Force Ratios (the old 3-to-1 rule)

[Chris jM]

Thanks for the responses. Much appreciated, especially Tom and Tukhachevskii for the links. It'll take me a few days to get through them as I've got a 'healthy' work-load on, but it all looks like interesting stuff.

Likewise JMA and SJP, cheers for the snippets.

SJPONeill - firstly, I hope your new job is going well. Secondly, with regards to the 1-6 against a conventional enemy, I'd be interested if you dig anything out on that as all the info I have to hand indicates it is 3-1 against a conventional enemy when the ratio is normally applied (excluding Fuchs mentioning of it applying to Soviet theory - from 'our' side I haven't seen any mention of it, at least).

Wilf - at the very least, I think the 3-1 "idea" is a good sanity checking device for a conventional commander in a conventional battle to determine if he is walking to his imminent doom, or if he has weighted success in his favour. It provided a good conceptual basis when I started to be assessed tactically - if you find a section, put a platoon up against it. If I find more than a section, get on the means and hit up the Company Comd for some more resources. I wasn't the smartest tactically so any and every idea available to me to simplify my job did help.

[William F. Owen]

Wilf - at the very least, I think the 3-1 "idea" is a good sanity checking device for a conventional commander in a conventional battle to determine if he is walking to his imminent doom, or if he has weighted success in his favour. It provided a good conceptual basis when I started to be assessed tactically - if you find a section, put a platoon up against it. If I find more than a section, get on the means and hit up the Company Comd for some more resources. I wasn't the smartest tactically so any and every idea available to me to simplify my job did help.

Checks on sanity may be very necessary. 3:1 may not serve that purpose, and I believe we can do better. Essentially it MAY be an aid to planning, but after that it really fails the "So what" test of effectiveness, because it is at best simplistic and at worse very misleading.

[JMA]

Checks on sanity may be very necessary. 3:1 may not serve that purpose, and I believe we can do better. Essentially it MAY be an aid to planning, but after that it really fails the "So what" test of effectiveness, because it is at best simplistic and at worse very misleading.

My opinion FWIW is that for a peacetime army 3:1 in training is probably essential. It certainly provides commanders (at junior levels) in battle for the first time with the ability to roll off a plan which will probably work just fine in most cases.

Yes also to the fact that as one gains combat experience against a specific enemy in a particular environment one no longer needs this 3:1 crutch... but that takes some time and a number of contacts at varying ranges, durations and intensities.

In our little war we did not have the resources in terms of helicopter lift and CAS to get anywhere near this sort of ratio on the bigger attacks into Mozambique and Zambia and subsequently had to rely heavily on the initial air strikes by aging Canberras and Hawker Hunters to get the comrades to adopt the swastika position and run into the stop lines. For example on Op Dingo - Zulu 1 - Chimoio of the 1,200 ZANLA fighters killed about half were killed by the airstrikes and the rest by the 184 men (96 SAS paras, 48 RLI paras, 40 RLI heliborne). Cost to us 2 KIA, 7 WIA. So it was a .04:1 ratio - made possible by accurate and decisive air strikes. In many cases the time of the daily muster parade when the whole camp was formed up on the parade square was a sitting duck for the Canberras and their cluster bombs.

Two days later Op Dingo - Zulu 2 - Tembue was also a turkey shoot except that their morning parade had been delayed so they missed their appointment with the flechettes which were dropped that day from a Hawker Hunter.

Op Barras - Sierra Leone - year 2000 the Brits applied a similar force level (180) against 600 West Side Boys to release hostages and suffered 1 KIA and 11 WIA. It is assumed that the aim was to free the hostages and not to get maximum kills. So 25 confirmed kills must be accepted. The ratio here was .3:1 ratio

Now contrast all this with the final Dien Bien Phu attack of 25,000 Viet Minh against fewer than 3,000 garrison troops. An 8.33:1 ratio.

In the end you do what you need to do to win... and to win you need to know your enemy!

[Fuchs]

My opinion FWIW is that for a peacetime army 3:1 in training is probably essential. It certainly provides commanders (at junior levels) in battle for the first time with the ability to roll off a plan which will probably work just fine in most cases.

Yes also to the fact that as one gains combat experience against a specific enemy in a particular environment one no longer needs this 3:1 crutch...

This reminds me of what I read about the German army in (surprise!) WW2:

'Green' units were assigned especially simply tasks at first (if the situation allowed for it). A Battalion was tasked with what would be a veteran company's task, a green company would do what a veteran platoon would and so on.



I do also remember having read that a study of historical battles showed no significant correlation between numerical superiority (of an army) and victory (in battle).


It seems to be of much greater importance to fight when the opponent isn't really ready for a fight (that's another way to look at the topic of tactical surprise).

[Ken White]

I do also remember having read that a study of historical battles showed no significant correlation between numerical superiority (of an army) and victory (in battle).

