Initial Officer Selection

[JMA]

I don't disagree with any of that, nor did I suggest anything to the contrary.

As I suggested earlier it may all be in the semantics.

I tend to shy away from the word 'questions' because it may be construed as order being 'questioned'.

There is a big difference between in combat and during training for combat.

During training there is plenty of time to discuss the reasons behind actions with all ranks. Certainly in the time I spent training officers I encouraged them to think/analyze/etc... in fact if they did not have an opinion on the matter under discussion I considered them to be (intellectually) limited.

In fact when you are training for a war into which you will be hurled in a matter of months or less it tends to focus the attention. It is in this period of training for war that you allow troops to seek clarity, to discuss drills and tactics and reach a level where they understand what is expected of them and the possible tactical options that they will be required to take part in. (note: no use of the word 'question'.)

Once you cock your weapon and head out the time for seeking clarity is over. You just do as you are damn well told.

[JMA]

Starting with post ~95 you criticised some suggestions as too time-consuming, esp. the very long time an officer of the Reichwehr would stay in the ranks of Leutnant/Oberleutnant in the time 1919-1932.

This allowed them to gain a lot of theoretical knowledge, gave them the opportunity to learn how to teach, and the time to train with the troops, usually at least one stint in a different branch.

Haupmann v. Schell refers to this generation of officers, when he made the statement you cite, therefore, my confusion.

You will have to give me the exact quote.

'Learn how to teach'? Von Schell talks of the US focus on teaching or being taught. The problem he identified then is the lack of time to 'exercise' with a unit in the field. The assumption is that when a person completes a course he has that skill.

What I am saying is that the skill is not mastered until it is exercised in as near to a war time setting as can be simulated... repeatedly.

Again I suggest any misunderstanding we may appear to have is through the choice of words.

BTW another gem of a book is 'Hans Von Luck - Panzer Commander - The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck'.

[Bob's World]

In 1932 in the US Army:

36 years time in service to make Colonel (on average, and a vast improvement from the 58 years required a century earlier)

Mean age of
LTs: 32
CPTs: 43
MAJs: 45.5
LTCs: 52.3
COLs: 59

My first BN CDR in 1986 was a Vietnam vet who had commanded 5 times at the Company level. While he was exceptional, he was not the exception. Good Commanders commanded.

Like in so many aspects of life, at some point you have to find the balance between old enough to know what to do, and young enough to still be able to do something about it.


(A great resoure for those interested in an army that is much more like what we need today than what we have coming out of 65 years of Cold War, Post Cold War and GWOT buildup is "The Regulars - The American Army 1898 - 1941" by Edward M. Coffman)

[Ken White]

As I suggested earlier it may all be in the semantics.

Not that (3), I agree with that. It's a feature of this discussion.

I tend to shy away from the word 'questions' because it may be construed as order being 'questioned'.

See? That's just being finicky and over semantically involved.

There is a big difference between in combat and during training for combat.

That (1). The difference should be as slight as one can make it. I agree with the rest of that thought. Particularly this:

It is in this period of training for war that you allow troops to seek clarity, to discuss drills and tactics and reach a level where they understand what is expected of them and the possible tactical options that they will be required to take part in.

However, this is a reversion to semantics:

(note: no use of the word 'question'.)

We each had / have a choice, I never object to questions, the more nervous types often do.

Once you cock your weapon and head out the time for seeking clarity is over. You just do as you are damn well told.

That (2). I certainly did not always do that and I rather doubt you did either. That, frankly is dangerous and just wrong. Things change and you have to adapt. You cannot ask for thinking Officers and NCOs -- and other ranks -- on the one hand then ask for robot like total compliance on the other; you can't have it both ways (I'd also note we're back to that trust thingy... ).

In 1966 in Viet Nam, I was unfortunately * attached to Dave Hackworth, then an Acting Bn Cdr, at one time. He gave me a mission using the Platoon of which I was the acting PL and I said "Yes, Sir" then went about it in a totally different manner than the way he had over directed be employed. He was afterwards quite torqued but couldn't say or do much but grumble because we had been successful and had no casualties. Aside from that incident I have many, many times disregarded orders, in peace and in combat, and done so with variations from very slight to totally ignoring and turning off my radio. I strongly encourage anyone who thinks to do the same. YMMV.

