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Thread: New Guidance on Counter-Insurgency

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    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    That is all true. It is certainly relevant to the early days of Ulster, but it in no way detracts from the efficacy using force to convince the armed opponent/insurgent that he can gain nothing by using violence to gain his political objective.


    Combine that with the fact that Hezbollah's standing in the Southern Lebanon is dropping, and it may be filtering through into the Arab and Palestinian consciousness that violence against Israel cannot bring about their desired political objectives. I think the Tamils may be coming to the same conclusion.
    What if the political objective of the insurgent is reasonable, and they adopted violence in the first place because they were excluded from any peaceful means of resolution?

    I'm not saying that violence has no place in fighting insurgency; that would be absurd. I'm saying that before we assume that the solution to insurgency is killing as many insurgents as possible, we might be well advised to try and identify the various motivations driving the actual fighters (not necessarily the leaders) and remove as many of those motivations as possible. Plenty of people who supported and fought for communist insurgencies wouldn't have known Karl from Groucho; they were fighting over local and often personal grievances with government, many of which were legitimate grievances. I suspect that the same may be true of many Islamist insurgencies. Identifying and addressing those grievances can be an effective way of isolating the ideological core of an insurgency from their active and passive support base.

    What we may see as defending a government against insurgents may be locally perceived as an outsider taking sides in a local quarrel, not a role that anyone really wants to play. It pays to be very careful before deciding who the "good guys" and "bad guys" are.

    In my part of the world, and I suspect elsewhere, Americans in particular have a reputation for being very easy to manipulate. One piece of advice I'd give anyone who is bringing resources (military, financial, whatever) into a chaotic situation is to be very, very wary of anyone who agrees with everything you say, tells you just what you want to hear, and wants to be your loyal ally. An alliance that falls in your lap without hard work on your part is more than likely an attempt to manipulate you and use the resources you have in pursuit of an objective that likely has nothing to do with yours.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    What if the political objective of the insurgent is reasonable, and they adopted violence in the first place because they were excluded from any peaceful means of resolution?
    I do not know. What is reasonable? If they took up arms, then it suggests that their demands were unreasonable to the Government. Why were they excluded?
    You only get fighting when one of the parties cannot be convinced that a peaceful achievement of their policy is either necessary or possible.

    The purpose of fighting is to force peace. The conditions for that are many and varied, but my basic premise is that a primary objective in "COIN" should be to force the enemy to give up violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal.
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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by PhilR View Post
    All of this comes back around to the current discussion, because I believe it highlights how our own doctrine and “way of war” must be a reflection of our own political constitution and beliefs. In this light, population-centric COIN ala FM 3-24 is appropriate. However, FM 3-24 may not be the appropriate COIN strategy for the “host” governments and societies that we are aiding. By implementing 3-24 in a FID or SFA manner, its required that we and the host government have the same concept of what a legitimate and effective government is and that it will be the ultimate goal of the conflict.
    My emphasis added.

    Thank you! Excellent observation. I would also submit that FM3-24 is a reflection of the political and social beliefs of it's writers, based on a flawed understanding of the problem. - Thus the title "COIN."
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by PhilR View Post
    I wrote that as an undergraduate thesis in 1986. I gave a copy to a CAP vet in 1997 and he later uploaded it to the internet.
    Its been some time ago, but I don't think I'm far off my present point, in one of the paper's concluding paragraphs, however:

    "Combined Action worked at providing area security. It excelled at this. It did work at pacification and Vietnamization. Pacification could only occur if the population felt that the GVN was stronger and preferable than the VC. Successful Vietnamization of the war was the only way this shift of thought could happen. No matter how effective at combating the VC the CAPs were, the CAPs were still US run units and represented foreigners who would someday leave. Unless the GVN was able to survive without US troops, it would lose the war. Combined Action could have been a positive step towards preparing the GVN to survive alone, but the effort in that direction was not there. There is also evidence that with the GVN, all the effort in the world would not have worked."

    s/f
    Phil Ridderhof USMC
    It is an excellant paper and you make an excellant point.

