Warrior Ethos

[CPT Foley]

Sorry but that's rubbish. No one in the military, or military thought takes the Toffler seriously. Are you seriously advocating the Tofflers over Clausewitz?
Killing someone is an act of disrespect. Did any of the US beheadings on the internet cause a strategic shift? Of course not.
The only news stories that can create strategic effect are stories about events which have strategic effect. Do not confuse the two.

It is only a competition is that if effects a political end state or outcome. Insurgents sometime do not need the support of the population, they just need to scare them into submission. I witnessed this in Sierra Leone.
My narrow mission oriented approach comes from being trained in "COIN" as a very young soldier and studying and reading about COIN for over 28 years. Since I am not American, COIN is not new to me. It is merely a form of warfare.

I am pretty sure Warfare and war in the next 20 years is going to be like the last 20, with Sierra Leone, Georgia, Gaza, Sri Lanka, Pakistan and Darfur, and Machetes, High Explosive and AKs will create more political effect, than 24 hour news channels.

I'm not suggesting Toffler replaces Clausewitz, but they aren't necessarily mutually exclusive. Sorry, but the idea that the military establishment scoffs at Toffler only confirms my sense he's probably on to something. To suggest that the media/internet doesn't have enormous impact on strategic events seems to defy credulity, e.g., Abu Ghraib, Gitmo, etc. By your reasoning these are just military detainment facilities. The mission is to keep prisoners from escaping and extract intelligence information. Why would we interfere with such military police operations with fuzzy public relations concerns? Because COIN is a big PR battle. It impacts support at home, host nation, IGOs, NGOs, coalition, etc.

I genuinely respect your considerable service in the COIN environment, but I find David Galula's views more persuasive, as best illustrated in his work "The Pacification of Algeria."

[Ken White]

with also some SF experience and as one who served as (non SF) advisor to two foreign Armies, I do not disagree with much you say and I do very much agree that Warrior is a bad term for the reasons you state and more, I still have some questions on your comments in this thread.

Given that I disagree with Wilf that the wars of the next 20 years for the US will only be like those of the last 20...

That will be true only if we allow that to happen -- we certainly need to be prepared for COIN support and FID but we should also avoid it if at all possible -- and we can do that if we wish -- one question is why would we not want avoid such warfare if at all possible?

To suggest that the media/internet doesn't have enormous impact on strategic events seems to defy credulity, e.g., Abu Ghraib, Gitmo, etc. By your reasoning these are just military detainment facilities. The mission is to keep prisoners from escaping and extract intelligence information. Why would we interfere with such military police operations with fuzzy public relations concerns? Because COIN is a big PR battle. It impacts support at home, host nation, IGOs, NGOs, coalition, etc.

Impact, yes, I agree -- but have those impacts truly affected anything?

I genuinely respect your considerable service in the COIN environment, but I find David Galula's views more persuasive, as best illustrated in his work "The Pacification of Algeria."

How did that effort in Algeria work out for Brother Galula and the French?

I ask that not to be snide or snarky but as a very serious question. Recall that the French had the same advantages in Algeria that the British had in Malaya; they were the government, there was no host nation to deal with -- we will always in any FID situation have the problem of dealing with the host nation and quite probably, also dealing with a coalition. Thus I question whether either Malaya or Algeria provides and guidelines we'd really want to follow. We did after all follow French guidelines in Viet Nam and we know where that got us.

As an aside, I'll point out that the Algerians were not like the Viet Namese as the French discovered, the Viet Namese were not like the Malays as we discovered -- and hopefully, we will realize that the Afghans are not like the Iraqis.

[Brandon Friedman]

I left active duty in 2004 before the U.S. Army began its intensive focus on COIN techniques and theory. I’m not “trained” in counterinsurgency. I’ve never been to the Counterinsurgency Center for Excellence and I’ve never studied the theoretical luminaries at ILE or the Army War College. I have only my own reading and experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan on which to base my views.