* He blustered and boasted a lot, bluffed -- poorly -- a lot...

[Ken White]

While I do not disagree that better training promotes trust, I submit that trust is rather hard to practice when those outside the chain of command... the knee jerk response by certain elected officials and their staffs to such stories.

Sadly true and an indictment of the media and the Congress but not so much those Leaders who were forced into such a position. That story, in variations, is all too common. It's also worldwide though we have over developed it here in the US.

I seem to recall Bn Cdrs micromanaging platoon-level fights in VN from their helicopters. With that kind of background informing the leadership development of the mentors of much of today's military senior leadership, is it any wonder that the best we might hope for from the current crop of seniors is something like a Reaganesque "trust but verify"?

Goes back further than that. Tales of Patton and even Bradley visiting the Troops and getting over directive abound. It got kicked up a notch in Korea after the mess settled down into trench warfare; too many senior Commanders (and their Staffs...) with too little to do could visit and 'engineer success.' Sad.

In Viet Nam the trend was excacerbated by the fact of major shortfalls in Captains and Senior NCOs in 67-68 -- those Bn Cdrs learned 2LTs and brand new SGTs would do anything you asked but didn't know much and so need a lot of supervision...

The trend and tendency was / is reinforced by the type of low intensity warfare in VN and today; gives the senior folks with too little to do a chance to piddle. That's particularly bothersome in an Army that prides itself on 'zero defects' like performance and staying busy. It's also all too easy with today's Comm and surveillance assets...

It, as Bob says, is not going away and is likely to get worse before it gets better. The saving factor is that such foolishness cannot be practiced in a major, high intensity rapidly moving conflict and we can learn to do it right -- after unnecessarily killing too many people and firing the nervous...

I can only speak to the American military, based on my experience. One hopes that other nations' militaries are not equally "blessed" with such trust and oversight.

Based on my observation, it's endemic worldwide, the more democratic the nation, the worse the problem...

[JMA]

In 1966 in Viet Nam, I was unfortunately * attached to Dave Hackworth, then an Acting Bn Cdr, at one time. He gave me a mission using the Platoon of which I was the acting PL and I said "Yes, Sir" then went about it in a totally different manner than the way he had over directed be employed. He was afterwards quite torqued but couldn't say or do much but grumble because we had been successful and had no casualties. Aside from that incident I have many, many times disregarded orders, in peace and in combat, and done so with variations from very slight to totally ignoring and turning off my radio. I strongly encourage anyone who thinks to do the same. YMMV.

I'm not sure I fully understand what you are meaning here (and the circumstances where a bn comd issues patrol orders directly to a platoon - where was your coy comd?)

Are you saying that a Bn Comd gave orders for a patrol more than the mission (being what to do) and instructed on the execution (how to do it) as well?

I can't think of circumstances where that would be required or advisable other than where the platoon commander is an absolute greenhorn or in an 'in contact' defensive setting where the movement tolerances are extremely tight.

The guiding principle in issuing such orders is to tell the patrol comd what to do (the mission) but not how to do it (the execution).

What I learned at the feet of the masters and adopted myself was to brief a patrol commander on his task (mission) then tell him to go away and plan his patrol but before he issued orders to come back to me and run the outline plan past me. In this way I could get a feel for the competence of the commander while at the same time being able to influence the conduct to some degree (while knowing that once the patrol commander was on his own he could do almost as he pleased regardless of what I had said).

This is how the men are separated from the boys. The more competent officers/NCOs tend to be given all the more testing patrol tasks while the junior ones or those about which there are some doubts get given the routine stuff.

As stated I never deviated from my orders because I was never told how to do it but suggest that where patrol comds find themselves in such a situation where they deviate from the orders on how to do it the troopies don't need to know this is happening. The last thing one needs, as it is bad for discipline, is for a general belief to develop that orders are negotiable where all junior officers and NCOs believe that they can decide which orders to follow and which to ignore.

[Ken White]

I'm not sure I fully understand what you are meaning here (and the circumstances where a bn comd issues patrol orders directly to a platoon - where was your coy comd?)

