Afghanistan indicators

[Bob's World]

This isn't Sierra Leone, which I would not classify as an insurgency at all, but rather just a power/money grab. There is a difference. Mexico is not insurgency either for similar reasons.

There is a very real resistance insurgency in Afghanistan. Do many participate in the resistance for a paycheck? Absolutely. They are Pashtun, and to fight an invader is far more honorable than to essentially be a reservation indian back in the village cleaning out irrigation canals for coalition "cash for work" program.

As to the poppy, I was always taught "never make a rule you are either unable or unwilling to enforce." I assure you, GIORA has no desire to kill this multi-Billion dollar industry, and EVERYONE in power (formal or informal) profits from this; and the Coalition would literally be waist deep in muddy fields of IEDs and sniper fire for little gain. The opening days of the Marjah campaign were like that, and it was ugly.

No, my assessment is accurate. The way to pull the plug on this is not by eradicating poppy, but rather by focusing on the top tier revolutionary aspect of the insurgency. The key there is reconciliation. Sooner than later this will be what we do. It's not a copout, its just the smart way to solve this type of problem.

[Dayuhan]

What will happen next year is less clear, and I submit will be impacted far more by how we engage the high-level political drivers between Karzai and the Quetta Shura than by any nation building or security efforts in the rural areas.

The way to pull the plug on this is not by eradicating poppy, but rather by focusing on the top tier revolutionary aspect of the insurgency. The key there is reconciliation. Sooner than later this will be what we do. It's not a copout, its just the smart way to solve this type of problem.

Do you believe that either Karzai or the Quetta Shura has any desire for reconciliation, as anything but a transient step toward full control?

The "high level political driver" between Karzai and the Quetta Shura seems pretty clear. They both want power, all of it. They both can't have it. They will fight until someone wins and the winner will take all. That's how they do it. That may change, likely over a few generations, but we aren't going to change it. I'd really like to believe that the QS are a bunch of reasonable people who would happily settle for representation in government and a share of the power, but I doubt that's the case.

It takes two to reconcile, and I'm not sure we even have one that's willing. For sure people will be willing to talk about it, and even to make a show of pursuing it, if they see an opportunity to advance their desire for complete power. That doesn't mean there's any real interest.

[William F. Owen]

This isn't Sierra Leone, which I would not classify as an insurgency at all, but rather just a power/money grab. There is a difference. Mexico is not insurgency either for similar reasons.

Since when were insurgencies not an attempt to seize power?

The COIN crowd never want to look at Sierra-Leone and Mexico, because it tramples the model, so they dismiss it as relevant to what they want to study, and talk about. War is War.

[Graycap]

Since when were insurgencies not an attempt to seize power?

The COIN crowd never want to look at Sierra-Leone and Mexico, because it tramples the model, so they dismiss it as relevant to what they want to study, and talk about. War is War.

This time I'm with Wilf in the eternal, and ever interesting, Bob-Wilf debate.

I'm italian and I'm viewing Mexico like an example of what could have happened in Italy some years ago when our mafia began a "war" with the government with a string of terrorist bombing.

We followed a completely different strategy: we send in thousands of soldiers in Sicily to help our police in low level actions and we opened the way to covert deals to fracture "cosa nostra".

The military wing of the mafia, once isolated, was soon arrested and the "business like" wing abandoned terrorism but has become somewhat collateral to the institutions,generating a possible secession with the northern part of the country (an unarmed insurgency??) that is no more willing to accept the burden of the southern economic "black hole".

Do we obtained a clausewitzian unuseful victory?

[Bob's World]

Since when were insurgencies not an attempt to seize power?

The COIN crowd never want to look at Sierra-Leone and Mexico, because it tramples the model, so they dismiss it as relevant to what they want to study, and talk about. War is War.

Identification of what something is is best done by understanding how it came to be, rather than what it looks like as it sits before one in some mature state.

This is how science identifies and classifies all plants, animals and minerals. It avoids all kinds of confused conclusions that can come from looking at some specific stage of something in isolation.