I was part of the QRF that got the call when the initial stages of Operation Anaconda turned into one big FAIL. As a rifle PL, I played a small role in what became a combined arms effort to literally blast our way into Afghanistan's Shah-e-Kot Valley to put an end to the AQ/Taliban resistance there. It was a kinetic fight to the max (to the point that I couldn’t stand having planes fly over me for several years). Throughout that week, there was no thought given to COIN, nor should there have been. It was all about the basics--shooting, moving, and communicating. And aside from the normal combat snafus (like occasionally shooting at each other), we were pretty good at it.

But when I arrived on the outskirts of Hillah, Iraq a year later during the invasion, the situation was entirely different. It was still a kinetic fight—we were still massing forces, utilizing air power and artillery, and aiming to seize and hold ground—but suddenly there were civilians everywhere. To survive and thrive in environment, we had to take the approach espoused by Mr. Owen when he says:

Dead civilians are a political problem, not a moral one.

and

Regardless of the frequency you actually do it, Killing and Capturing, or gain advantage from it's threat, is still your primary function. It's what militaries do.

and

You do not need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win in COIN. Your actions should merely not needlessly create enemies, and you only need to protect those civilians relevant to the mission.

and

It is not armed social work, or summed up with silly expressions like "hearts and minds." It is a form of warfare.

It was all about the mission of “taking Hillah.” We were only concerned with the population insofar as they assisted or inhibited our mission. And that was it.

However, when we arrived in Baghdad a few days later, with tracers still lighting up the night sky, the whole dynamic changed again. 3ID and the Marines had already punched through the cities defenses and the Iraqi Army had dispersed, leaving us to deal with intermittent snipers, masses of looters, and the capture of weapons systems (like all the locked and loaded AAA still positioned throughout Dora). Within 48 hours of my arrival in the city, the physical enemy was no more. Even the sniper attacks stopped. Our enemy had suddenly become a lack of public services.

At this point, our mission transitioned into the one described by CPT Foley when he says:

It is armed social work, and that's the paradigm shift.

I’m sorry, but that’s true. While many of my own leaders didn’t realize it at the time, our mission had quickly become an effort to pacify the population by keeping them happy. Officially, we were tasked with going after Saddam’s HVTs, but those were wild goose chases for the most part. Our real mission was to fill the vacuum left by Saddam’s government—which we attempted to do. Our real mission was preventive.

When you’re in a situation like that, you have to place a priority on the following tasks: 1.) Treating other people as you would have them treat you, 2.) listening to what the locals are saying, 3.) responding to their concerns, 4.) understanding their backgrounds and motivations, 5.) showing genuine empathy for their plight, 6.) and, all the while, somehow maintaining your ability to fight with unparalleled viciousness, should the need arise. It not only keeps you alive, but it also furthers the completion of the mission—which has now become political.

In fact, for the next three months, no one in my battalion fired a weapon. I have a photo that shows a list written on a wall of all the jobs guys in my company did during that time—after we left Baghdad and moved north to Tal Afar. Here’s the list:

1. Infantryman
2. Police officer
3. Gas station attendant
4. Painter
5. Water delivery guy
6. Security guard
7. Repo man
8. Chauffeur
9. Public relations officer
10. Graffiti prevention and removal officer

In Tal Afar and throughout northwestern Iraq, we kept a lid on things. While central Iraq smoldered and grew more violent by the day, aside from one incident in July, the AO of the 101st Airborne Division--under Petraeus--was the safest in Iraq. We didn’t go looking for fights and we focused on being “Officer Friendly.” I spent an entire day helping to coordinate transportation for Iraqi college kids trying to get to Mosul to make up their missed finals. We helped troubleshoot a pump station. We started learning Arabic. I yelled at one of my soldiers for shoving an Iraqi kid. I had one of my NCOs discipline another for throwing a water bottle from a moving truck at some guy’s sheep. We helped set up local elections. We hired locals to feed us and we hired locals to translate for us.

And when an insurgent or terrorist finally killed two of our guys on July 19 on the highway between Mosul and Tal Afar, the people of Tal Afar came out and brought flowers to the front gate of our HQ in the city.