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    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I do not know. What is reasonable? If they took up arms, then it suggests that their demands were unreasonable to the Government. Why were they excluded?
    You only get fighting when one of the parties cannot be convinced that a peaceful achievement of their policy is either necessary or possible.

    The purpose of fighting is to force peace. The conditions for that are many and varied, but my basic premise is that a primary objective in "COIN" should be to force the enemy to give up violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal.
    This assumes that the governments we support are reasonable and responsive to their citizenry, which has not always been the case. I've seen people join insurgencies because their Governments were forcing them out of their homes to make way for dams, plantations, etc. When they tried to protest peacefully they were shot, by government soldiers - and this was a government that the US considered an ally. The people in question were not consulted, and had no opportunity to vote. In cases like this, do we need to force the insurgents to give up "violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal" or do we need to force the government to stop stepping on its people?

    Here's a scenario, and I don't think it an unreasonable one:

    Tribe A represents a majority of the population in a given jurisdiction. They get their people elected to key positions, and use Government resources in an effort to force tribe B, a traditional rival, off lands that have been in dispute. Insurgents, aware of the conflict, offer aid to tribe B.

    As the leader of an outside force, you have tribe A, allied to the Government, and you have tribe B, allied to the insurgents. Do you necessarily want to take the side of tribe A, because you are nominally on the side of the Government and so are they? Or do you want to position yourself as a neutral broker and try to resolve the dispute that led tribe B to ally with the insurgents in the first place? Or do you simply see "insurgents" and "government" and not even look deeply enough to notice the original conflict?

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    As the leader of an outside force, you have tribe A, allied to the Government, and you have tribe B, allied to the insurgents. Do you necessarily want to take the side of tribe A, because you are nominally on the side of the Government and so are they? Or do you want to position yourself as a neutral broker and try to resolve the dispute that led tribe B to ally with the insurgents in the first place? Or do you simply see "insurgents" and "government" and not even look deeply enough to notice the original conflict?
    I assume you are asking me a soldier? I am an instrument of Policy. What Policy am I there to enforce? The source of the discontent may not be open to negotiation and/or subject to conditions of sovereignty that make my interference a bad thing.
    It's not my problem to solve. Best I can do is report my impression through my chain of command. It's a problem for my Policy maker.

    Now, I may want to "de-escalate" the situation and try and keep peace, but that depends on brokering a cease fire with the insurgents. Will both the indigenous and my own Government allow me to do that? Dunno!

    My feeling is that this strikes to the heart of the issue here on SWC.
    Soldiers are instruments of policy. Warfare is instrumental. There seems to be a constant desire here to effect Policy. Policy is Political. As a soldier your are absolutely limited to understanding the effects of your action on THE Policy. - not changing the Policy to better match your strategy.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Best I can do is report my impression through my chain of command. It's a problem for my Policy maker.
    Yes, I'd agree that as a soldier that would be all you could do... and one would hope that the policy maker would understand the possibility that a simplistic approach might very well strengthen the overall position of the insurgent.

    Of course in order to report that situation you would first have to be aware of it, and if you enter the area with the assumption that your job is simply to kill as many insurgents as possible there's a good chance that you might not become aware of it. All I'm saying is that before we start killing insurgents it might be useful to find out why the specific insurgents in a given local theater are fighting, and see what options exist for removing or mitigating local causes of conflict.

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    Posted by Dayuhan
    In my part of the world, and I suspect elsewhere, Americans in particular have a reputation for being very easy to manipulate. One piece of advice I'd give anyone who is bringing resources (military, financial, whatever) into a chaotic situation is to be very, very wary of anyone who agrees with everything you say, tells you just what you want to hear, and wants to be your loyal ally. An alliance that falls in your lap without hard work on your part is more than likely an attempt to manipulate you and use the resources you have in pursuit of an objective that likely has nothing to do with yours.
    Dayuhan makes an important point that I hope isn't simply glossed over. I have seen this too many times. Some local befriends a senior American officer or other official and all the sudden this person speaks for all indigenous personnel in the area, because it what we want to hear. Anyone saying anything contrary to the party line is obviously a minority. I seem to recall we were dubbed by a couple of key manipulaters during the build up to invading Iraq. Later the Kurds dubbed us repeatedly to achieve their objectives, and amateurs fell for it hook, line and sinker. Just two examples of how dangerous this trait this, and it probably due to arrogance and an excessively rosey outlook of the world where we mistakenly assume everyone wants to be like us and shares our values.