Yet insurgency is just one "stage" of the lifecycle of the dynamics between a populace and its government. It does not define that dynamic, one must go to its birth point to understand it most clearly.

Granted, historically military theorists, historians, political scientists and politicians have dumped all manner of informal conflicts into various buckets with little regard for such scientific approaches.

As an example, Colombia was a nationalists insurgency that got into the drug business. Mexico is a drug business that is beginning to challenge government. Two very different forms of genesis at work, and therefore two very different problems requiring very different solutions to resolve. Yet people go: "Violence? Check. Drugs? Check. Government on the ropes? Check. Ok toss these in the narco-terrorist insurgency bucket. Next!"

Insurgency is a unique form of illegal political challenge to government. The "war is war" crowd is uncomfortable with that idea, as it requires them to have more tools than a hammer and to be a bit more sophisticated than "two up and one back."

Certainly a change of power is common to all. If the insurgent opts to employ violent tactics, then violence is common as well in that stage. We need to look past the commonalities and focus on the differences at the point of inception. Otherwise one is apt to pick the wrong solution for the problem.

If I am just dealing with some cartel that wants to seize the diamond mines and control their profits; or expand the profit margin of his illegal drug enterprise by reducing governmental obstacles; that is not insurgency.

But for the COINdinistas, I would offer that going in and building nations while committing oneself to preserving the current government in power is not COIN either; and is highly unlikely to produce any better results than the "war is war" approach as neither addresses the root causes of the problem. One focuses on the symptoms of popular dissatisfaction, and one focus on the symptom of the illegal violent challengers that feed on that dissatisfaction.

I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.

For a power grab for profit? Very different. Crush the power grabber and one has likely solved the problem.

[Dayuhan]

I'm not at all convinced that the situation in Mexico can reasonably be described as "insurgency", or that the cartels want State power, which in many ways would be awkward for them. They are probably best off with what they've got: a government that is sovereign, limiting opportunities for foreign action against them, but ineffectual, limiting opportunities for domestic action against them. They seem less concerned with seizing state power than with limiting the ability of the state to constrain their business, and with suppressing competing cartels.

I'm also not at all convinced that the insurgency in Afghanistan is anything other than an attempted power grab. I doubt there's any real concern on either side for quality of governance, both sides simply want to govern, alone and for their own benefit. Seems less a backlash against bad governance (bad governance in Afghanistan is expected), but a simple fight over who gets to impose their own particular brand of self-serving bad governance.

[Steve the Planner]

I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.

Bob:

I, for one, really found Clolin Powell's doctrine of "You break it, you buy it," to be an bizarre bureaucratic concept not at all consistent with history.

What would have happened if we just broke something and left it for those folks to clean up? Hasn't that strategy been viable and applied many times throughout history without this British/Empirical Model of "Clear, Hold, Build" until the empire has bled itself to death.

Massive retaliation/intervention with no holding purpose was, after all, used to some effect along the Durand for centuries without too much detriment. Once the climate changes a century ago and the Silk Road broke down, these areas have been marginal/challenging. Shall we fix that little climate stuff, too?

Is there a field manual for Smash, Grab, Run, then Threaten from a Distance.

Dahuyan's point is well said: Not every actor has the same traditional power structure focus that some do. Most just want to keep their riches flowing and could care less about "the people" or anything else. To assume they share our visions is a mistake.

[Bob's World]

Bob:

I, for one, really found Clolin Powell's doctrine of "You break it, you buy it," to be an bizarre bureaucratic concept not at all consistent with history.

What would have happened if we just broke something and left it for those folks to clean up? Hasn't that strategy been viable and applied many times throughout history without this British/Empirical Model of "Clear, Hold, Build" until the empire has bled itself to death.

Massive retaliation/intervention with no holding purpose was, after all, used to some effect along the Durand for centuries without too much detriment. Once the climate changes a century ago and the Silk Road broke down, these areas have been marginal/challenging. Shall we fix that little climate stuff, too?

Is there a field manual for Smash, Grab, Run, then Threaten from a Distance.