By October, however, the fighting that began in central Iraq was no longer contained to that area. It spread north and, like everyone else, we were sucked into the cycle of violence. Thus, by the time I left Iraq, I had come full circle. My time in combat ended on a street in Tal Afar as it had begun in Afghanistan—in an all-out shooting gallery between combatants.

What I took from this overall experience is that these are three distinct techniques for success that should be applied as necessary. There’s the conventional, kinetic aspect of war, there’s the combination of kinetic operations with civilians on the battlefield—in which COIN techniques must be utilized—and there’s the preventive COIN environment, in which you spend the bulk of your time trying to keep the locals happy and safe—where it is “armed social work” and where you do “need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win," despite what Mr. Owen argues.

So my main question, I guess, is why doesn’t the military think it can train its troops for all three? Do we not think troops are able to adapt? We had never been trained in the differences, yet when placed in those environments, my company—through fits and starts and mistakes—was able to adapt. Why is there this conflict between people like William F. Owen and CPT Foley? The ideas aren’t mutually exclusive. There's a time and a place for both mentalities.

[Ken White]

are idealists, mostly. Regrettably the world is not an ideal place. Yet most of us develop our views of what's right and tend to try to do that and barring the proverbial epiphany we'll keep right on doing that. Some have had an epiphany, some have not, some think they might have...

.. is “armed social work” and where you do “need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win," despite what Mr. Owen argues.

That's true and one sometimes has to do that; what concerns many is that the attitude to do that sort of thing can remove a combat edge and such removal is not good when you may be confronted with more -- and especially, more intense -- combat.

There's also the fact that Wilf comes from the British tradition where the civilian side of the FID effort used to be very much in charge and that system worked well for them. Thus he wants the Army to do Army things. CPT Foley is an SF Officer ergo he's into FID; different backgrounds lead to different approaches. Our system has always reversed the Briotish process and the Armed forces have always had the lead. I think current British practice shows they've lost their civilian edge to an extent -- and that our history shows that our system is not particularly effective -- or desirable. My solution to that problem is develop the civilian structure and get the military out of the lead for such efforts Even better, diligently avoid such efforts unless there is a really good reason to get involved.

That, of course, means educating politicians -- and good luck with that...

As to full spectrum; fortunately, I'm old and have watched several good units make the switch between armed social work, a little casual door kicking, a few fairly stiff fire fights over a few days and the losses of weeks on end of continuous grinding combat. The switch isn't as hard as some believe; most people -- not all -- can do it fairly well.I've seen units switch back and forth and do so readily and easily.

So my main question, I guess, is why doesn’t the military think it can train its troops for all three? Do we not think troops are able to adapt? We had never been trained in the differences, yet when placed in those environments, my company—through fits and starts and mistakes—was able to adapt. Why is there this conflict between people like William F. Owen and CPT Foley? The ideas aren’t mutually exclusive. There's a time and a place for both mentalities.

In order of your questions and comments:

Because we adopted a pathetically bad training process in the 1970s that tries to drill down to basic tasks and thus imputes that the troops being trained (ALL ranks) are incapable of absorbing more complexity. This in the face of an Army that did it all in WW II and Korea (less well educated and largely draftees as opposed to today's well educated professional force) and one that managed to train for full spectrum warfare all through the early 1960s. Quite simply, the Army lost its way in the aftermath of Viet Nam.

There are some today who do not think the troops can adapt -- they're terribly wrong -- and there are others that see the greater degree of work and effort required to do it right -- they also are terribly wrong (in a different sense). There are still others who say 'we cannot afford that.' That's just untrue and is IMO, a cover for the other two rationales or lack thereof...

The Troops will always adapt and pull the senior leaders fat out of the fire -- that's a pretty poor way to habitually operate but that has been the 'system' since the mid-60s. The big problem is, as you know, that having to learn by doing is time and effort consuming, subject to much error and can create other problems. Not too smart when there are massive bodies of work explaining all the things needed for every step on the spectrum of conflict. We owe the Troops and the Nation a better way of doing business.