It seems to be of much greater importance to fight when the opponent isn't really ready for a fight (that's another way to look at the topic of tactical surprise).

The teaching of so-called rules of thumb like the 3:1 rule are bad practice and lead to tactical group think. They do not aid tactical thinking at all, they actually hinder it.

[Global Scout]

The teaching of so-called rules of thumb like the 3:1 rule are bad practice and lead to tactical group think. They do not aid tactical thinking at all, they actually hinder it.

Ken, you're so right on this one, the 3:1 madness that has polluted our thinking is destroying a lot of good options. The 3:1 metric was designed for a frontal assault against a peer enemy, so if our officers are still no better than they were in WWII Italy where they simply throw mass against mass, then hell we may need 10:1; however, if you're better trained, equipped and no how to maneuver forces you probably won't need a 3:1 advantage. This is group think at its worse. So typical of our force to look for simple rules to do their thinking for them, instead of actually thinking on their own.

[JMA]

This reminds me of what I read about the German army in (surprise!) WW2:

'Green' units were assigned especially simply tasks at first (if the situation allowed for it). A Battalion was tasked with what would be a veteran company's task, a green company would do what a veteran platoon would and so on.

I do also remember having read that a study of historical battles showed no significant correlation between numerical superiority (of an army) and victory (in battle).

It seems to be of much greater importance to fight when the opponent isn't really ready for a fight (that's another way to look at the topic of tactical surprise).

It all makes sense to use these rules of thumb or assumptions during basic and routine training.

It is folly to assume that we can present a blank tactical canvas during training and let commanders at every level exercise their initiative. Further when in times of total war when officers are being produced via a conveyor belt (90 day wonders) and experienced NCOs are produced in weeks rather than years they will need every crutch they can lean on.

If we look at the abject failure of Brit and US troops to adapt to the type of warfare required in Afghanistan we should not look at the use of rules of thumb (like 3:1) in their training but rather go look elsewhere...

And yes Fuchs you are correct, adapt to the enemy and the theatre. Let the decision like in your example be enforced just like Slim did in Burma. It gets a little more tricky in insurgency scenarios where more skilled leadership is required in depth... this may be lacking in most armies.

[Tukhachevskii]

Checks on sanity may be very necessary. 3:1 may not serve that purpose, and I believe we can do better. Essentially it MAY be an aid to planning, but after that it really fails the "So what" test of effectiveness, because it is at best simplistic and at worse very misleading.

How? In what way? What would your prefered method of a "sanity/reality" check look like?

[William F. Owen]

How? In what way? What would your prefered method of a "sanity/reality" check look like?

Start with education, so that training makes more sense. It requires skill and skills can be taught. Beyond anything else it is the ability of an attacking force the generate SHOCK, SURPRISE, SUPPRESSION and ISOLATION, that will see them succeed. It is the resources/training/skill etc to do those things that causes the other side to give up, NOT "throw a BN against a Company."

The great fallacy of 3:1 is it assumes you know all about "1" so you can plan for "3." Time and space are relevant. If you can concentrate more of your force against a small part of the enemy and then exploit that success, you may roll him up with a very low loss exchange ratio - LER. LER is almost always the defining criteria of tactical success, in that a low/very low LER enables the winning side to exploit more effectively.

Contrast and compare the Falklands War Battle of Mount Harriet, with Mount Longdon.

[Tukhachevskii]

If you can concentrate more of your force against a small part of the enemy and then exploit that success, you may roll him up with a very low loss exchange ratio - LER.

Sir, thanks for the reply (I may have sounded overly "agressive" in the previous post). What kind of metric/rule-o-thumb would one deploy to ascertain the correct amount of "concentration"? (Isn't that what the 3:1 ration is meant to provde, a shorthand battlefield expedient/reflexive aid). Is that concentration of "fire", "forces" or both? IMO Mearsheimer gives a pretty good defence of the 3:1 rule as a "rule of thumb" but he is careful to qualify that based upon terrain and troops avaliable and limits it's application to a purely frontal offensive situation (i.e., a break through battle).

My interest has been well and truely piqued. Mearsheimer and Dupuy...and the Chimp article is about all I read at Uni on the 3:1 rule so I'd like to be pointed in the direction of further readng material along the lines you suggested (this time...pretty please)

[William F. Owen]

I'd like to be pointed in the direction of further readng material along the lines you suggested (this time...pretty please)

Work by Jim Storr.

[Infanteer]

Storr's book is a good first start and it is a good first start for a lot of things. Of importance is what he writes on victory and what it is. Surprise, suppression and shock are the key and none of these are really dependant upon numbers. If I inflict enough shock on you, it doesn't matter what the ratio is.

Force Ratio, like the "Troop/Civilian" ratio often put forward in Counterinsurgency/Irregular Warfare theory, is likely a number pulled from outer space that has no factual basis.

[Tukhachevskii]

Work by Jim Storr.

Would that be the same Jim Storr who helped draft ADP Land Operations?