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    All I'm saying is that before we start killing insurgents it might be useful to find out why the specific insurgents in a given local theater are fighting, and see what options exist for removing or mitigating local causes of conflict.
    I have no problem with that. My focus on irregular warfare begins once the policy is to prevent the "Insurgent" from gaining his goal using violence. If he wants to use the Ballot box, or dialogue, then good luck.
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Council Member MikeF's Avatar
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    Excellent discussion probably one of the best that I have read in a long time. I'll highlight several points that jumped out at me.

    Quote Originally Posted by Dayuhan View Post
    In my part of the world, and I suspect elsewhere, Americans in particular have a reputation for being very easy to manipulate. One piece of advice I'd give anyone who is bringing resources (military, financial, whatever) into a chaotic situation is to be very, very wary of anyone who agrees with everything you say, tells you just what you want to hear, and wants to be your loyal ally. An alliance that falls in your lap without hard work on your part is more than likely an attempt to manipulate you and use the resources you have in pursuit of an objective that likely has nothing to do with yours.
    Tribe A represents a majority of the population in a given jurisdiction. They get their people elected to key positions, and use Government resources in an effort to force tribe B, a traditional rival, off lands that have been in dispute. Insurgents, aware of the conflict, offer aid to tribe B.
    This assumes that the governments we support are reasonable and responsive to their citizenry, which has not always been the case. I've seen people join insurgencies because their Governments were forcing them out of their homes to make way for dams, plantations, etc. When they tried to protest peacefully they were shot, by government soldiers - and this was a government that the US considered an ally. The people in question were not consulted, and had no opportunity to vote. In cases like this, do we need to force the insurgents to give up "violent means/military methods of achieving their political goal" or do we need to force the government to stop stepping on its people?
    YES, YES, AND YES. Dayuhan's points echo the gap that I've observed between the theory of counter-insurgency and the practice. The environments that we currently work in are complex, fluid, and dynamic. The local populaces operate in a manner that can be both foreign and confusing to American soldiers. Ancient tribes follow different rules of governance and economics. Social norms, customs, and traditions often differ from what we would call normal. Acceptable levels of violence exceed what we would consider stable. It is different for us, but it is normal for them.

    Entering into this "game" can be a dangerous endeavor particularly if you are naive to the rules. I've observed a direct correlation from those that take the non-kinetic version of pop-centric COIN to heart and those that are most succeptable to being used or manipulated by the tribal elder that smiles, speaks good english, and only wants to be a friend to the United States.

    One of my favorite sheiks put it to me bluntly:

    "Mike, only believe half of what I tell you, and if you cannot verify that information from two sources outside of my tribe or family, disregard it. This is Iraq. We have different rules."

    As I continue to shape my own thoughts on COIN, I keep coming back to the same limitations- external military force can only be used to provide security. In other words, we can go into an area, become the biggest tribe, and use force and influence to minimize the levels of violence. We cannot install democracy, governance, etc...Those measures will take a concerted effort by the host nation and our state department, NGOs, etc...

    One interesting study would be to see how the people voted in Afghanistan and the upcoming Iraq elections. My bet is that 99% of all votes followed the ethnic and tribal make-up of each area.

    v/r

    Mike

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    Quote Originally Posted by Red Rat View Post
    Tried that - doesn't work for me!! The aim of the UK's IT system is to add more process - not to enhance communications and make us more effective.
    My own system at work (Canadian government) also blocks me from accessing Scribd.com - NATO's posted a copy here:
    http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/offici...y_guidance.pdf

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    Council Member slapout9's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post


    One interesting study would be to see how the people voted in Afghanistan and the upcoming Iraq elections. My bet is that 99% of all votes followed the ethnic and tribal make-up of each area.

    v/r

    Mike
    I would like to see a study like that myself,for the reason you point out.

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    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post

    Entering into this "game" can be a dangerous endeavor particularly if you are naive to the rules. I've observed a direct correlation from those that take the non-kinetic version of pop-centric COIN to heart and those that are most succeptable to being used or manipulated by the tribal elder that smiles, speaks good english, and only wants to be a friend to the United States...