The conflicts you cite are between those who do not really disagree on the desired end result; just on the route to arrive at that nirvana. The issue is really not tactics and techniques but what, philosophically, your force should do. There are those who think Armies break things; there are those who think Armies should fix things (to pick two polar views and, as you know, there are thousands of other views between those two). The problem, as a cursory reading of history shows, is that Armies have to be able to do both so the philosophies are something to argue about but reality -- and Politicians -- dictate what Armies actually do and the answer is "all of the above." As you note. As I noted, people are mostly idealists; they want what they think should be the focus to be that focus. Reality again is that systems make focal decisions and the idealist in us doesn't like that...

Yep, time and place for both -- and you never know which will be required. Or where...

Awful wordy but discussion boards aren't the best comm medium and I'd rather put too much in and let you discard what you don't need (or want, probably don't need any of it) than leave out something that might, barely, make sense...

We need to be full spectrum and globally capable. Period.

[slapout9]

We need to be full spectrum and globally capable. Period.

That should be a SWC quote of the day,week,month or however that is done.

[CPT Foley]

Some awesome comments. We absolutely need to be committed to Full Spectrum Operations.

However, the characterization of the French failure in Algeria having anything to do with Galula's strategy or theories is misplaced.

He was a CPT during the conflict and had little influence over the French war strategy. However, it should be noted that CPT Galula was very successful in pacifying his AO, and it's hard to imagine that the French wouldn't have fared better had they adopted his approaches in a broader manner.

[Schmedlap]

The term "armed social work" is in danger of becoming the next "hearts and minds." By that, I mean that people will assume the common usage of the words and draw meaning of the term from there. What do we mean by "armed social work"?

Here is a definition of social work from the International Federation of Social Workers (I'm guessing they're fairly authoritative on the subject?)...

The social work profession promotes social change, problem solving in human relationships and the empowerment and liberation of people to enhance well-being. Utilising theories of human behaviour and social systems, social work intervenes at the points where people interact with their environments. Principles of human rights and social justice are fundamental to social work. - source

Perhaps a more accurate term would be "armed community organizer." (I recognize that term might bring with it baggage from politics, particularly the last prez campaign, but it sounds more accurate.)

[Surferbeetle]

The term "armed social work" is in danger of becoming the next "hearts and minds." By that, I mean that people will assume the common usage of the words and draw meaning of the term from there. What do we mean by "armed social work"?

Here is a definition of social work from the International Federation of Social Workers (I'm guessing they're fairly authoritative on the subject?)...
Perhaps a more accurate term would be "armed community organizer." (I recognize that term might bring with it baggage from politics, particularly the last prez campaign, but it sounds more accurate.)

Schmedlap

You are killing me with this...this..community organizer??!!!! Armed social work is bad enough.

Civil Affairs or Civil Military Operations.

Steve

[slapout9]

The term "armed social work" is in danger of becoming the next "hearts and minds." By that, I mean that people will assume the common usage of the words and draw meaning of the term from there. What do we mean by "armed social work"?

Here is a definition of social work from the International Federation of Social Workers (I'm guessing they're fairly authoritative on the subject?)...
Perhaps a more accurate term would be "armed community organizer." (I recognize that term might bring with it baggage from politics, particularly the last prez campaign, but it sounds more accurate.)

During the 60's the Black Panthers actually ran day care and food centers in poor neighborhoods and provided security against the oppressive US Guvmint as part of the community organizing political process, didn't work out to well

[William F. Owen]

The term "armed social work" is in danger of becoming the next "hearts and minds." By that, I mean that people will assume the common usage of the words and draw meaning of the term from there. What do we mean by "armed social work"?

Thank you! Hearts and minds was a silly think to say and Templer came to regret saying it. "Armed Social Work" is equally silly.