In reverse order, The Platoon was a Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon which did reconnaissance and surveillance missions as well as some limited economy of force actions. Only one per Battalion, assigned to Headquarters Company (which does not exercise tactical command). It is one of three tactical Platoons (Recon, Antitank, Mortar) which operate independently and directly under Bn Control. They are generally placed under Operational Control of other Bns only rarely; this was one of those rare times. Indeed, during seven years in such platoons in three units, that was one of only two times, both quite brief, such detachment was experienced.

I was given an over prescriptive order for a reconnaissance and an economy of force mission combined. Mission was not a particular problem but the 'how I think this should be done' way it was couched, engendered in large part due to that trust issue; he didn't know me or the capability of the Platoon, I didn't know him (that happens often in large Armies that rotate people frequently) was IMO the wrong approach, likely to result in failure and with a chance of own casualties. So, rather than get in an argument I would lose, I just said "Yes, Sir" and went ahead and did it my way.

Are you saying that a Bn Comd gave orders for a patrol more than the mission (being what to do) and instructed on the execution (how to do it) as well?

Exactly. Most would never do that, Hackworth, OTOH, was a legend in his own mind...

I can't think of circumstances where that would be required or advisable other than where the platoon commander is an absolute greenhorn or in an 'in contact' defensive setting where the movement tolerances are extremely tight.

I agree -- even given a cross attachment where neither person knows the other and the competence of the tasked organization is not known, it's rare but it does happen.

What I learned at the feet of the masters and adopted myself was to brief a patrol commander on his task (mission) then tell him to go away and plan his patrol but before he issued orders to come back to me and run the outline plan past me. In this way I could get a feel for the competence of the commander while at the same time being able to influence the conduct to some degree (while knowing that once the patrol commander was on his own he could do almost as he pleased regardless of what I had said).\

That's the way it's done ordinarily. For this particular mission, there was a time problem and that's why we were doing it instead of his own Reconnaissance Platoon. Which might've had a problem doing it in any event, that platoon had been combined with that Battalion's Antitank Platoon into what they called the 'Recondo' Platoon, it was, in essence a junior rifle company and was used as such and thus did not do reconnaissance missions often.

As stated I never deviated from my orders because I was never told how to do it

Well, good for you. Everyone should be so lucky. It is indeed a rare circumstance to be told 'how' but it does happen.

,,,but suggest that where patrol comds find themselves in such a situation where they deviate from the orders on how to do it the troopies don't need to know this is happening. The last thing one needs, as it is bad for discipline, is for a general belief to develop that orders are negotiable where all junior officers and NCOs believe that they can decide which orders to follow and which to ignore.

We can disagree on that with a situation dependent caveat (that approach is sometimes needed, more often not. The Troops aren't stupid...). I always had more confidence in myself, in the other NCOs and the Troops than that. In my experience that vaguely martinetish attitude certainly exists and is in fact too prevalent but everyone doesn't operate that way. Fortunately IMO.

[JMA]

In reverse order, The Platoon was a Battalion Reconnaissance Platoon which did reconnaissance and surveillance missions as well as some limited economy of force actions. Only one per Battalion, assigned to Headquarters Company (which does not exercise tactical command). It is one of three tactical Platoons (Recon, Antitank, Mortar) which operate independently and directly under Bn Control.

Yes of course that is the standard battalion arrangement.

They are generally placed under Operational Control of other Bns only rarely; this was one of those rare times. Indeed, during seven years in such platoons in three units, that was one of only two times, both quite brief, such detachment was experienced.

Yes not normal for standard infantry but SF would be used to be being tasked to 'answer a question' through recce just about anywhere (but would certainly not be told how to do it).

I was given an over prescriptive order for a reconnaissance and an economy of force mission combined. Mission was not a particular problem but the 'how I think this should be done' way it was couched, engendered in large part due to that trust issue; he didn't know me or the capability of the Platoon, I didn't know him (that happens often in large Armies that rotate people frequently) was IMO the wrong approach, likely to result in failure and with a chance of own casualties. So, rather than get in an argument I would lose, I just said "Yes, Sir" and went ahead and did it my way.