Dahuyan's point is well said: Not every actor has the same traditional power structure focus that some do. Most just want to keep their riches flowing and could care less about "the people" or anything else. To assume they share our visions is a mistake.

What I meant is that insurgencies happen when governments lose the bubble on their populace. A series of neglects over years, leading to the growth of conditions of insurgency among some segment(s) of the society which are then expolited by some internal or external actor to rise up, organize and challenge the government. At which point the civilians tend to punt the problem to the military to fight the "war" to "defeat the insurgent" so that the same civilians can get back to doing the same stuff that led to the insurgency in the first place. This is why I am all for dropping COIN from the "war" rolls, and addressing it as a civil emergency with civilian leadership being held to task to solve the problems they created. To fix themselves. They broke the country, they must fix the country.

Now, a resistance insurgnecy in an other matter. An external country invades, destroys the government of that country, releasing all of the suppressed insurgent movements caused by the government they took out; and inititating a whole new batch of resistance insurgents caused by their very presence as occupiers. (think IRAQ as the textbook example of this). A good plan going in would have been designed to maintain sufficient aspects of the HN government to keep the existing insurgencies in check until changes of governance can be developed and implemented to address the causal conditions. As to the resistance? It can be mitigated through good actions, good messages, but one needs to expect it as a fact. Zinni had such a plan for Iraq on the books, but it got tossed for the one we employed.

BL is to hold civil governance to task. Also to recognize those in civil government who are the great COIN warriors.

One such was Lyndon Johnson. All anyone talks about is Vietnam and how he escalated the conflict there. True. But his real COIN legacy is how he knowingly destroyed his own personal political career to pass three landmark pieces of civil rights legislation that actually may well have unleashed some racial violence to begin with (Watts came on the heals of one bill passing), but ultimately changed the domestic policies that were leading America into insurgency. That kind of moral courage is rare in a politician. The lack of recognition for his work, combined with the misplaced adoration on Kennedy contributed to his rapid decline upon leaving office.

[Dayuhan]

(think IRAQ as the textbook example of this). A good plan going in would have been designed to maintain sufficient aspects of the HN government to keep the existing insurgencies in check until changes of governance can be developed and implemented to address the causal conditions.

Given the depth and intensity of the sectarian and ethnic antipathies that made up the causal conditions, I'd say a better plan going in would have been to not go in, or at least to have gotten out as soon as Saddam was removed. That was never a situation that was going to be resolved simply by coming up with the right structure or constitution. Pull the lid off a pot like that, and it's going to boil over, no matter what you do. Only way to avoid getting burned is to not be there.

[Ken White]

Insurgency is a unique form of illegal political challenge to government.

Most are, some are other things couched as such a political challenge. We've written claim and counterclaim on that before so no rehas here, just a note to remind you that many aside from me, here and elsewhere, do not agree with that quite positive statement of yours. *

The "war is war" crowd is uncomfortable with that idea, as it requires them to have more tools than a hammer and to be a bit more sophisticated than "two up and one back."

Base canard, there . I and many others in the war is war crowd do not agree at all with that statement. Many have complained about the fact that the attitude you cite does exist but point out that existence is due more to political misuse and desire of the armed forces to comply with the wishes of their civilian taskmasters -- once again, you lambaste the pore ol' GPF wrongly. SF hasn't covered themselves with glory in these latest wars (also due to 'political' misuse and not totally their fault -- though not so much by politicians as by service / congressional / budget / turf politics...).

As usual, after a couple of hyperbolic statements, you get real:

But for the COINdinistas, I would offer that going in and building nations while committing oneself to preserving the current government in power is not COIN either; and is highly unlikely to produce any better results than the "war is war" approach as neither addresses the root causes of the problem. One focuses on the symptoms of popular dissatisfaction, and one focus on the symptom of the illegal violent challengers that feed on that dissatisfaction.

True and that applies not only to insurgencies but to many forms of domestic unrest.

I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.

Again true -- also not amenable in many cases to any military solution...