COIN is a form of warfare. It differs from other forms only in ways and means.
Based on his writing Moa-Tse-Tung read far more Clausewtiz than he did Sun-Tzu!

a.) Some in the US look at Iraq after an invasion and says "ahh... COIN," and confuses the acts associated with getting a society functioning, post war, with those acts exemplified by COIN best practice.

b.) What you see in "New COIN" is the US applying Iraq to COIN thinking and not COIN thinking applied to Iraq. - which is why A'Stan is far from over, and still may slip away.

c.) Securing the population, and addressing their physical needs - NOT SOCIAL - like, security, fuel, food, electricity etc, should only be done where the populations support/well being, bears on the political and military outcome, in that they support you, not the insurgent. Getting them to support you, to the extent that they provide you with intelligence, and deny the insurgents any support - so essentially give you target data, and deny the bad guys logistics - is aimed at doing the insurgents harm. Harm as in killing and capturing. This generally applies to all forms of warfare! - which is why the Nazis ended up with 100,000 strong "partisan" groups behind their lines in Russia.

To characterise the above as "armed social work" or "gaining the human terrain," is dumbing down solid, well understood and enduring military best practice.

[selil]

We need to be full spectrum and globally capable. Period.

This is exactly what I've been saying about cyber. Cyber is one chunk of the spectrum of conflict. It isn't high intensity conflict it isn't thermonuclear war and it may be in many ways like guerilla warfare. But, it isn't guerilla warfare. It is just one part of the spectrum of conflict.

COIN is not wrong or missing anything. It is part of the spectrum. It isn't going to replace high intensity conflict, armor operations, or anything else. it is another part of that spectrum. Counter to the USAF propaganda carpet bombing isn't the be-all it is just one part of the spectrum.

COIN has it's place within the spectrum. War is not a thing with walls it is a plateau with a horizon. All along that broad plateau the spectrum of war can be fought grabbing chess pieces of conflict. It is the intellectual minimalist that defines something as broad as war in a narrow space. What skill, strategy, process, tool, weapon, ideology, system, or person will bring about the desired result within the realm of conflict? Certain tools are the brushfires of destruction while others move through without disturbing a blade of grass. These tools are picked by the generals. The correct ones are picked by the good generals.

[Brandon Friedman]

My solution to that problem is develop the civilian structure and get the military out of the lead for such efforts Even better, diligently avoid such efforts unless there is a really good reason to get involved.

That, of course, means educating politicians -- and good luck with that...

Ha. Tell me about it, Ken. That frustrating struggle has been part of my day job for the past two years. As you've implied, politicians are, in most cases, more loyal to both their constituents and their own intuition than to someone else is telling them what's right or wrong. So you can only accomplish so much through lobbying. The bottom line is that if you really want to affect policy change, you have to work to get your own people elected to office--and that means people with military experience.

[Schmedlap]

Ha. Tell me about it, Ken. That frustrating struggle has been part of my day job for the past two years. As you've implied, politicians are, in most cases, more loyal to both their constituents and their own intuition than to someone else is telling them what's right or wrong. So you can only accomplish so much through lobbying. The bottom line is that if you really want to affect policy change, you have to work to get your own people elected to office--and that means people with military experience.

I agree with the frustration, with one caveat. I don't think most are loyal to their constituents. They are loyal to whatever will induce their constituents to vote for them. That can be something diametrically opposed to the welfare of their constituents. It is self-interest - re-election to enjoy the junkets and mingle at the Georgetown cocktail parties; re-election to set themselves up for a future lobbying gig, influence-peddling enterprise, and/or high-paying speaking fees.

Disagree with the solution. An ethical individual will do the right thing, whether that person has military experience or not. We don't need to elect people with military experience (though that's not a problem if they have it). We need to elect people who are ethical. Good luck with that.

[Ken White]

when it first came out, CPT Foley. Ipicked up an early copy at the SWC Bookstore on Smoke Bomb Hill in '64. First Edition. Read it a couple of more times later. Gave it to my son; he can use it, I'm long retired.