OK

It is indeed a rare circumstance to be told 'how' but it does happen.We can disagree on that with a situation dependent caveat (that approach is sometimes needed, more often not. The Troops aren't stupid...). I always had more confidence in myself, in the other NCOs and the Troops than that. In my experience that vaguely martinetish attitude certainly exists and is in fact too prevalent but everyone doesn't operate that way. Fortunately IMO.

Yes the troopies may get an idea of what is happening... I agree they are not all stupid, but I suggest it is a test of character for the patrol comd to resist the temptation to 'wave a flag' saying look what I'm doing. I'm flipping the Bn Comd.

Now moving along to the combat refusals in Vietnam. I assume there were valid reasons for these? If not how did this cancer start and spread?

[Ulenspiegel]

You will have to give me the exact quote.

'Learn how to teach'? Von Schell talks of the US focus on teaching or being taught. The problem he identified then is the lack of time to 'exercise' with a unit in the field. The assumption is that when a person completes a course he has that skill.

What I am saying is that the skill is not mastered until it is exercised in as near to a war time setting as can be simulated... repeatedly.

Again I suggest any misunderstanding we may appear to have is through the choice of words.

BTW another gem of a book is 'Hans Von Luck - Panzer Commander - The Memoirs of Colonel Hans von Luck'.

In the German system of ~1900 to 1935 there was no automatism between graduation and promotion (in contrast to Westpoint). Hauptkadettenanstalt graduates usually did not get their Leutnantspatent but had to prove themselves again in their regiment before getting their new rank/position.

Other differences can be found in academic cuture:

From German officers it was not requested to find a textbook solution, differnt opinions were encouraged. No need to please an superior in courses by finding the "correct" solution.

Interaction of the staff at the Germanan military institutions and their students was very different to the situation in the US couterparts. Staff was not only superiors but in many situation acted as peers/comrades.

Officers who strived for staff positions were expected to understand these points and were able to contribute to this with their teaching.

Quality of academic staff and differences in the curriculum (leadership vs management).

[Ken White]

Now moving along to the combat refusals in Vietnam. I assume there were valid reasons for these? If not how did this cancer start and spread?

I think there were probably two poles:

- A few of what most would consider a sensible refusal to do something illegal or bone stupid that the system virtually had to illuminate and that many resulted in a mere wrist slap while a very few were miscarriages of justice.

- A few egregious acts of sheer cowardice (or abysmal stupidity based on flawed principle) that merited a more harsh punishment than they received with perhaps the odd miscarriage of justice.

...And the majority of those refusals fell in between those two poles. Without being present and witnessing events, all we can do is speculate. I tend not to put much faith in written ex post facto reports -- most have an agenda. Come to think of it, that's true of most records and reports out of Viet Nam IMO. Lot of fudging went on...

I can however go beyond speculation on the spread of the problem -- political correctness and diffidence caused by changes in moral values in the west generally during the 1960s and by the perceived unpopularity (not only perceived with respect to the Media and most politicians, just with respect to the bulk of the US populace...) of that war.

ADDED: Missed this

...but I suggest it is a test of character for the patrol comd to resist the temptation to 'wave a flag' saying look what I'm doing. I'm flipping the Bn Comd.

Agree, generally nothing should be said but IMO, any questions from observant Troops should be answered honestly with an explanation that avoids the perception of "look what I'm doing..."

[JMA]

Quality of academic staff and differences in the curriculum (leadership vs management).

Care to explain this some more?

[Ken White]

However I suspect that "Quality of academic staff and differences in the curriculum (leadership vs management)" refers to the fact that the Germans selected instructors versus the US then and now assigning whoever was available without too much regard for capability (which is far from being the same thing as 'qualification') all too often...

General Philip Sheridan summed it up well in the 1870s when he noted with respect to the recent Prussian victory and a fascination in the US with them "We will make a mistake if we adopt the mechanics of the Prussian system rather than its intent." (or words to that effect; I let a friend borrow the book {LINK}). Sheridan also noted that whenever the Europeans had a war, the US army adopted the cap of the winning side -- a proclivity that still, quite unfortunately, holds true.

On the leadership versus management. An accurate slam. We in the US wrongly concentrate on the thing that can be 'measured' with metrics rather than on the far more important competency that can only be subjectively evaluated -- until a lot of people are killed unnecessarily. That produces a metric...