As any aside, anyone who praises Lyndon Johnson to me is highly suspect of misplacing priorities. I met the man, talked to him, served under him and participated in his funeral. I am not a fan and his passage of what was effectively Kennedy's Civil rights Bill was a piece of crass political opportunism and party politics covered in glowing rhetoric. Give the Devil his due, he did get the Bill passed -- but give him full due; his errors and and blatantly foolish foreign affairs dabbling and terribly flawed Viet Nam engagement created ill effects world wide -- some of that 'American arrogance' and support of Dictators you often decry -- that permeate the world, this country and the Armed Forces to this day. Not favorably, either.

That's shorthand for "I disagree with your frequent characterization of Johnson as COIN warrior." Fixing a governmental problem long overdue for repair is not always counter insurgency...

* I'll also point to Backward Observer's quote of Chairman Mao (LINK) -- and the issue of ideology versus spontaneity which Bill Moore and I frequently see you ignore...

As jcustis wrote:

Having said this...in the Afghan context, I think you are right on the money Dayuhan that inconsistent policy goals lead to terrible strategy and tactics. One of our greatest problems in doing anything consistent is the simple fact that we and GIRoA are not "same-same" in deciding the way ahead. When we are adrift at the national level, it's no wonder that at the district and provincial level, things tend to fair only slightly better. It's also no wonder that higher-level policy matters aren't easily translated down to the tactical level (where folks tend to forget that strategic compression can have the greatest positive or adverse affect).

That is an extremely perceptive and very import bit of verbiage. I'm sure it is quite accurate with respect to Afghanistan but, far more importantly, that lack of consistency is reflected in the way the US Government does business. That is, in effect, why we're having this discussion (and why Viet Nam was a debacle -- but that's another thread).

Our political system is based on a series of checks and balances and they all work quite well as each arm of government has over the last two centuries slightly tweaked their ability to check in order to enhance their power and lessen that of the other branches. Add to that problem -- and it is a problem in getting things done coherently -- the electoral system with changes of agendas at 2, 4, 6 and 8 year intervals. Until all the master strategists find workarounds in their plans to compensate for those factors, 'consistency' and 'the US government' will be an oxymoron. Unless an existential war appears; different rules then...

Sargent is on the right track(Good post, Jill):

The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again. But if you break Afghanistan and leave, what do you think happens? Someone else, who lives in the neighborhood, is going to walk in and impose their vision of what they want the rebuilt thing to look like. Do you want an Afghanistan under the control of Iran? Russia? China?

Again, the point is to not break the thing in the first place, to take that step only with great care and for spectacularly great reasons. If we hadn't lost focus on Afghanistan for four years, the rebuild might have been a bit easier. Maybe not. But breaking Iraq was an all time stupid idea. (emphasis added / kw)

Indeed. Iraq occurred because the toolbag had been purposely limited in what it could do in order to constrain the Politicians.

The Politicans didn't play fair and used the only tool seemingly available. We should avoid that in the future. Diplomatic solutions preferred, military involvement only as a last resort, then not in the costly and unsustainable FID / COIN mode but as Strategic raids. Short term, ability to avoid major breakage, economical, adaptable easily to the US political milieu...

[Steve the Planner]

Sarge:

The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again.

Right. What you are indicating is roads not travelled which, had they known what they were going to face, probably should have been considered. Oh, for planning based on relevant facts and reasonable expectations.

I would not be so quick, however, to say anything different about Afghanistan. We had the option of immediately turning it over to the King to sort out the future through a Grand Loya Jirga.

Our brilliant crew of half-assed constitution writers jumped in, though, and mucked it up.

Same bunch as in Iraq--mostly trying to have their cake and eat it too. Let's invade/not invade, but my friend can make a fortune in oil contracts if only we stay around and muck with their country..... (insert the appropriate DoS names (but it was not Cheney or Bush or anybody at DoD)).

Ken: Sorry we just couldn't survive without you.

In grad school, even the most impassioned liberal instructors explained that Great Society (Johnson and Nixon) only came about as domestic cover for the war. Cynical?

Custis: Last Sunday, my WP had 90 pictures of all those young soldiers no longer with us. Pissed me off royally, just like the ones did from Iraq in 2007.