I had before and after the book the opportunity to try his techniques and / or see them attempted. He doesn't have any more answers than anyone else does. All wars are different and if you get wedded to a technique or series of them, you will fail. People, culture, terrain -- all those things differ.

The problem with Galula and all the COIN experts is one of resources. There is no question that what they want to do works, I totally agree with the philosophies of FID and COIN.

The issue is that to do what's prescribed is simply unaffordable.

You will never get enough trained soldiers, not SF, with language and cultural skills to do what Galula and the others recommend. That's reality. The French could not do it in Viet Nam or Algeria and later in Viet Nam, with over 1.5M Allied troops in a nation with half the population of Iraq in one-fourth the area, we could not do that -- and good techniques were tried early on (too few people) and later (too few trained and competent people). Afghanistan is larger, has more people and far more difficult terrain. You cannot use good COIN practices without enough people with the skills to do the job required and you will not ever have enough adequately skilled. To do so would require significant devotion of a great many national assets to one small nation and a cessatio0n of short tours; stay until the job's finished. The cost benefit ratio will never support such an effort. Nor should it.

Plus you have to cope with the one third rule and the two year rule and you can finesse those just so long...

If State and SF don't stop potential FID efforts before they build, you're going to have to call in the grundy old Big Army and unless it's an Andorra sized nation, there won't be enough folks and they are unlikely to do it right -- it is not their job, not really. They'll give it their best shot but it's unlikely to ever be more than barely adequate. That, too is reality.

Said Boot:"I know its off topic, but you reminded me of something I had forgotten about until I read you post." So too did you too. Had to hitch a ride on a C-130 once upon a time; Crew Chief or Loadmaster said "you can't get on this plane with those Hand Grenades." So without a word, I pulled them off my harness and tossed 'em to him. The AF has no sense of humor...

Brandon

"The bottom line is that if you really want to affect policy change, you have to work to get your own people elected to office--and that means people with military experience."

I think you'll find that's a decidedly mixed bag; we've had a large former military / veteran presence in Congress, the WH and throughout Government before. Politics corrupts. They didn't do much better than the non-veterans have done. In fact, the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations did a really poor job on most things and they were loaded with WW II veterans. Johnson was far and away the worst President I've seen (even if he did give me a cigarette lighter).

Schmedlap has it right. Ethical and reasonably honest. Good luck with that indeed...

[Brandon Friedman]

I agree with the frustration, with one caveat. I don't think most are loyal to their constituents. They are loyal to whatever will induce their constituents to vote for them. That can be something diametrically opposed to the welfare of their constituents.

Absolutely. That’s what I meant when I said it. Should've been clearer.

Disagree with the solution. An ethical individual will do the right thing, whether that person has military experience or not. We don't need to elect people with military experience (though that's not a problem if they have it). We need to elect people who are ethical. Good luck with that.

It’s not just about ethics. It’s about ethics and expertise when you’re trying to decide whether or not to go to war. I’ve met ethical politicians who simply don’t have the requisite experience or information to even know who to listen to. And with competing lobbying organizations, think tanks, and other political pressures, it becomes a problem. Both the House and Senate are filled with committee members whose only qualifications are that their district or state elected them to office. Others have a very narrow breadth of professional expertise. It’s not unusual to find one’s self horrified at the lack of knowledge and awareness on the part of some members of the House and Senate Armed Services and Veterans Affairs Committees (like when you have to explain to a sitting member of Congress what “dwell time” is and why it’s important in terms of effectively managing a long war).

And when you’re fighting in two or more conflicts at the same time, this type of knowledge becomes important. So it helps when members have military experience. However, if you’re willing to forgo that by not competing for representation, then the SEIU, the Club for Growth, George Soros, and Rush Limbaugh—people whose first, second, and third priority is not defense policy--will be more than happy to assist other candidates in taking your potential candidate’s place.

And when you allow that to happen, you get a Congress that gets jerked around by guys like Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney. (Apologies if anyone here is a big fan of those two.)