[JMA]

I think there were probably two poles:

- A few of what most would consider a sensible refusal to do something illegal or bone stupid that the system virtually had to illuminate and that many resulted in a mere wrist slap while a very few were miscarriages of justice.

- A few egregious acts of sheer cowardice (or abysmal stupidity based on flawed principle) that merited a more harsh punishment than they received with perhaps the odd miscarriage of justice.

...And the majority of those refusals fell in between those two poles. Without being present and witnessing events, all we can do is speculate. I tend not to put much faith in written ex post facto reports -- most have an agenda. Come to think of it, that's true of most records and reports out of Viet Nam IMO. Lot of fudging went on...

I can however go beyond speculation on the spread of the problem -- political correctness and diffidence caused by changes in moral values in the west generally during the 1960s and by the perceived unpopularity (not only perceived with respect to the Media and most politicians, just with respect to the bulk of the US populace...) of that war.

ADDED: Missed thisAgree, generally nothing should be said but IMO, any questions from observant Troops should be answered honestly with an explanation that avoids the perception of "look what I'm doing..."

By 'combat refusals' I mean (what they really are and that is) mutiny. So I have an interest in that from the point of view of the desirability of ever using conscripts (other than in an existential war) and the role officers (and NCOs) play in such acts. Also looking at the culture that developed (or rather what the officer corps allowed to develop) where mutiny became a regular occurrence among US forces in 1971 in Vietnam (according to the book 'Crisis of Command' where it is reported that 254 such incidences were recorded by Senate testimony). It would be interesting to establish and research the role of officers in these acts of mutiny and how if anyway the culture of 'questioning' contributed.

Gen Bill Slim spoke of 'shirking' (talking of Burma during WWII) where troops went out on patrol and then instead of carrying out their mission found a shady/comfortable place to relax until the time they had to return to base.

Richard Holmes in the book 'Acts of War' quotes Tim O'Brien and Charles Anderson as saying that 'shirking' was prevalent in Vietnam.

Shirking was a problem in Rhodesia where conscripts and reservists were concerned and in addition where 'sticks' (four man patrols) were commanded by junior NCOs.

Hear stories of 'shirking' coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan (both US and Brit).

There has to be an officer dynamic in all this (and it highlights the need for higher standards in officers and NCOs especially in insurgencies).

I am in the process of obtaining a copy of 'Crisis in Command' not merely for the matters discussed above but importantly because of this I read in a review:

The organizational methods, as well as the ethic, of the business corporation have displaced the military's traditional structure and morality.

Interesting that Antony Beevor puts his finger on a similar problem amongst the Brit officer corps circa 1990 (more in terms of young officer attitudes in this case).

I have noticed that there seems to be a resurgence of the promotion of 'management' theories for the military these days... very dangerous... but understandable where an officer corps was selected based on academic ability and not on leadership potential.

[JMA]

General Philip Sheridan summed it up well in the 1870s when he noted with respect to the recent Prussian victory and a fascination in the US with them "We will make a mistake if we adopt the mechanics of the Prussian system rather than its intent."

True. One studies broadly to learn as much as one can in order to draw on that research for the benefit of one's own environment. Not to look for a solution which can be replicated exactly into one's own environment.

This is why the apparent search for an exact COIN doctrine to follow to the letter (as seen around here too often) is such a poor reflection of the officer corps of today.

Von Schell's book provides a good intelligent look in the US system by an outsider with no malicious intent. In fact he clearly states:

Let us take several actual examples from war and see what we can learn from them. In studying these examples it should be borne in mind that they do not constitute a universal formula; they deal only with German soldiers, moreover, they deal only with particular German soldiers in certain definite situations.

[Surferbeetle]

I have noticed that there seems to be a resurgence of the promotion of 'management' theories for the military these days... very dangerous... but understandable where an officer corps was selected based on academic ability and not on leadership potential.

vs

One studies broadly to learn as much as one can in order to draw on that research for the benefit of one's own environment. Not to look for a solution which can be replicated exactly into one's own environment.

Development of both leadership and management skill sets are a staple of a variety of American Military schools.