Difference was that a call went out for people to actually come and change things. I don't know about you folks, but my civ/DoS mission in Nov 2007 was explicitly stated as transfer US responsibilities fast, and set us up for exit. And that's what we did.

Afghanistan just looks like a log-rolling mission. Everybody knows what is broken, but covering a lot of asses. Give me that revised Iraq problem definition/mission for Afghanistan, and I'll work my ass off to get us out of that one, too.

I really feel for you and my friends on the ground who just can't get a link between reality and the grand strategy boys.

Stay safe.

[jcustis]

The way you avoid the problem is not to break the thing entirely -- eg, in Iraq, go in, get Hussein, and turn the keys over to Tariq Aziz. With a stern warning about not making us come back again. But if you break Afghanistan and leave, what do you think happens? Someone else, who lives in the neighborhood, is going to walk in and impose their vision of what they want the rebuilt thing to look like. Do you want an Afghanistan under the control of Iran? Russia? China?

i don't know that I care if one of those three assume control. Let an occupation drain THEIR national treasure. There is nothing worth anything there anyway.

[Dayuhan]

i don't know that I care if one of those three assume control. Let an occupation drain THEIR national treasure. There is nothing worth anything there anyway.

Amen. Squared.

I, for one, prefer to hold governments to task. To hold civil authorities to a higher standard that demands that they take responsibility for their actions. To apply the "Crate and Barrel Rule" to them: You broke it, you bought it. For true insurgency the cure comes in the repair of governance. Insurgent violence is a supporting effort problem to be managed while that takes place.

Hardly appropriate to apply that rule in Iraq and Afghanistan, where the breaking was done before the governments now in power existed. It's more like... "we broke it, then we put you in power and you're supposed to fix it. Now. The way we like it, please."

I guess there's room for interpretation over what "true insurgency" is and whether any given insurgency is "true", but I suspect that our ability to repair anyone else's governance is very, very limited.

[slapout9]

i don't know that I care if one of those three assume control. Let an occupation drain THEIR national treasure. There is nothing worth anything there anyway.

Now that is some Strategic thinking!

[Sargent]

i don't know that I care if one of those three assume control. Let an occupation drain THEIR national treasure. There is nothing worth anything there anyway.

It would be grand if they did everything as stupidly as we have, and pour their treasure into the country in search of creating some truly "correct" regime and society. But, let's assume they don't give a crap about how the Afghans live and just decide to call back the Taliban with the sole provision that in addition to allowing AQ to use the hinterlands for training that the regime allow space for the terrorist commandos of the sponsor's choice. That was, after all, the real problem with the Taliban and Afghanistan -- we didn't really care that they were bastards, but when it became clear that they were a training ground for effective enemies. So, in reality, we do care who controls the country, as in when those in control allow the vast spaces to become terrorist NTCs.

Again, like Iraq, the answer might have been not getting rid of the Taliban but simply compelling the Taliban to get rid of AQ. I'm sure there would have been a route forward on that matter.

But cheers, and thanks for making me refine my point!

Jill

[Entropy]

That is an extremely perceptive and very import bit of verbiage. I'm sure it is quite accurate with respect to Afghanistan but, far more importantly, that lack of consistency is reflected in the way the US Government does business. That is, in effect, why we're having this discussion (and why Viet Nam was a debacle -- but that's another thread).

Our political system is based on a series of checks and balances and they all work quite well as each arm of government has over the last two centuries slightly tweaked their ability to check in order to enhance their power and lessen that of the other branches. Add to that problem -- and it is a problem in getting things done coherently -- the electoral system with changes of agendas at 2, 4, 6 and 8 year intervals. Until all the master strategists find workarounds in their plans to compensate for those factors, 'consistency' and 'the US government' will be an oxymoron. Unless an existential war appears; different rules then...

Ken,

That is something you frequently say here and it's something I've come to believe is totally true. The implication for wars like Afghanistan, Iraq and Vietnam is pretty obvious to me at this point and goes a long way toward explaining why we suck at them.