You might say it’s not important to have people with military experience in office, but I will argue that it’s absolutely crucial that members of one co-equal branch of government be able to go head-to-head with a member from the other branch. Take Rumsfeld and Cheney for instance. Those guys, whether you support them or not, pushed Congress around in the lead-up to the Iraq invasion. They said that not only is invading Iraq an awesome idea, but we can do it with like 90,000 troops. And it’ll be easy.

And there was no one in Congress with enough of a following or enough political capital (like, say, a Jim Webb) to stand up and say, no, actually, that’s a really bad idea the way you’re presenting it. That's why it's important. I'm sure there were plenty of ethical politicians in 2003 who believed Wolfowitz over Shinseki.

(I should also add, I'm not suggesting that prior military experience makes a politician ethical. I could probably name half a dozen unethical, former military members of Congress off the top of my head.)

[William F. Owen]

—in which COIN techniques must be utilized—and there’s the preventive COIN environment, in which you spend the bulk of your time trying to keep the locals happy and safe—where it is “armed social work” and where you do “need to respect the culture or protect noncombatants to win," despite what Mr. Owen argues.

Sorry, but this strike to the heart of the issue. There is no such thing as "COIN techniques" - 99% of actions performed in COIN are applicable in other forms of warfare. What you are talking about is not something exclusive to something called COIN. It is a means to end, to applied as and when necessary, and within a political context.

Talking about "armed social work," and "respect for culture" utterly misses the point, of
a.) Don't let civilians, who are under your protection, come to needless harm, either by your action or ... worse.. inaction, because it will/may negatively impact your military operations.
b.) Do not do those things that will needlessly create offence, because it will/may negatively impact your military operations.

Now is statement A or B incorrect?
Are they actually different from saying "social work" and "respect for culture". I submit that A is not Social work, and B is good behaviour, not respect.
You are going to have to do things that are not synonymous with "respecting their culture" - killing, searches, etc, so why back yourself into that corner with sloppy semantics?

[Brandon Friedman]

Sorry, but this strike to the heart of the issue. There is no such thing as "COIN techniques" - 99% of actions performed in COIN are applicable in other forms of warfare. What you are talking about is not something exclusive to something called COIN. It is a means to end, to applied as and when necessary, and within a political context.

Call it whatever you like.

You are going to have to do things that are not synonymous with "respecting their culture" - killing, searches, etc, so why back yourself into that corner with sloppy semantics?

If you're not willing to empathize with the population--to try and put yourself in their shoes--and to show respect for their culture and history, then you'll never know your enemy.

And what do killing and searches have to do with not respecting their culture? Nobody said when you search a house you have to completely toss it. And you can be shooting at a guy and still respect his culture. You just don't have to respect the fact that he's trying to kill you. It's not personal. And if you've laid a solid foundation of mutual respect with the locals prior to that, then they tend to understand.

[William F. Owen]

Call it whatever you like.

Thanks, but I am not doing this to be a semantic pr*k. There is a real danger now that some, maybe a lot, think there is something called COIN and something call "War fighting" so the all the diverse reasons and conducts of warfare, are now in two boxes. When you they find another conflict that doesn't fit, they'll invent another box. In fact if you look at "Hybrid" and the Lebanon, they did.
Words matter, and so does the meaning. If it doesn't you can't have doctrine, because you cannot teach it.

If you're not willing to empathize with the population--to try and put yourself in their shoes--and to show respect for their culture and history, then you'll never know your enemy.

I can empathise with them on a very basic human level. That's entirely normal, and you don't need to be taught to do it.
You can't tell soldiers to respect a culture that holds values they don't understand and are in some cases abhorrent to them.
Do you think it's okay to deny women's right? Allow male domestic violence? Arrange marriages? Honour killings? Consider some races sub-human?
These are unacceptable, and you should not respect cultures, or those elements of culture that advocated such things.

Culture is a highly complex area with many different forms of expression, and vastly variable, so the blanket guidance "respect culture," is so simplistic as to cease to be useful.