    As I continue to shape my own thoughts on COIN, I keep coming back to the same limitations- external military force can only be used to provide security. In other words, we can go into an area, become the biggest tribe, and use force and influence to minimize the levels of violence. We cannot install democracy, governance, etc...Those measures will take a concerted effort by the host nation and our state department, NGOs, etc...
    Completely agree. Going back to the ISAF Guidance, its continual reference to ISAF's responsibility to the people of Afghanistan, as a seperate issue from our responsability to support the Government of Afghanistan, is "entering into this game" in a very big way.

    Phil Ridderhof USMC

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    As I continue to shape my own thoughts on COIN, I keep coming back to the same limitations- external military force can only be used to provide security. In other words, we can go into an area, become the biggest tribe, and use force and influence to minimize the levels of violence.
    If that is all conditional on making the Taliban fear you (and thus scared to harm the population), then I am all for it. Assuming it is, then how do you make the Taliban fear you?
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    Quote Originally Posted by PhilR
    Completely agree. Going back to the ISAF Guidance, its continual reference to ISAF's responsibility to the people of Afghanistan, as a seperate issue from our responsability to support the Government of Afghanistan, is "entering into this game" in a very big way

    I was going to make a point on this by adding up all the times the word WE was used in the current guidance. I lost count. In the long run, it is not so much about what WE do, but on what the Afghanis decide to do.


    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    If that is all conditional on making the Taliban fear you (and thus scared to harm the population), then I am all for it. Assuming it is, then how do you make the Taliban fear you?
    Simply put, Find, Fix, Finish, and Exploit.

    Here's a start...

    Pakistan Army: Taliban Camp Destroyed
    Associated Press

    Helicopter gunships destroyed a training camp for suicide bombers in northern Pakistan's troubled Swat Valley overnight, killing six Taliban militants, the army said Saturday.

    Several more militants were wounded in the camp, located on a small island in the Swat River opposite the town of Charbagh, the army said. It said the operation followed reports on the camp by intelligence agents and local residents.

    "The place was being used as a launching pad for preparing the suicide attackers," the army said in a statement, adding that those being trained were to bomb targets in Swat, including the valley's main city of Mingora.

    About a week ago, two suicide attacks on consecutive days killed seven people in Swat.

    "In the last weeks, the terrorists have been sending suicide bombers to cities in the valley. We have been working to find their source, and today we destroyed that source," Lt. Col. Akthar Abbas, the army spokesman in Swat, told The Associated Press.

    Lt. Col. Abbas said another six militants were killed in two separate operations elsewhere in the Valley. In one operation, five Taliban fighters were killed, including a close aid to a high-ranking Taliban commander, Shah Doraan.

    The officer said military operations were weakening the Taliban, and that many had chosen to turn themselves in rather than fight.

    "With every day passing, the noose is being tightened around them, and that's why more and more of them are opting to surrender," Lt. Col. Abbas said.
    v/r

    Mike

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    Council Member William F. Owen's Avatar
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    Quote Originally Posted by MikeF View Post
    Simply put, Find, Fix, Finish, and Exploit.
    Welcome to the land of moonlight, and shadows..... or maybe you were already there!
    Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"

    - The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
    - If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
    Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition

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    I recall rumours about Soviet Spetznaz officers who allegedly stalked in the night and stabbed mujaheddin and their supporters. That apparently freaked out a lot of mujaheddin.

    Another rumour is about the recent conflict; Lithuanian SF patrolling the countryside on motorcycles, hunting for Taleban.


    Reinforced rumours may have be effective in creating fear.
    That's how the French broke at Sedan in 1940, after all...rumours.

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    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    Welcome to the land of moonlight, and shadows..... or maybe you were already there!
    I've definitely walked a bit in the dark mostly in circles.

    My point is that the military should stick to its core competencies of security and warfighting. From this vantage point, we can act as arbitrators, referees, or peace-keepers. This is where I will probably diverge from Wilf's world. The pop-centric COIN crowd wants to force the military past security to nation-state building tasks. Unless we want an Empire and/or occupation, I would submit that this is an illusion of our own capabilities and a lack of understanding of our own limitations- not to mention the cost of both "lives and national treasure" to quote the late Sen. Kennedy.

