Economics and Irregular Warfare

[Bill Moore]

Posted by Surferbeetle

The general point I was/am attempting to make is that economics are an inseparable component of human wars. From this it follows that victors of wars understand how to use economics to further their aims, and that the use of economics has both destructive and constructive components which need to be trained upon.

In any social system there is an ecomonic system, just as in any biological organism there is an energy system to sustain life processes. Yet I stand firm, unless convinced with strong logical arguments, that is not the same as the USG blindly "attempting" to economic development to undermine an insurgent movement. If economic development is even required, then it needs to be focused on supporting the political objective. The other side gets that, Hezbollah are good at, LeT is good at it, and some communist insurgencies have had some success. The issue isn't whether it is important or not, in some cases it is, in others it isn't. Blanket statements and templated approaches are dangerous.

Being able to successfully execute a campaign comprised of simultaneous efforts synchronized toward common objectives is the result of intensive training. How often does the GPF train on how to use economics as part of a campaign? How about SOF?

This one is easy, we give classes on DIME (or DIMEFIL), then after class we complain about the lack of an integrated whole of government approach.

[slapout9]

This one is easy, we give classes on DIME (or DIMEFIL), then after class we complain about the lack of an integrated whole of government approach.

In the old days it was called Special Warfare which was why the old SF units had A-teams,CA-teams,PSYOP-teams combined as needed based upon the situation, now for some reason they don't do that anymore and things are not going so well I have read the Major Gant paper on tribes and how this is the mysterious all time whomper stomper strategy for A'stan. Except for a few exceptions that it exactly what I learned back in the 70's in NC because raising and training and advising indigenous forces on anything was what Green Berets did. Didn't have no DIMEFIL back then. We had the 7 steps of UW which doesn't seem any different now than then except we don't call it that. We are going back to the 70's Stagflation,Tribes and Cults oh boy! Guess we will have to start a Special Warfare Journal, Small Wars is becoming Obsolete

[Bill Moore]

In the old days it was called Special Warfare which was why the old SF units had A-teams,CA-teams,PSYOP-teams combined as needed based upon the situation, now for some reason they don't do that anymore and things are not going so well I have read the Major Gant paper on tribes and how this is the mysterious all time whomper stomper strategy for A'stan. Except for a few exceptions that it exactly what I learned back in the 70's in NC because raising and training and advising indigenous forces on anything was what Green Berets did. Didn't have no DIMEFIL back then. We had the 7 steps of UW which doesn't seem any different now than then except we don't call it that. We are going back to the 70's Stagflation,Tribes and Cults oh boy! Guess we will have to start a Special Warfare Journal, Small Wars is becoming Obsolete

Having been around in those old days I don't recall CA doing a lot of economic development with SF? Unfortunately the 7 phases of UW are very much military focused (more guerrilla warfare than UW, though some will argue the UW is implied), yet the reality is that very little attention was/is given to the political organization aspects. It was just assumed away except for some cursory instruction on the area command. I for one don't think MAJ Gant's paper was a strategy piece, at most it offered some TTPs, which as you said isn't anything new, but it would be fair to characterize it as a "rebirth" of common sense in SF.

There is a Special Warfare Magazine, but it is a little too much focused on back slapping, look at me side for my tastes. We need something more along the lines of a Special Warfare Parameters magazine with some seriously thoughtful and self criticizing articles. You'll never get better if you keep telling yourself you're great and there is nothing left to learn, actually at that point you have become obsolete. I would recommend calling it Political Warfare Magazine, because now Special Warfare means different things to different people, whereas political warfare is the context we need to be thinking in.

We had a Special Warfare Revolution in the 1950's and early 1960's that was embraced by the PSYWAR community, CIA and parts of the State Department, but not by many in DoD. A lot of incredibly smart folks wrote some serious papers on how to counter communist sponsored insurgencies and the various challenges associated with it. IMO we a Special Warfare evolution to address current threats and new global dynamics that impact the way war is fought now.

