Nation-Building Elevated

[M-A Lagrange]

Dear Dayuhan and Rex,

I see clearly your point on best practices. In some how, we do agree and words are probably what separates us.

Absolutely agreed. Indeed, I've often that we should spend far less time on "best practices," with all of the potentially dangerous baggage of external omniscience that it sometimes carries with it, and spend a little more time trying to understand "worst practices"--that is, how well-intentioned efforts can go awry, and what can be done to to mitigate those risks (or, at the very least, what questions ought to have been asked).

For me (And it's a personnal understanding) best practices includes DO and DON'T DO. And it's most of the time easier to find all the DON'T DO than even 1 I recommand you to process that way...

In some context, as emmergencies, you do have standards actions with basically: you do that way and no others for technical responses (Food distributiojns, water distributions, camp management...).
But I agree that it is limited for what I know best: immediat emmergencies responses. The "first box" if I can say so.

Even for recovery, (The very next box) you have "better" approach/practices and "practices to avoid" rather than a omniscient knowledge that you just drop on the people. Nothing is worst than a solution droped from the moon.
After, comes stages of "development" I have no clue of what could be a best practice or even a project. (I have no clue of what you do in rural development of a low developed country as Burkina Faso for example.)
If we go on a SWJ Experiment project that looks at providing a compilation of this community knowledge for State Building some steps can be just recommandations of what to not do with illustrated real cases.

The example of Dayuhan is basically a very good one, once you have clearly expose the context, of what to not do, how to not approach the problem...

But this example is may be something that is too far from the target we are looking at: advices for civil/military projects/actions.
We probably should be able to define the limits of such action and build the pre requirement of the advice: at that point you redraw and handover to the civilian development agencies, the local administration and step back until the local context falls back in a need for military action.

[Dayuhan]

But this example is may be something that is too far from the target we are looking at: advices for civil/military projects/actions.

I agree... and I think one piece of advice to start with would be to know what you are trying to accomplish. Is the project intended to promote development or is it intended to win loyalty or support? If the latter, for whom are we trying to win loyalty and support? For us? For the host nation Government?

It is difficult to propose a strategy until the immediate goal is clear.

[Steve the Planner]

Dayuhan:

As I understand it, many areas of Afghanistan were, in effect, self-governing and stable enough, in their own way, but decades of conflict leveled or destabilized a lot of old structures and systems, including with refugee flows and cross-border movements.

In some places, who is in charge, and in charge of what, may be both stable and well-known and understood.

Problem 1: What we are looking for is something very different than what existed before---a nationally-focused interest and commitment to centralized governments that both create and provide demonstrably different levels of economic, social and political linkages and dependencies on more advanced economic dependencies that will create future levarage against barbarism and "old ways".

The advanced economic performance and dependencies are inextricably linked, too, to social advancement factors including higher levels of education and transformational women's rights changes, and acceptance of other religions, cultures and heritages that have criss-crossed Afghanistan (the Bamyan Buddhas, etc...).

So, it is far beyond simple "reconstruction," and the "development" aspects are tightly wound with essential cultural and societal advancement factors that are truly remarkable in their breathtaking audacity---all this now wrapped around the axle of the original anti-AQ mission.

All these things are laudable, but, if our success (and Karzai's continuation) is dependent on them, it is certainly a huge mountain to climb.

The alternative is pretty simlar to what we did in Northern Iraq with MG Hertling: If nobody else has a plan for civilian reconstruction/stability, and I need a plan to accomplish my mission, then I will make a plan, and executed it.

That's a far cry from accidentally stumbling into success one battle space at a time. Intentionality, forethought, some basic interoperability and consistency (or each recovered area will be dissimilar and incompatible with the next), and some guiding purpose....

Amazing task, though.

[Dayuhan]

Problem 1: What we are looking for is something very different than what existed before---a nationally-focused interest and commitment to centralized governments that both create and provide demonstrably different levels of economic, social and political linkages and dependencies on more advanced economic dependencies that will create future levarage against barbarism and "old ways".

The advanced economic performance and dependencies are inextricably linked, too, to social advancement factors including higher levels of education and transformational women's rights changes, and acceptance of other religions, cultures and heritages that have criss-crossed Afghanistan (the Bamyan Buddhas, etc...).

Yikes. If that's problem 1, I don't even want to ask about problem 2.

The big problem I see with "problem 1" is the bold "we" in the citation above.

Somehow "we" went from wanting to see an Afghanistan that doesn't shelter people who attack us to wanting "a nationally-focused interest and commitment to centralized governments that both create and provide demonstrably different levels of economic, social and political linkages and dependencies on more advanced economic dependencies that will create future levarage against barbarism and "old ways". In the process (in my perhaps not entirely humble opinion at least) we went from climbing a mountain to rolling the rock of Sisyphus up a mountain. I can't imagine what would make anyone think that "we" are in a position to create, impose, dictate, inspire, incubate, or otherwise achieve such a thing in Afghanistan.

And at the end of the day, who are "we" to be telling the Afghans what they should become?

[Steve the Planner]

Relax:

Step 1 is still security, and to hold it until Step 2 can get done.

Oh, did I mention that step 2 is usually considered a process of social and economic advancement that takes place over about 20-50 years.

Here, we have to compress it a little...

Actually, the Genral should give it a few more weeks, and if nobody can come up with a credible and implementable civilian sub-national plan and schedule, develop and implement one based on the pieces he does have...and get on with it. Government by... and for...

For that, the rule is simple. Be humble and ask the people what they need to function reasonably, wrap that into a viable governance and economic implementation program that has prospects for sustainable application (and maybe even future societal advancement), and move down the road to implementation (if the partners will agree).

[Dayuhan]

For that, the rule is simple. Be humble and ask the people what they need to function reasonably, wrap that into a viable governance and economic implementation program that has prospects for sustainable application (and maybe even future societal advancement), and move down the road to implementation

If that's simple, I'd hate to see complex.

To start with, I suspect that the assumption of a centralized government is going to meet substantial opposition from local and regional powers, who are likely to be extremely suspicious of any central government they don't control.

[Steve the Planner]

I think that is the point.

Without an effective subnational governance plan emenating from the center, each area will set it's own course, which we will then support instead.

At that point, you have, by default, bypassed the central government, and, therefore, undermined it.

You already see it going on now with Intl aid starting to bypass Kabul.

A recent story on Pashtuns agreeing to oppose Taliban in exchange for development aid was quite instructive. They are as equally opposed to Kabul, which steals their money.

One deal at a time might end immediate AQ threats, but it won't make a nation (except by complete accident). Are we out to end immediate AQ threats or to build a nation as a more permanent threat reduction step?