For those who have not had the pleasure of attending such a school, or have not been exposed to historical examples of soldiers who are able to wield both skill sets, the exploits of Gen George Patton and his ability to both lead and manage elements of the American Army as they moved from Saarbrucken to Bastogne during WWII are worth review.

In all, Patton would reposition six full divisions (including his 3rd and 12th Army Corps) from their positions on the Saar front along a line stretching from Bastogne to Diekirch to Echternach.[75] Within a few days, more than 133,000 Third Army vehicles were re-routed into an offensive that covered a combined distance of 1.5 million miles, followed by supply echelons carrying some 62,000 tons of supplies.[76]

There are also more recent examples to consider.

Speed Kills: Supply Chain Lessons from the War in Iraq, by Diane K. Morales, Steve Geary, November 1, 2003, Harvard Business Review

Every seasoned leader knows that even the most brilliant strategy is only as good as its execution. Battle plans that seem full of promise on the whiteboard can be undone in the field by clumsy operations or a missing link in the supply chain.

Leadership uber alles briefs well in some utopian quarters, but it does not reflect the demands of the real world upon soldiers.

[Ken White]

Gen Bill Slim spoke of 'shirking' (talking of Burma during WWII) where troops went out on patrol and then instead of carrying out their mission found a shady/comfortable place to relax until the time they had to return to base.
. . .
Hear stories of 'shirking' coming out of Iraq and Afghanistan (both US and Brit).

There has to be an officer dynamic in all this (and it highlights the need for higher standards in officers and NCOs especially in insurgencies).

The Pharoah's troops shirked. So did Alexander's and Wellington's and Cronje's. There was shirking in all Armies in WW II. There was shirking in in Korea and indeed shirking in Viet Nam -- in the first case in 'elite' Marine units with no conscripts (also in NK and Chinese units who had conscripts...) and in the second in 'elite' Airborne units with few to no conscripts. People shirk and they do so for all sorts of reasons. In my observation the amount of shirking was directly analogous to the stupidity and / or lack of necessity in the eyes of the beholders and / or the tedium factor of task(s) being performed or directed. Most of that did occur with Junior NCOs but there were cases of more senior NCOs and even Oficers up to and including Company Commanders -- most of those latter two got caught and relieved if not a Court Martial. When things were hot or had the potential to be, I saw no shirking. When things got slack, shirking occurred. Most was not cowardice, just laziness.

It's a people thing and its also related to what's going on in ones war at the time -- in the case of Viet Nam in 1971, no one wanted to be the last guy to get killed in a war that was effectively over but still had troops in a position to be attacked and when the US Army was still foolishly insisting on 'conducting operations.'. We did not do that well. Nor did we do Iraq well or are we doing departure from Afghanistan well -- we're slow learners...

I have noticed that there seems to be a resurgence of the promotion of 'management' theories for the military these days... very dangerous... but understandable where an officer corps was selected based on academic ability and not on leadership potential.

It is understandable. It is also able to be passed off as 'fair and objective' to legislatures concerned about such things -- it's easier, too than the hard work of assessing leadership potential. More importantly, as you say, it is dangerous.

It's just wrong, too...

[Ken White]

Von Schell's book provides a good intelligent look in the US system by an outsider with no malicious intent.

He was heard. The Tactics Department at Fort Leavenworth used to preface their block of instruction with words to this effect:

"What we are going to teach you will work on a mild, clear June day in gently rolling terrain without heavy vegetation against a similarly organized and equipped enemy force provided you have all your personnel, they are adequately trained and properly equipped and all your equipment is functional. If ANY of those parameters are changed, you will have to adapt."

Hopefully, they're still doing that and, more hopefully, the students hear and will heed the message.

[JMA]

vs

Development of both leadership and management skill sets are a staple of a variety of American Military schools.

To be honest with you the initial 'officer selection' in terms of identifying leadership potential among candidates is weakest in the US system as opposed to the other NATO countries.

The knock on effect of this is where the nonsense line that 'leadership can be taught' is put out as official policy and belief when faced with a shortage of that natural skill among cadets.

Captain Adolf Von Schell:

It is certainly correct that leaders, like great artists, are born and not made; but even the born artist requires years of hard study and practice before he masters his art. So it is with the military leader; if he is to learn the art of war, he must practice the tools of his art.