I had a good friend/mentor (former Team Sergeant) who told me every Special Operations organization should be disbanded after 20 years, then another one stood up to get rid of the doctrinal and organizational baggage. I won't go as far as John Boyd in saying that once you have doctrine you're obsolete, but there is "some" truth in that statement. In some cases we're fighting too hard to protect the legacy organizations instead of building the force we need now.

[slapout9]

Bill, remember SF and the attempted SPARTAN doctine? Happened while I was up there.....don't know that it ever took hold, but more of what I think the CA/economic support should be.

[Ken White]

...every Special Operations organization should be disbanded after 20 years, then another one stood up to get rid of the doctrinal and organizational baggage...

May be fifteen if they're really doing welll.

... I won't go as far as John Boyd in saying that once you have doctrine you're obsolete, but there is "some" truth in that statement. In some cases we're fighting too hard to protect the legacy organizations instead of building the force we need now.

That, too...

We do ad-hoc beautifully, though..

[Bill Moore]

Bill, remember SF and the attempted SPARTAN doctine?

Slapout, help me, I don't recall this doctrine, but then again I didn't read too much doctrine back then

May be fifteen if they're really doing welll.

Ken, it takes five years to get a concept approved, another 7 to get the funding and manning, so really my buddy's suggestion about every 20 years is probably about right. Completely unfeasible in our bureaucracy, but as LTG Boykin put in his book they had to form Delta because SF was too conventional. I don't think SF was too conventional, but they were rigidly adhering to legacy definitions of unconventional. What was the issue back then that was driving the force change requirements for SOF? Oh yea, terrorist groups from the Middle East, both Palestinian and Iranian sponsored. Amazing how long we can keep our heads buried in the sand.

[slapout9]

Slapout, help me, I don't recall this doctrine, but then again I didn't read too much doctrine back then

SPARTAN
Special Proficiency at Rugged Training and Nation building. Google the whole!! name and you should get references.

Early 70's when I new about it. Worked with American Indians in Florida, Montana and other places to practice Tibal Area Improvements.....no sh.. it was a little like Billy Jack Protect them and help them Prosper.


Have to go watch a special on new info about the Kennedy Assasination....they still haven't figured it out....guess I will have to help them Be back in a little while. Slap

[Bill Moore]

Slapout, Thanks, some of the guys told me they did some work on the reservations, and I recall seeing a SF recruiting video about it, but I didn't know the name of the program. I'll take a look at it. Bet we stopped it because the Army couldn't see how that would stop tanks from rolling through the Fulda Gap, what do you think? Bill

[Surferbeetle]

Rand Monograph MR-1630 by: Kim Cragin, Peter Chalk: Terrorism and Development, Using Social and Economic Development to Inhibit a Resurgence of Terrorism

This report examines the social and economic development policies enacted by three countries — Israel, the Philippines, and the United Kingdom — to inhibit a resurgence of terrorism within their jurisdictions. Drawing on a broad research base, including numerous first-hand interviews, the authors outline the initiatives implemented by each country then assess their effectiveness, with the aim of informing U.S. decisionmakers of the benefits and pitfalls of such initiatives as they develop policy to counter terrorism. Among their conclusions are the following: Social and economic development policies can weaken local support for terrorist activities and discourage terrorist recruits, and such policies can be used as a "stick" to discourage terrorism. They caution, however, that the ability of these policies to inhibit terrorism depends on their implementation, and inadequately funded such policies are likely to renew support for terrorism.

Case Studies in Economic Development, Third Edition, by Stephen C. Smith, George Washington University, Department of Economics

Case Studies in Economic Development strives to represent alternative points of view in a balanced way. In doing so, the central role of market based development is stressed as a complement to the indispensable role of well-designed government policy. The prevalence of market failure in development is examined without overlooking the recurring problems of government failure. Finally, although at its core the text is one of development economics, it seeks to integrate the vital contributions of other disciplines when they help us to understand the complexities of development and guide the wise implementation of policy.