Do you know what you don't know?

[John T. Fishel]

and my post on that thread regarding some of the recent historical sources of the "just don't get it" syndorme.

The AID policy referred to in my post on the other thread began to change during and after Operation Provide Comfort in N. Iraq after DS/DS. Then, under the leadership of the Deputy Director of AID's Office of Foerign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Dayton Maxwell, OFDA collaborated with the Civil Affaris community to produce an FM (red cover) that would fit in a BDU pocket on how to conduct similar operations. As an aside, the Director of OFDA at the time was then Major Andrew Natsios, USAR, from the 352nd Civil affairs Command who was called up for the Kuwait Task Force. His boss in the KTF, COL Randy Elliott USAR was in his civilian job a Mid East Analyst in DOS' Bureau of Intelligence & Research. Natsios went on to head World Vision and later AID.

Cheers

JohnT

[Tom Odom]

and my post on that thread regarding some of the recent historical sources of the "just don't get it" syndorme.

The AID policy referred to in my post on the other thread began to change during and after Operation Provide Comfort in N. Iraq after DS/DS. Then, under the leadership of the Deputy Director of AID's Office of Foerign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), Dayton Maxwell, OFDA collaborated with the Civil Affaris community to produce an FM (red cover) that would fit in a BDU pocket on how to conduct similar operations. As an aside, the Director of OFDA at the time was then Major Andrew Natsios, USAR, from the 352nd Civil affairs Command who was called up for the Kuwait Task Force. His boss in the KTF, COL Randy Elliott USAR was in his civilian job a Mid East Analyst in DOS' Bureau of Intelligence & Research. Natsios went on to head World Vision and later AID.

Cheers

JohnT

Natsios was George the First's special Advisor on Disaster Relief. He was instrumental in talking us into Somalia; I had him come over and brief the CSA and Staff as we went in for Restore Hope. He bailed of course when Clinton was elected and drew a mega salary from World Vision. Brian Attwood was USAID Administrator and Nan Borden was OFDA chief during Goma. I liked both--they listened and they were not hesistant to tell stupid peeple to shut up.

On the USAID Policy thingy I see it as an good framework; the real issue is like an SOP in any military unit it is worthless unless read and enforced.

best

Tom

[Entropy]

Not much direct experience here, but it seems likely to me both sides see the other as "stone walls" simultaneously.

My comment would be: Where is the unity of command? At some point there has to be a big dog to settle these disputes. Imagine a military campaign with no joint force commander. Each component is off doing it's own thing, using its own vision to win the war. ISTM that's what is happening between other agencies, NGO's and the military - there's not higher authority that can make them play nice and work together using a coordinated strategy.

[Tom Odom]

At some point there has to be a big dog to settle these disputes.

Most of the time, in my experience, there was not, at least not on the ground, unless the ambassador or equivalent stepped up. that was absolutely true in Zaire.

In Rwanda, I had an Ambassador who stepped up. We also had Dick McCall as the #3 man in USAID on the ground. We had Susan Rice on the NSC in our court, and DoD with Joe Nye championing what we were trying to do. Dick Bogosian as State's regional coordinator was also a strong ally. Both SOCEUR and EUCOM were on board with us. US Embassies in Uganda and Tanzania were good partners. Kenya was a wind sock.

Opponents included elements of State Africa Burea, CIA, the US Mission to the UN, the US Diplomatic Missions (embassies) in Burundi and Zaire, and some members of Congress who at times seemed to forget there had been this thing called a genocide.

That is why Africa Command could be a real step forward if it works to iron out these issues before they are issues.

[John T. Fishel]

it serves to enable cooperative behavior. Of course, that depends on the individuals involved. Same problem with sharing intel, etc.

Entropy, you have had a "blinding flash of the ALMOST obvious." Those were the things that we used to call in SWORD sort of slap the head moments. It should have been obvious to anyone with half a brain but for some reason no one got it until somebody actualy pointed it out. Sometimes they don't get it even when it is pointed out. It is also why in interagency and multinational operations we refer to unity of effort rather than unity of command. The latter is a subset of the former and makes things a lot easier. But unity of command is no panacea, especially if the commander chooses to disregard the facts (which has happened on more than one occasion).

Cheers

JohnT

[Rank amateur]

NGOs don't follow commands. They operate by consensus. You are one person sitting around the table, with one vote and everyone else at the table is a loopy, wanna save the world left wing liberal. (Except for Tom's wife. I'm sure she's a wonderful woman.)

[Ken White]

...............

[Tom Odom]

NGOs don't follow commands.

true

but you can pull their funding

(Except for Tom's wife. I'm sure she's a wonderful woman.)

not true, at least the one you referring to,

[Stan]

true

but you can pull their funding

Too True, Tom.

Soldiers are disciplined and follow the ROE. I think we got along to the extent we humanly could (there) and we were not politically-driven by some agenda (other than wanting to go home).

AMBOs come and go, and we had the pleasure of having a few without agendas. Our team worked because it had to (down to 13 from a "once upon a time" 500 plus "official employees" in a mere 5 days.

Get the job done (or, as Tom did, send the Sierra home and get the team in order).

Enough said

[Beelzebubalicious]

I don't know shinola, so by definition, I don't know sh*t. That's how I always introduce myself. Seriously, I do get far by admitting I have a lot to learn and that's one of the reasons I follow SWC. I also have a preference for getting things done and avoiding bullsh*t.

I work in a not-for-profit and the consensus model drives me nuts sometimes. It paralyzes and frustrates. It's a model for those who don't want to make decisions and take accountability for those decisions.

NGOs can certainly benefit from different management and operational structures. The problem is that when you work with local counterparts on long-term development and capacity building stuff, a lot of time it's about working with them and coming to consensus on how to move forward. It doesn't really work to come in and tell people what to do and how to do it.