For those who have not had the pleasure of attending such a school, or have not been exposed to historical examples of soldiers who are able to wield both skill sets, the exploits of Gen George Patton and his ability to both lead and manage elements of the American Army as they moved from Saarbrucken to Bastogne during WWII are worth review.

Generals like Patton have 'staffs' who do all/most of the work but the majority of officers (down the line) neither have or need staff support for their limited and far less complex operations (from a logistics point of view).

Unlike leadership, management can be taught. Yes there will be those who are outstanding leaders in action but are unable to make the step up to command at higher levels and subsequently their careers wither and die.

Its a 'cart and horse' situation. First an officer must be a born leader then as he rises up the ranks (and becomes separated from the fighting men) he must develop command skills (through command and staff college etc etc).

In my time we were pretty critical of the weaker officers... until we found ourselves surrounded by civvies. Then we realised that our weakest were still way ahead of what passed for 'leaders' in commerce and industry.

Lets look at logistics (a military definition - not some knocked off civvilian version):

The science of planning and carrying out the movement and maintenance of forces.... those aspects of military operations that deal with the design and development, acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and disposition of material; movement, evacuation, and hospitalization of personnel; acquisition of construction, maintenance, operation and disposition of facilities; and acquisition of furnishing of services.

Yes, the people who operate the massive logistics behind the movements of modern armies need to be skilled at the science of logistics.

...but remember... logistics is a science but leadership is an art.

Leadership uber alles briefs well in some utopian quarters, but it does not reflect the demands of the real world upon soldiers.

Huh?

That sounds like a variation on the theme of 'size doesn't matter' where those who have no leadership ability sell the fiction that through management alone battles and wars can be won.

Go back to the beginning of the officer selection process. If selection was based on leadership potential together with a required academic and physical level then this would not even be discussed in the US military today ... but when 60% of the selection is based on academic ability and reliance is placed on school teacher references about the candidates leadership potential then your selection accuracy is no better than the throw of the dice. (What the hell do school teachers know about leadership, especially that required by officers in combat?)

Despite the system enough officers with leadership ability seem to make it through ... but maybe not enough.

[JMA]

He was heard. The Tactics Department at Fort Leavenworth used to preface their block of instruction with words to this effect:

"What we are going to teach you will work on a mild, clear June day in gently rolling terrain without heavy vegetation against a similarly organized and equipped enemy force provided you have all your personnel, they are adequately trained and properly equipped and all your equipment is functional. If ANY of those parameters are changed, you will have to adapt."

Hopefully, they're still doing that and, more hopefully, the students hear and will heed the message.

One can hope for no more.

[Surferbeetle]

Generals like Patton have 'staffs' who do all/most of the work but the majority of officers (down the line) neither have or need staff support for their limited and far less complex operations (from a logistics point of view).

Unlike leadership, management can be taught. Yes there will be those who are outstanding leaders in action but are unable to make the step up to command at higher levels and subsequently their careers wither and die.

Its a 'cart and horse' situation. First an officer must be a born leader then as he rises up the ranks (and becomes separated from the fighting men) he must develop command skills (through command and staff college etc etc).

We all regularly reflect upon how and why the long race unfolded...who was selected, how long did they last, what were they able to accomplish, the right and wrong of it all, and how do we improve it...

As a result of my reflections, I would suggest that 'good officers' meet a threshold criteria of being 'all-a-rounders' who are mentally & physically tough, smart, deeply driven, and selfless.

Cadet selection processes that i am familiar with place a premium upon a rich and plentiful amount of opportunities to assess and develop a feel for how a variety of systems & processes unfold (from the cadet perspective) while providing valuable insights into the core of the cadet (for those making the selection). The goal is to consistently select and develop balanced individuals able to effectively function across the 'full spectrum'.

Leadership and management skills are required of all officers throughout their careers...the actual balance between the two varies from situation to situation and over the course of various duties assigned...but my observation is that both skill sets are part and parcel of a successful officer's innate makeup.

Perhaps we are having difficulties with respect to our definitions of leadership and management skill sets...I know what they are and are not when i see them.....but i don't have references at hand at the moment that provide clean definitions of what i am trying to share...