans in the seminar with me were struggling with just how 'small' our national security structures are. Your NSC alone would absorb several of our national bureaucracies. Of course, it is a case of what suits one does not suit the other.

[Rob Thornton]

Hi Mark,
How do you think this is going to go in terms of standng it up, manning, training and equipping? What do you see as the major challenges? How is the debate shaping up at both the uniformed and political levels? Will the capability be leveraged when not deployed in a domestic capacity? Did not mean to broadside with the 1000 questions, but its of great interest

Your comment:

The IDG is really a case of necessity being the mother of invention. We have been engaged in wide range of stabilisation missions in our immediate region over the last eight years or so that have been demanding on resources -and even a casual scan of the issues would reveal that our requirements to be engaged would appear to be enduring. Quite simply, we had been doing this in an ad hoc fashion with the AFP working the the military in these areas, it made practical sense to institutionalise the arrangements and achieve some efficiencies of planning , training and readiness.

makes me wonder about the "tipping point" (can't shake Gladwell) of political risk and how that influences organizational change. I'd mentioned in the "adapt or die" thread that I thought the grass roots was sewing change with regards to SSTRO.

If as this develops you can provide insights and commentary on how this goes, I for one would really appreciate it. I honestly see this as a key capability in the area of security cooperation based on the threats of non-state types, and sponsors of non-state types - which I think translates well to conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

Best regards, Rob

[Mark O'Neill]

Hi Mark,
How do you think this is going to go in terms of standing it up, manning, training and equipping? What do you see as the major challenges? How is the debate shaping up at both the uniformed and political levels? Will the capability be leveraged when not deployed in a domestic capacity? Did not mean to broadside with the 1000 questions, but its of great interest

Your comment:


makes me wonder about the "tipping point" (can't shake Gladwell) of political risk and how that influences organizational change. I'd mentioned in the "adapt or die" thread that I thought the grass roots was sewing change with regards to SSTRO.

If as this develops you can provide insights and commentary on how this goes, I for one would really appreciate it. I honestly see this as a key capability in the area of security cooperation based on the threats of non-state types, and sponsors of non-state types - which I think translates well to conflict prevention and conflict resolution.

Best regards, Rob

G'Day Rob,

I will try and address your questions - I must stress that I have no 'special' knowledge of how the organisation is going - I am merely an interested mil observer. That said, I have met with and discussed the groups with some senior AFP officers in my capacity at the Think Tank I am currently attached to.

Firstly, my overall sense is that the development is proceeding relatively well. Recruitment seems to be meeting its targets (they are taking folks from within the AFP, various state police forces and are also attracting some current and ex-military folk). The leadership and development is a mix of AFP hands and ex-mil staff employed for their knowledge of the mil planning, log and deployment aspects.

I have some confidence in their 'ops' training - I know the ex-mil advisers they are using. I cannot offer any competent or professional assessment of their police training as it is beyond my area of knowledge and expertise, but I would think it a reasonable assumption that it meets the standards of the wider AFP.

I believe that there is the likelihood that the capacity will be leveraged domestically - it makes sense when you consider that many of the capabilities inherent in the IDG could supplant the 'traditional' concept of using the military in what we generally refer to as the 'aid to the civil power' role. For example, in the case of a requirement for the provision of cordons etc during any possible domestic terrorism incident. It would also be a lot 'neater' legally than using the military in some circumstances.

Regarding the 'debate' in the pol and mil circles, there seems to be a fair bit of bipartisan consensus that this is a good and useful development. I would summarise the military view as being the same (you have to remember we currently only have 6 and a half infantry Battalions on a growth path back to eight. We are quite 'busy' with these 6.5 bn (Iraq, Afghanistan, East Timor and the Solomons - before you allow for contingencies and 'reserve'). So, as you can imagine, any extra boots that may be available to assist with some of our 'lower order' stabilisation tasks in more benign security environments are very welcome.

One important thing that needs to be kept in mind is that whilst these guys are more 'deployable' than the average police officer, ultimately they are still cops - use of lethal force will remain a last resort culturally, and even a mild form of 'non-permissive' environment will quickly see them out of their depth. That said, I believe that they will (do) provide a useful additional capability in our national response options.

I note your request for me to keep the forum posted on developments as they occur here in Oz, I will comply as best I can, although this will probably become limited as I will be deployed soon-ish on an operational tour and will necessarily lose touch with these issues (and maybe this site) for a while.

Best,

Mark