Actually there was no threat of Iraqi WMD in 1997-2002 either.
There was no conventional Iraqi threat to Iran in 1991-2002 either, for the Iraqi military was almost disarmed in comparison to its 1990 state and the Iranian capabilities.
Actually there was no threat of Iraqi WMD in 1997-2002 either.
There was no conventional Iraqi threat to Iran in 1991-2002 either, for the Iraqi military was almost disarmed in comparison to its 1990 state and the Iranian capabilities.
I guess I should have added in one more question...
What time frame are we looking at when assessing this?
Obviously there is no way to determine this with great precision, but in general terms it seems almost self-evident that the mideast in 2030 will be significantly different as a result of this regime change than it would have been had we plodded away with sanctions that (as far as I know - though I'm no expert) showed no sign of weakening Saddam's grip on power. Do we have reason to believe that it will be more problematic for us in the long term?
Fuchs - I do agree there is a cost-benefit angle that needs to be considered. I'm trying to inquire into what the benefits were (advantageous versus disadvantageous changes in the situation). In my opinion, those are more difficult to ascertain than the costs, as it seems that most of the costs are either front-loaded (money, lives, limbs) or can be forecasted with reasonable accuracy (future military operations, future aid).
Strategic history can only be looked at as "history". Strategy can only be viewed by how it implemented the policy at the time - as it was executed.
Was the policy of getting rid of Saddam a blunder? Personally I believe not.
Personally, I think how the US invaded Iraq was done extremely badly - if the policy was to have stable, pro-US nation. That was the Strategic blunder.
It was so bad, that it is an example I use to show how people do not understand how strategy sets forth policy. Would an alternative have even worked? Dunno, but I almost any clown can show how strategy could have been bettered linked to policy.
Was Iraq worth 4,000+ KIA it cost? Dunno. What level of Iraqi support for the US - for how long - makes that all worth it? Dunno. - but strategy costs. Lives or treasure. It never comes free.
Not sure this helps, but it's free.
Infinity Journal "I don't care if this works in practice. I want to see it work in theory!"
- The job of the British Army out here is to kill or capture Communist Terrorists in Malaya.
- If we can double the ratio of kills per contact, we will soon put an end to the shooting in Malaya.
Sir Gerald Templer, foreword to the "Conduct of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya," 1958 Edition
One factor that has to be considered, but which is impossible to quantify, is the degree to which the focus on Iraq diverted attention and resources from Afghanistan and from the broader effort against AQ.
I'd have to say on balance that the Iraq program has worked out better than I expected, though as mentioned above it remains to be seen whether the current government can survive, and what will replace it if it does not.
Even worse, stupid wars distract from urgent domestic reform needs.Originally Posted by Dayuhan
Domestic problems can easily reach an annual relevance/loss of hundreds of billion USD. Few foreign policy problems come close to this, especially not a smallish already defeated dictator at the other end of the world.
A method for weighting the monetary costs is to add the discounted future debt servicing for the sum, using the appropriate debt interest rates.
In short: USD 100 billion war costs cost more than USD 100 billion. It's likely more close to USD 120 billion because of the additional interest.
This does apply similarly even in case of a debt-free state, for that one would have opportunity costs (the cost of getting no interest rate income on the sum).
Defeating dictators is easy. Controlling nations is difficult. Constructing new nations is more difficult. All of this could have been anticipated, and a more accurate assessment of the challenge might have affected the decision to some extent.
Against the cost + interest of the war one has to offset the cost of sustaining the stalemate that preceded it. If the current Iraqi government survives and manages to push oil production up to 6mbpd or so one would have to factor in the impact of additional supply on global oil prices. And of course the world looks better without Saddam Hussein sitting as a head of state, another of those unquantifiable benefits.
I doubt that anyone will ever come up with a full, credible, agenda-free assessment of cost and benefit, or even that it would be possible to do so, given the non-quantifiable nature of many of the factors involved. If the current Iraqi government survives, remains relatively neutral, and resumes oil production the operation will probably be slotted into the "qualified success" category, whether or not it really belongs there.
Depends on how much resources Iran would commit, and how they get bogged down by it.Wouldn't that gain evaporate if the GoI collapsed?
However, the Iranians didn't know that. After Iraq killed 1,000,000 of their people in the 1980’s, the Iranians were going to err on the side of caution. And they did.
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