FID or COIN? does it matter

[Old Eagle]

You might also look at the CORDS program in Vietnam, where there was a different, possibly more formal model of a tactical interagency program.

I would submit that there is still a significant combined and interagency effort in Afgh along the non-military LOOs.

[LS]

You might also look at the CORDS program in Vietnam, where there was a different, possibly more formal model of a tactical interagency program.

I would submit that there is still a significant combined and interagency effort in Afgh along the non-military LOOs.

OE: I don't disagree that there is significant presence by lots of USG agencies, bureaux, and offices. But that's like watching a crowd standing around a traffic accident and assuming someone has taken charge and is doing triage, providing assistance, calling 911, etc.

I think, on a scale of 1-to-10, where 1 is virtually no interagency or combined civ-mil collaboration and 10 is fully-integrated, we're about a 3. And happy, because we used to be at a 2; so we've improved our performance by 30%. But, IOT succeed, we really need to be at about a 7; and that would require a "revolution in civ-mil affairs." Radical things!

[Ken White]

If this is correct:

Our goal is an AFG that can police it's territory. That requires a "State," not a "Nation" (though I will certainly concede that some form of national identity or social contract is essential for a State to be seen as credible...).

That's achievable. If anyone wants to add to that goal words implying democratic in the western sense and / or at least slightly corruption free, it can become unachievable. Your UK Police Trainer has it exactly right and we are highly unlikely to change that; the focus on the Police was an error in wishful thinking by some and was caused by too many people reading too much theory and not watching what occurred on the ground.

Your HN Agency to manage the hold is the ANA -- and if that continues on its current track, there is an excellent chance that a crossover effect in ten or a few more years from today might improve the ANP. Might.

On your points:

1. True. That's why we don't do it at all well, we generally walk in too late. In Afghanistan and Iraq, we made the corpse. Mouth to mouth is not pleasant and it may or may not be successful. Still, we have to try for several reasons...

2. FID may or may not require military forces. If they are committed, support of the HN COIN operation is generally expected. Why else would the Military force be committed.

3. True.

4. Not correct, a host of stuff appeared in the 1961-70 period and some has appeared after that. The problem is no one wanted to think about it so it was ignored. Old Eagle is correct, check the CORDS stuff; better yet, tell the other Agencies to check their CORDS stuff. The problem now is that many agencies are being drug to the altar kicking and screaming and Papa Eichenberry needs to spank 'em. The senior US 'civilian' needs to be seen by some of those folks to be in charge; they'll resist military-in-charge just to be contrary. There'll be a minor problem in that Eichenberry is a military retiree but he speaks Manadarin so that'll help with some.

The civil side can and probably will get there but it's worse than pulling teeth...

5. True and unlikely to change.

6. True but his mission was and always is combat, call it COIN and be wrong, call it whatever you wish but combat is the reason the US Commander is there. FID is NOT a combat unit mission, it is a national undertaking using various US agencies for their normal mission parameter purposes to assist the host nation. Support of COIN operations of the host nation is a combat unit mission -- and so is mentoring and pairing with host nation units to impart skills (and values...).

I think, on a scale of 1-to-10, where 1 is virtually no interagency or combined civ-mil collaboration and 10 is fully-integrated, we're about a 3. And happy, because we used to be at a 2; so we've improved our performance by 30%. But, IOT succeed, we really need to be at about a 7; and that would require a "revolution in civ-mil affairs." Radical things!

I don't think you can get US agencies to an 8, much less a 10.

FWIW, in Viet Nam, we never really got above about a 5 or so -- so you're over halfway there...