    So, this gets us back to the question I asked on Friday.

    "What should we be doing?"

    Bob's World is probably on to something over in the deterence thread. I'm curious to read his upcoming paper.

    Quote Originally Posted by Bob's World View Post
    Most counterinsurgencies struggle because the counterinsurgent is unwilling to recognize and admit his own shortcomings, after all, he is in the right. Far easier to focus on the insurgent, who is by definition a criminal.

    So the BW approach is rooted in what I believe to be the underlying principles of human dynamics, group dynamics, and governance that I see at work in these types of conflicts. This is very different than the dynamics that lead to conflicts between states.

    The dynamics that drive insurgency are the same ones that drive neighborhood and family disputes. They are deeply personal and not about what "side" you are on; because at the end of the day you are on the same side, you just have an issue that is intolerable to some, and those same few don't feel they have a legitimate venue to resolve it.

    This is why I say the US Gov't approach to our Civil Rights Movement in the 60s was our most successful COIN effort by far. It never really slid from subversion into full insurgency, but primarily because Dr. King chose peaceful tactics, and because President Johnson was willing to enact and enforce concessions to address the issues of poor governance that gave rise to the movement.
    Another concept is to look at non-state actors to solve non-state problems. Again, I'm intrigued by the work Greg Mortesen has accomplished in Pakistan and Afghanistan in building schools.

    v/r

    Mike

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    Council Member Dayuhan's Avatar
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    Comments on comments, looking back over a useful discussion...

    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    The policy is to force a Pro-US Government in A'Stan. Correct?
    Is this the policy? I hope not, because if it is, we're toast. A more reasonable goal would be a government that is not going to attack anyone or host those who do. Personally, I don't care if they are pro-US or anti-US. As long as they don't resort to violence in pursuit of that orientation, or give sanctuary to those who do, how they feel about the US is not for us to decide.

    Quote Originally Posted by PhilR View Post
    we ARE NOT (or should not) be doing COIN in Afghanistan, but are supporting another government's COIN effort.
    True in a sense, but the government in question is our creation. We need to remember that, because nobody else in the picture is likely to forget it.


    Quote Originally Posted by William F. Owen View Post
    I have no problem with that. My focus on irregular warfare begins once the policy is to prevent the "Insurgent" from gaining his goal using violence. If he wants to use the Ballot box, or dialogue, then good luck.
    Wilf, are you assuming here that the policy-makers have sorted this stuff out before you come into the picture? If so, your faith in the policy-makers exceeds mine by several orders of magnitude.

    Quote Originally Posted by Fuchs View Post
    I recall rumours about Soviet Spetznaz officers who allegedly stalked in the night and stabbed mujaheddin and their supporters. That apparently freaked out a lot of mujaheddin.
    And at the end of the day, who was left standing?

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    Quote:
    Originally Posted by PhilR
    we ARE NOT (or should not) be doing COIN in Afghanistan, but are supporting another government's COIN effort.

    Posted by Dayhuan in response to PhilR,
    True in a sense, but the government in question is our creation. We need to remember that, because nobody else in the picture is likely to forget it.
    I do tire of the party line that we don't do COIN, we do FID and the host nation does COIN. Hopefully that is true in most in most situations, but it sure as hell doesn't apply to Afghanistan where a large part of the fighting is still being done by U.S. and coalition forces. As the Zen instructor frequently yells during mediation sessions, WAKE UP! We do COIN. We are confusing the desired state (the Afghans leading the COIN effort) with reality, and delusions in war are dangerous.

    Besides winning (still needs to be defined), we need to identify what's more important:

    - Is the most important thing to win, no matter what? If a win is more important than who wins it, then perhaps we can do more by focusing on winning instead of focusing on nation building.

    - On the other hand if it is more important that the Afghans win or lose this fight with the coalition in support, then that leads us to a different strategy (their strategy, not ours).

    Which one is it?
    Last edited by Bill Moore; 08-31-2009 at 04:22 AM.

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