Let me give you a specific example. If you went to search a house and woman told you from behind a close door, "my husband is not home, go away!" would you? Respecting her culture means you go away. Understanding her culture, means going and getting two woman from another house, who can protect "her honour" and tell her husband, while you search her home.

World of difference. - and at some point, all the allowances and negotiations run out. If you can't find other women, you are going in anyway, and in some cases, that could get that woman beaten or even killed, by the husband, and there is nothing you can do about it. - then turn around to the platoon and tell them this is a culture they need to respect.

[Umar Al-Mokhtār]

"sloppy semantics" going on here (love that term wilf).

The term “respect” is a bit subject to interpretation since it can mean "to hold in esteem or honor" as well as “to show regard or consideration for.”

I for one do not respect the Arab / Muslim culture since it is decidedly misogynist and in many ways sadistic, ignoring basic human rights, particularly with regards to women.

However, when dealing with Arabs / Muslims I show respect for aspects of their cultural norms in not handing them items with my left hand, not exposing the soles of my feet, not touching the top of heads, and especially being mindful of women's precarious position in regards to contact with non-family member males since it could be very detrimental to their personal health and well being.

I think some folks are using the term in the latter sense vice the former; where as wilf is solidly using it in the former. But that's just me.

[Brandon Friedman]

Thanks, but I am not doing this to be a semantic pr*k. There is a real danger now that some, maybe a lot, think there is something called COIN and something call "War fighting" so the all the diverse reasons and conducts of warfare, are now in two boxes. When you they find another conflict that doesn't fit, they'll invent another box. In fact if you look at "Hybrid" and the Lebanon, they did.
Words matter, and so does the meaning. If it doesn't you can't have doctrine, because you cannot teach it.

While there might be some people who want to put "COIN" and "war fighting" in two different boxes, I'm not one of them, and I never suggested that. But you're absolutely right that words do matter.

I can empathise with them on a very basic human level. That's entirely normal, and you don't need to be taught to do it.
You can't tell soldiers to respect a culture that holds values they don't understand and are in some cases abhorrent to them.
Do you think it's okay to deny women's right? Allow male domestic violence? Arrange marriages? Honour killings? Consider some races sub-human?
These are unacceptable, and you should not respect cultures, or those elements of culture that advocated such things.

I'm not going to get sucked into broad-brushing a billion Muslims here. That's absurd. Of course we don't respect men who abuse women or who practice honor killings. But when you walk into a city like, say, Baghdad with the mentality and preconception that the inhabitants are a bunch of wife-beating, 11th century savages, then you're setting yourself up for failure. When you enter a situation like that, you have to give people the benefit of the doubt--regardless of what you think you know about them. And if they disappoint you (or try to kill you), then you can make the adjustment. But when you allow an air of "their-culture-is-abhorrent"/"hajji-this-hajji-that" to permeate your unit in advance of any interaction, I'm telling you, it's going to cause problems for everyone.

Culture is a highly complex area with many different forms of expression, and vastly variable, so the blanket guidance "respect culture," is so simplistic as to cease to be useful.

Fair enough.

Let me give you a specific example. If you went to search a house and woman told you from behind a close door, "my husband is not home, go away!" would you? Respecting her culture means you go away. Understanding her culture, means going and getting two woman from another house, who can protect "her honour" and tell her husband, while you search her home.

World of difference. - and at some point, all the allowances and negotiations run out. If you can't find other women, you are going in anyway, and in some cases, that could get that woman beaten or even killed, by the husband, and there is nothing you can do about it. - then turn around to the platoon and tell them this is a culture they need to respect.

The ideal answer here is neither. In ultra-conservative areas like eastern Afghanistan, the answer is to bring along both Western female troops and plenty of Afghan troops. If that's not possible, then, like you say, in most--but not all--cases you have to go in anyway. If it's viewed in the community as a lack of respect, then it's something you'll have to take up with the village elders. But if you've shown respect in the past and you have good working relationships in the area, then it should work. On the other hand, if they're all Taliban, then you can, you know, make the adjustment.